Wilson 2007

Wilson, Fiona. (2007). "Transcending race? schoolteachers and political militancy in andean peru, 1970-2000." Journal of Latin American Studies, 39(4), 719-746

• In Latin America the school has been important to nation formation since teh 19th century, it is the space for social reproduction, but also the production of the state (719-720)
• education was the way to achieve citizenship (720)
• great lit review on the importance of the state to social formation (719-722)
• "My research in teh Peruvian central sierra in teh 1990s suggested that teachers felt teaching had been reduced to a profession of last resort ad this, in turn, reflected back on their racial identity in that they risked being defined as mestizos of last resort too." (722)
• most teachers in Peru held the mestizo identity partially because they were agents of the staet (725)
• they were expected to be more than teachers, and to perform a host of functions apart from teaching
• they were a civilizing force
• but as members of this civilizing avant garde, teachers have at times organized against the state, and have often been repressed (726)
• SUTEP was founde din 1972, led by Marxist university teachers, held that there was no racism in their ranks (728)
• teachers were very important memebrs of Sendero Luminoso (728-729)
• at times teachers would side with the peasants, especially int eh areas of agrarian reform in the 1970s, because they felt it was an important step in civilizing the indgenous populationj (731-33)
• but then this resulted in teachers being cast out from the white society from which the originally came (733)
• SUTEP became more popular among teachers as teachers began losing status through the massification f their profession (734)
• but this also had the danger of making teachers seem eve less cultured and sophisticated
• 1978 strikes won a few demands, but when the state started to back away from these in 1979, new strike which was repressed and meant teachers working conditions and salaries were reduced (735)
• the union became a haven of mestizaje for the teachers, though outside society branded the union as the opposite, cholos and firebrands
• now teachers became potential subsersives, coudl no longer be trusted to represent the state (736)
• many teachers may have suported Sendero Luminoso, but after the real fighting began many tried to abandon the group and take up a middle space between the state and the Maoists, which was difficult to do given the polarization of society (744)
• teaches who didn't toe the state line were cholos, which disheartened many techers who had become teachers specifically to avoid/overcome this low racial status (745)

Nardacchione 2012

• In Neuquen in 1997 protets against Menemismo came through alliances between piquteros and teachers (2)
• on the one hand they were unhappy with unepmloyment, etc
• on the other hand they were trying to defend public education
• this allowed the union to push against provincialization in a national way, create a political movement, and demand national support for public edcuation as a universal justice demand
• provincialization caused
• wages to go down (3)
• working conditions to get worse
• CTERA found itself unable to coordinate its demands to the national level, stuck in a fragmented opposition
• some governments started paying teachers under the table, meaning they did not contribute to obras sociales (4)
• CTERA had trouble of articulating provincial demands at the national level
• for example: SUTEBA would strike, but SADOP and FEB didn't help
• Provincial crises
• at first the provincialization of education caused a drop in militancy and strikes, but eventually problems at the province level made the edcuation adn fiscal crisis worse (5)
• fiscal crisis occurred in many provinces because the national government was an important source of money for the provinces (5)
• not only were education budgets low, but they were set up irrationally (6)
• this strong problem a the provincial level led to deepening and expanding labor protest at the provincial level
• soon the teachers in some provinces were striking more against general issues facing society as a whole, not just for specific issues in regard to their own salaries or working conditions (7)
• this general protest, combined with the fact that it was happenign in many different provinces and the fact that there was some violence result in the re-nationalization of the conflict in 1997 (7)
• when other unions didn't join SUTEBA protests, they found allies outside the union sector, and eventually with UCR and FREPASO (8)
• The nationalization and politicization of the conflict
• the first is a recentralization of the deabte, the second is a move away from technical questions to social/citizenship ones (8)
• the CTERA wanted to do a national strike in 1996, but was having trouble convincing its uniosn to follow, and to get the government to talk to them...the government eventually agreed to talk about these things... (10)
• but hte union in Nequen decided to go on strike anyway, it was a broad colaition against lowering salaries across public sector workers, and the closing of YPF...
• violence to clear roadblock, bystander killed by police (10)...
• in response to this violence, CTERA called  anational strike (80% adhesion) and quit negotiating with teh government (11)
• BIG strike with lots of help, carpa blanca, and after this the idea of nationalizing education demands became a reality (11)
• this also helped the politicization of the cause, as non-union groups joined the fight after this (11-12)
• national ministry wanted to focus the talks on techinical aspects of teaching, while CTERA changed the topic to political and social-economic role of teaching (12)
• CTERA starts doing a lot of social actions, whole eudcation question became way bigger than just a union issue (13)
• 
  

Perazza 2011a

Perazza, Roxana. 2011a. Relaciones de consenso y cooperación. El caso argentino. Desafíos desde la política pública. El Cotidiano, Julio-Agosto, 121-126.

