Gentili, Suárez, Stubrin, and Gindín 2004

• Introduction
• teachers have gone on strikes a lot in LA recently, as have university students (1252)
• these fights and negotiations happened in places where the economy was in crisis, the education sector wasn't in great shape, and many went through processes of reform to improve education system (1253)
• authors suggest that the conflict over education system is about the fact that many of the reforms were very ambitious and didn't take into account economic crises that came or traditions of the sector
•  these authors want to create an integrated theory about teacher protest, not just assume it's all about salary (1253-4)
• it seems cyclical (1254)
• it's hard to divorce it from larger economic crises that occurred
• but a big part of the problem is that tensions would arise with any reform, but in this case most of the reforms didn't include teachers at all, which provoked greater protest (1256-7)
• the lack of democratic discussion about education reform was a common issue throughout the region (1257)
• Education conflict: creating a definition is theoretically ambitious
• thinking about education conflict as a place for active adn dynamic contestation that creates the agents and strategies of the agents....that is to say, it's not a place of pure reaction due to sructural factors (1258)
• obviously this also means that interests will conflict and will be complex, even within what one might imagine would be a similar group....it's economic and poltiical but also has to do with cultural and psychology of a person/group
• aha....1257-1260 is sort of relating the various theories of social conflict, transplanting them to education a bit, and then saying the authors are going to look across LA to see which themes come up most often (1260)
• 1998-2003: a chronology of union action around education reforms in LA
• education reform processes have generated a lot of conflict in LA, pretty much across the board, though reactions to this conflict have differed (1261)
• 863 conflicts during this time, 40% of which were started by base-level unions (1262)
• during this time 54% of the conflicts were aimed at teh central government, while 31% were at provincial governments (the latter usually from decentralized education systems
• none were exclusively against private schools!
• private school unions tend to be less combatitive
• when they are combative, it's usually as part of larger confederations that are dominated (in numbers) by public school teachers (1263)
• private-school battles are usually very small and circumscribed
• most often working conditions and salary are basically set by the state anyway, so it makes more sense to go after government, and to do so you need lots of help, not just private sector (1263)
• Argentina had the most conflict, with 1491 days lost in this time period (1264)
• data! (1265)
• the reforms were not undertaken in a democratic way, which resulted in higher levels of conflict, though all the governments who undertook these reforms were certainly democratically elected (for the most part) (1266)
• of the actiosn taken
• 79% had labor demands
• 28% were based on larger demands of education politics, like those against decentralization
• 12% were against teh political system en total
• usually salary demands were linked to larger, more theoretical demands
• teachers strikes have a very high level of adhesion in teh region (1266-7)
• unions led practically all the manifestations, and a lot of them included wage/pay demands (1268)
• Conclusions
• much of the traditions and norms of education and education politics were greatly changed by the reforms across LA, and they did so with very little consultation with the teachers (1269)
• this resulted in a lot of conflcit aroudn education, which tended to become the center of even larger social conflcits (1270)
• 
  

Tello 2013

Tello, César. 2013. "Las políticas docentes y la perspectiva sindical en Argentina, México y Chile: debates y negociaciones. Los casos de CTERA, SNTE y el Colegio de Profesores en los últimos veinte años." Educar em Revista, (48), 149-166.

• Introduction
• in the 1990s education systems started being changed to follow neoliberal ideas, but in the 200s some governments began putting the state back in charge of education (150-151)
• Chávez (2010) showed:
• continued neoliberalism: Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, and others (151)
• concertacion: Arg, Brazil, Guatemal, Uruguay, Paraguay (152)
• rupture from neoliberal: Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela
• argument seems to be that the historical relationship between the unions and government in Mexico and Chile can help us understand what happened in those cases, but that in Argentina the more recent political scenario is explanatory (152)
• the debate: World Bank versus the unions
• teachers unions said reforms would make teaching worse, make salary go down, working conditions worse
• IFIs thought teachers needed someone to hold them accountable, finally, like parents, pushed for school autonomy (154)
• specifics of each case
• Chile
• has had decentralized education since 1990, thanks to the military dictatorship (156)
• unions helped kick out Pinochet
• the Colegio de Profesores was traditionally a group that sought to limit conflict, negotiate, but started acting more like a real union when they got some ability to do so after Pinochet left in 1991 (156-157) 
• the union traded improved salaries for some accountability measures with Lagos, but then subsequently demanded Bachelet and Pinera change the education system (157-9)
• but suggests this is more about the awakening of the union and its demanding what it was promised at the start of democracy (159)
• Mexico
• SNTE is super powerful in education sector, thanks ot historic relations with the PRI (160)
• change in relations and mobilization with SNTE came when PAN in power, though union tried to make-up with PRI in 2012, article doesn't know about EEG getting arrested, but it sstill uncolear ot author if old allinace will be renewed or not (161)
• Argentina
• anti Menem hard in 1990s (162)
• Marcha and Carpa Blancha made thema national force (162)
• friends with Ks, for a while, thanks to laws that gave them tons of money and national negotiations, but when this started to break down they had more strikes (162)
• Conclusions:
• in Chile, union was against the dictatorship and onyl after 20 years of alliance with those parties decided to break from them (163)
• in Mexico union never conronts the government, except as an oligarchic group
• in Argentina union was agisnt the government but has now been friends with Ks and moderated between 2003 and 2011

Bordonaro and Huirton 2006

Bordonaro, Nora Garro, and Ignacio Llamas Huitrón. "Los trabajadores urbanos de la educación en los sectores público y privado, 1996-2002." DE LA GARZA TOLEDO, Enrique; SALAS, Carlos (Comp.) La situación del trabajo en México (2006).

