Stokes 2006

Do Informal Rules Make Democracy Work? Accounting for Accountability in Argentina" Susan C. Stokes 125-139

in editors Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky 2006. Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

• likens some informal rules of democracy to language rules, where we learn to follow them before we learn what they actually are  (125)
• two central premises of the chapter:
• the way people vote in elections is rule-governed, and individuals rules for making voting decisions should be taken seriously (126)
• voters decision rules are grammatical: they are known and diffused through social mechanisms and rarely discussed openly, but are still not violated
• informal institutions and rules do not just describe what people do, but also what the expect other people to do (128)
• In Argentina, author suggests, democratic institutions are weak (128-129)
• Argentine democracy actually functions better in places where informal rules enforce accountability (129)
• people in places where democracy works pretty well display a heightened appreciation for mechanism of accountability AND expect others to follow decision-rules that make accountability possible (mar del Plata)
• in clientelisitic areas, people expect others to vote in ways that support clientelism (BA, Córdoba, Misiones)
• uses survey evidence
• "Expectations of accountability, when they do occur in Argentina, focus both on formal institutions and on informal rules and behaviors." (131, emphasis added)
• in places where democracy works, voters vote on whether a politician was accountable and expect others to do the same (132)
• none of this comes from any inherent belief (in Mar del Plata) that people are more trustworthy (135) or because they think perpetrators will be caught (136) but because they think people will lose support, voters, whatever if they aren't accountable (136-137)
• Authors hunch: beliefs in accountability are both a cause and a consequence of well-functioning democracy (138-139)
• 
  

Helmke and Levitsky 2006

 Introduction, Helmke and Levitsky, 1-30

editors Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky 2006. Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

• lots of literature, the "unrule of law" scholars, question the extent to which focus on "parchment" rules of law actually misses important on-the ground realities (1)
• "informal rules shape how democratic institutions work" (2)
• some informal rules compete with and subverts democracy (dedazo in Mexico), others can complement and help sustain them (Chilean Concertacion) (3)
• informal institutions definition: socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels (5)
• they must be enfored in some fashion (5)
• four distinctions: informal institutions should be distinguished from (6)
• weak institutions
• other informal behavioral irregularities: a patterned behavior must be accompanied by a rule and social sanction (if not done) for it to be an informal institution
• informal organizations (7): separate rules from players
• culture. these are not culture, though it can at times be hard to tell them apart
• why informal rules matter: (8) (can be good and/or bad)
• Political representation can be affected in both directions
• programmatic links can be broken
• sometimes looks like the tradeoff in clientelism
• democratic accountability (9):
• vertical accountability (citizens can punish officials), and
• horizontal (officials are responsible to other agencies, officials)
• informal rules can provide more accountability, but it might not provide the right type of public accountability (10-11)
• democratic governance
• informal rules of accommodation, power-sharing, and coalition building can prevent intractability problems (11)
• at times these may improve governance and stability, but not democracy
• citizenship and the rule of law
• brown areas = places where citizens do not actually possess the rights they should, especially indigenous (12)
• informal institutions can both violate and advance citizenship rights in areas not fully controlled by the state
• typology (13)
• two dimensions:
• degree of convergence between informal and formal institutions
• effectiveness of relevant formal institutions
• page 14:

	Effective formal institutions	Ineffective formal institutions
Convergent	Complementary	Substitutive
Divergent	Accommodating	Competing

• some final points on this typology
• Substitutive may be able to achieve things that formal rule fail to (17)
• same informal rules may be in different box depending on the formal institutions discussed
• the relationship between formal/informal institutions is dynamic, both can cause decay and/or institutionalization of the other, can cause stability or instability in formal rules

Auyero 2000

Auyero, Javier. 2000. "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account". Latin American Research Review. 35 (3): 55-81.

• Story of Norma, who opens a unidad basica (grassroots Peronism center) and her relationshi pwith rising politician Gustavo Pedele
• Norma is the puntera, Pedele the referente
• at first Norma has minimal access to state resources
• "the important thing to know is the right person" (56) -- mobilize people and know the right person and you can get access to resources
• the "red peronista" operates a problem-solving network that institutes a web of material and symbolic resource distribution (57)
• Clientelism must be approached from its least known and least specatcular side: the everyday dealings, the practices and perspectives of clients, the problem solving network that links clients, brokers, and patrons (58)
• fieldwork from the 1990s
• Argument: as neoliberalism was decreasing the role of the state in providing for society, clientelism and political networks became increasingly important for gaining access...indeed, clientelist networks began to replace the functions that the state was abandoning (60)
• hyper-unemployment has drained the slum economy, causing informal reciprocal netowrks to bleed to death (62)
• in Villa Paraíso survival strategies are increasingly embedded in political networks
• this is reinforced when there simply isn't a formal economy for these people to ever refill their private funds with
• political party has become the most reliable means of satisfying the poor's basic needs (63)
• the punteros similarly can't find resources outside of the party
• Brokers and their networks
• the punteros closest helpers stick around in hopes that the puntero may find them a job
• the inner circle does a lot of the legwork for solving everyday problems of the slum dwellers (66)
• the outer circle has contacts with the puntero, but they are looser (67)
• punteros function as gatekeepers between the municipal government and the people
• the differences in brokers stems from their control of resources from above
• sometimes brokers specifically give incorrect information to their clients in order to maintain their role as the only channel through which resources can be found (68)
• social workers, NGOs, and other community activists get angry with this (69)
• in neighborhoods where social organizations have disappeared (due to deep poverty), punteros become the only place to access information, thus becoming indispensable problem solvers for neighborhood dwellers
• punteros also work hard to reinforce their necessity in this regard
• The client's perspective
• punteros are sometimes seen as using the people, or corrupt politicians, especially by those who don't use their services (70)
• but to members of their inner circle, and those who rely on them as problem solvers, punteros are usually caring people who personally solve problems for others
• the punteros become the ones distributing the resources, not the state (71)
• elections are seen as times to solve problems...(we have to wait for an election) (72)
• but many others see assistance as a more consistent thing, not a part of "politics"
•  norms of assistance and problem solving become understood...i get this, i go to a rally (73)
• brokers present their job as deriving from a passion for helping people...those in a broker's network agree, though those outside of a network suggest brokers are simply in it for themselves
• the tie between client and broker is only maintained as long as the broker seems/is able to deliver! (74)
• 
  