• since 2003 government-teacher union relations have been really important in decisions around education (121)
• Governments in Latin America need to improve and expand education systems (122)
•  state is retaking its role as important garantor of education rights of its citizens (122)
• the state has had many responses to teachers unions, sometimes it ignores them, somtimes it works with them
• one big reason why unions have been included in negotiations over education policy is because teachers unions have gotten into politics
• but education reforms also produce tensions in teh relationship between government adn unions
• teacher careers, training, and promotion has been a place where governments have attempted to confront teachers unions
• but despite this, it is important to note that some of the things that need reofrming would actually be good for teachers, like (123)
• less ridigity in what is taught
• new demands are being made of teachers, especially given the massive influx of students
• reforms could be made that respect labor rights and actually allow teachers to have access to professional improvement
• ANALYSIS: reforms aren't bad in themselves, but seem to be resisted by teachers unions because they can be double-edged
• the post dictatorship period in argentina until 2003 was all about cuts for teachers (123)
• marcha blanca in 1988 and and carpa blanca in 1997, fought Menem (123-124)
• in 2003 everthign changed, and the president made laws that made the teachers happy (124)
• now national and provincial governments get together and talk with teachers when there are problems
• BUT teacher protest and strikes continued in a few places, some provinces had to borrow money from teh central government to pay teacher salaries (124)
• but though Argentina has started to rely on consensus with teachers, many of the old problems of education still exist (124-125)
• yet strikes still occur... (125)
• and unions in governmetn face an intersting tadeoff that can rsult in radicalization of the base
•  also inequality complicates everything, and improved education policy isn't the answer, needs to be coupled with better economic and social policy (126
• governments should try to bild consensus with teacehrs unions and give restitution if some of their historical demands are not met (26)
• 
  

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. G, & Tilly, C. 2001. Dynamics of contention. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Chapter 1:

• contentious politics: episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, and object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (b) the claims would, if resolved, affect the interests of as least one of the claimants  (5)
• episodic is key to this being contentious politics, and not just "normal" politics
• this definition is broad to combat the fact that the study of institutional/non-institutional politics has gotten too narrow, and often politics (contentious or otherwise) can go in and out of institutional realm (6)
• contained versus transgressive contention: (govt is involved in both in some way)
• contained contention
• cases of contention in which all parties are previously established actors employing established means of claim making (7)
• transgressive contention:
• at least some of the actors involved are newly self-identified political actors AND/OR at least some parties employ innovative collective action (7-8)
• "many instances of transgressive contention grow out of episodes of contained contention" (8)
• "substantial short-term political and social change more often emerges from transgressive contention than from contained contention", contained contention often just reifies existing regimes (8)
• "insted of seeking to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for mobilization, action, or certain trajectories, we search out recurrent causal mechanisms and regularities in their concatenation (13)
• seem to be looking for similarities across different cases
• pursuing "partial parallels" (13-14)
• four overlapping and competing lines fof explanation of contention (20)
• (21) structural analysis -- interests + capacities = action or not
• rationalist analysis -- individuals are rational and decide
• phenomenological analysis -- plumbing states of awareness for explanations of involvement in contentious politics
• cultural approaches -- norms, beliefs, and symbols that affect/create contention
• mechanism: a delimited class of events that alter relations among specifified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations (24)
• types:
• environmental mechanisms (25): extnerally generated changes to social conditions, ie resource depletion
• cognitive mechanisms (26): alterations of individual and collective perceptions
•  relational mechanisms (26): alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks
• processes: regular sequences of mechanisms that produce similar transformations (24)
• families of processes:
• mobilizations
• political identity formation
• the family of repression, diffusion, and radicalization (28)
• episodes: continuous streams of contention including collective claims-making (24)
• combine all these things above
• 
  

Rodríguez 2001

GONZALO M. RODRÍGUEZ. 2001. "Crisis, Social Explosion, and Three Moments of Breaking with Representative Democracy in Argentina". International Journal of Political Economy. 31 (1): 79-88.

• "If in the light of the events it is clear that the will of millions of citizens, expressed through voting, is not respected by their supposed representatives, it is then revealed that representative democracy is not a mechanism of representation, but rather a means of expropriating the popular will." (80)
• the economic consequences of the de la Rua government were the wake-up call of the urban middle sectors (81)
• three breaks with representative democracy
• null votes in October 2001 (82)
• protests in December 2001, supermarket lootings, middle class caceralazos (82-83)
• middle classes and poor rebelled at same time, but they used very different strategies (83)
• asambleas barriales (84)
• big, radical break with representative democracy (85)
• "As Argentine society heads toward an intensification of its social contradictions, the confrontation between the ruling class and the popular sectors (which now include sectors of the comfortable middle class) grows deeper and more visible." (86)
• "Today the people do not have representatives or referents within the "political class"...the people mobilized themselves outside the traditional state structures of the parties, and outside even the unions and other preexisting movements." (86)

Wolff 2007

Jonas Wolff. 2007. "(De-)Mobilising the Marginalised: A Comparison of the Argentine Piqueteros and Ecuador's Indigenous Movement". Journal of Latin American Studies. 39 (1): 1-29.

