Murillo 1999

Murillo, M. V. (1999). Recovering political dynamics: Teachers' unions and the decentralization of education in argentina and mexico. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(1), 31-57. 

• this draws out some of the same ideas in her 2001 book, but looks at differences in education reform in Mexico and Argentina, noting the reforms occurred differently due to variation across partisan identities (of the unions), organizational fragmentation (in the unions) and leadership competition (both for union and government officials) (31)
• education reform became an important issues because education was seen as
• important to developing human capital, increasing social equity, and consolidating young democracies (33) see footnote 6 for some citations
• the public felt the edcuation systems were becoming inadequate to mee the countries' needs
• The suggestion made by many groups is that decentralized education is more responsive to local needs, and thus more efficient than hihgly centralized education systems (33-34)
• BUT unions can play an important role in enhancing or sabotaging reforms (34)
• Public sector unions:
• public sector militancy is often more visible to the general public, which would suffer from loss of delivery of public goods thanks to strikes (35)
• "Indeed, strikes often serve the dual purpose of demanding higher wages from the government and mobilizing public opinion to call for greater budget allocations for public services." (35)
• teaching is labor intensive, teachers are distributed across the country, and they can have a great affect on public opinion (36)
• a large proportion of education budgets is directed to salaries (36)
• decentralization reforms in Mexico and Argentina
• The SNTE suppressed it's opposition to decentralization and the government met some of its demands (38)
• CTERA kept unsuccessfully resisitng decentralization and was ignored by Menem (38)
• Stats:
• Law 1,420 of 1881 established free public edcuation and compulsory primary education for all Argentina (39)
• initially the federal government centralized education, by 1952 feds controlled 42.7% of primary, 64.8% of secondary, and 82.5% of vocational schools (Paglianetti 1991)
• military started to decentralize
• By 1987 the national jurisdiction had only 1.9 % of primary schools, 44.7% of secondary schools, and 37.8% vocational schools (40)
• 1991 law enacted in 1992, Law 24,049, transfered all the rest of the schools to provincial jurisdiction (40)
• history of teachers unions (42-43)
• CTERA was with CGT and PJ int eh 1980s, but broke with Menem in 1991 and formed CTA (42)
• CTERA has been strong at province level, but never really centralized enough to be strong national presence (43)
• reform
• most teachers unions rejected Menem's reform (44)
• feared financing would be hurt
• also concerned with declining real wages and wage dispersion once bargaining became decentralized
• teachers struck and demonstrated against reform
• government officials ignored militancy and demands (45)
•  decentralization DID enhance CTERA's position over other competing union confederations (45)
• CTERA joined UCR to form coalition, but meant they found few allies among the mostly PJ provincial governors who didn't want to ally with enemy party (46)
• also competition over teachers weakened all unions, meaning government had no desire to offer concessions (46)
• explaining the difference between SNTE and CTERA
• SNTE was PRI, and not fragmented, CTERA was opposition and fragmented (47-48)
• why not get allies where you can? not really a full explanation here
• conclusion:
• party loyalty can speeed reforms but hinder their effectiveness (see Murillo 2001) (49)
• when there is leadership competition, as there was for SNTE, government will make concessions to keep their leader in power
• CTERA had neither leadership competition (it seems) AND teachers unions were fragmented -- seems a bit weak here

Gindin 2008

Gindin, J. 2008, "Sindicalismo docente en México, Brasil y Argentina: una hipótesis explicativa de su estructuración diferenciada", Revista mexicana de investigación educativa, Abril-junio 2008 volume 13 number 37, p 351-375.

• Argument: the fundamental variable that explains the difference between the cases in Brazil/Argentina and Mexico is the relationship with the sate established at the period of consolidation of labor relations systems (353)
• Argentina
• CTERA created in 1973 (367)
• generally CTERA has been pretty fragmented and weak
• in 1987 there was a split in the CTERA, half were under a UCR leader and half under a PJ leader
• but the PJ half essentially dissolved after it started and lost a big national strike in 1988 (367-8)
• CTERA helped create CTA (368) and bolstered its own power by allowing for leadership at every level to be elected directly, making them the most centralized of the teachers unions (369)
• White tent in 1997 against Menem (369)
• stayed up unti lthe UCR-led coalition won in decemeber 1999
• CTERA got close to NK after his election, but this closeness allowed the teachers to be a sort of internal opposition and still be militant (370)
• the differenc ein that the SNTE was a mediator between teh government and teachers, while in ARgentina and Brazil the government(s) didn't incorporate teachers into the coproate system, and simply ruled them directly when it wanted to. (370-371)
• the mobilization of the 1980s restructured Argentina and Brazil docente unions, while it didn't have this effect on teh SNTE (372)
• said another way, SNTE in Mexico was part of corporatism, and not in Arg and Brazil
• author suggest this starting point helps us understand current teachers' unions

Torre 1998

Juan Carlos Torre 1998 "The Amibivalent Giant: The Peronist Labor Movement, 1945-1995" 125-137

in

Brennan, James P., Peronism and Argentina. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998.