Lapegna 2013

Lapegna, Pablo. 2013. "Social Movements and Patronage Politics: Processes of Demobilization and Dual Pressure". Sociological Forum. 28 (4): 842-863.

• Monte Azul (Arg), 2003, herbicides dropped on families, results in protests by Movimiento Campesino de Formosa, MoCaFor (842-843)
• Monte Azul and Moreno, 2009, same thing, no protests!
• this in spite of the fact that administrations between 2003 and 2011 were generally nice to protest movements (843)
• Argument: processes of demobilization result from the pervasiveness of patronage/clientelism (uses interchangeably) and from a relational process of "dual pressure" on popular movements
• dual pressure: from below: poor participate in movements as a problem-solving mechanism (ie get money and food), so when they join movements they expect something in return
• from above: when movements finally make alliances with politicians, politicians expect movement to eschew collective actions (844)
• Article attempts to find the toolkit that keeps SMOs alive even when they aren't protesting
• Distribution of resources in LA is embedded in a long standing traditional expectation of reciprocity and mutual obligation -- author describes this as a "cultural" thing (845)
• "I focus here on the links between clientelism and social movements, because they offer a window to see how those symbolic aspects are connected to material grievances and expressed in quotidian interactions, while shedding light on the agentic aspects and strategic choices of popular actors.
• Contention, Patronage Politics, and Popular Demobilization in Argentina and Formosa
• After 2001, then 2003 and Kirchner, the relationship between the state and movements changed strikingly, and many movements demobilized (849)
• Argument: demobilization is less a function of cooptation and more of the dual pressures from members and the political allies of an SMO
• Popular movements and Patronage Politics
• public employment is a BIG driver in Formosa, which is driven by patronage
• welfare benefits + public employment is the main source of income for most Formosa residents (850)
• MoCaFor was created when a previous agrarian movement become an client/appendage of the provincial government in the 1990s
• in order to maintain themselves, they allied with the national FTV (851)
• When FTV joined Kirchner, MoCaFor found itself as an ally of the nattional government and enemy of the provincial government
• Demobilization as Dual Pressures
• Pressure from below
• people who join the movement expect something in return (852)
• as time goes on they specifically look for planes  money
• MoCaFor becoming to look like a client machine itself (852-853)
• leaders feel like they are constantly trying to fix peoples problems (853)
• to get things from MoCaFor, people had to have individual meetings with leaders, a very clientelistic sort of relationship!
• Just as exchange of goods and services may eschew collective action, expectations of reciprocity may subdue internal dissent (854)
• Pressure from above
• MoCaFor planned a march that was cancelled when head of FTV (and memebr of K government) comes to help negotiations
• governor eventaully backs out of this deal, negotiates with FTV at national level rather than with MoCaFor (855)
• Mocafor are distributors of resources, but also recipients from their national olitical allies, so they have to follow the lead of those above them
• in the end, Mocafor is just like it sown members, it relies on funds from above and demobilizes at the behest of national allies (856-857)
• "if we (leaders) confront the government, then we just make our people suffer along with us"
• Clientelism in this case is a bit exploitative, but also a strategy to achieve the movements goals (857)
• Discussion
• Paradox: social movement leaders reject clientelism while inadvertently reproducing similar practices within their own organizations (858)
• important to note that Mocafor does what it does so that it can continue as a social movement organization...what good is ideals without money for food?
• 
  

Roberts 2002

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. "Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era". Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID). 36 (4): 3-33.

