Notes!: PRI

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism

Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)

but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
and within countries
and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well

Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)

but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
even went after traditional union strongholds
author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)

MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS

ARGUMENT:

The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)

Chapter 2: Theory

Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
Partisan loyalty (14)

reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions

Leadership competition

Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)

Union competition

more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)

Market Reforms

opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements

this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
Thus militancy is generally expected in this case

See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition

Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies

short story of transition

CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)

All Three countries:

included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
labor codes also limited union competition (31)
these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
but also made unions reliant on party power

histories in each country

Venezuela: 33-39)
Mexico: (39-45)
Argentina: (45-50)

Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance

union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both

Chapter 4: Venezuela

Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)

COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)

Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround

bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration! breaking traditional alliance! (58)

Market Reforms

Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
Labor Flexibility:

though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)

Leadership competition in the CTV

most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)

the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)

replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)

meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)

Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)

Sector analysis

oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)

early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders

automobiles: cooperation

in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)

TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)

traditionally one union, no partisan competition
in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control

electricity: cooperation --> opposition (effective)

centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat

education: opposition (ineffective resistance)

teachers militant against education reforms (83)
but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)

Summary:

the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)

Conclusion and Epilogue

CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)

Chapter 5: Mexico

until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)

in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
dlM tried to hold the PRI together

Salinas!

took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)

only a minority of unions resisted

Market Reforms

stabilization

CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest (99)
CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)

trade liberalization

all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this

privatization

most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)

pension reform

official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)

housing (INFONAVIT)

CTM rejected this reform vigorously
all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)

though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)

Labor flexibility

CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)

Labor organization regulations

all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)

Union competition and PRI monopoly

PRI-unions competed for favor with government
1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another

this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)

Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM

CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)

THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
sectors:

oil: subordination

union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head

automobile: subordination

local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union

telecommunications

STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)

electricity

LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
Sánchez became political asset for Salinas
but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant

education: opposition (effective militancy)

union rejected decentralization (122)
CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)

allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)

Conclusion

PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)

but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)

Chapter 6: Argentina

When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)

but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)

Reforms

measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
Stabilization

pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)

trade liberalization

pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this

privatization

pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)

pension reform

reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993

CTA remained against it (144)

social security

CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place

labor flexibility

reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises

labor organization regulation

government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
CTA and employers liked it
CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it

Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)

split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)

but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)

sector analysis

oil: cooperation (effective restraint)

privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a private oilworkers union (153)
union leaders had no partisan or union competition (154)
union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization

automobiles: opposition --> cooperation

initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)

telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)

privatization threatened downsizing
FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)

electricity: opposition --> cooperation

union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy

government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation

education

CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
"the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)

Conclusion

peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)

peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
government would pay off militant CGT unions

concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation

CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge

Chapter7: Multilevel comparison

cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
At a national level (176)

CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)

the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore

if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)

market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)

and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective
CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)

sector comparisons: 183-192

Chapter 8: Conclusions

Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms

the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:

limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological

for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Notes!

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Murillo 2001

Monday, September 23, 2013

9/23/2013