• from 1955 to 1973 the peronist working class was in a curious position. "on the one hand, the unions needed to represent the workers in collective bargaining negotiations and service their needs--through social welfare programs, retirement plans, and vacation colonies--in a country in which the state had abandoned any pretensions to such concerns. On the other hand, organized labor was effectively the political representative of the Peronist movement in these years, with Perón as its recognized leader. So the working class played a rather conventional role in the country's economy, as well as socially, but an adversarial, destabilizing role within the political system." (130)
• after the Resistance subsided uniosn became pragmatic, but co-optation by the state and acceptance as an independent actor were prevented by the political dimension of peronism (131)
• "If the Radical government was a godsend for perpetuating these patterns of behavior, the election of a Peronist government in 1989 and its recent reelection in 1995 may well constitue a fatal misfortune. As in 1973-1976 the Peronist trade union leadership has been forced to accept policies, in teh name of solidarity with a Peronist government, that threaten their very existence." (134)
• "The decline in the unions' importance in the country's economic structure has had its counterpart in new developments in the political realm. Since the restoration of democracy, the Peronist trade union leaders have experienced repeated reversals in their pretensions of influencing developments within the Peronist movement as a whole." (135)
• 
  

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Elbert 2010

Elbert, Rodolfo. 2010. "How Do Unions Respond to Nonstandard Work Arrangements? Relations between Core and Non-Core Workers in a Food Processing Factory (Argentina, 2005-2008)". Journal of Workplace Rights. 15 (3): 387-398.

•  Introduction
• Though the working class is increasingly fragmented, in Argentina  workers in formal labor movements are being a bit more militant now (387-388)
• This paper is about a successful case of non-standard and standard workers cooperating to improve the lives of non-standard wokers
• there are grassroots strategies that non-core workers developed in order to obtain the support of core workers (388)
• Nonstandard work arrangements and Union Strategies in the Global South
• labor protests can include both core and non-core workers, and these protests need to be analyzed in light of this fact (389)
• Context of the Factory Case Study:
• K-Foods
• Production
• two main sections, manufacturing and packaging (390)
• some gender division in labor
• Labor relations = conflictual
• workers say management is too demanding
• management says workers are ideologically set against them (391)
• there is more or less explicit competition between teh company and the union for workers' loyalty
• nonstandard work
• most nonstandard workers are not represented by the union
• union politics
• three main groups (392)
• core workers, aligned with national leaders
• core workers who are more militant
• non-core workers seeking solidarity and core jobs
• Core and Non-core workers during two Labor Conflicts
• Campaign against Labor Outsourcing
• there was labor outsourcing at one of the plants, but the union did not fight it until 2005 (393)
• before this the national union did not intitiate a fight, despite favorable conditions
• in 2005 some grassroots organization began with outsourced workers and activists (394)
• core workers showed solidarity, and eventually (2006) these nonstandard workers were hired as core workers
• Temporary workers win permanent contracts
• temp contracts or those hired through agencies (395), NOT outsourced labor
• some of these workers also joined the grassroots group
• these workers eventually blockaded a highway to get their demands (to be core workers, among others) to be met
• when temp workers were sent home, allegedly because their was no work to be done, WHOLE PLANT went on strike (395-396)
• shop floor union and activist group came together, finally, most temp workers got core contracts (396)
• Union Strategies that Confront Nonstandard work Arrangments
• non-croes workers campagins were grassroots
• involved rank and file, despite teh fact that the union rarely did so
• ruthless in the pursuit of the creation of solidarty across core/non-core
• ALL OF THIS CREATED SOLIDARITY, which won the day
• these actiosn reveresed trend of labor fragmentation
• ME: Where's the government in all this?  They blockaded a highway and nothing bad happened?