• Introduction
• Social inequality along class "fault lines" is unusually pronounced and appears to be growing (3)
• despite inequality growth and economic insecurity, parties are not cleaving the political arena along class lines, but are building cross-class platforms (4)
• this is especially true in Latin America, which is contiuning historical subordination of the popular classes
• though in the past class cleavages were important, after neoliberal turn party systems now are more elite dominated than before, and the elites dominate the popular classes through diffuse, multi-class forms of representation (5)
• Distinction between "segmented" and "stratified" cleavages
• segmented cleavages are constructed across class lines (ELITE parties)
• stratified cleavages are grounded in class consituencies or organizations (LABOR MOBILIZING parties)
• neoliberal critical juncture was hard on stratified parties, made them seek/create more segmented party structures (5-6)
• Argumetn is that neoliberal juncture realigned party systems across Latin America toward segmented structures (6)
• Economic Crisis, Strucutral Adjustment, and Deepening Social Inequalities
• Given teh growth of inequliaty, one could expect rejuvenation of class-based politics (7)
• but it's not happening
• early protests against neoliberalism were not sustaine
• the economic transition drove new wedges between different sectors of the lower classes, diffusing class cleavages
• Party Systems and Cleavage Structures in Latin America: Historical Patterns
• uses term from European scholars, class cleavages, where a cleavage must: differentiate a group, organize them for political representation, and generate a sense of collective identity (8) (citing Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and Bartolini and Mair 1990)
• this rarely happens so neatly in Latin America
• most economic identities are rather shallow
• labor-backed parties have always had to attract other support as well
• better definiton of segmented versus stratified cleavages (9)
• segmented cleavages may be grounded in social/cultural distinction, or the may be entirely political
• at 1900 modernization began creating a more diversified social structure (10)
• the mobilization of workers created intense class conflict
• nevertheless, class cleavages were never quite as durable in Latin America as the were in Europe
• nor, indeed, were parties organized only within one class...most were at least partially multi-class
• this meant that labor either supported historical parties, or became a major supporter of populist/cross-class parties (11)
• though populism did not generate strict class cleavages, it did create stratified fault lines that differentiated elite adn mass parties (12)
• but the impportance of labor unions as backers for populist and left parties at least meant that some stratficiation occurred in class cleavages for left and labor mobilizing parties
• for elite/traditional parties, the relationship with labor was usually patronage-based, and did not encapsulate voters within a party, could be more personalistic (113)
• labor movemetns were, thus, weaker in elite-party systems
• Countries with l abor-mobilizing parties tended to adopt more and deeper ISI measures, thus the neoliberal turn buffeted both socioeconomic and political connections between parties and popular sectors (14)
• Party Systems in the Transition from ISI to Neoliberalism
• Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico were regional leaders in ISI, joined by Bolivia, Peru, Venzuela
• in all these coutnries, the state became the focal point of social deamnds (15)
• thus the fundamental change in development model (from ISI to neoliberalism), and its commensurate withdrawing of the state from development, posed the greater political and economic shock to parties with labor mobilizing party systems (16)
• (up to that point) the most stable electoral party systems are those that have eschewed the organization of class cleavages and are grounded in intra-elite schisms (Roberts pulls this back and makes a different claim in a 2012 article!) (18)
• Market reforms pose a threat to the resources available for clientelism, but they pose little threat to the segmented organizational logic (19)
• in contrast, beoliberalism produced sharp discontinuities in labor-mobilizing systems with stratified organizations
• the stratified logic have been undermined by the more individualistic nature of neoliberalism
• The Erosion of Class Cleavages in the Neoliberal Era
• Argentina, Chile, and Peru demonstrated (in the past) that all three dimensions of class cleavage can develop in Latin America (20-21)
• But the new economic model has thrown much of that into doubt (21-26)
• the new economic model creates dispersion and segmentation among workers, with only a few having stable jobs, which fragments the labor movement (22)
• unionization has also dropped, meaning unions have a smaller political voice
• many labor-based parties have relaxed their ties to labor (Levitsky 1998, 2001, 2003, Murillo 1997, 2001)(23-24)
• class has also been less important in determining voting patterns (24-25)
• The Transformation of Political Representation in Comparative Perspective
• Brazil seems the last labor-mobilizing party left, but class still hasn't been important recently as it has in the past for voting (26)
• there has been an erosion of stratified axes of electoral competition, and a reinforcement of segmented patterns
• labor unions remain political actors, but their ties to parties and state institutions have loosened, their access to policy-making has narrowed, and their voice has diminished (26-27)
• suggests their is a "re-oligarchization" of politics

Levitsky 2005

"Crisis and Renovation: Institutional Weakness and the Transformation of Argentine Peronism, 1983-2003" Levitsky, p181-206

