Levitsky 2003b

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties In Latin America: Argentine Peronism In Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: 
• The PJ's flexibility contributed to its adaptation and survival in teh neoliberal era (3)
• the weakly institutionalized labor-party link permitted the traditional mechanisms f labor participation in the party to be quickly dismantled
• the absence of stable career paths and secure tenure patterns meant it was easy to get rid of old-guard leaders
• the absence of stable norms of accountability in the party allowed Menem the freedom to design and implement a radical economic program (3-4)
• the decline of postwar ISI brought on a programmatic and a coalitional challenge to labor based parties (5)
• programmatic: slowdown of economic growth, globalized trade, and debt-crisis helpers (IMF, World Bank) made it very difficult for parties to enact policy that wasn't orthodox neoliberal (5-6)
• coalitional: economic changes hanged class, labor had fewer votes to trade (6)
• Look at party change (organizational change) in terms of a two-level, nested game, in which party leaders are located at the intersection of environmental and intraorganizational dynamics (12)
• leaders who seek to increase their power must respond to changes in the external environment, but their strategies to do so are mediated by the power game within the party and the party's strucutre
• "Yet the flexibility-stability tradeoff may not be as steep as the literature suggests.  ... Although the Pj is unquestionably a mass party, its mass organization is informal rather than bureaucratic, and the rules and procedures that govern the internal life of the party are fluid, contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored." (14)
• "A central claim of this book is that routinization limits the capacity of organizations to respond quickly to environmental challenges, and that weakly routinized organizations may be better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than highly routinized organizations." (18)
• routinization affects strategic flexibility in three ways: (19)
• leadership renovation (ease of changing old-guard)
• leadership autonomy
• structural pliability, or ease of changing a party's structure
• Chapter 2
• This chapter sets up the book's central argument,, which is that the PJ's fluid internal structure can be traced to its formative phase (36)
• but also, it's proscription after the first coup meant that it was highly decentralized, had a "movement" structure, which continues to this day (36-37)
• decentralization during proscription period meant peronist movement essentailly in anarchy, allowed for many autonomous units to self-direct, also allowed for groups to seek very divergent goals, from leftist to conservative, all under name of peronism (41-43)
• "partyization" occurred during teh 1980s, where the movement focused mainly on winning elections (minus a few revolutionary groups and the Ubaldinist labor unions), but it did not result in routinization (49-57)
• chapter 3;
• the PJ is an "informal mass party" (59-60)
• mass because: it maintains an extensive membership (60)
• it has a dense organizational strucutre, partucularly in working class neighborhoods (61)
• it has lots of informal structures that help it embed deeply into working-and lower-class neighborhoods (62)
• the party is informal (doesn't rely on bureaucracy), segemented (few insitutionalized horizontal ties between groups) and decentralized (65-76)
• chapter4: populism in crisis: environmental change and party failure, 1983-1985
• chapter5: union-party links: see levitsky 2003a
• in peripheral provinces where hte uniosn were weak, union leaders had only gotten their tercio thanks to the good will of hte party bsoses, so in the provinces it was much easier to dismantle this (114)
• the 25 organizations, which was allied with the Renovators, didn't demand any institutional linkages to the party, just assumed the renovadores would reward them. in the end, they didn't and the 1987 Congress did not establish any body/org to represent labor inside the party. party leaders ended up choosing who the few remaining labor representatives would be  (116-118)
• int eh face of union politics, some uniosn set up their own territorial based agrupaciones, but these end up being fixed investments which helps entrench teh system of union political fragmentation (131)
• chapter 6: Menemism and Neoliberalism: Programmatic adaptation in teh 1990s
•  chapter 7: the view from below, party activists and the transformation of base-level peronism
• argument: two factors that allowed teh PJ to maintain its activists base even as it programmatically changed (and experience litlte intra-party dissent for this change) (186)
• increase access to state resources
• decentralized party structures
• the combo of sate resources and local autonomy allowed some local groups to engage in traditional peronist practices even as the national aprty abandonded them
• but by relying on state resources the personal, ideological, and union-based ties that had sustained local peronist organizations began to erode
• this left he party more reliant on state resources than it ever had been before
• chapter 8: the paradox of menemism: party adaptation and regime stability in the 1990s
• chapter 9: crisis, party adaptation, and democracy: argentina in comparative perspective

McGuire 1997

McGuire, James W. 1997. Peronism without Perón: unions, parties, and democracy in Argentina. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