• about teacher sin Mexico, comparing public versus private
• public employment in schools is a political question, private schools are more of a market relation (293)
• data from a national survey
• public schools are still major education (294)
• teachers are only 2.7% of urban working population (296)
• teachers in private schools average younger at every level (300)
• supports idea that public school positions are more stable (300)
• except for primary level, number of hours per week is longer for public educators (302-3), and by 2002 average hours for all had dropped (303)
• teachers who work less than 35 hours per week: primary public way higher than primary private, but every other level priavte has more part-time workers than public (304)
• private teachers are WAY more likely to have temporary contracts (304)
• teachers in public schools make more money (306-7), and their salaries were more consistent, though the gap narrowed in many cases by 2002 (307)
• overall wages per hour have been pretty flat since 1995, but at least steady in real terms (306-307)
• number employed in private schools grew a large proportion between 1996 and 2002, but still a small overall part of education sector (308)
• 
  

Gindin 2011

Gindin, Julián. 2011. "La Tradición Sindical y la Explicación de las Prácticas Sindicales: Conclusiones de una Comparición Internacional Sobre los Docentes delSecotr Publico." Revista Latinoamericano do Trbalho, año 16 no. 26, 119-143.

• Introduction
• comparing Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico throughout the length of the 20th century
• this article proses the idea of "teacher unionism of the base", which is defined by a gravitation of the unions to the union base (in teachers unions), labor demands as the axis of activity, and open collective conflict with the government (120)
• this article presents how the union tradition can explain how a union works
• seven elements go into structural elements of the union (121)
• political relation with the state
• expansion and development of education system
• local work realities
• ideas of decent employment
• recruitment of teachers
• gender
• social image of the public school and teacher
• history of the union is also a key part of how/what a union does, as it often informs values and norms of the union
• its a little bit working class culture, a little bit union history
• two parts to the idea of "sindicalismo docente de base (122)
• union base includes leaders whose power is not taken by upper level leaders
• willingness to have open and strong conflict with, opposition to the government
• uses critical junctures to compare time periods that aren't actually the same across countries (123)
• notices three junctures:
• one, the existence of some sort of group that says it will represent workers (124)
• two, that group must become the representative of a large base of teachers
• three, consolidation of sindicalismo docente de la base, where the union is able to free or reorganize itself as independent from the state
• Critical junctures in teacher union history
• first, unions in Mex, Arg, Brz form as part of popular mobilization for democracy against the oligarchy (125)
• for Argentina this was the first radical government, Revolution in Mexico, and jsut before Estada Novo in Brazil (125-126)
• groups become solid as opposed to small, marginal
• these weren't necessarily unions, just teachers groups
• second, these groups became real unions, attached to a base
• either through state of mobilization of the teachers themselves (127-8)
• in Mexico it seemed like teachers were mobilizing themselves, but int he end the state was able to impose  union (128)
• in Argentina Peron started to organize through state, but coup meant that teachers ended up mobilizing themselves
• Brazil teachers mobilized themselves weakly and failed to consolidate in the face of government repression (128, 130)
• third, unions serve the base, can count on leaders in the base, are autonomous from government
• Mex: 1974-83, with CNTE emerging and the SNTE, for the first time, using its power within the SEP to not implement government changes (131-132)
• for Argentina and Brazil this happened in the 1980s with the return of democracy, both places unions willing to mobilize against the government (132)
• THE KEY IS A NETWORK OF LEADERS AMONG THE BASE
• Brazil uniosn join PT, but it becomes unclear if uniosn serve party or vice versa (133)
• SNTE plays politics, but its clear that union does so as a pragmatic way to gain power, since it doesn't succumb to too many political demands (133)
• national strikes are rare in Argentina, but happen at the state level depending on union history and political situation (133-4)
• conclusions
• union tradition is a mediating factor between teachers demands and union actions (134)
• union tradition is a legacy of critical junctures, and as such is also... (135)
• a mechanism of that explains path dependence (135)

Murillo 1999

Murillo, M. V. (1999). Recovering political dynamics: Teachers' unions and the decentralization of education in argentina and mexico. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(1), 31-57. 

• this draws out some of the same ideas in her 2001 book, but looks at differences in education reform in Mexico and Argentina, noting the reforms occurred differently due to variation across partisan identities (of the unions), organizational fragmentation (in the unions) and leadership competition (both for union and government officials) (31)
• education reform became an important issues because education was seen as
• important to developing human capital, increasing social equity, and consolidating young democracies (33) see footnote 6 for some citations
• the public felt the edcuation systems were becoming inadequate to mee the countries' needs
• The suggestion made by many groups is that decentralized education is more responsive to local needs, and thus more efficient than hihgly centralized education systems (33-34)
• BUT unions can play an important role in enhancing or sabotaging reforms (34)
• Public sector unions:
• public sector militancy is often more visible to the general public, which would suffer from loss of delivery of public goods thanks to strikes (35)
• "Indeed, strikes often serve the dual purpose of demanding higher wages from the government and mobilizing public opinion to call for greater budget allocations for public services." (35)
• teaching is labor intensive, teachers are distributed across the country, and they can have a great affect on public opinion (36)
• a large proportion of education budgets is directed to salaries (36)
• decentralization reforms in Mexico and Argentina
• The SNTE suppressed it's opposition to decentralization and the government met some of its demands (38)
• CTERA kept unsuccessfully resisitng decentralization and was ignored by Menem (38)
• Stats:
• Law 1,420 of 1881 established free public edcuation and compulsory primary education for all Argentina (39)
• initially the federal government centralized education, by 1952 feds controlled 42.7% of primary, 64.8% of secondary, and 82.5% of vocational schools (Paglianetti 1991)
• military started to decentralize
• By 1987 the national jurisdiction had only 1.9 % of primary schools, 44.7% of secondary schools, and 37.8% vocational schools (40)
• 1991 law enacted in 1992, Law 24,049, transfered all the rest of the schools to provincial jurisdiction (40)
• history of teachers unions (42-43)
• CTERA was with CGT and PJ int eh 1980s, but broke with Menem in 1991 and formed CTA (42)
• CTERA has been strong at province level, but never really centralized enough to be strong national presence (43)
• reform
• most teachers unions rejected Menem's reform (44)
• feared financing would be hurt
• also concerned with declining real wages and wage dispersion once bargaining became decentralized
• teachers struck and demonstrated against reform
• government officials ignored militancy and demands (45)
•  decentralization DID enhance CTERA's position over other competing union confederations (45)
• CTERA joined UCR to form coalition, but meant they found few allies among the mostly PJ provincial governors who didn't want to ally with enemy party (46)
• also competition over teachers weakened all unions, meaning government had no desire to offer concessions (46)
• explaining the difference between SNTE and CTERA
• SNTE was PRI, and not fragmented, CTERA was opposition and fragmented (47-48)
• why not get allies where you can? not really a full explanation here
• conclusion:
• party loyalty can speeed reforms but hinder their effectiveness (see Murillo 2001) (49)
• when there is leadership competition, as there was for SNTE, government will make concessions to keep their leader in power
• CTERA had neither leadership competition (it seems) AND teachers unions were fragmented -- seems a bit weak here