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• although the PJ is well-organized it's internal structures are weakly institutionalized, its lacks stable internal rules and bureaucracy (181)
• the PJs weakly institutionalized party-union linkages allowed reformers to dismantle traditional mechanism of labor participation (182)
• this enabled the party to 
• attract the middle class
• create a clientelistic relationship with the urban poor
• The fluidity of the PJ sent it into crisis in 2000-2001 along with the rest of the country, but this fluidity also allowed it to adapt and survive the crisis
• Institutionalization and Party Adaptation
• institutionalization creates stable expectations, rules of the game (O'Donnell 1994) (182)
• but institutionalization also inhibits organizational change (Zucker 1977) (183)
• they are sticky
• The PJ as a Weakly Institutionalized Party
• PJ is well-organized with deep roots in working- and lower-class society (184)
• but it lacks even a minimal bureaucratic structure
• in the years following Perón's death, no faction was able to impose an organizational structure or binding rules (185)
• The Renovators in the 1980s tried to create more rules, but essentially failed
• "We use the party statutes when they are useful. When they are not useful, we don't use them."
• Three areas of institutional weakness
• Weak leadership bodies (186)
• the party's national leaders are routinely ignored by lower-level branches and officeholders
• the government runs the party, especially when their is a seated executive
• Fluid Party Hierarchy
• politicians and those with power have often parachuted into top leadership/electoral positions  (187)
• in many provinces internal elections are negotiated or imposed by party bosses
• Loosely Structured party-union linkage
• 62 organizations and the tercio (188)
• The effects of weak institutionalization
• the PJ suffers from low levels of trust in the organization (188-189)
• the PJ is highly malleable, and may be changed quickly to line up with short-term goals of dominant actors (189)
• Pj experiences bandwagoning effect (190)
• PJ officeholders have substantial autonomy from the party
• Peronism's dual transformation int eh 1980s and 1990s
• Crisis:
• working class had eroded (191)
• debt crisis and exhaustion of ISI left the PJ without the ability to continue a statist program
• to adapt the PJ dismantle union-party inks and replaced them with clientelistic links
• labor participation had been based entirely on need of party leaders for the resources unions had (192)
• 62 orgs and tercio were often imposed by union leaders
• as PJ won office, politicians were able to use state resources instead of union resources
• Erosion of union influence enhanced the PJ's autonomy, allowing it to attract the middle class... (195)
• ...meanwhile it created clientelistic networks to maintain ties to urban poor in era of de-industrialization, and shrinking working class
• but clientelism generated political costs, as the Pj became the part of corruption (196)
• though most of the Party didn't agree with Menem and neoliberal turn, bandwagon was created since he had control over appointments to office/government (197-198)
• The Crisis
• The PJ's fluid structure meant the party had no unified response to the 2000 crisis, sending Pj into its own internal conflict/crisis (200)
• no one had enough power to find a unified program or to discipline party members (201)
• Menem and Duhalde were bitter enemies and fought over control of the party (202)
• this rivalry meant there was no agreement on primaries, candidates
• in 2003 PJ supported no presidential candidate, allowed all three to run outside the party (202-203)
• Kirchner's victory pushed the party to the center-left (204)
• even though the PJ had undertaken the neoliberal reforms themselves, the internal fluidity allowed this leftist, dark horse candidate (Kirchner) to rise and have a chance in the election
• Kirchner realigned the PJ with leftist politicians, progressive intellectuals, and humans rights groups (205)
• Conclusion
• Peronisms current coalition change seem to be more permanent (ie away from labor unions) (206)
• PJ remains the party of the poor, but will likely never again be a labor backed party

Hilgers 2008

Hilgers, Tina. 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (4): 123-153. 