• Chapter 1: Peronism, Party Institutionalization, and Democracy
• "Peronism is a strong collective identity, but weakly institutionalized as a political party. ... Those who have spoken for the Peronist movement, beginning with Juan Perón himself during his 1946-55 presidency, have repeatedly insisted that Peronism is a national movement committed to real democracy, not a political party preoccupied with formal democracy." (1)
• the plebiscitarian leader and the trade unions have always been the core
• "The leaders and members of a national movement, by contrast, think it desirable, and potentially feasible, to establish full ad permanent control of the polity." (4)
• and power can be won in many different ways, electorally or otherwise
• union leaders are not very devoted to the party, meaning they don't have as much at stake for the survival of democracy (5)
• suggestion that the level of party institutionalization is heavily dependent on its origins, and Peróns didn't want or need a strongly institutionalized party (14-15)
• Augusto Vandor tried to create a peronist pary not centered on Perón, but Perón allied with those marginalized by Vandor, and Perón's candidate beat vandor's in the 1966 governor election in Mendoza (18-19)
• this first cycle of routinization ailed, and the specter of Perón's growing power led to military coup (19)
• the second cycle of (attempted) institutionalization came after Luder lost the 1983 election, led by the Renovation wing, Menem had ambiguous but existent ties with the old wing, so the 2nd attempt also failed (19-22)
• this study contends Perón's and Menems unwillingness to institutionalize the party was a big cause PJ never institutionalized (22)
• union leaders were key to both party building movements and the groups that thwarted these movements (26)
• "struggles among Peronist unionists, along with the power-preservation and power-enhancement interests of Peronism's plebiscitarian leaders, have contributed to Peronism's weak party institutionalization.
• Chapter 7, the rise and fall of renovation peronism
• Alfonsin's presidency helped the isntitutionalization of the PJ, for three reasons
• the military had lost legitimacy, so there was a feeling democracy would be around a while (187)
• public opinion seemed to favor adn support political parties (instead of, say corporatism) (187-188)
• Radical Party gained some legitimacy as well, didn't look liek the party that always lost to PJ or always allowed military to take over (188)
• PJs loss in presidential election of 1983 meant the party had to build party from the legislature, not be headed by a super strong prez (188-189)
• leader of the metalworkers had been major power, leader in the party for this election, loss discredited him
• renewal faction of PJ wanted internal elections, less backroom maneuvering (190)
• in the midterm elections the UCR won 43 to 35%, with the renewal faction of the PJ winning by 2-1 margin
• the July 1984 union reform law helped to democratize unions a bit, even if peronists still maintained a lot of control in elections (192)
• with the PJ 62 unions were old school, wanted to control the party, while the "25" ceded leadership of the party to politicians, but also used more leftist talk, opposing hegemony of the US and transnational capital (192-193)
• 13 general strikes against Alfonsin 
• between 1984 and 88 there wre 2721 local strikes (199)
• general strikes may have been an effort on the part of union leaderhsip to contain, channel protests from the base (200)
• neither the 15 (conciliated with Alfonsin) nor the Ubaldinistas (current in CGT) saw the PJ as a useful vehicle for making a mark on politics and society, they wanted to get direct influence on the national executive
• the 15 tried to control the labor ministry
• Ubaldini tried to mobilize unionists with pure economic/societal power to influence the exec (205-6)
• "The "62" liked the tercio because the financial and organizationl weakness of of nonunion Peronism assured them control of nominations in the women's and men's branches of the movement as well as in the union sector." (209)
• Menem did not have the support of hte party but did have the support of the unions (210)
• when Menem won presidential primary in 1988, renovadores lost power in the PJ (211)
• Menem's style reflected Peron's a bit, willing to disregard the rules
• "Above all, Menem defended the notion that Peronism was, first and foremost, a national movement, not a party preoccupied with democracy..." (212)
• for the 15 Menem's victory gave them a chance to get power that their weakness in the CGT and the PJ had long denied them (215)
• left Ubaldini forced to pursue general strike strategy against a peronist, not a great idea
• Chapter 8 free=market reform and political shenanigins
• some peronist leaders opposed Menem's reforms, but most went along with them thansk to the many inducements involved (216), these, of course, meant declines in union membership and deterioration of finances, as well as a new limit on the right to strike
• by 1995 when the growth had slowed, many unions now wanted to oppose menem, but the reforms had already progressed far enough tht there was litlte chance of stopping them (217)
• Menem's rule by decree deinstitutionalized the PJ and, despite runnign fiar elections, did many things that udnermined democratic consolidation
• Menem's economic reforms, content and impact
• Menem's economic reforms were implemented in bad ways, especially privatization which broke most of the UN's "Seven Sins of Privatization", especially the use of discretionary/nontransparent procedures (220)
• currency overvaluation meant wages went down while productivity rose (221)
• main cost was a huge surge in unemployment (223)
• mainly caused by massive layoffs, wage cuts in public sector, capital repalcing waged laborers, and increased import competition (223)
• unions:
• employment dropped in public and private sector, so membership dropped (223-4)
• curtailed right to strike (224)
• collective bargaining was decentralized a bit (by decree, law never quite made it out of congress) (224-5)
• also a decree to reform obras sociales, though labro leaders fought off real reform (226)
• union responses
• union leaders had differing responses to these reforms, from strong opposition to cooperation with tepids of both
• actual responses simply came about because union leaders were very autonomous and just ended up responding differently to conflicting imperatives (protect union versus be loyal to PJ) (226)
• turf battles also played a role (227)
• CGT splits when menemists (allied, oddly enough, with anti-menemists) try to get Ubaldini out of Sec gen position in 1989 (228)
• surprisingly, some of the more combative "25" union leaders became menemists (230)
• when Menem went after the obras sociales, CGT reunited (though with lots of internal conflicts remaining) to fight this (231)
• and the same time the leaders of the state workers ATE and teachers CTERA broke to form the CTA
• CGT called for a General strike in in 1992, but it was weakly attended, and afterwards they adopted a conciliatory tone, whcih didn't win them much (231-232), CTA was combative of all Menem's reforms (232)
• when Menem went after obras sociales in 1993/4 CGT called for a general strike, but called it off after neogtiations were started
• MTA, within CGT, was more combative and untied with CTA for some general strikes and protests against obras changes in 1994 (233)
• CGT acquiesced to Menem because reforms were pretty good, in some instances, for the economy (234-5)
• also menem was head of PJ, adn workers supported the PJ (235)
• hyperinflation had been rough, so fixing it made workers OK with other things (236-237)
• also, privatizations were new opportunities for unions to make money (237)
• suggests decline in normal strike activity was because telephone workers lost a showdown strike (a la PATCO), and economic growth then made future strikes less likely (240-241)
• The Deinstitutionalization of the PJ


