Notes!: Venezuela

Showing posts with label Venezuela. Show all posts

Saturday, April 12, 2014

Roberts 2012

Introduction

one the one hand, democratic regimes from the 1980s have proven remarkably durable adn resilient to crises (2)
On the other hand, party systems have been far less stable
Paradoxically, democratic consolidation has coincided with a crisis of representation and general disillusionment with the political establishment

but this crisis affects different countries differently

Critical junctures:

neoliberal turn (3)
reactive sequences against neoliberalism!

Modes of political representation based in ISI were undermined by its collapse, specficially among the popular classes

and party systems varied widely in their ability to channel these issues

Broadly, these critical junctures dealigned parties, made their programmatic promises seem less sincere (especially thanks to bait and switch)
Argument:

when a populist/mass-based party undertook economic reform

it often made the transition more politically viable
but also dealigned the party from its constituents (4)

when a right party undertook economic reform

left party was able to channel dissent through the insittuions
party alignment was "reinforced"

in both cases, parties that undertook reforms were vulnerable to leftist challenges

The Puzzle of Party System Stability in Latin America

Presidentialized party systems may result in parties with unaccountable elites, ambiguous programmatic stands, but it doesn't help explain the wide variation in strength and durability of party systems (5)
electoral competition has not stabilized party systems or crystallized partisan identities
During neoliberal transition programmatic differentiation was tough, since there were such acute constraints on policy options available (7)

by contrast, the left turn helped realign some of these party systems

"neoliberal critical junctures and teh reactive sequences they spawned dislodged and reconfigured historic party systems, altering their programmatic alignments in was that heavily conditioned the stability ot partisan competition in the aftermath period" (8)

Market Liberalization and Part system alignments during neoliberal critical junctures

Critical junctures are designed to explain why similar types of political or economic challenges produce different, path dependent patterns of institutional change across a range of cases
suggest neoliberal critical juncture from 1973-1998 (Chavez ended it) (9)
it altered:

the character and purpose of state power
the patterns of association in civil society
the ways in which societal interests and claims were articulated and represented in the political arena (Collier and Handlin 2009, Yashar 2005)

Party systems before market adjustment: (10)

labor mobilizing
elitist (with clientelistic relations to popular sectors)
these preconditions weighed heavily on results of critic juncture, but did not define them entirely

three basic requirements of programmatic structuring of party systems

parties must adopt relatively coherent stands on salient issues that divide teh body politic (11)
policies adopted in office must bear resemblance to election platform

bait and switch severs relationship between electoral verdicts and the content of public policy (12)

there must be meaningful differences/policy alternatives between the competing parties

often not true during ISI crisis

The regionwide transition undermined all three of these basic conditions (13)

lots of policy switching, left/populist parties went along with reforms, or did bait and switch (13)
created internal party dissension among leftish parties
often meant that popular sector connections to parties were severd, replaced with clientelistic relations (14)
BUT if a conservative party initiated transition, and left remained in opposition, no dealignment

Three possible outcomes: table on page 16

parties aligned (contested liberalism), outcome was a durable party system (15)

Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Uruguay
Mexico, thanks to creation of PRD which replaced PRI as left
ambiguously Nicaragua (17)

dealigned (bait and witch), or neutral (no real left to contest) results on part system (neoliberal convergence), outcome was not a durable part system

dealigned: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
Neutral: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay

contested liberalism allowed for dissent to be challenged through stable forms of electoral competition (17)
neoliberal convergence resulted in systems susceptible to destabilizing reactive sequences

17-25 goes through cases and uses electoral data, etc to prove this story

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism

Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)

but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
and within countries
and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well

Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)

but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
even went after traditional union strongholds
author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)

MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS

ARGUMENT:

The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)

Chapter 2: Theory

Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
Partisan loyalty (14)

reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions

Leadership competition

Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)

Union competition

more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)

Market Reforms

opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements

this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
Thus militancy is generally expected in this case

See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition

Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies

short story of transition

CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)

All Three countries:

included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
labor codes also limited union competition (31)
these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
but also made unions reliant on party power

histories in each country

Venezuela: 33-39)
Mexico: (39-45)
Argentina: (45-50)

Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance

union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both

Chapter 4: Venezuela

Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)

COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)

Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround

bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration! breaking traditional alliance! (58)

Market Reforms

Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
Labor Flexibility:

though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)

Leadership competition in the CTV

most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)

the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)

replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)

meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)

Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)

Sector analysis

oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)

early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders

automobiles: cooperation

in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)

TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)

traditionally one union, no partisan competition
in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control

electricity: cooperation --> opposition (effective)

centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat

education: opposition (ineffective resistance)

teachers militant against education reforms (83)
but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)

Summary:

the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)

Conclusion and Epilogue

CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)

Chapter 5: Mexico

until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)

in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
dlM tried to hold the PRI together

Salinas!

took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)

only a minority of unions resisted

Market Reforms

stabilization

CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest (99)
CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)

trade liberalization

all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this

privatization

most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)

pension reform

official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)

housing (INFONAVIT)

CTM rejected this reform vigorously
all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)

though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)

Labor flexibility

CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)

Labor organization regulations

all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)

Union competition and PRI monopoly

PRI-unions competed for favor with government
1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another

this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)

Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM

CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)

THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
sectors:

oil: subordination

union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head

automobile: subordination

local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union

telecommunications

STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)

electricity

LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
Sánchez became political asset for Salinas
but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant

education: opposition (effective militancy)

union rejected decentralization (122)
CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)

allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)

Conclusion

PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)

but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)

Chapter 6: Argentina

When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)

but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)

Reforms

measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
Stabilization

pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)

trade liberalization

pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this

privatization

pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)

pension reform

reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993

CTA remained against it (144)

social security

CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place

labor flexibility

reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises

labor organization regulation

government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
CTA and employers liked it
CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it

Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)

split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)

but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)

sector analysis

oil: cooperation (effective restraint)

privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a private oilworkers union (153)
union leaders had no partisan or union competition (154)
union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization

automobiles: opposition --> cooperation

initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)

telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)

privatization threatened downsizing
FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)

electricity: opposition --> cooperation

union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy

government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation

education

CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
"the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)

Conclusion

peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)

peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
government would pay off militant CGT unions

concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation

CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge

Chapter7: Multilevel comparison

cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
At a national level (176)

CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)

the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore

if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)

market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)

and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective
CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)

sector comparisons: 183-192

Chapter 8: Conclusions

Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms

the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:

limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological

for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

"Neoliberal Class Formation(s): The Informal Porletariat and "new" Workers' Organizations in Latin America" Susan Spronk 75-94

Applies EP Thomspons "class struggle without class" ideas
notes other authors (murillo 2001) saying that unions just tried to surivive, not fight enoliberalism

But during the neoliberal period the locus of class struggle has moved out of the factory and into the streets/communities (82)
partially because many people are employed informally/self-employed
the focus of class strgugle has shifted from demands over wages to demands for basic subsistence

piqueteros born of those who weren't represented by traditional unions

at first hey were very radical, non-hierarchical, etc. etc.
but then they were coopted by employment plans from Kirchner (except for more radical splinter) (83-84)

Oscar Olivera and gas war people: start with everyday struggle, get imporved conditions, and then work towards socialism (85)

but actual gains in both cases have been minimal

CRITIQUE OF BOTH these organizations arises from an argument about "treating the symptoms versus treating the cause"
(86-88) plant takeovers in Argentina and Venezuela face issues with government and with (previous) business owners

but even outside of these issues, cooperativism doesn't undo the bad social relations, it just makes the workers their own bosses

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Roberts 2003

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2003. "Social Correlates of Party System Demise and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela". Latin American Politics and Society. 45 (3): 35-57.