• Compares the indigenous movement in Ecuador and the piqueteros in Argentina
• on the one hand, these movements have mobilized the marginalzied, which is unexpected
• but the state (in each case) has been able to subsequently demobilize and tame these movements without really giving into their lager demands (2)
• These movements were tamed because they coupled a NEGATIVE broad demand (anti-neoliberalism) with PRAGMATIC goals toward local and regional community needs (2-3) -- this allowed them to be coopted, essentially
• indigenous movement was coming from a historical exclusion, whereas the piqueteros emerged with the memory of inclusion that was lost during privatization (3)
• History of CONAIE in Ecuador (4-6), Piquteros (6-9)
• Movements commonalities (9-18)
• 1) both movements combined a negative macropolitical focus and a pragmatic stance toward local demands (work, food)
• but these same problems made groups fragmented (see Kurtz) 11-12)
• "Formally functioning but publicly delegtimised democracy presented a decisive opportunity structure to both movements" (12)
• the macro-political claims of both these movements were of a global rejection, a ardical negative stance, which was combine with a pragmatist desire to secure conrete micro-political gains (13)
• concrete, pragmatic claims were very much based on local level needs/desires
• the double transformation made people feel like political and social inclusion crpmises were largely unfulfilled (10-11)
• 2) specific territoriality
• indigenous have their villages, campo, and the piqueteros have the barrios
• 3) organization strategy that responded to the crisis of representation both in politics and in traditional representatives
•  relied on participatory and consensus decision making (16-17)
• but as groups become nationalized, the old distance returns and participation becomes less-popular-based (17)
• 4) repertoire of contention: the roadblock (17-18)
• its effectiveness depends on public resonance: is it a legitimiate protest or just illegitimate troublemakers (18)
• The evolution of the movement
• these movements represent new (and enduring) facets of each country's social and political life, but at the moment they are limited to seeking/gaining regimes to make adjustments (19)
• how were these groups "tamed", why didn't they threaten the old political and economic elites to a greater extent?
• the state and state actors have acted to integrate teh voices f these movements into the political system, and these movements have accepted that offer (20)
• the movements enjoy some form(s) of veto power on questions concerning their vital interests
•  concrete demands are being served (20-21)
• but at the macro-level, demands of these groups have not been met (21-22)
• the restabilization of these countries came from a combo of cooptation and marginalization, partial disarticulation and demobilization of the contentious protest alliances (22)
• the internal features that initially enabled mobilization also proved to be vulnerable to manipulation
• the negative stance was fine, but when it stalled groups fractured over figuring out a more positive stance (because they were so heterogeneous)
• absence of a program outside of an identity was a problem
• internal division grew
• leaders also drawn into political dialogues, away from their constituents (23)
• tension of quasi-corporatist demands from the state and participatory democracy from the rank and file
• piqueteros lost social support for their roadblocks once teh government was trying to integrate them (24)
• these intrinsic weaknesses in the movements reveals a remarkable capacity for democratic regimes to regain stable and pacific relations with civil society (26)
• combination of cooptation via ad hoc dialogues, quasi-corporatist negotiations, and clientelist and populist practices proved able to demobilize these groups by fixing their concrete needs while still ignoring their larger demands (26-27)
• Conclusion
• Ecuador's indigenous have gained political voice through social and political organizations
• piquteros mostly relying on singluar leaders who have gotten government office
•  "What is new, however, is that such movements of marginalised people are the prime forces of contentious collective action in democratic politics. This directly follows the weakening of 'traditional' social and political organizations which represent the popular sectors that is associated with the double transformation in teh region" (28)

Garay 2007

Garay, Candelaria. 2007. "Social Policy and Collective Action: Unemployed Workers, Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina". Politics & Society. 35 (2): 301-328.

• Introduction
•  unemployed and informal workers have traditionally been marginalized by labor unions, as they are a threat to formal workers (301)
• but in the 2000s the unemployed in Argentina engaged in an impressive amount of collective action (302)
• and political leaders began to want to integrate these groups into partisan politics
• Argument:  that Plan Trabajar, a national workfare program created in 1996, encouraged collective action among unemployed and informal poor workers (303), because it
• had a short supply of benefits relative to demand
• lack of clear rules to define beneficiaries
• funds were administered to community organizations
• The state responded to protests with more workfare provisions, which in turn brought on more protest!
• Challenges to Popular-Sector Collective Action (Lit Review)
• more informal employment, heterogeneity in people made organization difficult (304)
• belief that most social programs reduced collective action
• despite problem-solving groups being formed, most scholars thought these groups just got pulled into clientelistic networks (305)
• Explaining Collective Action: A Policy Centered Approach
• many of the collective identities of these unemployed only arose after or during protest of policy and state responses
• policies can generate new groups, coalitions, and/or constituencies in, around, and in response to these policies
• this is especially true if policies give money to organizations to disburse, as opposed to state disbursing them directly (306)
• Argument: the program design of Plan Trabajar favored the creation of collective action
• Program Design and Collective Action
• low supply of benefits + no transparency = grievances (306)
• funds disbursed to groups = creation of new collective organizations, and thus identities (307)
• some groups even disbursed benefits based on who showed up to protest
• horizontal linkages between these new groups also sprung up because divided they would lose benefits to more powerful, pre-existing client-machines
• State Responses to Collective action
• repression/confrontation backfired (thanks to democratic context) (308)
• negotiation
• this at first led to more protest, but eventually led to less
• unemployed groups become actors in negotiation with the state, not protesters demanding access
• Protests started before 2001, and by mid-1998 two of these unemployed groups had formed alliances with unions CTA and CCC (311)
• 2000 saw some austerity, limiting number of people who received Plan Trabajar benefits
• new associations emerged from this
• many new and old associations began coordinated nationwide protest (313)
• Duhalde increased beneficiaries despite crisis (313)
• created formal and informal negotiation spaces between state and unemployed
• broader access to benefits meant unemployed groups multiplied, but also fragmented the movement
• Effects of Collective Action
• redefined social policy
• coverage has expanded (314)
• get money instead of a basket of goods
• now you get it until you get a job
• national state came to control this budget and decision on disbursement of these funds 
• but the program seems unable to lift people out of poverty
• changed modes of interest mediation between popular sectors and the state
•  duh, new movement! (315)
• some groups community based, large
• other groups led by social militants
• still others organized from the top down (clientelistic?)
• challenged partisan machines
• popular organizations now have greater access to state resources, as opposed to trying to get them through machines (317)
• reversed normal distance between labor union and unemployed (see CTA alliance)
• created linkages between parties and unemployed groups
• PJ has gotten access to these unemployed, undermining Left parties (318)
• Kirchner tried to get these groups to be his popular sector support (successfully)
• Comparative Context
• Goes against lit, shows that in certain ways policies to alleviate poverty can cause protest, collective action, and increase in social spending (318-320)
• this is happening a bit in Brazil, too (319-320)
• these unemployed groups count as reconfiguration of the PJ (321)

Cochabamba 2004

Olivera, Oscar, and Tom Lewis. 2004. Cochabamba!: water war in Bolivia. Cambridge, Mass: South End Press.