• Menem bypassed the party in filling government posts and picking candidates for office, increased isolation of party leadership from government and party members (241)
• internal elections continued, but above meant that party was more deinstitutionalized that insti'ized
• during Alfonsin, everyone had to try and gain power through teh legislaturem, but with Menem everyone could skip legislature adn go straight to the top (241-242)
• Menem imposed lots of extraparty candidates (243)
• "menem thus desintitutionalized the PJ in part by ignoring and then capturing and subordinating a party leadership whose ties to party members, union chiefs, and provincial presidents were in any case tenuous at best." (248)
•  Menem and democratic institutions
• "Some conditions became more propitious for the development of a principles commitment to democracy during Menem's first term in office. Menem presided over six years of electoral activity, proposed or backed legal and constitutional reforms that increased the resilience, fairness, and relevance of certain democratic arenas and procedures, and reduced the level of overt military contestation.
• Against these credits, however, one must weigh Menem's manipulation of electoral rules, bypassing of congress with executive decrees, stacking of the supreme court, tolerance for administrative corruption, lackadaisical respo0nse to physical attacks on journalists critical of the government, and pardons of military officers convicted of human rights violations." (252)
• On the one hand, Menem's policies may grow the national pie, making it easier to settle claims for distribution (260)
• on teh other hand, the party is now less able to actually channel distributive claims, meaning the outcome could still be conflict of distributional issues (261)
• Chapter 9: conclusion
•  weak party institutionalization encouraged union leaders to express their demands through strikes and protests, not the party or elections (262)
• also meant unions weren't devoted to democratic institutions, meaning they didn't necessarily always oppose military dictatorship
• the party became dispensable in union leaders' eyes
• the argument of this book is that, like the rural elites who controlled votes of peasants, the working class leaders could mobilize enough votes to dominate politics, and thus was uninterested in creating strong political democracy (263)
• union power and democratic consolidation are not necessarily at odds, but strong unions can increase distributive conflict and wield a stronger ability to sway political system, meaning democratic consolidation can come down to the level that union leaders want democratic consolidation (266)
• at times union power can have ambiguous results for the poor, who may bear the costs of the creation of a privilege working class
• 1980s union density data (268)
• the strong labor movement from 1955-1983, coupled with weak parties, meant that the labor unions contributed to a strong distributional conflict without any institutional ways to channel it, which created instability (270-271)
• why is it a problem that democracy is not institutionalized? it makes crises and nondemocratic responses to these crises more likely (281)
• 
  

Alcañiz and Scheier 2007

Alcañiz, Isabella, and Melissa Scheier. 2007. "New Social Movements with Old Party Politics". Latin American Perspectives. 34 (2): 157-171.