Gindin 2008

Gindin, J. 2008, "Sindicalismo docente en México, Brasil y Argentina: una hipótesis explicativa de su estructuración diferenciada", Revista mexicana de investigación educativa, Abril-junio 2008 volume 13 number 37, p 351-375.

• Argument: the fundamental variable that explains the difference between the cases in Brazil/Argentina and Mexico is the relationship with the sate established at the period of consolidation of labor relations systems (353)
• Argentina
• CTERA created in 1973 (367)
• generally CTERA has been pretty fragmented and weak
• in 1987 there was a split in the CTERA, half were under a UCR leader and half under a PJ leader
• but the PJ half essentially dissolved after it started and lost a big national strike in 1988 (367-8)
• CTERA helped create CTA (368) and bolstered its own power by allowing for leadership at every level to be elected directly, making them the most centralized of the teachers unions (369)
• White tent in 1997 against Menem (369)
• stayed up unti lthe UCR-led coalition won in decemeber 1999
• CTERA got close to NK after his election, but this closeness allowed the teachers to be a sort of internal opposition and still be militant (370)
• the differenc ein that the SNTE was a mediator between teh government and teachers, while in ARgentina and Brazil the government(s) didn't incorporate teachers into the coproate system, and simply ruled them directly when it wanted to. (370-371)
• the mobilization of the 1980s restructured Argentina and Brazil docente unions, while it didn't have this effect on teh SNTE (372)
• said another way, SNTE in Mexico was part of corporatism, and not in Arg and Brazil
• author suggest this starting point helps us understand current teachers' unions

Lopreite 2014

not yet published, politics of reproductive rights

• Introduction
• variation in domestic policy re: reproductive rights in Arg, Mex (1)
• both are federal countries with subnational mobilization on these issues
• looks at role of women legislators and political parties in understanding success of gender legislation (2)
• separates contraception and abortion, as they engender different responses (3)
• Explaining Legislative outcomes
• would expect:
• number of women in legislature to increase bills on women's issues
•  party ideology and fragmentation will also come into play: strong ideology drives legislators, fragmentation suggests parties will be less liekly to take a stand on the issue (4)
• National level politics in favor of women's reproductive rights was bleak with Menem, Fox (4-5)
• In Mexico, PRD control of DF meant that DF allowed contraception and abortion (6)
• this resulted in conservative backlash in other parts of the country
• ability of states to create own penal code allowed for political opportunities in both directions (7)
• Starting with Duhalde, women legislators in Argentina able to get federal government ot OK contraception rights (8)
• Women in Congress and Preferences toward Reproductive Rights
• Lots of Women in Arg parliament (9)
• Mexico doesn't follow quotas well (11)
• Political parties fragmentation in Argentina means parties don't take strong stand, women able to form cross-party coalitions (11-12)
• Conclusions:
• number of women in legislature was not a determining factor for policy success (13)
• party ideology was key
• 
  