•  Introduction
• PRD has been dhandicapped by factionalism, personalism, and clientelism (123)
• PRD has lost many supporters because they have become disillusioned with PRD
• Why have PRD politicians come to use clientelism?
• External Factors
• poverty
• long history of clientelism in Mexican politics
• PRI's use of clientelism
• PRD founders proficiency at using clientielism
• Internal Factors
• party's strategy during democratic transition
• predominance of Cuauthémoc Cardenas and primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic factions and centralized power (124)
• the PRD focused on elections
• did NOT focus on creating an institutionalized party
• thus leadership and alliances were personalized
• Comparison case: PT in Brazil
• shared similar external factors, but this party decided to create internal institutions
• Use of clientelism also ambiguous
• PRD client experiences range from exploitation to participatory community building (125)
• Defining Clientelism
• People of differing social status exchange goods and services for mutual benefit
• the durability of the relationship depends on its benefits outweighing its costs
• Gouldner (1977), clientelism not necessarily bad, "principle of reciprocity" (126)
• Flynn (1975) clentelism = elite control of masses
• Fox (1994)
• authoritarian clientelism = relationship of asymmetrical power
• semi-clientlelism = elites have no capacity to ensure compliance
• heart of clientelism = tension between positive and negative processes (127)
• but just describing it as "exchange of goods" does not distinguish clientelism from patronage, vote-buying, or pork-barreling
• The Initial Causes of Perredista Clientelism
• PRI used camarillas extensively, networks through which (128)
• groups endorsed successful figures
• and actors moved up in the ranks of government as their mentors did
• though much of the lower classes likely voted for Cárdenas in 1988, they couldn't afford to continue to support him post-election because this would threaten their relationship with PRI government
• Given this environment, Cárdenas and his supporters decided to consooidate the amalgam of the FDN into a party (129)
• immediate problems:  this party was ridiculously divided ideologically
• only thing everyone agreed on: they wanted to beat the PRI
• Generally three big currents (FAR fro internally homogeneous)
• institutional, independent left -- all the previous left parties, ended up being sort of center-left
• social left/civil society organizations -- left, but did not fit in with institutional groups...mobilizers, student movements, etc
• ex-priistas -- no unity, just wanted to beat PRI
• Cárdenas believed best strategy was electoral, just try and get PRI unelected at every level
• democratic transition immediately, radical change could come later
• primacy of his vision legitimated  Cárdenas even though he ran for Presidency of PRD unopposed (130)
• ((some FDN groups didn't join PRD, either wanting to maintain independence or not anger PRI))
• PRD never formally detailed procedures for structuring the currents and ensuring internal democracy in PRD (131)
• no horizontal links in the party...all info flowed through Cárdenas!
• the currents began to seem like the PRI's camarillas
• BUT the PRD didn't have as much access to resources, so internal competition over resource was worse
• each current was organized around one "strong man"
• everything became a negotiation, internal elections became undeniably fraudulent/negotiated
• The rise of AMLO split the party between Cárdenas and AMLO (152)
• AMLO made alliances with external groups, which strengthened his position but weakened party unity
• At times the PRD's desire to win elections has overshadowed its principles
• some candidates are courted purely because of their clientelist networks
• In 2004 Congress the pRD noted the issues of clientelism and corruption in the party, tried to ameliorate them, but of course these changes totally failed to win overall support (133)
• The PRD in Government
• even in elected local government there are disputes between members of different currents
• In the Federal District (134)
• the PRD promised to regulate taxis drivers (piratas who rob people), vendors and squatters
• but instead allied with them to increase PRD voter strength
• groups/citizens that are unable/unwilling to make such alliances are immediately and a disadvantage
• THERE HAVE BEEN SOME GOOD DEVELOPMENTS IN DF (135)
• but these tend to be undermined by the methods through which they were achieved
• AMLO portected the poor through unorthodox and extra-constitutional means
• in the end, this is probably bad for democracy
• PRD administrator in Nezhualcóyotl, Estado Mexico, made government way more tasnparent
• BUT this meant he/his faction was less able to negotiate party positions and policy
• in Chiapas clients  who leave the PRD are repressed (136)
• My Take: OVERALL: Good governing undermines ability for people to move up in PRD
• Now people just expect the PRD to be clientelistic, nationwide (137)
• Comparison to PT in Brazil
• PT faced authoritarian beginnings, lots of clientelism in country, and success hinged on Lula's personalistic leadership (138-139)
• PT still does patronage and targeted social programs, but this isn't like the PRD's clientelism (139)
• patronage does note = clientelism (140)
• Blosa Familia is universal, so while its good for PT votes, it doesn't exactly have the same connotation as focused clientelistic distribution of benefits
• My Take: Splitting hairs a bit, but there is something less bad about PT's clentelism than the PRD's
• While PRD though winning electiosn was key, the PT did not think this was enough (141)
• PT's early focus was on building organization, seeking POLICY change first!
• PT adopted democratic procedures early on and the rules are enforced, as is party unity
• PT's connection with voters/its base have kept it from becoming a catch-all party
• The Clients' Perspective
• in some instances clientelism is the best method for keeping politicians accountable, and could build community (142)
• FPFV, squatters group, allied with PRD in DF
• demonstrating and rallying with PRD became mandatory to get apartment/material benefits (143)
• if you left group, they didn't return your deposit assuming you wouldn't have the legal means/stamina to get it back
• clearly it is tough being in this alliance, but members have few resources and few alternatives (144)...some think it's a fine bargain, others don't
• some in DF sought clientelistic linkages to provide for themselves, but found they built community and political power as well (145)
• Conclusion
• Those wo stick with PRD after engaging in clientelism are not the poorest of the poor, nor are they in highly exploitative relationships with their patron (147)
• 
  

Szwarcberg 2013

Mariela Szwarcberg. "The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine Case." Latin American Research Review 48.2 (2013): 32-54.

• Introduction
• while clientelism is often taken as a given, party operatives in Argentina and elsewhere can prefer not to distribute goods in exchange of electoral support (33)
• argument:  a party operative's capacity to turn to clientelistic strategies of mobilization is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the use of clientelism...party operatives have to prefer to build clientelistic linkages with voters
• study of municipal candidates in Argentina
• Mobilizing Voters: Lit review
• while the poor are targets of clientelistic strategies, scholars have convincingly shown that the poor are strategic and sophisticated in making political decisions
• to explain candidates' strategic choices to turn out voters, I distinguish between a candidates CAPACITY and PREFERENCE to use clientelism (34)
• political parties contribute to shaping politicians' strategies by providing (or not providing) incentives to use clientelism to turn out voters (35)
• Choosing Strategies of Political Mobilization
• Assumption: candidates interested in a political career have to demonstrate their ability to get votes for the party
• Table 1: (36)

Candidate has Capacity to use Clientelism	Candidate Prefers to use Clientelism
	Yes	No
Yes	Pragmatist	Idealist
No	Resentful	Utopist