• looking at how new social movements interact with old parties (157)
• three factions of piquteros
• groups that are more likely to enter into agreements with the state, the FTV and the CTA
• moderate groups with the CCC
• radical groups with the Movimiento Territorial de Liberacion (MTL) and the National Piqutero Bloque
• Bloque piquetero gets fewest subsidies (158)
• Argument: preexisting partisan networks (linking unemployed to institutional political forces) determined the specific development of piqutero coalitions, and these coalitions in turn limited the strategies available to movements and ther iability to persist over time
• second try: piquetero groups formed along lines of previous partisan networks, which subsequently meant these groups had varying access to parties
• while others have shown that clientelism is important, authors show that other mechanisms of political organization can replace the need for such links
• The piqueteros are coming
• piqueteros first appeared in oil towns, places with long and rich histories of social, political, and labor organization (159)
• first wave of piqueteros tended to be unemployed union workers
• second wave (2001) were independent of, and often vocally rejected the lead of Peronist unions
• Leaders in the first wave had been labor organizers, second wave were mostly from leftist political parties (160)...even those with prior union exerience rejected verticality of peronist unions
• Old partisan networks and new coalitions
• previous social networks among piqueteros shaped the way they saw the unemployment situation, which in turn shaped coalition strategies for piqutero groups
• MTL was specifically founded around rejection of neoliberalism, distrust of peronist politics (161)
• this precludes coalition/strategy that invloves the PJ or UCR
• The Political economy of the piquetero movement
• two important environmental variables help explain piquteros
• bad economy
• unions and PJ had been based on full-employment economy, so downturn in economy in 1990s resulted in piqueteros who weren't used to being unemployed, felt they were owed a job by society (more or less) (162)
• but unions were too weak to demand them, so they protested
• social policy was decentralized, making municipalities and non-state actors the coordinators/distributors of state resources (163)
• this prompted organization on the part of these unemployed, so their groups could get control of resources
• also promoted growth of clientelism
• importantly: piquetero organizations were a place where opposition parties could get an ally in the popular sector
• Piquetero cooperatives and the rise of the MTL
• the communist party helped found the CTA, which in turn got the PC involved in te unemployed movement (164)
• FTV head D'Elia endorsed a teachers protest in 1997, which got the FTV closer to the CTA, which got the PC involved with the FTV
• 1998 FTV officially joins CTA (165)
• in June 2001 MTL created because the communists don't like the soft line taken by the FTV
• "The issue of autonomy is a central concern of the MTL movement" (165)
• but how can the MTL stay autonomous and still have the funding necessary to help its people?
• through the IMFC, Institute for the Mobilization of Cooperative Funds)
• MTL got employment through the IMFC and financial autonomy for the MTL (166)
• IMFC is a buffer between the MTL and the PC, meaning MTL has real autonomy
• IMFC was created by PC in 1958 and formed a group of cooperative banks
• seems to be independent-ish of the PC
• MTL not initially excited about cooperatives idea, which was proposed by PC and the IMFC
• eventually all three collaborate to buy/operate a mineral processing plant in 2005 (expropriation not supported by government) (166-167)
• MTL also started a large housing project in BA, supported by loans from the city (167)
• city and the MTL consider this a pilot project for future housing projects developed by social movements and paid for by government (168)
• Concluding remarks
• MTL's association with the PC offered and alternative to traditional patterns of government-labor relations
• my take: but not really, as housing project shows, government still has biggest coffers
•  odd coalition, between the horizontal MTL and the hierarchical PC, but these ties were based in historical ties
• MTL voters, of course, vote peronist (169)

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Levitsky 2005

"Crisis and Renovation: Institutional Weakness and the Transformation of Argentine Peronism, 1983-2003" Levitsky, p181-206