Oscar Oliveira  "Privatization" 7-24

• (11-12) "we were--and still are--tremendously worried by the fact that the Bolivian government evidently prefers to follow the dictates of the World Bank instead of taking into account what the population views as in its best interests"
• disconnenct between government and people, either in reality or in perception..."why don't they (the government" listen to us, help us??
• (14) describes selling mineral rights as "stripped of our material inheritance"
• (15) external debt was contacted "undemocratically--in our name, but without our consent"...and now Bolivia is hostage to its external debt, resulting in terrible conditions for the people
• (16) external debt is "a complete loss of sovereignty

Oscar Oliveira "Organizing" 24-32

• (27 28) offered office of the union for the Coordinaria en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida
•  a group formed by the union and a previous civil society org. interested in water issues (27)
• the Coordinaria spoke in the name of the people who felt ignored (28)
• hoped that the water issue would unite disparate factions, urban and country, etc etc, and it worked (30)
• in one protest Oliveira and Morales snared traffic, busted windows, were repressed by police when government promised (and failed to show up to) negotiations (31)

Raul Gutiérrez-Aguilar 2004 "The Coordinaria: One Year after the Water War" (53-64)

• the coordinaria movement differed from trade-union movements in the past in that it focused on basic, universal needs, not just individual proposals (55)
• the coordinaria used assembly-style poolitics, not internal institutions (56)
•  the coordinaria assembly became a place for other civil groups to discuss with each other more specfici problems, neighborhood to neighborhood, as well as a mass-mobilizing movement
• the coordinaria has had toruble in times of calm due to "the atomized society" and stretching of the social farbic by neoliberalism (58) -- people are lazy
• coordinaria hopes to poltiicize the people, and the working class, who have been under-political since the demise of the trade unions (64)

 
Álvaro García Linera 2004 "The 'Multitude'" 65-86

• 
  
• idea that unoins are being replaced by political parties as the means of negotiation between the state and society...is this surprising? (69)
•  this has looked more like clientelism, in this authors view
• "union" form of collective organizing is being replaced (in Bolivia) with the "Multitude" form (70-71)
• since the unified workplace has been diffused (often ino the niehgborhoods and homes), geographic groups and collective action organizations are more important now (71-73)
• Coordinaria members are uniting under an identity created through the struggle, but it is vauge, something like "ordinary working people" (78)  <<The breadth of this identity is an important weakness of it>>
• 
  
•  

Kingstone, Young, Aubrey 2013

Kingstone, Peter, Joseph K. Young, and Rebecca Aubrey. 2013. "Resistance to Privatization: Why Protest Movements Succeed and Fail in Latin America". Latin American Politics and Society. 55 (3): 93-116

• Introduction
• Broad Defense in Peru, coalition of many civil society organizations, was able to block privatization in 2002 (93-94)
• Article focuses on privatization because it fidrectly affest jobs and consumers, and national industries can be symbolic (94)
• Argument: protest tend to succeed under two conditions
• when protesters engage in "brokerage" across multiple sectors of society (94-95)
• (95) protests are most successful when civil rights are protected but political representation is weak
• this model accounts well for failure, but not so well for success...will discuss example of Bolivia and Uruguay to play this out
• Privatization in Latin America
• Privatization can have diffuse and uneven effects, improving the experience of some while decreasing jobs and increasing prices as well (96)
• the perception of corruption can increase hostility to privatization
• this is likely due to or increased by lack of transparency and public scrutiny in these privatizations (97)
• authors identify 104 protest cases in 18 countries between 1990 and 2000
• 25 successfully reversed the sale
• protests were frequent in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, though few succeeded in any of these places, and were less frequent but more successful in Costa Rica and Uruguay
• Successful Resistance
• political opportunity
• hypothesis 1: and open civil rights climate is associated with greater likelihood of success for protest (99)
• hypothesis 2: the level of political rights is negatively associated with success of protest movements
• assume that high political representation will result in grievances going through "proper channels"
• brokerage
• occurs when previously unconnected groups cooperate in seeking a common goal
• hypothesis 3: brokerage increases probability of protest success (100)
• alternative explanations
• protest became more frequent and successful later in period as neoliberal project lost steam
• no trend in this direction in data
• certain sectors are more likely to generate protest
• protest were more successful and had more linkages if a public utlity
• but suggest that overall success is high enough that this doesn't really pan out in data either.
• could make argument they're making a molehill out of a mountain here!
• Research Design:  uses a bunch of third party measures (101-103). tests political, economic, and brokerage variables
•  Results
• all hypotheses proven (103), economic variables hard to gauge, and their seem to be some country effects as well (104) (through discussion on 106)
• Democracy, Neoliberalism, and Protest
• the modal case of a successful protest is one where civil rights are protected but political representation is weak enough to demand groups use outside channels (106)
• Bolivian Water War
• 107-109
• privatization of water company done without consultation of the polity (108)
• Earlier protests against privatization had failed, in Cochabamba there was brokerage
• protesters barricaded, took over parts of city when government failed to negotiate
• police leveraged this situation for a pay raise...is this significant to success?
• importantly, the political exclusion of indigenous people led to this successful mobilization (109)
• Protecting ANTEL in Uruguay
• ultimately the protest was channeled through a national plebiscite (109)
• generally the country is seen as politically open, but Elite parties were losing groudn to Frente Amplio at this point
• notes brokerage between PIT-CNT union confedration and the Frente Amplio's civil society org (110)
• does this really count as two civil society orgs?!
• protesters took advantage of national plebiscite rule in Constitution (110-111)
• Conclusions
• privatization, especailly when its done undemocratically, may tap into deeper, already held feelings of political exclusion (111)
• this political exclusion may predate privatization effort, and even neoliberalism for that matter (though likely not the latter)
• high success in Costa Rica and Uruguay occured because of brokerage between CSOs, unions, and political parties (111-112)...protests are eventually channeled into political institutions
• these stand in contrast to Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico where protest has taken place almost entirely outside of formal political institutions  (112)

