Lapegna 2013

Lapegna, Pablo. 2013. "Social Movements and Patronage Politics: Processes of Demobilization and Dual Pressure". Sociological Forum. 28 (4): 842-863.

• Monte Azul (Arg), 2003, herbicides dropped on families, results in protests by Movimiento Campesino de Formosa, MoCaFor (842-843)
• Monte Azul and Moreno, 2009, same thing, no protests!
• this in spite of the fact that administrations between 2003 and 2011 were generally nice to protest movements (843)
• Argument: processes of demobilization result from the pervasiveness of patronage/clientelism (uses interchangeably) and from a relational process of "dual pressure" on popular movements
• dual pressure: from below: poor participate in movements as a problem-solving mechanism (ie get money and food), so when they join movements they expect something in return
• from above: when movements finally make alliances with politicians, politicians expect movement to eschew collective actions (844)
• Article attempts to find the toolkit that keeps SMOs alive even when they aren't protesting
• Distribution of resources in LA is embedded in a long standing traditional expectation of reciprocity and mutual obligation -- author describes this as a "cultural" thing (845)
• "I focus here on the links between clientelism and social movements, because they offer a window to see how those symbolic aspects are connected to material grievances and expressed in quotidian interactions, while shedding light on the agentic aspects and strategic choices of popular actors.
• Contention, Patronage Politics, and Popular Demobilization in Argentina and Formosa
• After 2001, then 2003 and Kirchner, the relationship between the state and movements changed strikingly, and many movements demobilized (849)
• Argument: demobilization is less a function of cooptation and more of the dual pressures from members and the political allies of an SMO
• Popular movements and Patronage Politics
• public employment is a BIG driver in Formosa, which is driven by patronage
• welfare benefits + public employment is the main source of income for most Formosa residents (850)
• MoCaFor was created when a previous agrarian movement become an client/appendage of the provincial government in the 1990s
• in order to maintain themselves, they allied with the national FTV (851)
• When FTV joined Kirchner, MoCaFor found itself as an ally of the nattional government and enemy of the provincial government
• Demobilization as Dual Pressures
• Pressure from below
• people who join the movement expect something in return (852)
• as time goes on they specifically look for planes  money
• MoCaFor becoming to look like a client machine itself (852-853)
• leaders feel like they are constantly trying to fix peoples problems (853)
• to get things from MoCaFor, people had to have individual meetings with leaders, a very clientelistic sort of relationship!
• Just as exchange of goods and services may eschew collective action, expectations of reciprocity may subdue internal dissent (854)
• Pressure from above
• MoCaFor planned a march that was cancelled when head of FTV (and memebr of K government) comes to help negotiations
• governor eventaully backs out of this deal, negotiates with FTV at national level rather than with MoCaFor (855)
• Mocafor are distributors of resources, but also recipients from their national olitical allies, so they have to follow the lead of those above them
• in the end, Mocafor is just like it sown members, it relies on funds from above and demobilizes at the behest of national allies (856-857)
• "if we (leaders) confront the government, then we just make our people suffer along with us"
• Clientelism in this case is a bit exploitative, but also a strategy to achieve the movements goals (857)
• Discussion
• Paradox: social movement leaders reject clientelism while inadvertently reproducing similar practices within their own organizations (858)
• important to note that Mocafor does what it does so that it can continue as a social movement organization...what good is ideals without money for food?
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