Roberts 2012

• Introduction
• one the one hand, democratic regimes from the 1980s have proven remarkably durable adn resilient to crises (2)
• On the other hand, party systems have been far less stable
• Paradoxically, democratic consolidation has coincided with a crisis of representation and general disillusionment with the political establishment
• but this crisis affects different countries differently
• Critical junctures:
• neoliberal turn (3)
• reactive sequences against neoliberalism!
• Modes of political representation based in ISI were undermined by its collapse, specficially among the popular classes
• and party systems varied widely in their ability to channel these issues
• Broadly, these critical junctures dealigned parties, made their programmatic promises seem less sincere (especially thanks to bait and switch)
• Argument:
• when a populist/mass-based party undertook economic reform
• it often made the transition more politically viable
• but also dealigned the party from its constituents (4)
• when a right party undertook economic reform
• left party was able to channel dissent through the insittuions
• party alignment was "reinforced"
• in both cases, parties that undertook reforms were vulnerable to leftist challenges
• The Puzzle of Party System Stability in Latin America
• Presidentialized party systems may result in parties with unaccountable elites, ambiguous programmatic stands, but it doesn't help explain the wide variation in strength and durability of party systems (5)
• electoral competition has not stabilized party systems or crystallized partisan identities
• During neoliberal transition programmatic differentiation was tough, since there were such acute constraints on policy options available (7)
• by contrast, the left turn helped realign some of these party systems
• "neoliberal critical junctures and teh reactive sequences they spawned dislodged and reconfigured historic party systems, altering their programmatic alignments in was that heavily conditioned the stability ot partisan competition in the aftermath period" (8)
• Market Liberalization and Part system alignments during neoliberal critical junctures
• Critical junctures are designed to explain why similar types of political or economic challenges produce different, path dependent patterns of institutional change across a range of cases
• suggest neoliberal critical juncture from 1973-1998 (Chavez ended it) (9)
• it altered:
• the character and purpose of state power
• the patterns of association in civil society
• the ways in which societal interests and claims were articulated and represented in the political arena (Collier and Handlin 2009, Yashar 2005)
• Party systems before market adjustment: (10)
• labor mobilizing
• elitist (with clientelistic relations to popular sectors)
• these preconditions weighed heavily on results of critic juncture, but did not define them entirely
• three basic requirements of programmatic structuring of party systems
• parties must adopt relatively coherent stands on salient issues that divide teh body politic (11)
• policies adopted in office must bear resemblance to election platform
• bait and switch severs relationship between electoral verdicts and the content of public policy (12)
• there must be meaningful differences/policy alternatives between the competing parties
• often not true during ISI crisis
• The regionwide transition undermined all three of these basic conditions (13)
• lots of policy switching, left/populist parties went along with reforms, or did bait and switch (13)
• created internal party dissension among leftish parties
• often meant that popular sector connections to parties were severd, replaced with clientelistic relations (14)
• BUT if a conservative party initiated transition, and left remained in opposition, no dealignment
• Three possible outcomes: table on page 16
• parties aligned (contested liberalism), outcome was a durable party system (15)
• Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Uruguay
• Mexico, thanks to creation of PRD which replaced PRI as left
• ambiguously Nicaragua (17)
• dealigned (bait and witch), or neutral (no real left to contest) results on part system (neoliberal convergence), outcome was not a durable part system
• dealigned: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
• Neutral: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay
• contested liberalism allowed for dissent to be challenged through stable forms of electoral competition (17)
• neoliberal convergence resulted in systems susceptible to destabilizing reactive sequences
• 17-25 goes through cases and uses electoral data, etc to prove this story
• 
  

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Nolan Garcia 2013

Silva, Eduardo. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia,  Network Dynmaics and Local Labor Rights Movements in Puebla, Mexico 106-140

• suggests that most labor movements tried to get protective legislation in the face of neoliberalism, and still do (106)
• whole story is about alliances...when transnational movement returned to wield power at the local level, positive/negative unionization outcomes were decided (mainly) by who was allowed to stay in the alliance...when some members were excluded, unions lost important resources which in turn led to defeat (107)
• looking at maquilas, especially Kukdong
• transnational network built over Kukdong fight, then after that was done network leadership was transferred to Mexicans in Matamoros (where they lost)...in two other places, Johnson Contorls and Vaqueros Navarra, national alliances supplied resources that were once supplied by internaional allies, leading to success (107-8)
• (109) local groups seek international allies in hopes of garnering some resources (put broadly) that would allow them to overcome domestic obstacles
• an important key to positive outcomes is what happens when transnational movements "come home"
• starting on 112, account of Kukdong issue, official union is the CROC
• workers at Kukdong became center of a convergence of other groups who became a transnational movement, including USAS, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Maquila Solidarity Network, a local (new) workers center (CAT) and many others (114)
• Kukdong eventually liquidated itself to create a new identity, thus nulling contract with the CROC and allowing independent union to be formed (117)
• though transnational allies wanted to leverage this win into new organizing, members of the new union just wanted to keep their jobs, and withdrew from organizing efforts once they had a contract.  eventually the union lost its own control of the factory to another PRI organization
• CAT then took the lead as this network (minus USAS and a couple others) took on a plant in Matamoros...the network specifically had CAT take the lead so it would be a Mexican-led charge ...goal was to form an independent union (118)
• CAT decided to go after PUMA (because they made clothes at Matamoros Garment) and sought German allies (119)
• but then Matamoros Garment just closed their plant, ending the struggle (120)
• then CAT moved on to Tarrant Ajalpan (TA)
• again goal was to get independent union
• CAT took the lead, but informed the transnational network (121)
• MY IDEAS: "informed"?  is this really transnational cooperation anymore
• took the route of trying to enforce codes on conduct, not mexican law
• early brand targets don't really pan out (122)
• CAT never really got any traction, meanwhile the owners began taking orders to other shops, TA was heading for closure (123)
• everyone gets impatient, workers get tired of waiting for CAT, everyone bickers, and TA closes (123-124)
• CAT COMES OFF WIN AT KUDONG JUST TO LOSE TWICE
• CAT failed after Kukdong because they weren't able to leverage brands the same way that transnational network idd at Kukdong (125)
• brand focus provided all the economic leverage, which is utterly necessary
• at Johnson Controls and Vaqueros Navarra, workers decided to register with Mineros and FAT (resp.), meaning they got to skip first step of union registration process nad could go straight to the election process! (126)  in this case the weaker local groups were able to get help from stronger, though national, groups, and work around local hurdles (127)
• SO WHY DOESN'T EVERYONE DO THIS? why doesn't everyone just affiliate with a national union?!
• Conclusion:  IN THE END, ALL THESE FACTORIES WERE CLOSED, or the unions were busted (128)
• 
  

Hilgers 2008

Hilgers, Tina. 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (4): 123-153. 