Silva 2012

Silva, Eduardo. 2012. "Exchange Rising? Karl Polanyi and Contentious Politics in Contemporary Latin America". Latin American Politics and Society. 54 (3): 1-32.

• Introduction
• organized workers and their capacity for mobilization were a key nonparty political societal source of advocacy and defense of protections [from capitalism in the 20th century]" (1)
• But deindustrialization, privatizaion, deregulation, and business-friendly labor codes debilitated the workplace as the locus from which to organize effective societal countermovement [against neoliberalism]"
• so what now? who will stand up against capitalism?
• Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador suggest that Polanyi's theory may still be useful (2)
• that is, that the circuits of exchange in capitalism, the commodification of labor, land, and money, can be sources of mobilization and resistance
• this article seeks to anchor Polanyi in real events
• thsi article also needs an explanation for how social movements reocgnized the common threat of recommodification and then formed horizontal linkages to fight it (3)
• goes for contentious politics literature, using threat, framing, and brokerage
• this article combines this idea with Poanyi's circuits of exchaage
• NOTE: defnesive reactiosn to recommodification were also mized with identity, organization, and disruptive action, NOR DID LABOR DISAPPEAR FROM THE SCENE
• labor was important before neoliberalism, and likely led the charge against reforms initially, but in many places there is a new "head" organization in current contentious politics, and it tends to not be labor (4)
• Two Sources of Societal Countermovement to Free-Market Captialism: Production and Exchange
• Marx focused on point of production (4-5)
• concentration of workers created shared identities (5)
• large-scale industrial owrkplace provided place for uniosn to organize
• power depended on ability of unions to disrupt production
• Polanyi had a different persepective
• what's important are the attempts to subordinate market economics to SOCIAL RELATIONS
• people demadn some stability and reciprocity, but te market is to volatile to give it to them (6)
• ressistance to free-market (in Polanyi's view) can come from more places than just the industrial proleriat
• Polanyi predicts blacklash against the free-market, McAdam explains the nuts and bolts of how the movements are created (7)
• Market Reforms, National Populism, and Organized Labor
• "National populism was Latin America's version of the social democratic compromise that evolved in Europe during the long 20th century (8)
• a coalition of urban labor, middle classes, and domestic market oriented bourgeoisie, mediated by the state, supported ISI
• labor in Latin America was not as powerful as labor in Europe, which is why they had to rely on a coalition with the middle class and labor-friendly parties (9)
• labor led the popular sectors, most of the others got a decent deal, but not as good as labor (8-9)
• first and second stage structural (neoliberal) reforms intensified the commodification of labor , land, and money
• first stage was liberalizing the economy, shrinking the economic reach of hte state (10)
• second stage extended market logic to education, healthcare, other government services
• labor protested, but was too weakened by reforms to stop them
• Exchange, threat, and Contentious Politics
• new social movements arose from territories, social categories, identity politics because the point of production was no longer a relevant reference (11)
• but they operated alongside class-based groups, ie unions
• Many of the grievances sought by these groups were based around the commodificiation of land, labor, or money (12)
• peasants wanted land reforms, issues that were often intertwined with indigenous identity movements
• downside is that these movements tended to be a bit more heterogeneous that old union movements, since new movements were mobilized around multiple issues, not just at the point of production (like labor of old)
• but the weakness of labor also meant these movemetns had a chance to be of more central importance to the resistance against capitalism
• Argentina
• Unemployed movements showed up first in small towns in the interior (13)
• because they were unemployed, locus of fight was communities, not the workplace
• successful unemployed and underemployed movements in the WOrkers' Party in the late1990s (14)
• piqueteros, asembleas populares also happening
• these community-based movements linked up with the CTA
• the main CGT never hooked up with these movements, was mainly fighting rear-guard actions to control its own downsizing (15)
• Bolivia
• COB national union was powerful in Bolivia, but was massively weakened by privatization of tin mines and radical downsizing of the satate (16)
• coca federations, other peasant groups rose up in their place
• coca sindicatos were targeted for eradication by the US and Bolivian authorities in counternarcotics raids
• the CSUTCB union joined up with the cocaleros, framed the movement as anti-imperialism, neogtiated coca laws with the federal government (17)
• intertwining of material and indigenous culture strengthened the movement
• when the government took on indigenous rights and customs, the movement further consolidated itself and fought off this challenge
• also, water wars (18) and gas wars, demanding water access and use of money from gas mining to benefit the nation
• Ecuador
• urban labor movements mobilized against the reforms, but were weak and easily coopted (19)
• organized indigenous peoples became the main opposition to neoliberalism
• CONAIE, combined movement of highland and lowland indigenous movements, blocked land liberalization
• Exchange and the Repertoire of Contention
• direct action in the form of roadblocks, takeovers, and other disruptions to daily business overtook strikes on production as the most important form of direct action (19-21)
• Exchange and Framing
• exchange-based framing allowed individuals to unite despite the fact that they were in different locations in the structure of production (22)
• neoliberalism became an important frame
• it came to stand for loss of sovereignty to foreign governments, international institutions, and transnational capital
• corruption by government officials and helping foreign creditors and/or foreign banks was framed as theft
• moral indignation rallied people (22-23)
• life became an encompassing frame as well
• neoliberalism became an assault on life
• such big terms, frames allowed groups to make many horizontal linkages, more than just class-based ideas (23)
• (23-24) in Argentina many people experienced unemployment, precarity, or new forms of employment which they attributed to neoliberalism
• many differently situated people recognized themselves as part of the world of work, and saw neoliberal reforms as a worsening of their work lives (24)
• some dissident unions began proclaiming "the neighborhood is the new factory"
• this shifted the center of resistance away fro teh factory and into popular sector neighborhoods
• the demand for state intervention brought in other groups as well, environmentalists, gender, human rights, as they saw the state as the only actor who could protect them from the market
• Conclusions
• in practical matters, this means that movements need to be more broadly cooperative and coordinate with each other (26)
• but it also brings a challenge to the left in Latin America, who will be expected to agglomerate and channel these movements into real political power