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• although the PJ is well-organized it's internal structures are weakly institutionalized, its lacks stable internal rules and bureaucracy (181)
• the PJs weakly institutionalized party-union linkages allowed reformers to dismantle traditional mechanism of labor participation (182)
• this enabled the party to 
• attract the middle class
• create a clientelistic relationship with the urban poor
• The fluidity of the PJ sent it into crisis in 2000-2001 along with the rest of the country, but this fluidity also allowed it to adapt and survive the crisis
• Institutionalization and Party Adaptation
• institutionalization creates stable expectations, rules of the game (O'Donnell 1994) (182)
• but institutionalization also inhibits organizational change (Zucker 1977) (183)
• they are sticky
• The PJ as a Weakly Institutionalized Party
• PJ is well-organized with deep roots in working- and lower-class society (184)
• but it lacks even a minimal bureaucratic structure
• in the years following Perón's death, no faction was able to impose an organizational structure or binding rules (185)
• The Renovators in the 1980s tried to create more rules, but essentially failed
• "We use the party statutes when they are useful. When they are not useful, we don't use them."
• Three areas of institutional weakness
• Weak leadership bodies (186)
• the party's national leaders are routinely ignored by lower-level branches and officeholders
• the government runs the party, especially when their is a seated executive
• Fluid Party Hierarchy
• politicians and those with power have often parachuted into top leadership/electoral positions  (187)
• in many provinces internal elections are negotiated or imposed by party bosses
• Loosely Structured party-union linkage
• 62 organizations and the tercio (188)
• The effects of weak institutionalization
• the PJ suffers from low levels of trust in the organization (188-189)
• the PJ is highly malleable, and may be changed quickly to line up with short-term goals of dominant actors (189)
• Pj experiences bandwagoning effect (190)
• PJ officeholders have substantial autonomy from the party
• Peronism's dual transformation int eh 1980s and 1990s
• Crisis:
• working class had eroded (191)
• debt crisis and exhaustion of ISI left the PJ without the ability to continue a statist program
• to adapt the PJ dismantle union-party inks and replaced them with clientelistic links
• labor participation had been based entirely on need of party leaders for the resources unions had (192)
• 62 orgs and tercio were often imposed by union leaders
• as PJ won office, politicians were able to use state resources instead of union resources
• Erosion of union influence enhanced the PJ's autonomy, allowing it to attract the middle class... (195)
• ...meanwhile it created clientelistic networks to maintain ties to urban poor in era of de-industrialization, and shrinking working class
• but clientelism generated political costs, as the Pj became the part of corruption (196)
• though most of the Party didn't agree with Menem and neoliberal turn, bandwagon was created since he had control over appointments to office/government (197-198)
• The Crisis
• The PJ's fluid structure meant the party had no unified response to the 2000 crisis, sending Pj into its own internal conflict/crisis (200)
• no one had enough power to find a unified program or to discipline party members (201)
• Menem and Duhalde were bitter enemies and fought over control of the party (202)
• this rivalry meant there was no agreement on primaries, candidates
• in 2003 PJ supported no presidential candidate, allowed all three to run outside the party (202-203)
• Kirchner's victory pushed the party to the center-left (204)
• even though the PJ had undertaken the neoliberal reforms themselves, the internal fluidity allowed this leftist, dark horse candidate (Kirchner) to rise and have a chance in the election
• Kirchner realigned the PJ with leftist politicians, progressive intellectuals, and humans rights groups (205)
• Conclusion
• Peronisms current coalition change seem to be more permanent (ie away from labor unions) (206)
• PJ remains the party of the poor, but will likely never again be a labor backed party

Levitsky and Murillo 2005b

"Building Castles in the Sand? The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Argentina" Levitsky and Murillo, 21-44

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

•  Central argument OF THE BOOK: the major cause of Argentina's under-performance was persistent and widespread institutional instability (21)
• The Origins of Institutional Instability
• between 1955 and 1972 Argentina politics were deadlocked (24)
• one the one hand, allowing Peronist party to compete in elections woul certainly result in Personit victory, which was unacceptable to many elites
• yet, on the other hand, keeping the Peronists out of elections was a major destabilizing influence
• eventually military leadership had to allow Peron back into power (25), then another military regime
• The brutality and dramatic failure of the military regime discredited the military in the eyes of the public (26)
• gave rise to broad public support for liberal democracy (Catterberg 1990
• and gave rise to a powerful human rights movement
• change in office between Alfonsín and Menem was first time democratic change of hands, but even then Alfonsín resigned early because of economic crisis, and there was a lot of institutional fluidity
• Argentina under Menem
• Menem abandoned traditional Peronism, set off on neoliberalism (27)
• among the fully democratic countries, Argentina carried out the most rapid and far-reaching reforms
• among the countries with the deepest crisis and radical reform, Argentina was the most democratic
• BUT many of the policy arrangements made by Menem proved to be economically unsustainable
• AND Menem did little to strengthen political institutions, and in same cases he weakened them
• The Politics of Radical Economic Reform: Why Menem was successful
• Menem's ability to end hyperinflation increased public support for him/his policies (28)
• The strength of the PJ helped Menem keep a solid electoral base
• the PJ's hegemony in the popular sectors limited possibility of anti-reofrm appeals (29)
• PJ's close ties to organized labor gave union leaders a stake in limiting opposition from working class
• Menem gave side payments and policy concessions to losers (30)
• unions protected pro-labor law
• industrialists were giving help in competing for privatization contracts
• governors wooed by putting off provincial budgetary adjustments
• Encroachment on legistlative and judicial perogatives
• lots of executive decrees
• court-packing and impeachments
• PROBLEMATIC LEGACIES (31)
• convertability left governmetn without tools to rspond to economic shocks or erosion of competitiveness
• public debt grew a lot
• reforms generated large-scale social exclusion (and middle class shrunk
• Democratic Institutions under Menem
• Menem frequently circumvented legistlaive process using decrees (32-33)
• M allowed little judicial independence (33)
• executive accountability decreased, allowing corruption to increase
• widespread perception of corruption and abuse eroded the credibility of Argentina's representative institutions (35)
• Party system and Political representation in the 1990s
• Alianza able to win on anti-corruption ticket (37)
• mostly because middle and upper-middle classed had little faith in credibility of government
• The Post-Menem Era
• Alianza failed to clean up politics (37)
• actually got caught up in its own curruption scandal, which it didn't handle very well (37-38)
• Alianza did poorly in economic arena
• inherited a recession *38)
• convertibility left them without policy tools, and convertibility was too popular to be touched
• in 1999 legislative vote 22% cast spoiled/blank votes
• three Presidents in 2 weeks
• third was Duhalde, who ended convertibility (39)
• economic plunged into chaos
• poliitcal system and parties pushed into crisis as well
• FREPASO and UCR disintegrated (40)
• 2003 elections:
• military made no move to intervene
• despite anger, no anti-establishment outsider received more than 2% of the vote (41)
• PJ finished 1-2-3 in presidential vote, all other partis wiped out
• PJ proved remarkably resilient
• Kirchner 1
• concentrated power in the executive (43)
• but his initiatives were more transparent and oriented toward institutional integrity
• rst of the story yet to be seen (chapter form 2005)....