•  Introduction
• PRD has been dhandicapped by factionalism, personalism, and clientelism (123)
• PRD has lost many supporters because they have become disillusioned with PRD
• Why have PRD politicians come to use clientelism?
• External Factors
• poverty
• long history of clientelism in Mexican politics
• PRI's use of clientelism
• PRD founders proficiency at using clientielism
• Internal Factors
• party's strategy during democratic transition
• predominance of Cuauthémoc Cardenas and primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic factions and centralized power (124)
• the PRD focused on elections
• did NOT focus on creating an institutionalized party
• thus leadership and alliances were personalized
• Comparison case: PT in Brazil
• shared similar external factors, but this party decided to create internal institutions
• Use of clientelism also ambiguous
• PRD client experiences range from exploitation to participatory community building (125)
• Defining Clientelism
• People of differing social status exchange goods and services for mutual benefit
• the durability of the relationship depends on its benefits outweighing its costs
• Gouldner (1977), clientelism not necessarily bad, "principle of reciprocity" (126)
• Flynn (1975) clentelism = elite control of masses
• Fox (1994)
• authoritarian clientelism = relationship of asymmetrical power
• semi-clientlelism = elites have no capacity to ensure compliance
• heart of clientelism = tension between positive and negative processes (127)
• but just describing it as "exchange of goods" does not distinguish clientelism from patronage, vote-buying, or pork-barreling
• The Initial Causes of Perredista Clientelism
• PRI used camarillas extensively, networks through which (128)
• groups endorsed successful figures
• and actors moved up in the ranks of government as their mentors did
• though much of the lower classes likely voted for Cárdenas in 1988, they couldn't afford to continue to support him post-election because this would threaten their relationship with PRI government
• Given this environment, Cárdenas and his supporters decided to consooidate the amalgam of the FDN into a party (129)
• immediate problems:  this party was ridiculously divided ideologically
• only thing everyone agreed on: they wanted to beat the PRI
• Generally three big currents (FAR fro internally homogeneous)
• institutional, independent left -- all the previous left parties, ended up being sort of center-left
• social left/civil society organizations -- left, but did not fit in with institutional groups...mobilizers, student movements, etc
• ex-priistas -- no unity, just wanted to beat PRI
• Cárdenas believed best strategy was electoral, just try and get PRI unelected at every level
• democratic transition immediately, radical change could come later
• primacy of his vision legitimated  Cárdenas even though he ran for Presidency of PRD unopposed (130)
• ((some FDN groups didn't join PRD, either wanting to maintain independence or not anger PRI))
• PRD never formally detailed procedures for structuring the currents and ensuring internal democracy in PRD (131)
• no horizontal links in the party...all info flowed through Cárdenas!
• the currents began to seem like the PRI's camarillas
• BUT the PRD didn't have as much access to resources, so internal competition over resource was worse
• each current was organized around one "strong man"
• everything became a negotiation, internal elections became undeniably fraudulent/negotiated
• The rise of AMLO split the party between Cárdenas and AMLO (152)
• AMLO made alliances with external groups, which strengthened his position but weakened party unity
• At times the PRD's desire to win elections has overshadowed its principles
• some candidates are courted purely because of their clientelist networks
• In 2004 Congress the pRD noted the issues of clientelism and corruption in the party, tried to ameliorate them, but of course these changes totally failed to win overall support (133)
• The PRD in Government
• even in elected local government there are disputes between members of different currents
• In the Federal District (134)
• the PRD promised to regulate taxis drivers (piratas who rob people), vendors and squatters
• but instead allied with them to increase PRD voter strength
• groups/citizens that are unable/unwilling to make such alliances are immediately and a disadvantage
• THERE HAVE BEEN SOME GOOD DEVELOPMENTS IN DF (135)
• but these tend to be undermined by the methods through which they were achieved
• AMLO portected the poor through unorthodox and extra-constitutional means
• in the end, this is probably bad for democracy
• PRD administrator in Nezhualcóyotl, Estado Mexico, made government way more tasnparent
• BUT this meant he/his faction was less able to negotiate party positions and policy
• in Chiapas clients  who leave the PRD are repressed (136)
• My Take: OVERALL: Good governing undermines ability for people to move up in PRD
• Now people just expect the PRD to be clientelistic, nationwide (137)
• Comparison to PT in Brazil
• PT faced authoritarian beginnings, lots of clientelism in country, and success hinged on Lula's personalistic leadership (138-139)
• PT still does patronage and targeted social programs, but this isn't like the PRD's clientelism (139)
• patronage does note = clientelism (140)
• Blosa Familia is universal, so while its good for PT votes, it doesn't exactly have the same connotation as focused clientelistic distribution of benefits
• My Take: Splitting hairs a bit, but there is something less bad about PT's clentelism than the PRD's
• While PRD though winning electiosn was key, the PT did not think this was enough (141)
• PT's early focus was on building organization, seeking POLICY change first!
• PT adopted democratic procedures early on and the rules are enforced, as is party unity
• PT's connection with voters/its base have kept it from becoming a catch-all party
• The Clients' Perspective
• in some instances clientelism is the best method for keeping politicians accountable, and could build community (142)
• FPFV, squatters group, allied with PRD in DF
• demonstrating and rallying with PRD became mandatory to get apartment/material benefits (143)
• if you left group, they didn't return your deposit assuming you wouldn't have the legal means/stamina to get it back
• clearly it is tough being in this alliance, but members have few resources and few alternatives (144)...some think it's a fine bargain, others don't
• some in DF sought clientelistic linkages to provide for themselves, but found they built community and political power as well (145)
• Conclusion
• Those wo stick with PRD after engaging in clientelism are not the poorest of the poor, nor are they in highly exploitative relationships with their patron (147)
• 
  

Grayson 2004

Grayson 2004

(in Wiarda 2004)

Grayson, George W. “Mexico's Semicorporatist Regime,” in Wiarda, Howard J. 2004. Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America--revisited. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Overview:

• Salinas’s neoliberal reforms
  
  • Ruptured the ruling party (246)
    
  • Diminished rewards to the faithful (due to lower government revenues through tariffs, quotas, etc.)
    
  • Diminished central control
    
  • Caused businesses to start competing on labor costs, which is bad for system/unions
    
• Wiarda also Suggests these reforms led to calls for greater democracy, and gave rise to opposition party successes (especially at the state and local level)
  
• Population growth and social diversification also meant there were more groups outside the corporatist political framework (247)
  
• As corporatist institutions had been slightly undermined, Fox did not have great control over corrupt labor leaders (248)
  
• Talks a lot about Fox’s political styling
  
  • disdain for politicians
    
  • attempt to use media instead of government organizations
    
  • included PRI in some things, didn’t hammer away at them, not many panistas in his cabinet
    
  • allowed Sup Marcos and EZLN to address nation
    
• PRI maintains traditional sectors, though does some changes (BUT, of course, primaries for elections undermine any delegate/candidate concessions)
  
• AMLO taking some corporatist reins, very humanistic but also relatively authoritarian (read: populist)
  
• Lots of foreign NGOs hanging out, too…massive increase over the 2000s, maybe they’ll be important in the future?
  
• No new rules of the game exist for governing (255)
  
  • No new organizations have replaced traditional corporatist structures
    
  • Corp. structures remain, although in much weaker form.
    

Quotes:
“No new rules of the game exist for governing.” (255)

Greer, Stevens, and Stephens 2007

Greer, Stevens, Stephens 2007

GREER, CHARLES R., CHARLES D. STEVENS, and GREGORY K. STEPHENS. 2007. "The State of the Unions in Mexico". Journal of Labor Research. 28 (1): 69-92.
Overview:

• Mostly relies on other literature, not much new analysis
  
• Covers declining union density, composition of employment in Mexico (70-74
  
• Description of power union lost as PRI marginalized labor, and CTM leaders still held on to PRI (75-76)
  
• Uses Bensusán’s typology to show how state-corp unions losing power means the whole movement is losing power (80-83)
  
• Relative Deprivation theory suggests workers should be more active (86)
  
• Transnational alliances (87-88)
  

Quotes:
“The once powerful alliance of government, unions, and business is becoming more tilted against union and workers’ rights and is losing power in the global marketplace.” (82)
“Thus, with the emergence of broad economic and political change, labor unions and the workers they are supposed to represent are at a decided disadvantage and are struggling to find ways to promote the kind of change in labor institutions and support of workers’ rights that is necessary to ensure adequate wages, safety, and other workplace conditions (Gillespie and Tergen 1995).” (84)
‘Relative deprivation theory may partially explain the actions of individuals and workers’ rights organizations oriented toward labor unrest and disputes (Greer and Stephens 1996). More specifically, relative deprivation may lead to increasing collective action, such as growing membership in and support for independent unions. However, obstacles are in the way of such action, such as the traditional ineffectiveness of union intervention, unfriendly legislation, government interpretation of existing laws in favor of company positions, and the prevalence of protectionist company unions…Spontaneous, unofficial, and even violent worker responses to some employer actions should not be entirely unexpected” (86)
“Despite the rhetoric for cross0border solidarity such alliances have not had much success in the past. Reasons for their failures include divergent interests of workers, at least as perceived in the short-run; absence of international expertise or program infrastructure in most unions…; reactive efforts as opposed to strategic initiatives…There are fewer reasons to expect successful alliances between the United States and Mexico given the differential wages and the past hostility of the Mexican government…” (88-89)

“We predict that more independent unions will grow stronger because they meet worker instrumentality needs and because of perceptions of relative deprivation. A country can pursue an economic development strategy based on low wages for only so long. Workers will replace the state-corporatist unions…with independent unions (Bensusán’s terms…) that better represent their interests” (89)

Middlebrook 1995

Middlebrook (1995)

1. Chapter 1: Mass Politics and Regime formation
   1. On the concept of Post-revolutionary Authoritarian rule
      1. Features:
         1. Prominence of mas actors
            1. May be mobilized less and less over time
            2. Still important base of control for government
         2. Political ideals from revolutionary era
            1. Something referencing social change
            2. Rule is legitimated by invoking these symbols/ideologies
            3. Cannot be empty promises, must deliver the goods as well
         3. Dual importance of state and hegemonic party
            1. Party mobilizes social base
            2. Party can serve to cement social alliances
            3. Party can serve as method through which social allies can gain access to state apparatus
   2. Framework for studying mass politics in authoritarian regimes
      1. Limitations on mass mobilization
         1. Can happen through public apathy, legal restrictions, channeling mobilization through the party.
      2. Limits on sociopolitical pluralism
      3. Limits on Demand articulation
         1. Restrictions creates situation in which groups must negotiate, compromise, or modify their goals
   3. (28) “ The party [PRI (and its predecessors)] has been the principal channel through which leaders of lower class organizations achieve upward political mobility”
      1. BUT: the party never developed autonomous means of limiting its constituents’ political actions, it relied on state power for those controls.
      2. THUS: organized labor enjoyed relative autonomy in the party framework (though certainly not in the state regime)
   4. Central Argument: to understand the bases of elite control over and general character of mass politics, must understand both state and societal controls over the labor movement
      1. State = labor law, etc.
      2. Societal = labor unions’ reliance on state subsidies
         1. Economic structure that influenced patterns of unionization and CB power
         2. Organizational form of the labor movement
         3. Political ideas that influence policy preferences and political response strategies
2. Chapter 2: State Structures and political Control
   1. (42) “On the one hand, expanded state administrative capacity gradually increased governing elites’ ability to control developments in the labor sector. On the other hand, legal recognition of basic labor rights and inclusion of worker representatives in come administrative structures strengthened organized labor by providing important symbolic and material benefits to both unions and individual workers.”
   2. (51-2) 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo institutionalized activist role of government in protection f workers at a time when the unions weren’t strong enough to protect themselves (the CROM had fallen out of power soon before 1930)
      1. Leads to creation of Secretary of Labor (STPS, Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social), as well as the CTM
   3. JCA’s preserves the distinction between federal and local jurisdictions (60)
   4. Labor seat on JCA’s help unions expand their organizations (61-62)
   5. Reconocimiento, official recognition/registration of unions, improves power of unions compared to employers, but also gives state power over unions (65)
   6. State has some ability to meddle in union internal affairs (elections, etc.) but not much. Also, requirements do not safeguard union democracy.
   7. Strikes must be registered, only occur after arbitration proceedings have concluded (69)
3. Chapter 3 – The challenge of mass participation and the origins of Mexico’s state subsidized labor movement
   1. Before the revolution, labor movements were dispersed, and in small enterprises, who had little bargaining power
   2. Morones, while founding the CROM
      1. marginalized the anarchosyndicalists, and
      2. decided they need to ally with the government to have any power
   3. CROM never made inroads in industries with strong unions, like railroad workers and electrical workers
   4. Relations between the CROM and Obregon quickly soured, were eventually charged with assassination of Obregon!
   5. CTM founded by CROM dissidents and under Cardenas’ hope to unite labor movement to support him, CROM remains relatively pro-Calles
   6. Even while he supported the CTM, Cardenas worked against the CTM
      1. He helped found the FSTSE to keep government workers out of the hands of the CTM
      2. He kept peasants out of the CTM
   7. Cardenas’s PRM first to officially tie labor to an official political party (1938), SECTORS
   8. SME leaves CTM in 1939 after CTM supports presidential candidate Camacho
   9. Subsidies to labor movement
      1. Legal
         1. Exclusion clauses
         2. Separation clauses
      2. Financial
         1. CTM had trouble collecting dues, but stayed solvent
         2. Middlebrook hints at direct monetary subsidies
      3. Political
         1. Preferential access to electoral lists of PRM/PRI and administrative positions
            1. Leverage for union
            2. Personal benefit
         2. No reelection meant constant demand for new and loyal candidates
         3. CTM dominated these positions
         4. Chair in the Chamber of Deputies was most available, some Senate seats, practically no governorships (too important to PRI power structure to give away as spoils)
   10. (106) “The consolidation of the post-revolutionary social pact occurred, then, not with CTM membership in the governing party but with the political triumph of progovernment labor leaders in the aftermath of a major labor crisis in the late 1940s” (emphasis added by me!)
4. Chapter 4: Turning Point the 1947-51 Labor Crisis
   1. Case study on railroad workers
   2. RR, like other protected sectors, autonomous, strong, politically minded
   3. During labor crisis (post-WWII) government supports more pragmatic leadership, alternative/radical paths slowly squelched
   4. Once these unions are turned toward pragmatic (non-radical) ends
      1. CTM dominant, BUT:
      2. Begins period of truly institutionalized social pact
         1. Previously pact had rested on shoulders of President and specific union confederations
   5. Labor movement united under CT in 1966, but only a façade under which fragmentation persists
   6. Social pact:
      1. Unions (leaders) can’t survive without political support
      2. Unions become effective tools of worker control for political leaders
   7. Also, CROC formed in 1952 by Aleman government, “to unite disparate labor groups in an organization that was simultaneously…
      1. …Loyal to the government (it was affiliated with the PRI), and…
      2. …Hostile to the CTM.” (page 250)
      3. United some conservative groups (like the CPN, Confederación Proletaria Nacional) and the CUT (formerly lefty under RR workers leaders)
5. Chapter 5: State Structures, Political Control, and Labor Participation: an Assessment
   1. STRIKES: “…postrevolutionary governments generally maintained strong control over stieks in federal-jurisdiction economic activities, regardless of changes in the political character of different presidential administrations.” (171)
   2. LABOR UNION REGISTRATION: Political influence/action can influence rates of labor union registration, but generally no variables explained differences in time to register, meaning there was NO effect due to
      1. presidential administration
      2. difference in confederation
   3. WORKER DEMAND RESOLUTION:
      1. Includes an in-depth case of RR workers union
      2. Some presidential effect, but also surprising anti-worker effect for Cardenas
6. Chapter 6: Labor Politics and ISI
   1. ISI good and bad
      1. Development, work, but
      2. Balance of payment problems
      3. Inflation problems
      4. Result: people have jobs, but their wages are falling!
   2. CTM often spoke radically, acted pragmatically when ISI stumbled and inflation rose
   3. Section on democracy in Mexican automobile sector
      1. Neither presidential policy nor strength of state labor federations adequately explains democratization (229)
      2. Car mfg. undergoing changes, less paternal relations, just-in-time0ish style prxn, and modern assembly line
      3. Workers viewed democratization seen as a way to gain better bargaining power, as their leaders were initially unable to cope with their new demands
      4. Workplace differences (especially with delegado system) important to explaining variation across auto plants (236)
      5. Democratic unions generally better at gaining control of production, bad at increasing wages, struck more often
7. Chapter 7: Labor Politics under Economic Stress in the 1980s
   1. Failure of ISI
      1. Economic difficulties, interest rates, defaults
      2. Less government spending
      3. Inflation!!!
   2. Organized Labor’s Response
      1. Unions never thought they were adequately compensated for sacrifices during 1976-7 crisis
      2. De la Madrid agrees to price controls in 1983, then immediately breaks his deal
      3. NO strike petitions approved
      4. CROC and CROM used to harass CTM
      5. 1984 CTM threatens general strike, but steps back and agrees to negotiate on de la Madrid’s terms, CT makes demands but never gains anything real
      6. WORKERS LOSE
      7. “The CTM’s historical reluctance to pursue more aggressive collective action in support of workers’ interests is one of the most noteworthy aspects of state-labor relations in Mexico.” (265)
   3. What explains unions’ actions?
      1. Usual suspects
         1. Crisis weakened bargaining power
            1. CTM had heterogeneous members
            2. None/few in strategic industries
         2. Government control over strikes and union recognition
         3. CTM had more deputies in Congress, maybe thought they’d recoup losses later?
      2. New ideas
         1. Internal weakness of CTM, others
         2. Leaders’ (Velazquez’s) political beleifs
            1. (Weakish)
            2. Leaders’ fear that a true mobilization would be a breeding ground for union democracy, undermine their old control over unions
   4. Industrial restructuring in automobile industry
      1. Automakers open new plants, get CTM unions, undermine democratic unions
      2. CTM unions give management much more leeway on production methods, democratic unions able to fight back a bit
      3. Volkswagen at Puebla
         1. Leaders capitulate a bit in secret agreement
         2. Midlevel and rank and file revolt
         3. Union turmoil allows VW (thanks to JFCA decision) to fire everyone, rehire who they want, keep pliable union
      4. Flexible contracts more important than low wages to managers! (286)
   5. Privatization of state-owned firms crushed official unions ability to use political influence to win economic demands
   6. State-subsidized labor organizations lost their ability to win concessions, but maintained their significance as instruments of political control of workers.
8. CONCLUSION
   1. Union/party alliance
      1. Benefitted labor because resulted in subsidies
      2. Benefitted party because party had no other means of controlling mass base
   2. CTM resisted democratic opening: why?! Central question of the chapter
   3. Over time unions had experienced a cumulative weakening after presidents defined and redefined the alliance
   4. Unions weakest point ever in 1980s/90s, and business gains better foothold with government
   5. BUT labor still important for getting out the vote
      1. This control, however, became less reliable (see 1988 prez election)
   6. “Because post-revoutionary authoritarian regimes generally develop distinctive ideologies that give workers a special place in postrevolutionary society…labor has a stronger interest in preserving elements of the status quo…” (317)
      1. Long-term democratization may be a good thing, BUT
      2. Short term democratization may pose significant costs to labor unions
   7. As jobs move north in Mexico, they further weaken unions by
      1. Dispersing labor
      2. Gets far away from political center of country
      3. Move closer to anti-union areas of the country.
   8. Labor leaders also suck at times, protection contracts
   9. Political parties are an important place where labor can get power, but
      1. Have the taint of old style PRI relationships
      2. PRD, rest of left have focused on electoral competitions, not alliances with unions (325-6)
   10. Finally, labor law needs to change, bad!

Samstad 2002

Samstad 2002

Samstad, James G. 2002. "Corporatism and Democratic Transition: State and Labor during the Salinas and Zedillo Administrations". Latin American Politics and Society. 44 (4): 1-28.
Overview:

• Corporatism involved three levels
  
  • State/”Macro”-corporatism: national level, tripartite discussions of economic and political policy (3)
    
  • Micro/Local or firm level corporatism: representatives on JCA’s
    
  • Party corporatism
    
• Shift to export-led growth created tensions in the coalition forged under ISI (5)
  
• Procedural democracy poses a greater challenge to corporatism that ELG (6)
  
  • Decline of strong president gives each level of corp. more autonomy
    
  • Resistance to herding rank and file by authoritarian labor leaders
    
• By end of Salinas, labor corp. still basically intact (11)
  
• Creation of UNT in 1997, labor split challenged all three levels of corporatism
  
  • who gets to peak bargain? (MACRO)
    
    • CTM tries ‘corporatism without government’
      
  • UNT and some in CT call for more democratic PRI(PARTY)
    
    • ALSO: primaries for candidates decreases labor delegates
      
• Few structural changes to corporatism, HOWEEVER, big changes in how corporatism works in practice
  

Quotes:
“The party (PRI) has formally incorporated labor as a ‘sector’ with nominal voting rights…Over the years, representatives of PRI-affiliated labor organizations consequently secured a non-insignificant share of nominations for elected posts…In return, those organizations were often expected to deliver the votes and organizational support of their rank and file…” (4)
“The shift to export-led growth created tensions in the coalition forged under ISI” (5)
“What change that has occurred has been in how corporatism functioned in practice, and this transformation has come primarily as a side-effect of a decline in centralized presidentialism and an increase in political pluralism during [Zedillo’s] sexennio.” (19)

Fairris and Levine 2004

Fairris and Levine 2004

Fairris, D., and E. Levine. 2004. "Declining union density in Mexico, 1984-2000". MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW. 127 (9): 10-17.
Overview:
Data on Declining Union Density in Mexico, drop of 10 percentage points from 1984-2000
Uses old data from 1980s combined with household surveys
Education workers HIGHLY unionized, well higher than any other industry (13-14)
Finds changing composition of workforce is part of the decline (areas of low unionization, gender, etc etc.), but much of the decline is changing institutional context (Unfavorable government, employers)
Quotes:
“For the "formal" sector labor force as a whole, union density declined from just over 30 percent in 1984 to just under 20 percent in 2000.” (11)

De la Garza Toledo 2003

De la Garza Toledo 2003

De La Garza Toledo, E. 2003. "MEXICAN TRADE UNIONISM IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL TRANSITION". Research in the Sociology of Work. (11): 207-228.

from cornfield and McCammon 2003

Overview

• Two factors causing crisis of corporatism
  
  • Neoliberal turn
    
  • Restructuring of large firms and production processes
    
    • Has resulted in flexible and/or unilateral collective bargaining model
      
• Tried neoliberal corporatism, failed
  
• New working class in Mexico has lost its ideology and project, new working class (maquila sector) have no class identity, no trade union tradition
  
• The state, unions, and firms prefer ghost unions to no unions
  
• Little has changed
  
• UNT not being overly confrontational
  
• Predicts unlikely that Fox will wage war against corporatism (he’s right!)
• NEW TAKE
• the "neoliberal corporatist" attempts during the early 1990s totally failed to change unions (210)
• this also failed because the state partially withdrew from labor relations leaving firms to carry out their own restructuring (211)
• AGAIN STATE IS A PASSIVE PLAYER
• 
  

Quotes:
“The unions appeared in the nineties as mere control instruments sustained by a formal and informal political, judiciary, and institutional superstructure constructed over workers since the thirties”

“It would seem these leaders are more interested in survival or in gaining power that in taking advantage of the situation in order to reorient trade unionism toward non-corporate, democratic and representative paths”