Elbert 2010

Elbert, Rodolfo. 2010. "How Do Unions Respond to Nonstandard Work Arrangements? Relations between Core and Non-Core Workers in a Food Processing Factory (Argentina, 2005-2008)". Journal of Workplace Rights. 15 (3): 387-398.

•  Introduction
• Though the working class is increasingly fragmented, in Argentina  workers in formal labor movements are being a bit more militant now (387-388)
• This paper is about a successful case of non-standard and standard workers cooperating to improve the lives of non-standard wokers
• there are grassroots strategies that non-core workers developed in order to obtain the support of core workers (388)
• Nonstandard work arrangements and Union Strategies in the Global South
• labor protests can include both core and non-core workers, and these protests need to be analyzed in light of this fact (389)
• Context of the Factory Case Study:
• K-Foods
• Production
• two main sections, manufacturing and packaging (390)
• some gender division in labor
• Labor relations = conflictual
• workers say management is too demanding
• management says workers are ideologically set against them (391)
• there is more or less explicit competition between teh company and the union for workers' loyalty
• nonstandard work
• most nonstandard workers are not represented by the union
• union politics
• three main groups (392)
• core workers, aligned with national leaders
• core workers who are more militant
• non-core workers seeking solidarity and core jobs
• Core and Non-core workers during two Labor Conflicts
• Campaign against Labor Outsourcing
• there was labor outsourcing at one of the plants, but the union did not fight it until 2005 (393)
• before this the national union did not intitiate a fight, despite favorable conditions
• in 2005 some grassroots organization began with outsourced workers and activists (394)
• core workers showed solidarity, and eventually (2006) these nonstandard workers were hired as core workers
• Temporary workers win permanent contracts
• temp contracts or those hired through agencies (395), NOT outsourced labor
• some of these workers also joined the grassroots group
• these workers eventually blockaded a highway to get their demands (to be core workers, among others) to be met
• when temp workers were sent home, allegedly because their was no work to be done, WHOLE PLANT went on strike (395-396)
• shop floor union and activist group came together, finally, most temp workers got core contracts (396)
• Union Strategies that Confront Nonstandard work Arrangments
• non-croes workers campagins were grassroots
• involved rank and file, despite teh fact that the union rarely did so
• ruthless in the pursuit of the creation of solidarty across core/non-core
• ALL OF THIS CREATED SOLIDARITY, which won the day
• these actiosn reveresed trend of labor fragmentation
• ME: Where's the government in all this?  They blockaded a highway and nothing bad happened?

Murillo and Ronconi 2004

Murillo, Maria Victoria, and Lucas Ronconi. 2004. "Teachers' Strikes in Argentina: Partisan Alignments and Public-sector Labor Relations". Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID). 39 (1): 77-98.

• Intro
• Teachers have been the most militant sector since 1989 (77)
• increase in militancy is related to, but can't be fully explained by (78)
• worsening of conditions
• challenges to income security (through decentralization)
• "Patterns of teachers' militancy are better explained by political alignments between public employees' and teachers' unions than by labor institutions (78)
• How does/would this explanation change in the context of no viable parties outside the PJ?
• then partisan alignments are less salient, but alignments with factions of the one party may be important
• at some point this may become clientelism, depending on your definition of clientelism, as unions may ally themselves with personalties or groups within the PJ (as they have in the past)
• Teachers' strikes reflect a larger but uneven trend of provincialization of protests, which happened no doubt because of the decentralization of the education system
• Explaining Public Teachers' Strikes
• economic conditions don't quite play in here, since these are public sector workers (79)
• labor strength can var across provinces, so it could bean important variable
• but political alignments will likely be very salient, given that governors have a high degree of discretion in implementing labor laws (80)
• Argentine Public Education and the Provincial Analysis
•  by 1993 primary and secondary public education administered at the provincial level (81)
• provincial governors now have the power to decide legality of strikes, etc, but also have a lot of discretionon how they use labor laws
• provincial governors also control education expenditures
• CTERA has traditionally been the national union (82)
• teachers caught between government and parents at times 
• A Cross-Provincial Test on Teachers' Militancy
• dependent variable: strike days lost
• independent measures: (82-83)
• political affiliation of union leaders compared to governor, percentage of legislators of governor's party, change in teachers' real earnings, unemployment, attendance bonus, unionization, union fragmentation
• downside: data are for a short period of time, so some independent variables don't really change much (85)
• Political alignment (of union leaders/governors) has the strongest effect, though other variables have an effect as well (86)
• if job stable and unemployment high (ie low exit alternatives), union members will protest for better things
• authors suspect that executive discretion diminishes the effect of institutional and organizational variables, which is why they weren't necessarily strong effects here (88)
• Conclusion
• politicization of labor relations thanks to provincialization of education AND executive discretion re: labor laws
•  suggestion: labor laws should be strengthened to decrease executive discretion, which should in turn decrease strike days (89)

Bellinger and Arce 2011

Bellinger,, Paul T., and Moisés Arce. 2011. "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era". Political Research Quarterly. 64 (3): 688-704.

• Introduction
• LA has seen a generalized rise in protests (688)
• collective actors in LA are highly responsive to changes in economic policy, and democracy ahs given them room to move
• central question:  do economic reofrms in teh context of democracy demobilize political actors, or RE-mobilize them?
• literature notes discord between neoliberlal society and democratic protest
• paper is to test and see which effect is greater, demobilization associated with neoliberalism or re-mobilization associated with democracy (689)
• Literature review
• demobilization literature
• increase in poverty, decrease in equality, higher levels of unemployment, and lower standards of living all create "anomie" (Zermeño 1990)
• but this literature has trouble explaining the revival of protests in Latin America
• in this literature, market policies erode democracy (690)
• and state diminishes, leaving it an unhelpful target of economic grievances
• Repoliticization literature (690-691)
•  traditional class-based actors are protesting (labor)
• NEW actors are protesting (unemployed, indigenous, regional groups)
• elaborating the repoliticization argument (691)
• neoliberal turn:
• heightened economic insecurities
• offered a master frame for protest
• democracy enhanced opportunity for collective activity
• authors believe regime type is a core component of the political opportunity for collective mobilization
• Data and Method
• data from 1970-2003 (692)
• dependent variable: collective protest
• independent variables: economic liberalization, democracy, semi-democracy, autocracy, and interactions between these two categories
• Controls include the level of regional protest to account for cyclical, demonstration effect (693)
• Results
• economic liberalization x democracy and economic liberalization x semi-democracy interaction terms are positive, support repoliticization argument (695)
• econ lib x autocracy supports demobilization argument IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS
• also protest is shown to be regionally cyclical (697)
• index of civil liberties shows that the political opportunities provided by democracy, outside of simple elections, are actually driving remobilization
• Conclusion
• authors cast doubt on demobilization perspective (699)
• Latin American citizens do not seem to be passive, atomized

Peruzzotti 2005

"Demanding Accountable Government: Citizens, Politicians, and the Perils of Representative Democracy in Argentina" Enrique Peruzzotti, p.229-249

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• in the past 20 years a more sophisticated and demanding citizenry has emerged, demanding representation and accountability from Argentine politicians (229-230)
• and important actor was the rise of the human rights movement in response to the dictatorship (230)
• Menem's disregard of demands for greater accountability also spured the citizenry
• Redefinition of Representation
• Argentine citizenry switched from  "authorization" view of representation, which is connected to populism, to demanding accountability of representatives as in liberal democracy (Pitkin 1972) (231)
• populist leaders were given authorization to act in the interests of the people
• now citizens demand politicians be directly accountable
• this pivoted thanks in part to the emergence of the human rights movement in the 1980s and their demands against the military (231-232)
• there is no longer a direct relationship between constituents and representatives...this relationship is mediated by institutions (233)
• this is a change driven by leveling off of high expectations for politicians and a new trust in institutions
• The partial dissolution of captive electorates has led to more fluid and unpredictable electoral behavior (235)
• footnote: the PJ has been able to keep hold of its lower class constituents through clientelism
• The Politics of Social Accountability
• three main actors
• NGOs and advocacy organizations (236-237)
• Social movements (237)
• watchdog journalism (237-238)
• threefold contribution
• signalling to population, "what's happening, why its bad" (238-239)
• social initiatives can activate a network of horizontal agencies of accountability, gets a movement going (239-240)
• establishment of permanent watchdog groups/agencies (240)
• 2001 buildup and Accountability politics
• Alianza promised to renew ties, not be corrupt (241)
• then the Senate scandal (241-242)
•  the scandal cast doubts n the electoral arena as a place where accountability could be found (243)
• the bribes went to the very heart of the state's electoral institutions
• Alianza was slow to respond, and had a tepid response
• this led to electoral protest/null ballots in 2001 (244-245)...
• ...and mobilizations against leaders, que se vayan todos, (245-246)
• and local, representative, unofficial neighborhood "governments" called asambleas sprung up (246-248)
• these eventually ran out of steam in 2002 and most were gone by 2003 (248)
• Conclusion
• shared concern of the quality of democratic institutions connects the politics of social accountability, the cacerolazos (pot banging protests), and the asambleas (249)
• importantly, though, these mobilizations were triggered by the spread of frustration that the government wasn't listening/wasn't accountable