Etchemendy 2005

"Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001" Sabastián Etchemendy, p. 62-87

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• rather than being unambiguous losers in the neoliberal reforms, some key industrial and labor actors within the old ISI coalition can and do preserve their existing market power in the new "liberal" order (62-63)
•  argument: dominant unions and certain established industrial players were actually part of the reform coalition (63)
• two goals of chapter
• explain why Menem chose to rewared some industries and unions
• assess the consequences of this pattern of transformation of the populist/industrial coalition
• ISI past generated very strong industries that were also potential losers in turn to neoliberalism (64)
• unions had a very clear goal of preserving the corporatist institutions -- ((induced them to be willing to trade liberalization for maintaining this bastion of power))
• Results of Menem's bargains (65)
• Business
• compensations eventually led to a high exchange, which undermined business's ability to compete
• no strategy in the face of global competition was developed...once the side payments were gone, business still couldn't compete on open market
• labor
• benefits funneled only to formal sector
• bureaucratization of unions allowed room for the creation of large, autonomous, powerful groups of unemployed and other actors
• Industry: Political Winners
• the government compensated firms from four tradeable sectors: oil extraction, petrochemicals, autos, and steel (66)
• privatization usually meant directly rewarding state assets to these businesses
• and the pace of deregulation was consistently slowed
• why firms in these sectors?
• mixed sectors, meaning these firms had a higher lobbying capacity because they were partially public (69)
• these firms were the largest and most powerful in economic terms
• these firms were also relatively more concentrated (fewer firms and more economic value per firm) (70-71)
• all of these firms had monopolistic industry associations through which they could bargain (72)
• Working Class: Compensating Leaders and Insiders in the Formal Sector
• the politics of compensation focused on teh leaders (74)
• unemployed and laid off were left to their fate
• there were four payoffs:
• maintenance of corporatist union structure
• while government did get some flexibilization of contracts (75)...
• unions maintained their monopoly of representation in privatized firms 
• preserving labor's administration of healthcare
• deregulation only went so far as to promote competition within the union-run system
• granting unions privileged position in private pension market (76)
• unions were allowed to create/control their own pension funds to compete on the market
• but unions abandoned most of these by 2000 (no explanation given by author)
• granting unions share of privatization
• employee stock ownership programs (76)
• these rpograms were only offered to formal employees (77)
• and the stocks were monaaged by hte unions
• and the stock value totally soared
• generally all four of these payoffs converged on maintaining union leaders' control of unions and increasing the amount of money they controlled (79)
• they faced little danger of being uprooted by competing organizations or their own rank and file
• The Consequences
• the compenstations porlonged the fixed exchange rate (80-81)
• disregarded any strategy for actual export competition (82)
• compensation was based on teh control of domestic markets (82)
• this ended up being a short term strategy, and no one sought a longer term one
• when the compenstations, which were based on the strong exchange rate, were consumed by the end of the decade, firms still could compete on the global market! (83)
• offered nothing to the unemployed (83)
• there was no antional policy to attenuate hardships of neolibreal transformation, specifically focused on working class/poor who lost jobs and purchasing power (84)
• government chose to support unions over the unemployed
• and the unions chose to take their compensations and similarly ignored the poor, which just paved the way for the piquteros and other groups (85)
• Conclusions
• the configuration of labor and industrial interests befor ethe reform determined the pattersn fo compensations during and after the reform (86) ... my take: the rich get richer, sort of
• the compensatory policies were a double edged sword (86-87)
• on the one hand, they made the reform politically viable (87)
• on the other hand, these compensations sowed the seeds of future economic and political instability, which erupted in 2001

Levitsky and Murillo 2005b

"Building Castles in the Sand? The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Argentina" Levitsky and Murillo, 21-44

