Wilson 2007

Wilson, Fiona. (2007). "Transcending race? schoolteachers and political militancy in andean peru, 1970-2000." Journal of Latin American Studies, 39(4), 719-746

• In Latin America the school has been important to nation formation since teh 19th century, it is the space for social reproduction, but also the production of the state (719-720)
• education was the way to achieve citizenship (720)
• great lit review on the importance of the state to social formation (719-722)
• "My research in teh Peruvian central sierra in teh 1990s suggested that teachers felt teaching had been reduced to a profession of last resort ad this, in turn, reflected back on their racial identity in that they risked being defined as mestizos of last resort too." (722)
• most teachers in Peru held the mestizo identity partially because they were agents of the staet (725)
• they were expected to be more than teachers, and to perform a host of functions apart from teaching
• they were a civilizing force
• but as members of this civilizing avant garde, teachers have at times organized against the state, and have often been repressed (726)
• SUTEP was founde din 1972, led by Marxist university teachers, held that there was no racism in their ranks (728)
• teachers were very important memebrs of Sendero Luminoso (728-729)
• at times teachers would side with the peasants, especially int eh areas of agrarian reform in the 1970s, because they felt it was an important step in civilizing the indgenous populationj (731-33)
• but then this resulted in teachers being cast out from the white society from which the originally came (733)
• SUTEP became more popular among teachers as teachers began losing status through the massification f their profession (734)
• but this also had the danger of making teachers seem eve less cultured and sophisticated
• 1978 strikes won a few demands, but when the state started to back away from these in 1979, new strike which was repressed and meant teachers working conditions and salaries were reduced (735)
• the union became a haven of mestizaje for the teachers, though outside society branded the union as the opposite, cholos and firebrands
• now teachers became potential subsersives, coudl no longer be trusted to represent the state (736)
• many teachers may have suported Sendero Luminoso, but after the real fighting began many tried to abandon the group and take up a middle space between the state and the Maoists, which was difficult to do given the polarization of society (744)
• teaches who didn't toe the state line were cholos, which disheartened many techers who had become teachers specifically to avoid/overcome this low racial status (745)

Roberts 2012

• Introduction
• one the one hand, democratic regimes from the 1980s have proven remarkably durable adn resilient to crises (2)
• On the other hand, party systems have been far less stable
• Paradoxically, democratic consolidation has coincided with a crisis of representation and general disillusionment with the political establishment
• but this crisis affects different countries differently
• Critical junctures:
• neoliberal turn (3)
• reactive sequences against neoliberalism!
• Modes of political representation based in ISI were undermined by its collapse, specficially among the popular classes
• and party systems varied widely in their ability to channel these issues
• Broadly, these critical junctures dealigned parties, made their programmatic promises seem less sincere (especially thanks to bait and switch)
• Argument:
• when a populist/mass-based party undertook economic reform
• it often made the transition more politically viable
• but also dealigned the party from its constituents (4)
• when a right party undertook economic reform
• left party was able to channel dissent through the insittuions
• party alignment was "reinforced"
• in both cases, parties that undertook reforms were vulnerable to leftist challenges
• The Puzzle of Party System Stability in Latin America
• Presidentialized party systems may result in parties with unaccountable elites, ambiguous programmatic stands, but it doesn't help explain the wide variation in strength and durability of party systems (5)
• electoral competition has not stabilized party systems or crystallized partisan identities
• During neoliberal transition programmatic differentiation was tough, since there were such acute constraints on policy options available (7)
• by contrast, the left turn helped realign some of these party systems
• "neoliberal critical junctures and teh reactive sequences they spawned dislodged and reconfigured historic party systems, altering their programmatic alignments in was that heavily conditioned the stability ot partisan competition in the aftermath period" (8)
• Market Liberalization and Part system alignments during neoliberal critical junctures
• Critical junctures are designed to explain why similar types of political or economic challenges produce different, path dependent patterns of institutional change across a range of cases
• suggest neoliberal critical juncture from 1973-1998 (Chavez ended it) (9)
• it altered:
• the character and purpose of state power
• the patterns of association in civil society
• the ways in which societal interests and claims were articulated and represented in the political arena (Collier and Handlin 2009, Yashar 2005)
• Party systems before market adjustment: (10)
• labor mobilizing
• elitist (with clientelistic relations to popular sectors)
• these preconditions weighed heavily on results of critic juncture, but did not define them entirely
• three basic requirements of programmatic structuring of party systems
• parties must adopt relatively coherent stands on salient issues that divide teh body politic (11)
• policies adopted in office must bear resemblance to election platform
• bait and switch severs relationship between electoral verdicts and the content of public policy (12)
• there must be meaningful differences/policy alternatives between the competing parties
• often not true during ISI crisis
• The regionwide transition undermined all three of these basic conditions (13)
• lots of policy switching, left/populist parties went along with reforms, or did bait and switch (13)
• created internal party dissension among leftish parties
• often meant that popular sector connections to parties were severd, replaced with clientelistic relations (14)
• BUT if a conservative party initiated transition, and left remained in opposition, no dealignment
• Three possible outcomes: table on page 16
• parties aligned (contested liberalism), outcome was a durable party system (15)
• Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Uruguay
• Mexico, thanks to creation of PRD which replaced PRI as left
• ambiguously Nicaragua (17)
• dealigned (bait and witch), or neutral (no real left to contest) results on part system (neoliberal convergence), outcome was not a durable part system
• dealigned: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
• Neutral: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay
• contested liberalism allowed for dissent to be challenged through stable forms of electoral competition (17)
• neoliberal convergence resulted in systems susceptible to destabilizing reactive sequences
• 17-25 goes through cases and uses electoral data, etc to prove this story
• 
  