Wada 2006

“Claim Network Analysis: How are Social Protests Transformed into Political Protests in Mexico?” Takeshi Wada 95-111

in Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. Latin American social movements: globalization, democratization, and transnational networks. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

• Introduction
• The current state of citizenship in any given country is a historical outcome of contentious claims making by citizens upon the state and the state’s responses (95)
• Neoliberal turn in Mexico triggered disputes over citizenship expectations (96)
• yet while political opportunity remained rather closed, due to yet-democratized state...
• cultural opportunity was closing, since the neoliberal turn caused the closing of the old master frame of social and collective rights based in the Revolution
• Other scholars found a shift in protest from social to political protests, ie demanding civil rights instead of social outcomes
• author differentiates between goal oriented and strategic (means oriented) claims
• goal oriented: why people engage in collective action
• strategic/means-oriented: how people engage in collective actions
• traces different claims made by protesters and whether they are goal- or means-oriented
• Results: Political rights have supplanted past demands of social rights and material demands, BUT that political rights are often demanded strategically, main goal may be social/civil rights/other issues/outcomes
• Theory and Methodology
• Applies to study of popular protest in authoritarian context (97)
• Broad cultural frames usually allow/legitimize for some claims making
• uses event analysis and newspaper reports (97-98)
• Neoliberal Reforms and Visions of Citizenship in Mexico
• during the period of hegemony, ideas of “revolutionary nationalism” meant that the ruling elite was more tolerant of demands focused on social aspects of citizenship, less so of civil or political aspects (98)
• the population responded when the elite, in starting neoliberl turn, began to withdraw traditional rights
• Methods (99-101)
• newspapers
• usings network analysis-style thing to see what sorts of rights are being demanded, how, and in conjunction with what other rights
• baskets: social, political, civil, economic, socioeconomic
• three periods (101-102):
• post-revolutionary, 1964-1982
• neoliberal transition, 1983-1994
• neoliberal consolidation, 1995-2000
• Results
• general
• civil and political claims increased (102)
• number of campaigns increased over time
• social claims stable and low
• economic and socio economic claims fluctuate, diverge across media sources
• relational
• citizens often made multiple claims simultaneously (103)
• economic demands were the most important throughout (104), but increasingly these demands were coupled with political, social, and civil demands, as the latter seemed to become more important as the former became more difficult to achieve as singular demands during the neoliberal period
• author suggests this means that civil and political rights were increasingly valued in themselves
• my take: could just be the neoliberal government wouldn’t budge on economic issues
• social demands began to be used more strategically during the neoliberal period, that is, social demands were made in order to get something else more important (105, 107)
• most of the “claims spheres” increased their dependence on the political sphere during the neoliberal periods (105)
• Discussion
• the prominence of political claim makings is the result of decay of revolutionary ideals and the slow opening of political democratization (108)
• Overall claim: networks of protest were “politicized”, because of the prominence of the political demands vis a vis other demands (110)

Auyero 2006

“The Moral Politics of Argentine Crowds” Javier Auyero, 147-162

in

in Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. Latin American social movements: globalization, democratization, and transnational networks. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

• Introduction
• Argentina has seen the rise of new and unconventional forms of popular contention: sieges of public buildings, barricades on roads, camps on central plazas, rallies (including those in from of supermarkets demanding food) (148)
• these represent a rupture with traditional political practices (ie clientelism) and a novel form of popular politics (Dinerstein 2001) (148)
• Argument:
• popular grievances in two cases came from divergent moral politics
• these politics are rooted in different political traditions (patronage versus populist welfare)
• and these moral politics influence the types of protests and crowd behavior
• El Estallido: Santiago
• protesters attack government buildings and homes of politicians (150-151)
• precision by which the crowd moved from one home to another shows how the city’s geography was well known, and how the sources of corruption and suffering were centralized in rich neighborhoods (151)
• routine (patronage) politics played a part, since the protesters knew where everyone lived because they had been their for patronage parties! (152)
• protest-as-carnaval
• “For once Santiago was ours”
• protesters enjoyed themselves, thought the protest was fun (153-154)
• La Pueblada and Los Piqueteros: Cutral-co
• announcement that area did not get contract for fertilizer plant (154-155)
• radio sends news, calls for people to start demonstrating
• former mayor behind much of this, since he was in a political battle with current administration (155)
• first day the politicians secretly organized everything, but protesters eventually began ignoring the politicians (157)
• protesters define themselves as el pueblo (158), protesting to protect/demand the return of their past experience under a semi-welfare state (which had been buttressed by local oil money, which decreased when company was privatized) (159)
• The Moral Politics of the Crowds
• in each case there were different moral politics that defined what was legitimate protest and what wasn’t (159)
• In Santiago, (160)
• the clientelist networks defined the itinerary
• “honest” protesters were fighting “dishonest”/corrupt politicians
• corrupt should be punished directly
• In Cutral-co (160)
• party politics, not just clientelism, involved in the origins of the pueblada
• protesters placed emphasis on citizenship, visibility, demand to be heard in a time whose existence was threatened
• stayed on the road to be recognized, not ignored (161)