Peru’s attempt at populism in 1980s ended in inflationary spiral and political upheaval (35)

many assumed populism was now dead, thanks in part to to Washington Consensus (35-36)

Rise of Washington consensus undermined the party and labor institutions that had been the left in LA (36)

void left after these parties collapsed was filled by personalistic leaders who cultivated direct relationship with the masses

appears to be a dialectical relationship between the demise of traditional representative institutions and the eruption of new forms of populism

Chávez was a master of the politics of antipolitics
he capitalized on and deepened public antipathy toward established institutions

Populism asirse most forcefully during times of political and economic crisis, when established patterns of representation are breaking down and have yet to be replaced with new ones (37)

first period in the 1920s
another period in the 1980s

BUT, given Venezuela’s strong institutions, no one would have guessed they would crumble and be replaced by populism (38)

these were founded on a mix of corporatist and clientelistic linkages that could not withstand the decline of the oil economy and several attempts at market liberalization (38-39)
then successive administrations by each dominant party failed to fix the economy (39)

Dominant theories provide no reason why Venezuela’s system would collapse (41)

institutionalism, structuralism, rational choice, and political culture
all focused on two critical variables, design of political institutions and oil money
BUT Coppedge (1990) argues that over-institutionalization can be just as problematic as under-institutionalization
Cartelization and bureaucratic routinization made the AD overly rigid, restricted its ability to adopt economic reforms (Levitsky 2001 and Corrales 2000) (42)
along the lines of Crisp (2000) parties became frozen in status quo, allowing them to control policymaking and keep new groups out of politics and new issues off the agenda
undependable oil revenues eventually left parties unable to fund their clientelistic relations (structural approach)
political culture: oil created rentier mentality, people supported democracy only as long as the money flowed...when money stopped, no one cared for democracy (Romero 1997)

Venezuela’s parties were more bureaucratic, but they did not differ significantly from other LA countries in their societal bonds (43)

their bonds were made through ISI, and were strained by the 1980s (43-44)
Venezuela’s system was set up more along corporatist lines, to complement clientelism (44)
in 1980s Venezuela avoided hyperinflation because labor tempered its demands thanks to connections between unions and parties (45)

Economic and political trauma worse in countries with labor based parties, as old forms of representation totally erode

to replace corporatist linkages, many parties had to form larger networks of more contingent clientelism (46)

VENEZUELAN CASE

post-1958 party system had corporatism and clientelism (46-47)
everyone participated in distribution of oil rents, capitalists, campesinos, middle-class, workers (48)
by 1970 two dominant parties were almost indistinguishable from each other
plunging oil prices in the 1980s emasculated campesino and unions, and new independent union movement stripped out more voters from corporatist system (48-49)
neoliberal reforms in 1989 generate violent backlash, military repressed riots (49)
organized labor lost its ability to channel opposition to neoliberal reforms because they stayed too close to party (49-50)
Venezuela’s parties were unable to maintain balance of: distributing enough payouts to reproduce collective identities, but not so much as to harm macroeconomic health (50)

parties continuing use of patronage in hard times increased their delegitimization (51)

Prolonged economic crisis + social change = erosion of corporatist and clientelist linkages

both parties lost legitimacy since neither were able to fix the problem (52, 53)

Chávez replaced party-based mediation between state and society with direct, personalistic relationship between president and masses

Burgess and Levitsky 2003

Burgess, Katrina and Steven Levitsky. 2003. "Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in Latin America: Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela." Comparative Political Studies. 36: 881-911.

Introduction

changes in trade and production altered the working class (882)
fall of Soviet Union altered international political situation
These changes compelled mass-populist parties to rethink their platforms and social coalitions
populist parties changed their coalitions in very different ways across LAm
two level framework:

Parties incentives to adapt = economic + political conditions

deep economic crisis and weak left alternatives created incentives to turn to neoliberalism

Organizational capacity to adapt = fluidity of leadership hierarchies + autonomy of chief executive

more fluid structures and stronger executive leads to great adaptive capacity (883)

Four “cases: all four experienced similar economic pressures

PJ in Argentina --> medium neoliberal --> stable electoral base
PRI in Mexico --> high neoliberal --> losing ground-but-stable electoral base
no neoliberal, electoral collapse:

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) en Peru
Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela

VARIATION CAUSED BY EXTERNAL INCENTIVES AND ABILITY TO ADAPT

Explaining Populist Party Adaptation

Mini-lit review

informal workers are a much more tenuous support base for populist parties compared to old working class (Roberts 1998) (884)
This article contextualizes previous approaches that relied only on leadership as cause of party adaptation (885)

Environmental factors: Electoral and Economic Environment

Electoral environment, two possible challenges

center/center-right parties that attract middle class, leave populist parties with only working class constituents (885-886)
further left parties may draw off support of the urban informal sector and poor (886)

Economic environment, depends on depth of crisis

extreme crises, like hyperinflation, mean that any means (read: neoliberal means) are worth it since cost of letting crisis continue outweighs cost of abandoning traditional statist program (887)
moderate crisis, change less necessary

Party Organization: Capacity to Adapt

fluidity of party hierarchy

more fluid, less bureaucratic, easier leadership change = better able to adapt (887-888)

degree to which office-holding leaders are autonomous from parties

essentially a measure of bureaucracy of intra-party relations (888)

Applying the Framework

lack of market reform was closely associated with electoral decline in 1980s/90s (889)
PJ: Adaptation and Electoral Success: 1989 Menem neoliberal surprise, little intraparty resistance (890-891)
PRI: Adaptation and Survival: really ramped up with Salinas (891), Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas defected, but generally no intraparty resistance (892)
APRA: Failed Populism and Electoral Decline: 1985 Alan García stayed populist, Peru descends into hyperinflation, APRA collapses in 1990s
AD: Blocked Reform and Electoral Decline:

1984 Jaime Lusinchi implemented tough austerity measures, but abandoned them once recovery came and relied heavily on oil revenue (893)
Carlos Andrés Pérez 1989, “The Great TUrnaround” neoliberalism, blocked by AD itself (intraparty)

Incentives to Adapt

variables: inflation rate, GDP growth rate, balance of payments the year President was elected (894)

PJ = high incentives to adapt (895)

deep crisis from a heterodox administration (895)
no threat from the left (895)
story: Menem faced credibility gap with foreign investors, crisis started under UCR heterodox government, no threat from left, and PJ needed to better attract middle class anyway (896)

PRI and AD = medium incentives: (895)

moderate crisis (895)
weak to mixed electoral incentives (895)
PRI story: Mexico had a bit of a credibility gap, and faced threats from right (PAN) and left (PRD). (897) ME: Essentially, Mexico doesn’t quite fit this framework
AD Story: Venezuela had two short-lived crises (898); reforms were started but increase in oil revenues and government spending usually fixed them (898); economic hardships usually seen by public as mismanagement and corruption, not failure of economic model (899); AD faced no electoral challenge, but one minor one came from the left, so added to disincentive (899)

APRA = disincentives:

moderate crisis inherited from ORTHOdox government (895)
intense left wing competition (895)
story: poor economic performance in the 1980s was associated with IMF-style austerity program under center-right government (897-898), Since 1950s APRA had shifted toward the right, and leftist military dictator meant that left made a lot of inroads, threatened APRA’s working class constituency (898)

Capacity to Adapt (899)

PJ is really fluid and flexible (see Levitsky 2003) (900),and executives have a lot of autonomy: “government controls the party” (901)
PRI is relatively fluid, but not extremely fluid. Real cause is the chief executive’s massive autonomy from party (902)
APRA is “strategically flexible” (read: it’s a populist party) but does not have a fluid party structure (903). Importantly: executive has a lot of autonomy, though APRA also has it’s own power autonomous from Prez
AD: bureaucratic party with low leadership autonomy. started acting like an opposition party when Pérez initiated reforms (904)

Page 905	Hi incentive to adapt	Medium incentive	low incentive
High capacity to adapt	PJ (adapted)	PRI (adapted)
Medium Capacity			APRA (no adapt)
Low capacity		AD (no adapt)

Putting the Variables Together/Conclusion

“In this context, Salinas’ decision to accelerate and deepen neoliberalism was rather bold” (905) Meaning: Mexico doesn’t fit our model very well
“...the strategies of individual parties may have profound party systemic implications as well” (907)

Systems in Argentina and Mexico stayed stable
Systems in Peru and Venezuela collapsed