•   Without observing explicit choice, can't tell the difference between resentful and utopist
• Data
• ballot positions reflect the value of each candidate to the party (39)
• data suggests the longer a candidate uses clientelism to build a constituency the more likely they will have a higher ballot position
• Candidates Capacity
• Incumbent candidates are more likely to have access to material goods (39)
• access to resources is also conditioned by level of government
• candidate who has party members in national and/or regional office has more resources than one who is just a local incumbent (40)
• also, to effectively use clientelism a candidate need to have access to resources AND a network of party activists to spread resources around
• in Argentina this means only the PJ and Radical party (my take: though maybe not the Radicals anymore?) (41)
• given the data, cast majority of the sample is PJ activists
• Some new parties do have minimal clientelist networks if candidates brought activists and networks with them from a previous party (PJ or UCR) (42)
• Candidate's Preferences
• Candidates that engage in "solving voter problems" will obtain electoral support and will also monitor political participation (43)
• usually by taking attendance at political rallies
• this works because voting is mandatory, but finding who voted what is still impossible
• for this paper, a candidate who takes attendance is clientelistic
• Explaining variation in candidate preferences
• interesting thing is that idealists are almost equal in number to the pragmatists (44)
• now focus on PJ, since they are the ones with the most resources
• in José C Paz neighborhood, unemployment rate is 80%ish (45)
• easy to mobilize voters by distributing goods
• intraparty competition induces candidates to use clientelism (46)
• if one doesn't do it, another will
• if candidate doesn't go clientelistic, sends signal to party that he's not willing to do "whatever it takes" to win
• idealist candidates essentially know they are committing political suicide (47)
• candidates realize that the best way to mobilize voters is to help and then coerce them
• but if this doesn't happen, party "doesn't forgive you" (48)
• its bad, but "these are the rules of the game"
• in Río Cuarto, another municipality, two Radical candidates faced off
• one wanted to create electoral alliance with another party
• the other wanted to keep "purity" of Radical ideology
• electoral coalition won because able to attract more voters!
• Resentful candidates blame their electoral failure entirely on their incapacity to provide benefits (49)
• strong correlation between pragmatist candidates and PJ (49), fewer pragmatists in UCR (50)
• Conclusion
• THE PARTIES CREATE THE INCENTIVES THAT CAUSE MOST CANDIDATES TO TURN TO CLIENTELISM (51)
• But not all candidates prefer to use clientelism...parties could create ways to get these "cleaner" politicians to rise through the ranks

Holzner 2007

Holzner, Claudio A. 2007. "The Poverty of Democracy: Neoliberal Reforms and Political Participation of the Poor in Mexico". Latin American Politics & Society. 49 (2): 87-122.

• Introduction
• Focus on core of democratic politics: citizen participation in the political process (87) 
• this paper on the non-electoral forms of political action, such as petitioning activity and protests (88) 
• Free market reforms require governments actively to suppress political participation and citizen voice by weakening trade unions, leftist parties, and other social organizations that advocate redistributive social and economic policies (citing Przeworksi 1991) 
• Though elected officials court the popular vote with promises of redistribution, once in office they face pressures to continue market reforms (citing Stokes 2001) (89) 
• "After an initial surge in political activity and growing feelings of political engagement by the poor during the 1990s [in Mexico], voter turnout, petitioning activity, and feelings of political interest and efficacy have declined overall since 1997” (91) 
• some of this apathy comes from Left’s inability to complete credibly in elections 
• BUT the changing structure and actions of the Mexican state in the 2000s are creating obstacles and disincentives for political mobilization, especially for the poor 
• Net effect of institutional reforms has been to stifle poor peoples political activity, especially in comparison to more affluent
• Political Participation in Mexico
• By 2000, high-income individuals participated in politics more frequently than low-income individuals, reversal from the past (92)
• Frequency of political activity peaked after 1982, declined after 1997
• after narrowing during 1990s participation gap widened between poor and affluent after 1997 
• affluent are now twice as likely to petition than the poor 
• Puzzle: why is political activity decreasing (for the poor) just as democratization should be opening up more avenues? (93) 
• Explanation: changes in the relationship between the state and the poor (95)
• suggestions seems to be that institutional reforms have created obstacles and disincentives to participation that affect the poor more adversely
• three possible mechanisms of discouragement
•  poverty, severity of poverty, and income inequality has worsened, meaning poor people find it difficult to muster the material and organizational resources necessary for petitioning the state
• free-market forces have weakened lower-class mobilization organizations, like labor unions
• technocratic policymaking sends the signal that the state doesn't have the interests of the poor in mind (96) 
•  Poverty and  Declining Resources for Participation
• Graph showing national survey results: (97)
• EVERY income group thinks they are worse off in 2003 compared to 2000
• in income groups 10x minimum wage and below, proportion is between 35 and 45%
• Petitioning government officials for direct assistance has historically been the most common form of participation of Mexico's poor, reflecting clientelism (98)
• this requires an investment of time, money, and lost wages
• but now the cost of petitioning too high for many poor (99)
• by 2003 income = best determinant of petitioning and protest activity. (Positive relationship)
• Declining Resources for Mobilization: Organizations
• organizations in civil society became more diverse in the 1990s as new groups came to fill in vacuum for retreating corporatist groups (101)
• BUT this also meant that political parties became the only/best game in town for articulating interests at the regional/national level
• organizations that now represent the popular sector, replacing old corporatist ones, haven't been able to gather the material resources or aggregate demands enough to become important in regional/national politics (101-102)
• Changing State-Society Relations
• neoliberalism radically changed the relationship between the state and the poor (102)
• by changing the basic functions of the state, neoliberal policies also changed the logic of political participation (103)
• the shrinking state made the state/politics less relevant to the poor
• other reforms have made it clear that the state cannot or will not provide for popular groups
• for example, new targeted poverty relief measures use formulas, which eliminates the discretion of implementing these policies by politicians
• my take: that sounds too naive...politicians can still game the system, no?
• poor people increasingly feel like petitioning is useless because traditional channels are closed (104-105)
• feeling that that government has abandoned their traditional role as caretaker of the poor (106)
• the poor are tired of neoliberal methods for fighting poverty and inequality (106-107)
• by the time the neoliberal changes to civil service institutions had been cemented by the late 1990s, the poor had little confidence in these institutions' ability to actually help them (107)
• poor see little relevance in political action, and thus see little importance in paying attention to politics
• neoliberal policies have alienated the poor to a much greater extent than affluent citizens (108)
• when the poor do act, they are more likely to target the local and state governments than the federal government (109)
• More affluent target federal government, less often state or local governments
• BUT ALL THE MACROECONOMIC DECISIONS ARE MADE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
• the poor simply cannot bear the costs of actually protesting/petitioning the level of government that has control of the economy (110)
• Statistical Analysis
• income is the most important predictor of protesting and petitioning activity (112)...make more money, more likely to petition/protest!...this basically meditated everything!
• membership in traditional corporatist organizations has no effect on petitioning (surprising....)
• respondents who believed the parties would listen to them were more likely to petition, but even then the effect was stronger for higher incomes (114)
• BUT poor people who receive government aid were more likely to petition
• this could be because of clientelism (114) or because the receipt of assistance creates incentives to petition again (115)
• Conclusions
• the decline of corporatism in Mexico has not meant an end to clientelism (116)
• nor have autonomous organizations been capable to mobilizing the poor effectively
• elections are losing their luster for the poor
• politics for the poor increasingly revolves around how to meet basic needs, less about the political ideology or directing reform of the state (117)