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

•  Central argument OF THE BOOK: the major cause of Argentina's under-performance was persistent and widespread institutional instability (21)
• The Origins of Institutional Instability
• between 1955 and 1972 Argentina politics were deadlocked (24)
• one the one hand, allowing Peronist party to compete in elections woul certainly result in Personit victory, which was unacceptable to many elites
• yet, on the other hand, keeping the Peronists out of elections was a major destabilizing influence
• eventually military leadership had to allow Peron back into power (25), then another military regime
• The brutality and dramatic failure of the military regime discredited the military in the eyes of the public (26)
• gave rise to broad public support for liberal democracy (Catterberg 1990
• and gave rise to a powerful human rights movement
• change in office between Alfonsín and Menem was first time democratic change of hands, but even then Alfonsín resigned early because of economic crisis, and there was a lot of institutional fluidity
• Argentina under Menem
• Menem abandoned traditional Peronism, set off on neoliberalism (27)
• among the fully democratic countries, Argentina carried out the most rapid and far-reaching reforms
• among the countries with the deepest crisis and radical reform, Argentina was the most democratic
• BUT many of the policy arrangements made by Menem proved to be economically unsustainable
• AND Menem did little to strengthen political institutions, and in same cases he weakened them
• The Politics of Radical Economic Reform: Why Menem was successful
• Menem's ability to end hyperinflation increased public support for him/his policies (28)
• The strength of the PJ helped Menem keep a solid electoral base
• the PJ's hegemony in the popular sectors limited possibility of anti-reofrm appeals (29)
• PJ's close ties to organized labor gave union leaders a stake in limiting opposition from working class
• Menem gave side payments and policy concessions to losers (30)
• unions protected pro-labor law
• industrialists were giving help in competing for privatization contracts
• governors wooed by putting off provincial budgetary adjustments
• Encroachment on legistlative and judicial perogatives
• lots of executive decrees
• court-packing and impeachments
• PROBLEMATIC LEGACIES (31)
• convertability left governmetn without tools to rspond to economic shocks or erosion of competitiveness
• public debt grew a lot
• reforms generated large-scale social exclusion (and middle class shrunk
• Democratic Institutions under Menem
• Menem frequently circumvented legistlaive process using decrees (32-33)
• M allowed little judicial independence (33)
• executive accountability decreased, allowing corruption to increase
• widespread perception of corruption and abuse eroded the credibility of Argentina's representative institutions (35)
• Party system and Political representation in the 1990s
• Alianza able to win on anti-corruption ticket (37)
• mostly because middle and upper-middle classed had little faith in credibility of government
• The Post-Menem Era
• Alianza failed to clean up politics (37)
• actually got caught up in its own curruption scandal, which it didn't handle very well (37-38)
• Alianza did poorly in economic arena
• inherited a recession *38)
• convertibility left them without policy tools, and convertibility was too popular to be touched
• in 1999 legislative vote 22% cast spoiled/blank votes
• three Presidents in 2 weeks
• third was Duhalde, who ended convertibility (39)
• economic plunged into chaos
• poliitcal system and parties pushed into crisis as well
• FREPASO and UCR disintegrated (40)
• 2003 elections:
• military made no move to intervene
• despite anger, no anti-establishment outsider received more than 2% of the vote (41)
• PJ finished 1-2-3 in presidential vote, all other partis wiped out
• PJ proved remarkably resilient
• Kirchner 1
• concentrated power in the executive (43)
• but his initiatives were more transparent and oriented toward institutional integrity
• rst of the story yet to be seen (chapter form 2005)....

Levitsky and Murillo 2005a

"Introduction" Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, p. 1-17

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Federalism and the Link between Subnational and National Politics
• subnational politics are crucial to understanding national-level politics and policymaking in Argentina (9)
• provincial governors have been able to gather enormous power under democratic rule
• The Transformation of State-Society Relations in the Postcorporatist era
• labor protest has been increasingly confined to provincial public sector employees (Farinetti 2002) (12)
• blockade as a new form of protest
• the participants in provincial riots and urban looting are frequently embedded in (and mobilized by) the very clientelistic networks that they are said to replace (13)
• much of the urban poor was incorporated into clientelistic networks during the 1990s
• postcorporatist scenario reveals a trend away from national-level collective bargaining organizations and national definied class identities
• localized, territorial identities are becoming more salient
• most new social actors are resisting close ties to the state
• authors mention the middle class, CTA, and piqueteros....but some of the piqueteros have drawn closer to the state in recent years

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89. 

•  Introduction
• argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):
• pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
• this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments
• other explanations are incomplete
• authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
• corporatism is too party/politics focused
• the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
• moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions
• labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which  in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law
• Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics
• Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
• the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)
• that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups
• pluralist system allows autonomy
• corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
•  state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)
• A Note on Case Selection
• Uruguay (64)
• pluralist labor relations system
• class-based unionism
• strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
• Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention
• this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.
• Chile
• historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
• argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)
• decentralizing influence of labor law
• state has a lot of power over unions
• parties have control of unions
• THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship
•  Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion
• Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)
• meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
• Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)
• Uruguay
• unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
• gave them and independent streak
• they also formed a number of labor-based parties
• before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)
• this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created
• Meant that:
• in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
• while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties
• Authoritarian Labor Regimes
• Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
• Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)
•  Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
• military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations
• Transitional Context
• Chilean transition was controlled (72)
• left parties and unions still outlawed
• in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
• the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)
• decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)
• In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)
• initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
• contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)
• Return of Elected Rule
• Chile
• "concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
• inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
• state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
• union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
• business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so
• Uruguay
• reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
• return to 1968 labor relations system
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
•  entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)
• manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
• most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)
• with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)
• Conclusion
• one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)
• BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)
• strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
• "institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
• testable hypothesis:  regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched
• my take:  makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle
• under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Grayson 2004