Levitsky and Cameron 2003

Levitsky, Steven, and Maxwell A. Cameron. 2003. "Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru". Latin American Politics and Society. 45 (3): 1-33.

1. Introduction
1. In the 1990s, party system in Peru totally disintegrated (1)
2. The weak and fragile opposition failed to check Fujimori’s dismantling of institutional limits on his power...he only fell out of power after a corruption scandal
3. Goals:
1. explain party system decomposition (2)
1. Fujimori’s success really drove this home
2. regime implications of a party system collapse
1. political figures stopped acting as horizontal checks to power
2. proliferation of candidate-centered movements eroded oppositions ability to act collectively
3. prospects for rebuilding parties in Peru?
1. current politicians lack the incentive and capacity to build new parties
2. Why Parties Matter in a Democracy (3)
1. parties act as cues to voters (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999)
2. parties also allow short-sighted politicians make longer-term plans (Aldrich 1995)
3. Parties protect against one group taking complete control, politics becomes the arena for all powerful actors to duke it out (army, working class, etc etc), rather than in the streets
4. Strong parties increase governability (3-4)
5. parties help hold elected leaders accountable (4)
6. parties limit power of executive
7. parties socialize elites, thereby limiting power of outsiders
8. PARTIES FACILITATE COLLECTIVE ACTION (5)
3. Democratic Breakdown and Party System Collapse in Peru (6)
1. Party Crisis, Outsider Politics, and the 1992 Autogolpe
1. In the late 1980s parties fell into crisis
1. radically changed electorate:
1. final expansion to universal suffrage
2. large scale urban migration
3. expansion of urban informal sector
2. at the same time, there was a deep recession (6-7)
3. AND the Sendero Luminoso guerilla movement
2. In 1990 political outsider ALberto Fujimori won the presidency (thanks to a few contingent things) (7)
3. Fujimori’s election further weakened democracy
1. Peru was experiencing a democratic collapse, and Fujimori had no party to help him combat this
2. so Fujimori opted for an authoritarian strategy to save his presidency
2. Authoritarian Success and the Rise of Political “Independents” (8)
1. Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe successfully convinced the electorate that it was necessary to overturn “false democracy” (Paredes Castro et al. 1992)
1. Fujimori got very popular
2. Fujimorista factions won big majority of elections in 1992
2. Fujimori (in 1992) able to defeat BOTH inflation AND Sendero Luminoso
3. Peru is only place where anti-party president was able to end economic crisis (9)
1. when opposition parties defended democratic institutions, popular opinion was actually AGAINST them/that issue
4. TWO LESSONS for Peruvian politicians at that time (10)
1. defending pre-autogolpe democracy was not viable (many adopted ambiguous positions re: autogolpe)
2. parties no longer needed (Fujimori didn’t create one)
5. New Parties = “disposable”, one-election vehicles (11-12)
1. “Peru’s party system was created anew at each election” (12)
4. Party Weakness, Caesarism, and the Failure of the Democratic Opposition
1. Atomized system of politics was consolidated in 1990s (13)
1. parties played little role in Fujimori’s downfall
2. environment where defense of democracy and party-building were widely perceived as unprofitable
2. Destruction of Mechanism or Horizontal Accountability