Holzner 2006

“Clientelism and Democracy in Mexico:  The Role of Strong and Weak Networks”, Claudio A Holzner  pp 77-94

in Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. Latin American social movements: globalization, democratization, and transnational networks. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

• Introduction
• clientelism has not gone away in Mexico, and may be strengthening in some areas (Fox 1994, Hellman 1994, Holzner 2002)
• Study of rival organizations in a squatter settlement in Oaxaca (78)
• PAN wrested control of municipality away from PRI
• results:
• some squatters deserted the PRI
• some squatters remained loyal to the PRI
• Argument: strength of ties between clients and patron has an important effect on whether clientelism continues in democratic context
• The Puzzle: Clientelism and Democracy
• in 1980s organizations in civil society began to become more assertive to the PRI (79)
• At the grassroots level, thousands of less formal organizations have sprung up to fill the vacuum left by the retreating Mexican state
• Voting results show that PRI still has the poor vote outside of DF and Guadalajara
• important key to Mexican context:  in the past, PRI had monopolistic control over organizational life before democracy and during the gradual transition (80)
• my take: historians may quibble about strength, dominance of the state, but at least among the poor it is likely true that someone/group controlled them, even if that person/group wasn’t a pure priista
• old theories
• clientelist practices are result of irrationality conditioned by hegemonic ideologies forced on the people by ____ (the state, the leader, etc) (Stokes 1995) --> not wrong, but over generalizes, gets a bit normative re: irrationality (81)
• Strong and weak ties to organizations create opportunities and constraints (Granovetter 1973)
• variations of A) ability of leaders to monitor behavior of clients and B) control of information to clients defines the strength/weakness of ties
• strong ties: dense networks with little outside-network social interaction
• can be used to get members involved in politics
• can also be used to stifle members participation in politics
• weak ties: organizations try to make contact with other organizations
• information cannot be controlled by leaders
• filtering information is a strong control over behavior because it doesn't demand the use of outright coercion (82)
• A Tale of Two Networks
• Two groups in Solidaridad, a squatter settlement in city of Oaxaca, capital of Oaxaca (83)
• the random process of settlement of this community created a heterogeneous community, one where identity formation (despite similar problems facing them) was still incomplete (84)
• had tequios, indigenous tradition of communal work to improve community (84-85)
• by keeping track of residents participation in tequios and other community events the community as a whole was able to enforce property rights and settle disputes among neighbors (85)
• but the leader of this community organization became aligned with the PRI, so political participation lost its vitality, and by 1995 was largely symoblic
• then in 1995 PAN won the local elections
• told neighborhoods to adopt a new organizational framework, COMVIVE, which would shift leadership away from the PRI dominated one (not yet PAN dominated, though they likely would have wanted to dominate it) (86)
• new leaders in Solidaridad cut off ties with PRI
• about 1/3 of the residents stayed in the PRI network, stopped participating in COMVIVE, believing that RI was still the best way to access government resources
• neighborhood split, practically no communication across networks
• PRI affiliated people just stopped being involve in larger community, stopped doing tequios, etc.
• “In such a context of declining benefits and increasing political competition, monitoring compliance, and controlling information flows becomes critical to the survival of clientelist organizations” (87)
• Monitoring
• even though it’s objectively impossible for the PRI to know how people vote, they did a few tricks where they collected identification information to make it seem like they could find out/figure out how you voted (88-89)
• Information Constraints
• PRI’s historical model was to create dense ties among small groups, resulting in little cross-group interaction even between PRI groups (89)
• PRI used to control the TV too (used to? or still does...)
• also, false promises of the past make most neighborhood groups skeptical...promises have to be proven (90)
• After two years of the COMVIVE program, only Solidaridad had signed up for the new program
• AND those who stuck with the PRI in Solidaridad were fed false information, to discredit municipality's (PAN) programs (91)
• PRI members are reluctant to leave the PRI, because they don’t want to lose access to resources and ar uncertain about the PAN’s ability to deliver on its promises, and the PRI is feeding these groups misinformation, making them even less likely to ‘leave the fold’ as it were (92)
• Conclusion
• the transformative capacity of grassroots organizations hinges on their ability to create extensive weak ties that bridge strong clientelistic networks, allowing resources and information to move more freely (92)
• these broader networks allow poor to broaden their information sources
• the more sporadic government patronage becomes, the more the poor will cling to clientelist networks hoping to be rewarded later