Grayson 2004

(in Wiarda 2004)

Grayson, George W. “Mexico's Semicorporatist Regime,” in Wiarda, Howard J. 2004. Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America--revisited. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Overview:

• Salinas’s neoliberal reforms
  
  • Ruptured the ruling party (246)
    
  • Diminished rewards to the faithful (due to lower government revenues through tariffs, quotas, etc.)
    
  • Diminished central control
    
  • Caused businesses to start competing on labor costs, which is bad for system/unions
    
• Wiarda also Suggests these reforms led to calls for greater democracy, and gave rise to opposition party successes (especially at the state and local level)
  
• Population growth and social diversification also meant there were more groups outside the corporatist political framework (247)
  
• As corporatist institutions had been slightly undermined, Fox did not have great control over corrupt labor leaders (248)
  
• Talks a lot about Fox’s political styling
  
  • disdain for politicians
    
  • attempt to use media instead of government organizations
    
  • included PRI in some things, didn’t hammer away at them, not many panistas in his cabinet
    
  • allowed Sup Marcos and EZLN to address nation
    
• PRI maintains traditional sectors, though does some changes (BUT, of course, primaries for elections undermine any delegate/candidate concessions)
  
• AMLO taking some corporatist reins, very humanistic but also relatively authoritarian (read: populist)
  
• Lots of foreign NGOs hanging out, too…massive increase over the 2000s, maybe they’ll be important in the future?
  
• No new rules of the game exist for governing (255)
  
  • No new organizations have replaced traditional corporatist structures
    
  • Corp. structures remain, although in much weaker form.
    

Quotes:
“No new rules of the game exist for governing.” (255)

Middlebrook 1995

Middlebrook (1995)