1. between 1995 and 2000, Fujimori dismantled most checks of the 1993 Constitution (14)
1. when Constitutional Tribunal (TC) tried to block Fujimori, Fujimori simply dismantled TC (15)
2. opposition did not have enough elected officials to call a referendum
1. Peruvians opposed Fujimori’s abuses, but could not channel opposition/protests into a sustainable movement
2. atomized politicians shied away from taking on the government, further hindered cohesion of opposition (16)
3. The 2000 Transition: Opposition Weakness and Collapse from Within
1. Fujimori systematically oppress opposition candidates in 2000 (17)
2. Fujimori caught up in scandal when his party, Perú 2000, didn’t technically get enough real signatures to have Fujimori on the ballot
1. yet major parties did not fight this scandal out
3. In second round of elections, remaining opposition leader refused to compete against Fujimori, damaged his legitimacy (18-19)
1. Fujimori still won, and faced protest from internal and external sources (19)
2. BUT none of these sources were able to dislodge Fujimori from power
4. Fujimori was even able to construct a new governing coalition by bribing and coopting individual members of the opposition to become members of his bloc (these politicians became known as “transfugas”) (19-20)
1. party weakness meant the parties had no mechanism to induce these politicians to stay in the fold (20)
5. BUT, then a video surfaced in 2001 of a transfuga literally being paid to join Fujimori (21)
1. Congress and the President both lost legitimacy
2. Montesinos, Fujimori’s head of Intelligence, had an large video archive of Fujimori/ista bribery
3. Fujimori resigns rather than be open to blackmail
4. Change and Continuity in the 2001 Elections
1. The country’s democratic institutions were thoroughly reformed after Fujimori resigned
2. But electoral politics remained very candidate-centered (22)
5. The Prospects for Part (Re)Building in Peru (25)
1. Resignation of Fujimori means government no longer repressing opposition candidates
2. Institutionalists: Institutions were fixed-ish after 2001, which is good
3. BUT historical-structuralists:
1. no stable parties have been created since full suffrage (24), usually stable parties come after big social cleavages (23-24)
2. Changes in class structure and technology have atomized voters, and also made it easier to access these voters despite their atomization (24)
3. mass media also means politicians don’t need party mechanisms
4. 1990s may have been a critical juncture for party system in Peru...since established parties failed, politicians have had little incentive to create new ones (outside personalistic vehicles) (25)
1. What new parties do emerge will likely be loose coalitions with tenuous linkages to society (26)
6. CONCLUSION:  Democracy without Parties?
1. without parties, increased likelihood of (27)
1. executive-legislative conflict
2. executive abuse of power
3. corruption
4. successful outsider/anti-system candidates
2. parties provide democratic goods (see lit review), without them these goods aren’t provided
3. CONUNDRUM:
1. “...parties are among the least credible democratic institutions in Latin America today, yet democracy without them is nearly inconceivable”

Burgess and Levitsky 2003

Burgess, Katrina and Steven Levitsky. 2003. "Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in Latin America: Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela." Comparative Political Studies. 36: 881-911.