Hilgers 2008

Hilgers, Tina. 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (4): 123-153. 

•  Introduction
• PRD has been dhandicapped by factionalism, personalism, and clientelism (123)
• PRD has lost many supporters because they have become disillusioned with PRD
• Why have PRD politicians come to use clientelism?
• External Factors
• poverty
• long history of clientelism in Mexican politics
• PRI's use of clientelism
• PRD founders proficiency at using clientielism
• Internal Factors
• party's strategy during democratic transition
• predominance of Cuauthémoc Cardenas and primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic factions and centralized power (124)
• the PRD focused on elections
• did NOT focus on creating an institutionalized party
• thus leadership and alliances were personalized
• Comparison case: PT in Brazil
• shared similar external factors, but this party decided to create internal institutions
• Use of clientelism also ambiguous
• PRD client experiences range from exploitation to participatory community building (125)
• Defining Clientelism
• People of differing social status exchange goods and services for mutual benefit
• the durability of the relationship depends on its benefits outweighing its costs
• Gouldner (1977), clientelism not necessarily bad, "principle of reciprocity" (126)
• Flynn (1975) clentelism = elite control of masses
• Fox (1994)
• authoritarian clientelism = relationship of asymmetrical power
• semi-clientlelism = elites have no capacity to ensure compliance
• heart of clientelism = tension between positive and negative processes (127)
• but just describing it as "exchange of goods" does not distinguish clientelism from patronage, vote-buying, or pork-barreling
• The Initial Causes of Perredista Clientelism
• PRI used camarillas extensively, networks through which (128)
• groups endorsed successful figures
• and actors moved up in the ranks of government as their mentors did
• though much of the lower classes likely voted for Cárdenas in 1988, they couldn't afford to continue to support him post-election because this would threaten their relationship with PRI government
• Given this environment, Cárdenas and his supporters decided to consooidate the amalgam of the FDN into a party (129)
• immediate problems:  this party was ridiculously divided ideologically
• only thing everyone agreed on: they wanted to beat the PRI
• Generally three big currents (FAR fro internally homogeneous)
• institutional, independent left -- all the previous left parties, ended up being sort of center-left
• social left/civil society organizations -- left, but did not fit in with institutional groups...mobilizers, student movements, etc
• ex-priistas -- no unity, just wanted to beat PRI
• Cárdenas believed best strategy was electoral, just try and get PRI unelected at every level
• democratic transition immediately, radical change could come later
• primacy of his vision legitimated  Cárdenas even though he ran for Presidency of PRD unopposed (130)
• ((some FDN groups didn't join PRD, either wanting to maintain independence or not anger PRI))
• PRD never formally detailed procedures for structuring the currents and ensuring internal democracy in PRD (131)
• no horizontal links in the party...all info flowed through Cárdenas!
• the currents began to seem like the PRI's camarillas
• BUT the PRD didn't have as much access to resources, so internal competition over resource was worse
• each current was organized around one "strong man"
• everything became a negotiation, internal elections became undeniably fraudulent/negotiated
• The rise of AMLO split the party between Cárdenas and AMLO (152)
• AMLO made alliances with external groups, which strengthened his position but weakened party unity
• At times the PRD's desire to win elections has overshadowed its principles
• some candidates are courted purely because of their clientelist networks
• In 2004 Congress the pRD noted the issues of clientelism and corruption in the party, tried to ameliorate them, but of course these changes totally failed to win overall support (133)
• The PRD in Government
• even in elected local government there are disputes between members of different currents
• In the Federal District (134)
• the PRD promised to regulate taxis drivers (piratas who rob people), vendors and squatters
• but instead allied with them to increase PRD voter strength
• groups/citizens that are unable/unwilling to make such alliances are immediately and a disadvantage
• THERE HAVE BEEN SOME GOOD DEVELOPMENTS IN DF (135)
• but these tend to be undermined by the methods through which they were achieved
• AMLO portected the poor through unorthodox and extra-constitutional means
• in the end, this is probably bad for democracy
• PRD administrator in Nezhualcóyotl, Estado Mexico, made government way more tasnparent
• BUT this meant he/his faction was less able to negotiate party positions and policy
• in Chiapas clients  who leave the PRD are repressed (136)
• My Take: OVERALL: Good governing undermines ability for people to move up in PRD
• Now people just expect the PRD to be clientelistic, nationwide (137)
• Comparison to PT in Brazil
• PT faced authoritarian beginnings, lots of clientelism in country, and success hinged on Lula's personalistic leadership (138-139)
• PT still does patronage and targeted social programs, but this isn't like the PRD's clientelism (139)
• patronage does note = clientelism (140)
• Blosa Familia is universal, so while its good for PT votes, it doesn't exactly have the same connotation as focused clientelistic distribution of benefits
• My Take: Splitting hairs a bit, but there is something less bad about PT's clentelism than the PRD's
• While PRD though winning electiosn was key, the PT did not think this was enough (141)
• PT's early focus was on building organization, seeking POLICY change first!
• PT adopted democratic procedures early on and the rules are enforced, as is party unity
• PT's connection with voters/its base have kept it from becoming a catch-all party
• The Clients' Perspective
• in some instances clientelism is the best method for keeping politicians accountable, and could build community (142)
• FPFV, squatters group, allied with PRD in DF
• demonstrating and rallying with PRD became mandatory to get apartment/material benefits (143)
• if you left group, they didn't return your deposit assuming you wouldn't have the legal means/stamina to get it back
• clearly it is tough being in this alliance, but members have few resources and few alternatives (144)...some think it's a fine bargain, others don't
• some in DF sought clientelistic linkages to provide for themselves, but found they built community and political power as well (145)
• Conclusion
• Those wo stick with PRD after engaging in clientelism are not the poorest of the poor, nor are they in highly exploitative relationships with their patron (147)
• 
  

Szwarcberg 2013

Mariela Szwarcberg. "The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine Case." Latin American Research Review 48.2 (2013): 32-54.

• Introduction
• while clientelism is often taken as a given, party operatives in Argentina and elsewhere can prefer not to distribute goods in exchange of electoral support (33)
• argument:  a party operative's capacity to turn to clientelistic strategies of mobilization is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the use of clientelism...party operatives have to prefer to build clientelistic linkages with voters
• study of municipal candidates in Argentina
• Mobilizing Voters: Lit review
• while the poor are targets of clientelistic strategies, scholars have convincingly shown that the poor are strategic and sophisticated in making political decisions
• to explain candidates' strategic choices to turn out voters, I distinguish between a candidates CAPACITY and PREFERENCE to use clientelism (34)
• political parties contribute to shaping politicians' strategies by providing (or not providing) incentives to use clientelism to turn out voters (35)
• Choosing Strategies of Political Mobilization
• Assumption: candidates interested in a political career have to demonstrate their ability to get votes for the party
• Table 1: (36)

Candidate has Capacity to use Clientelism	Candidate Prefers to use Clientelism
	Yes	No
Yes	Pragmatist	Idealist
No	Resentful	Utopist

•   Without observing explicit choice, can't tell the difference between resentful and utopist
• Data
• ballot positions reflect the value of each candidate to the party (39)
• data suggests the longer a candidate uses clientelism to build a constituency the more likely they will have a higher ballot position
• Candidates Capacity
• Incumbent candidates are more likely to have access to material goods (39)
• access to resources is also conditioned by level of government
• candidate who has party members in national and/or regional office has more resources than one who is just a local incumbent (40)
• also, to effectively use clientelism a candidate need to have access to resources AND a network of party activists to spread resources around
• in Argentina this means only the PJ and Radical party (my take: though maybe not the Radicals anymore?) (41)
• given the data, cast majority of the sample is PJ activists
• Some new parties do have minimal clientelist networks if candidates brought activists and networks with them from a previous party (PJ or UCR) (42)
• Candidate's Preferences
• Candidates that engage in "solving voter problems" will obtain electoral support and will also monitor political participation (43)
• usually by taking attendance at political rallies
• this works because voting is mandatory, but finding who voted what is still impossible
• for this paper, a candidate who takes attendance is clientelistic
• Explaining variation in candidate preferences
• interesting thing is that idealists are almost equal in number to the pragmatists (44)
• now focus on PJ, since they are the ones with the most resources
• in José C Paz neighborhood, unemployment rate is 80%ish (45)
• easy to mobilize voters by distributing goods
• intraparty competition induces candidates to use clientelism (46)
• if one doesn't do it, another will
• if candidate doesn't go clientelistic, sends signal to party that he's not willing to do "whatever it takes" to win
• idealist candidates essentially know they are committing political suicide (47)
• candidates realize that the best way to mobilize voters is to help and then coerce them
• but if this doesn't happen, party "doesn't forgive you" (48)
• its bad, but "these are the rules of the game"
• in Río Cuarto, another municipality, two Radical candidates faced off
• one wanted to create electoral alliance with another party
• the other wanted to keep "purity" of Radical ideology
• electoral coalition won because able to attract more voters!
• Resentful candidates blame their electoral failure entirely on their incapacity to provide benefits (49)
• strong correlation between pragmatist candidates and PJ (49), fewer pragmatists in UCR (50)
• Conclusion
• THE PARTIES CREATE THE INCENTIVES THAT CAUSE MOST CANDIDATES TO TURN TO CLIENTELISM (51)
• But not all candidates prefer to use clientelism...parties could create ways to get these "cleaner" politicians to rise through the ranks

Roberts 2003

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2003. "Social Correlates of Party System Demise and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela". Latin American Politics and Society. 45 (3): 35-57.

• Peru’s attempt at populism in 1980s ended in inflationary spiral and political upheaval (35)
• many assumed populism was now dead, thanks in part to to Washington Consensus (35-36)
• Rise of Washington consensus undermined the party and labor institutions that had been the left in LA (36)
• void left after these parties collapsed was filled by personalistic leaders who cultivated direct relationship with the masses
• appears to be a dialectical relationship between the demise of traditional representative institutions and the eruption of new forms of populism
• Chávez was a master of the politics of antipolitics
• he capitalized on and deepened public antipathy toward established institutions
• Populism asirse most forcefully during times of political and economic crisis, when established patterns of representation are breaking down and have yet to be replaced with new ones (37)
• first period in the 1920s
• another period in the 1980s
• BUT, given Venezuela’s strong institutions, no one would have guessed they would crumble and be replaced by populism (38)
• these were founded on a mix of corporatist and clientelistic linkages that could not withstand the decline of the oil economy and several attempts at market liberalization (38-39)
• then successive administrations by each dominant party failed to fix the economy (39)
• Dominant theories provide no reason why Venezuela’s system would collapse (41)
• institutionalism, structuralism, rational choice, and political culture
• all focused on two critical variables, design of political institutions and oil money
• BUT Coppedge (1990) argues that over-institutionalization can be just as problematic as under-institutionalization
• Cartelization and bureaucratic routinization made the AD overly rigid, restricted its ability to adopt economic reforms (Levitsky 2001 and Corrales 2000) (42)
• along the lines of Crisp (2000) parties became frozen in status quo, allowing them to control policymaking and keep new groups out of politics and new issues off the agenda
• undependable oil revenues eventually left parties unable to fund their clientelistic relations (structural approach)
• political culture: oil created rentier mentality, people supported democracy only as long as the money flowed...when money stopped, no one cared for democracy (Romero 1997)
• Venezuela’s parties were more bureaucratic, but they did not differ significantly from other LA countries in their societal bonds (43)
• their bonds were made through ISI, and were strained by the 1980s (43-44)
• Venezuela’s system was set up more along corporatist lines, to complement clientelism (44)
• in 1980s Venezuela avoided hyperinflation because labor tempered its demands thanks to connections between unions and parties (45)
• Economic and political trauma worse in countries with labor based parties, as old forms of representation totally erode
• to replace corporatist linkages, many parties had to form larger networks of more contingent clientelism (46)
• VENEZUELAN CASE
• post-1958 party system had corporatism and clientelism (46-47)
• everyone participated in distribution of oil rents, capitalists, campesinos, middle-class, workers (48)
• by 1970 two dominant parties were almost indistinguishable from each other
• plunging oil prices in the 1980s emasculated campesino and unions, and new independent union movement stripped out more voters from corporatist system (48-49)
• neoliberal reforms in 1989 generate violent backlash, military repressed riots (49)
• organized labor lost its ability to channel opposition to neoliberal reforms because they stayed too close to party (49-50)
• Venezuela’s parties were unable to maintain balance of: distributing enough payouts to reproduce collective identities, but not so much as to harm macroeconomic health (50)
• parties continuing use of patronage in hard times increased their delegitimization (51)
• Prolonged economic crisis + social change = erosion of corporatist and clientelist linkages
• both parties lost legitimacy since neither were able to fix the problem (52, 53)
• Chávez replaced party-based mediation between state and society with direct, personalistic relationship between president and masses