1. Chapter 1: Mass Politics and Regime formation
   1. On the concept of Post-revolutionary Authoritarian rule
      1. Features:
         1. Prominence of mas actors
            1. May be mobilized less and less over time
            2. Still important base of control for government
         2. Political ideals from revolutionary era
            1. Something referencing social change
            2. Rule is legitimated by invoking these symbols/ideologies
            3. Cannot be empty promises, must deliver the goods as well
         3. Dual importance of state and hegemonic party
            1. Party mobilizes social base
            2. Party can serve to cement social alliances
            3. Party can serve as method through which social allies can gain access to state apparatus
   2. Framework for studying mass politics in authoritarian regimes
      1. Limitations on mass mobilization
         1. Can happen through public apathy, legal restrictions, channeling mobilization through the party.
      2. Limits on sociopolitical pluralism
      3. Limits on Demand articulation
         1. Restrictions creates situation in which groups must negotiate, compromise, or modify their goals
   3. (28) “ The party [PRI (and its predecessors)] has been the principal channel through which leaders of lower class organizations achieve upward political mobility”
      1. BUT: the party never developed autonomous means of limiting its constituents’ political actions, it relied on state power for those controls.
      2. THUS: organized labor enjoyed relative autonomy in the party framework (though certainly not in the state regime)
   4. Central Argument: to understand the bases of elite control over and general character of mass politics, must understand both state and societal controls over the labor movement
      1. State = labor law, etc.
      2. Societal = labor unions’ reliance on state subsidies
         1. Economic structure that influenced patterns of unionization and CB power
         2. Organizational form of the labor movement
         3. Political ideas that influence policy preferences and political response strategies
2. Chapter 2: State Structures and political Control
   1. (42) “On the one hand, expanded state administrative capacity gradually increased governing elites’ ability to control developments in the labor sector. On the other hand, legal recognition of basic labor rights and inclusion of worker representatives in come administrative structures strengthened organized labor by providing important symbolic and material benefits to both unions and individual workers.”
   2. (51-2) 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo institutionalized activist role of government in protection f workers at a time when the unions weren’t strong enough to protect themselves (the CROM had fallen out of power soon before 1930)
      1. Leads to creation of Secretary of Labor (STPS, Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social), as well as the CTM
   3. JCA’s preserves the distinction between federal and local jurisdictions (60)
   4. Labor seat on JCA’s help unions expand their organizations (61-62)
   5. Reconocimiento, official recognition/registration of unions, improves power of unions compared to employers, but also gives state power over unions (65)
   6. State has some ability to meddle in union internal affairs (elections, etc.) but not much. Also, requirements do not safeguard union democracy.
   7. Strikes must be registered, only occur after arbitration proceedings have concluded (69)
3. Chapter 3 – The challenge of mass participation and the origins of Mexico’s state subsidized labor movement
   1. Before the revolution, labor movements were dispersed, and in small enterprises, who had little bargaining power
   2. Morones, while founding the CROM
      1. marginalized the anarchosyndicalists, and
      2. decided they need to ally with the government to have any power
   3. CROM never made inroads in industries with strong unions, like railroad workers and electrical workers
   4. Relations between the CROM and Obregon quickly soured, were eventually charged with assassination of Obregon!
   5. CTM founded by CROM dissidents and under Cardenas’ hope to unite labor movement to support him, CROM remains relatively pro-Calles
   6. Even while he supported the CTM, Cardenas worked against the CTM
      1. He helped found the FSTSE to keep government workers out of the hands of the CTM
      2. He kept peasants out of the CTM
   7. Cardenas’s PRM first to officially tie labor to an official political party (1938), SECTORS
   8. SME leaves CTM in 1939 after CTM supports presidential candidate Camacho
   9. Subsidies to labor movement
      1. Legal
         1. Exclusion clauses
         2. Separation clauses
      2. Financial
         1. CTM had trouble collecting dues, but stayed solvent
         2. Middlebrook hints at direct monetary subsidies
      3. Political
         1. Preferential access to electoral lists of PRM/PRI and administrative positions
            1. Leverage for union
            2. Personal benefit
         2. No reelection meant constant demand for new and loyal candidates
         3. CTM dominated these positions
         4. Chair in the Chamber of Deputies was most available, some Senate seats, practically no governorships (too important to PRI power structure to give away as spoils)
   10. (106) “The consolidation of the post-revolutionary social pact occurred, then, not with CTM membership in the governing party but with the political triumph of progovernment labor leaders in the aftermath of a major labor crisis in the late 1940s” (emphasis added by me!)
4. Chapter 4: Turning Point the 1947-51 Labor Crisis
   1. Case study on railroad workers
   2. RR, like other protected sectors, autonomous, strong, politically minded
   3. During labor crisis (post-WWII) government supports more pragmatic leadership, alternative/radical paths slowly squelched
   4. Once these unions are turned toward pragmatic (non-radical) ends
      1. CTM dominant, BUT:
      2. Begins period of truly institutionalized social pact
         1. Previously pact had rested on shoulders of President and specific union confederations