Palcios-Valladares 2010

Palacios-Valladares, Indira. 2010. "From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in Contemporary Chile". Latin American Politics and Society. 52 (2): 73-102.

• Introduction
• While union membership decline was initially caused by the 1973 and repression, the neoliberal turn created increasing union fragmentation and job precariousness which, in the long run, weakened unions’ capacity to attract members (73)
• Limitations of current research
• focus on national confederations,  yet about 70% of unionized workers are organized by firm-level unions (Dirección del Trabajo nd), fewer than half of these unions below to confederations, and only a little more than a quarter of these worker are in unions that are in national confederations (Arrieta 2003) (74)
• Rely too heavily on structural causes to explain current unionization rates
• This Article:
• differences in individual union strategy re: management played a key role in shaping variation in unionization rates (75)
• specifically, more accommodating unions gained a recruiting edge
• BUT these strategies that helped increase membership also undermined union strength
• as union members fled more militant unions, more accommodating unions benefitted from this flow, but consequently did little to reach out to unorganized workers
• Overall, strategies matter, but are highly dependent on the broader institutional political, and economic context
• MY TAKE: strategies matter, but only if unions accommodate, and then they are weak anyway
• Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary Union Membership Decline
• Although the democratic transition provided opportunities for labor, the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores) had trouble shaping the broader, national economic and labor relations context (Cook 2007, Frank 2004, Haagh 2002) (75)
• as a result, Chilean unions operate in a labor relations system that tends to weaken them (cook 2007, Haagh 2002)
• deindustrialization, etc will mean that blue collar unions face different pressure than white-collar unions (77)
• in the larger, international context, it has become common for unions to simply try and rely on union raiding to increase membership (Milkman and Voss 2004)
• THIS STUDY finds that strategic decisions at specific points of firm restructuring were a major determinant of the trajectory of a union’s membership rate (78)
• BUT this study also highlights the limitations of partnership strategies in a fragmented union environment with weak bargaining power
• workers migrate from union ot union, but labor isn’t better off
• Research Design
• 13 unions across a telecom firm and bank (79)
• each firm has a relatively high unionization rate, but also a lot of different unions representing workers
• skilled-ish workers
• Union Member Trajectories: The Bank
• between 1990 and 2004 union density declined at the Bank by one-quarter (80)
• initially six unions, all in one federation
• threatened strike in 1990, but federation quickly decided to accomodate management:  unions get a say in decisions, deliver labor peace and collaborate in firm restructuring (81)
• the dominant, more militant union does not join this agreement, management takes a hard line with this union, militant union cannot gain concessions, loses member to other unions (81)
• in two other mergers (1994 and 2000-2002), federation gets the inside track on bargaining, unions from other merging firms (many more militant) get shut out of the process, end up capitulating or being broken (81-5)
• Telecommunications Firm
• 1990-2004, density declined by one-fifth (85)
• 1980s had been a rough time for labor management relations, 1990-98 the unions and management agree to accommodation, unions felt like this was “co-governance” of the firm
• but this accommodation caused tensions between unions (86)
• 1999: top management changed, took a hard line against unions, lots of layoffs (87)
• Massive strike in 2002 when management continued hard line during new CB rounds, all workers joined, it still failed (87-88)
• lots of workers defected from the strike
• some unions gave up, others held up longer before giving up (in 2003)
• two of the unions competed with all the others, raided for blue and white collar workers (respectively) (88-89)
  these two unions became the firm’s favorites, got better access to management (89)
• Results:
• if a union accommodates during restructuring, it is likely to get ahead (90)
• in the tough context of job losses, intensifying work, and weak institutional and political support for unions, getting on management’s good side is almost the only way to get concessions for one’s membership (91)
• Strategic calculations of union leaders are most conditioned by past experiences, whether workers have been willing to fight the company, strength of management, etc. (92)
• Management doesn’t choose favorite union, thy let unions react and pick the one whose reaction they like best (93)
• All this accommodation leads to weak unions that are increasingly dependent on management to provide a sense of legitimacy (93)
• Conclusion
• the real Achilles’ heel for these unions is the tough institutional framework they face, combined with the lack of political support (94)