1. Introduction
1. changes in trade and production altered the working class (882)
2. fall of Soviet Union altered international political situation
3. These changes compelled mass-populist parties to rethink their platforms and social coalitions
4. populist parties changed their coalitions in very different ways across LAm
5. two level framework:
1. Parties incentives to adapt = economic + political conditions
1. deep economic crisis and weak left alternatives created incentives to turn to neoliberalism
2. Organizational capacity to adapt = fluidity of leadership hierarchies + autonomy of chief executive
1. more fluid structures and stronger executive leads to great adaptive capacity (883)
6. Four “cases: all four experienced similar economic pressures
1. PJ in Argentina --> medium neoliberal --> stable electoral base
2. PRI in Mexico --> high neoliberal --> losing ground-but-stable electoral base
3. no neoliberal, electoral collapse:
1. Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) en Peru
2. Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela
4. VARIATION CAUSED BY EXTERNAL INCENTIVES AND ABILITY TO ADAPT
2. Explaining Populist Party Adaptation
1. Mini-lit review
1. informal workers are a much more tenuous support base for populist parties compared to old working class (Roberts 1998) (884)
2. This article contextualizes previous approaches that relied only on leadership as cause of party adaptation (885)
2. Environmental factors: Electoral and Economic Environment
1. Electoral environment, two possible challenges
1. center/center-right parties that attract middle class, leave populist parties with only working class constituents (885-886)
2. further left parties may draw off support of the urban informal sector and poor (886)
2. Economic environment, depends on depth of crisis
1. extreme crises, like hyperinflation, mean that any means (read: neoliberal means) are worth it since cost of letting crisis continue outweighs cost of abandoning traditional statist program (887)
2. moderate crisis, change less necessary
3. Party Organization: Capacity to Adapt
1. fluidity of party hierarchy
1. more fluid, less bureaucratic, easier leadership change = better able to adapt (887-888)
2. degree to which office-holding leaders are autonomous from parties
1. essentially a measure of bureaucracy of intra-party relations (888)
3. Applying the Framework
1. lack of market reform was closely associated with electoral decline in 1980s/90s (889)
2. PJ: Adaptation and Electoral Success: 1989 Menem neoliberal surprise, little intraparty resistance (890-891)
3. PRI: Adaptation and Survival: really ramped up with Salinas (891), Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas defected, but generally no intraparty resistance (892)
4. APRA: Failed Populism and Electoral Decline: 1985 Alan García stayed populist, Peru descends into hyperinflation, APRA collapses in 1990s
5. AD: Blocked Reform and Electoral Decline:
1. 1984 Jaime Lusinchi implemented tough austerity measures, but abandoned them once recovery came and relied heavily on oil revenue (893)
2. Carlos Andrés Pérez 1989, “The Great TUrnaround” neoliberalism, blocked by AD itself (intraparty)
4. Incentives to Adapt
1. variables: inflation rate, GDP growth rate, balance of payments the year President was elected (894)
1. PJ = high incentives to adapt (895)
1. deep crisis from a heterodox administration (895)
2. no threat from the left (895)
3. story:  Menem faced credibility gap with foreign investors, crisis started under UCR heterodox government, no threat from left, and PJ needed to better attract middle class anyway (896)
2. PRI and AD = medium incentives: (895)
1. moderate crisis (895)
2. weak to mixed electoral incentives (895)
3. PRI story: Mexico had a bit of a credibility gap, and faced threats from right (PAN) and left (PRD). (897) ME: Essentially, Mexico doesn’t quite fit this framework
4. AD Story: Venezuela had two short-lived crises (898); reforms were started but increase in oil revenues and government spending usually fixed them (898); economic hardships usually seen by public as mismanagement and corruption, not failure of economic model (899); AD faced no electoral challenge, but one minor one came from the left, so added to disincentive (899)
3. APRA = disincentives:
1. moderate crisis inherited from ORTHOdox government (895)
2. intense left wing competition (895)
3. story: poor economic performance in the 1980s was associated with IMF-style austerity program under center-right government (897-898), Since 1950s APRA had shifted toward the right, and leftist military dictator meant that left made a lot of inroads, threatened APRA’s working class constituency (898)
5. Capacity to Adapt (899)
1. PJ is really fluid and flexible (see Levitsky 2003) (900),and executives have a lot of autonomy: “government controls the party” (901)
2. PRI is relatively fluid, but not extremely fluid.  Real cause is the chief executive’s massive autonomy from party (902)
3. APRA is “strategically flexible” (read: it’s a populist party) but does not have a fluid party structure (903).  Importantly: executive has a lot of autonomy, though APRA also has it’s own power autonomous from Prez
4. AD: bureaucratic party with low leadership autonomy.  started acting like an opposition party when Pérez initiated reforms (904)

Page 905	Hi incentive to adapt	Medium incentive	low incentive
High capacity to adapt	PJ (adapted)	PRI (adapted)
Medium Capacity			APRA (no adapt)
Low capacity		AD (no adapt)

6. Putting the Variables Together/Conclusion
1. “In this context, Salinas’ decision to accelerate and deepen neoliberalism was rather bold” (905) Meaning: Mexico doesn’t fit our model very well
2. “...the strategies of individual parties may have profound party systemic implications as well” (907)
1. Systems in Argentina and Mexico stayed stable
2. Systems in Peru and Venezuela collapsed