   5. Labor movement united under CT in 1966, but only a façade under which fragmentation persists
   6. Social pact:
      1. Unions (leaders) can’t survive without political support
      2. Unions become effective tools of worker control for political leaders
   7. Also, CROC formed in 1952 by Aleman government, “to unite disparate labor groups in an organization that was simultaneously…
      1. …Loyal to the government (it was affiliated with the PRI), and…
      2. …Hostile to the CTM.” (page 250)
      3. United some conservative groups (like the CPN, Confederación Proletaria Nacional) and the CUT (formerly lefty under RR workers leaders)
5. Chapter 5: State Structures, Political Control, and Labor Participation: an Assessment
   1. STRIKES: “…postrevolutionary governments generally maintained strong control over stieks in federal-jurisdiction economic activities, regardless of changes in the political character of different presidential administrations.” (171)
   2. LABOR UNION REGISTRATION: Political influence/action can influence rates of labor union registration, but generally no variables explained differences in time to register, meaning there was NO effect due to
      1. presidential administration
      2. difference in confederation
   3. WORKER DEMAND RESOLUTION:
      1. Includes an in-depth case of RR workers union
      2. Some presidential effect, but also surprising anti-worker effect for Cardenas
6. Chapter 6: Labor Politics and ISI
   1. ISI good and bad
      1. Development, work, but
      2. Balance of payment problems
      3. Inflation problems
      4. Result: people have jobs, but their wages are falling!
   2. CTM often spoke radically, acted pragmatically when ISI stumbled and inflation rose
   3. Section on democracy in Mexican automobile sector
      1. Neither presidential policy nor strength of state labor federations adequately explains democratization (229)
      2. Car mfg. undergoing changes, less paternal relations, just-in-time0ish style prxn, and modern assembly line
      3. Workers viewed democratization seen as a way to gain better bargaining power, as their leaders were initially unable to cope with their new demands
      4. Workplace differences (especially with delegado system) important to explaining variation across auto plants (236)
      5. Democratic unions generally better at gaining control of production, bad at increasing wages, struck more often
7. Chapter 7: Labor Politics under Economic Stress in the 1980s
   1. Failure of ISI
      1. Economic difficulties, interest rates, defaults
      2. Less government spending
      3. Inflation!!!
   2. Organized Labor’s Response
      1. Unions never thought they were adequately compensated for sacrifices during 1976-7 crisis
      2. De la Madrid agrees to price controls in 1983, then immediately breaks his deal
      3. NO strike petitions approved
      4. CROC and CROM used to harass CTM
      5. 1984 CTM threatens general strike, but steps back and agrees to negotiate on de la Madrid’s terms, CT makes demands but never gains anything real
      6. WORKERS LOSE
      7. “The CTM’s historical reluctance to pursue more aggressive collective action in support of workers’ interests is one of the most noteworthy aspects of state-labor relations in Mexico.” (265)
   3. What explains unions’ actions?
      1. Usual suspects
         1. Crisis weakened bargaining power
            1. CTM had heterogeneous members
            2. None/few in strategic industries
         2. Government control over strikes and union recognition
         3. CTM had more deputies in Congress, maybe thought they’d recoup losses later?
      2. New ideas
         1. Internal weakness of CTM, others
         2. Leaders’ (Velazquez’s) political beleifs
            1. (Weakish)
            2. Leaders’ fear that a true mobilization would be a breeding ground for union democracy, undermine their old control over unions
   4. Industrial restructuring in automobile industry
      1. Automakers open new plants, get CTM unions, undermine democratic unions
      2. CTM unions give management much more leeway on production methods, democratic unions able to fight back a bit
      3. Volkswagen at Puebla
         1. Leaders capitulate a bit in secret agreement
         2. Midlevel and rank and file revolt
         3. Union turmoil allows VW (thanks to JFCA decision) to fire everyone, rehire who they want, keep pliable union
      4. Flexible contracts more important than low wages to managers! (286)
   5. Privatization of state-owned firms crushed official unions ability to use political influence to win economic demands
   6. State-subsidized labor organizations lost their ability to win concessions, but maintained their significance as instruments of political control of workers.
8. CONCLUSION
   1. Union/party alliance
      1. Benefitted labor because resulted in subsidies
      2. Benefitted party because party had no other means of controlling mass base
   2. CTM resisted democratic opening: why?! Central question of the chapter
   3. Over time unions had experienced a cumulative weakening after presidents defined and redefined the alliance
   4. Unions weakest point ever in 1980s/90s, and business gains better foothold with government
   5. BUT labor still important for getting out the vote
      1. This control, however, became less reliable (see 1988 prez election)
   6. “Because post-revoutionary authoritarian regimes generally develop distinctive ideologies that give workers a special place in postrevolutionary society…labor has a stronger interest in preserving elements of the status quo…” (317)
      1. Long-term democratization may be a good thing, BUT
      2. Short term democratization may pose significant costs to labor unions
   7. As jobs move north in Mexico, they further weaken unions by
      1. Dispersing labor
      2. Gets far away from political center of country
      3. Move closer to anti-union areas of the country.
   8. Labor leaders also suck at times, protection contracts
   9. Political parties are an important place where labor can get power, but
      1. Have the taint of old style PRI relationships
      2. PRD, rest of left have focused on electoral competitions, not alliances with unions (325-6)
   10. Finally, labor law needs to change, bad!

Samstad 2002

Samstad 2002

Samstad, James G. 2002. "Corporatism and Democratic Transition: State and Labor during the Salinas and Zedillo Administrations". Latin American Politics and Society. 44 (4): 1-28.
Overview:

• Corporatism involved three levels
  
  • State/”Macro”-corporatism: national level, tripartite discussions of economic and political policy (3)
    
  • Micro/Local or firm level corporatism: representatives on JCA’s
    
  • Party corporatism
    
• Shift to export-led growth created tensions in the coalition forged under ISI (5)
  
• Procedural democracy poses a greater challenge to corporatism that ELG (6)
  
  • Decline of strong president gives each level of corp. more autonomy
    
  • Resistance to herding rank and file by authoritarian labor leaders
    
• By end of Salinas, labor corp. still basically intact (11)
  
• Creation of UNT in 1997, labor split challenged all three levels of corporatism
  
  • who gets to peak bargain? (MACRO)
    
    • CTM tries ‘corporatism without government’
      
  • UNT and some in CT call for more democratic PRI(PARTY)
    
    • ALSO: primaries for candidates decreases labor delegates
      
• Few structural changes to corporatism, HOWEEVER, big changes in how corporatism works in practice
  

Quotes:
“The party (PRI) has formally incorporated labor as a ‘sector’ with nominal voting rights…Over the years, representatives of PRI-affiliated labor organizations consequently secured a non-insignificant share of nominations for elected posts…In return, those organizations were often expected to deliver the votes and organizational support of their rank and file…” (4)
“The shift to export-led growth created tensions in the coalition forged under ISI” (5)
“What change that has occurred has been in how corporatism functioned in practice, and this transformation has come primarily as a side-effect of a decline in centralized presidentialism and an increase in political pluralism during [Zedillo’s] sexennio.” (19)

De la Garza Toledo 2003

De la Garza Toledo 2003

De La Garza Toledo, E. 2003. "MEXICAN TRADE UNIONISM IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL TRANSITION". Research in the Sociology of Work. (11): 207-228.

from cornfield and McCammon 2003

Overview

• Two factors causing crisis of corporatism
  
  • Neoliberal turn
    
  • Restructuring of large firms and production processes
    
    • Has resulted in flexible and/or unilateral collective bargaining model
      
• Tried neoliberal corporatism, failed
  
• New working class in Mexico has lost its ideology and project, new working class (maquila sector) have no class identity, no trade union tradition
  
• The state, unions, and firms prefer ghost unions to no unions
  
• Little has changed
  
• UNT not being overly confrontational
  
• Predicts unlikely that Fox will wage war against corporatism (he’s right!)
• NEW TAKE
• the "neoliberal corporatist" attempts during the early 1990s totally failed to change unions (210)
• this also failed because the state partially withdrew from labor relations leaving firms to carry out their own restructuring (211)
• AGAIN STATE IS A PASSIVE PLAYER
• 
  

Quotes:
“The unions appeared in the nineties as mere control instruments sustained by a formal and informal political, judiciary, and institutional superstructure constructed over workers since the thirties”

“It would seem these leaders are more interested in survival or in gaining power that in taking advantage of the situation in order to reorient trade unionism toward non-corporate, democratic and representative paths”

Cook 2007

Cook, Maria Lorena. 2006. The politics of labor reform in Latin America: between flexibility and rights. University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Chapter 5: Bolivia and Mexico (only Mexico here)

• Technical, ambiguous nature of the law allows the JCAs a lot of discretionary power
• also makes protection contracts easier to attain
• exclusion and separation clauses
• make protection unions stronger
• protect leadership in unions from rank-and-file revolt
• 1980s: “The economic crisis weakened all labor unions, but independent unions were hit hardest by industrial restructuring and never regained a presence in manufacturing” (163)
• Government devoted to neoliberal model
• in 1990s-2000s, “corporatist compromise” granted increased flexibility to employer in exchange for conserving the status quo on unions’ organizational prerogatives and collective rights
• First round of labor reform proposals in late 1990s, both for PRD and PAN, tried to take apart corporatist system, demand greater union democracy
• labor divided:
• official wanted to keep positions
• UNT unions divided, because some (SNTE, STRM?) didn’t want to totally demolish system
• also fear that once the bill hit Congress, everything would change!
• Fox appoints a businessman, Carlos Abascal, to head Labor Ministry
• His reform (which fails) would create greater flexibility and not touch internal democracy of unions
• Sequence of transition, economic then democratic, may have limited possiblities for democratic labor reform
• business now heading the labor ministry!!
• official unions can give wage restraint, which managers want, so managers allow official unions to survive
• “As long as the PRI remains a significant presence in Mexican politics, labor’s relationship with the party is likely to continue and the party is likely to degfnd the demands of the traditional labor sector” (192)
• see labor reform failure in 2012!
• MEXICO NOT ABLE TO REALIZE PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR LAWS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION