Solinger 2009

Solinger, Dorothy J. States' Gains, Labor's Losses: China, France, and Mexico Choose Global Liaisons, 1980-2000. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.


Compares China, France, Mexico response to globalization and changes in labor-state partnership

• "This book is about how an enduring legacy of revolution in these apparently dissimilar places structures state-labor relations in a time of crisis. In all of them, revolutionary-era outcomes left their mark on the roles and functions of unions, vis-á-vis their own states' moves after 1980; repercussions from workers them set the style for subsequent state welfare replies." (4)
• China started internally liberalizing in the 1980s, ans seemingly abandoned labor, but then "Though the old communist, state-labor alliance at first appeard to be wholly abandoned, public militancy reawakened the bond, if in starkly altered form (5)
• France hit some trouble in the 1980s, but 1997 total job losses affected a "stunning" 41.6% of the original labor force; the labor movement didn't do much to protest, and the state didn't do much to help
• similarly Mexican Labor movement didn't fight much, and the state subsequently didn't offer them much for their losses
• Conclusion
• Mexico, France, and China all jettisoned labor allies at the behest/to join Supranational Economic Organizations (208), a proxy for joining global economy
• How labor unions were joined to politics after the revolution was important -- Chinese unions were SUPER weak, meaning workers had a freer hand in starting their own protests! (209)
• "In short, it was the nature of the job that the states permitted--or coerced--their unions to perform that liberated the worker (in China), left them relatively passive (in France), or clamped down on them (in Mexico), once the eliminitation of formerly protective regulations meant removing workers from their positions and once the restrictiveness imposed by austerity rewrote the terms of old welfare contracts." (209-210)

Torre 1998

Juan Carlos Torre 1998 "The Amibivalent Giant: The Peronist Labor Movement, 1945-1995" 125-137

in

Brennan, James P., Peronism and Argentina. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998.

• from 1955 to 1973 the peronist working class was in a curious position. "on the one hand, the unions needed to represent the workers in collective bargaining negotiations and service their needs--through social welfare programs, retirement plans, and vacation colonies--in a country in which the state had abandoned any pretensions to such concerns. On the other hand, organized labor was effectively the political representative of the Peronist movement in these years, with Perón as its recognized leader. So the working class played a rather conventional role in the country's economy, as well as socially, but an adversarial, destabilizing role within the political system." (130)
• after the Resistance subsided uniosn became pragmatic, but co-optation by the state and acceptance as an independent actor were prevented by the political dimension of peronism (131)
• "If the Radical government was a godsend for perpetuating these patterns of behavior, the election of a Peronist government in 1989 and its recent reelection in 1995 may well constitue a fatal misfortune. As in 1973-1976 the Peronist trade union leadership has been forced to accept policies, in teh name of solidarity with a Peronist government, that threaten their very existence." (134)
• "The decline in the unions' importance in the country's economic structure has had its counterpart in new developments in the political realm. Since the restoration of democracy, the Peronist trade union leaders have experienced repeated reversals in their pretensions of influencing developments within the Peronist movement as a whole." (135)
• 
  

Levitsky 2003b

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties In Latin America: Argentine Peronism In Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: 
• The PJ's flexibility contributed to its adaptation and survival in teh neoliberal era (3)
• the weakly institutionalized labor-party link permitted the traditional mechanisms f labor participation in the party to be quickly dismantled
• the absence of stable career paths and secure tenure patterns meant it was easy to get rid of old-guard leaders
• the absence of stable norms of accountability in the party allowed Menem the freedom to design and implement a radical economic program (3-4)
• the decline of postwar ISI brought on a programmatic and a coalitional challenge to labor based parties (5)
• programmatic: slowdown of economic growth, globalized trade, and debt-crisis helpers (IMF, World Bank) made it very difficult for parties to enact policy that wasn't orthodox neoliberal (5-6)
• coalitional: economic changes hanged class, labor had fewer votes to trade (6)
• Look at party change (organizational change) in terms of a two-level, nested game, in which party leaders are located at the intersection of environmental and intraorganizational dynamics (12)
• leaders who seek to increase their power must respond to changes in the external environment, but their strategies to do so are mediated by the power game within the party and the party's strucutre
• "Yet the flexibility-stability tradeoff may not be as steep as the literature suggests.  ... Although the Pj is unquestionably a mass party, its mass organization is informal rather than bureaucratic, and the rules and procedures that govern the internal life of the party are fluid, contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored." (14)
• "A central claim of this book is that routinization limits the capacity of organizations to respond quickly to environmental challenges, and that weakly routinized organizations may be better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than highly routinized organizations." (18)
• routinization affects strategic flexibility in three ways: (19)
• leadership renovation (ease of changing old-guard)
• leadership autonomy
• structural pliability, or ease of changing a party's structure
• Chapter 2
• This chapter sets up the book's central argument,, which is that the PJ's fluid internal structure can be traced to its formative phase (36)
• but also, it's proscription after the first coup meant that it was highly decentralized, had a "movement" structure, which continues to this day (36-37)
• decentralization during proscription period meant peronist movement essentailly in anarchy, allowed for many autonomous units to self-direct, also allowed for groups to seek very divergent goals, from leftist to conservative, all under name of peronism (41-43)
• "partyization" occurred during teh 1980s, where the movement focused mainly on winning elections (minus a few revolutionary groups and the Ubaldinist labor unions), but it did not result in routinization (49-57)
• chapter 3;
• the PJ is an "informal mass party" (59-60)
• mass because: it maintains an extensive membership (60)
• it has a dense organizational strucutre, partucularly in working class neighborhoods (61)
• it has lots of informal structures that help it embed deeply into working-and lower-class neighborhoods (62)
• the party is informal (doesn't rely on bureaucracy), segemented (few insitutionalized horizontal ties between groups) and decentralized (65-76)
• chapter4: populism in crisis: environmental change and party failure, 1983-1985
• chapter5: union-party links: see levitsky 2003a
• in peripheral provinces where hte uniosn were weak, union leaders had only gotten their tercio thanks to the good will of hte party bsoses, so in the provinces it was much easier to dismantle this (114)
• the 25 organizations, which was allied with the Renovators, didn't demand any institutional linkages to the party, just assumed the renovadores would reward them. in the end, they didn't and the 1987 Congress did not establish any body/org to represent labor inside the party. party leaders ended up choosing who the few remaining labor representatives would be  (116-118)
• int eh face of union politics, some uniosn set up their own territorial based agrupaciones, but these end up being fixed investments which helps entrench teh system of union political fragmentation (131)
• chapter 6: Menemism and Neoliberalism: Programmatic adaptation in teh 1990s
•  chapter 7: the view from below, party activists and the transformation of base-level peronism
• argument: two factors that allowed teh PJ to maintain its activists base even as it programmatically changed (and experience litlte intra-party dissent for this change) (186)
• increase access to state resources
• decentralized party structures
• the combo of sate resources and local autonomy allowed some local groups to engage in traditional peronist practices even as the national aprty abandonded them
• but by relying on state resources the personal, ideological, and union-based ties that had sustained local peronist organizations began to erode
• this left he party more reliant on state resources than it ever had been before
• chapter 8: the paradox of menemism: party adaptation and regime stability in the 1990s
• chapter 9: crisis, party adaptation, and democracy: argentina in comparative perspective

McGuire 1997

McGuire, James W. 1997. Peronism without Perón: unions, parties, and democracy in Argentina. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

• Chapter 1: Peronism, Party Institutionalization, and Democracy
• "Peronism is a strong collective identity, but weakly institutionalized as a political party. ... Those who have spoken for the Peronist movement, beginning with Juan Perón himself during his 1946-55 presidency, have repeatedly insisted that Peronism is a national movement committed to real democracy, not a political party preoccupied with formal democracy." (1)
• the plebiscitarian leader and the trade unions have always been the core
• "The leaders and members of a national movement, by contrast, think it desirable, and potentially feasible, to establish full ad permanent control of the polity." (4)
• and power can be won in many different ways, electorally or otherwise
• union leaders are not very devoted to the party, meaning they don't have as much at stake for the survival of democracy (5)
• suggestion that the level of party institutionalization is heavily dependent on its origins, and Peróns didn't want or need a strongly institutionalized party (14-15)
• Augusto Vandor tried to create a peronist pary not centered on Perón, but Perón allied with those marginalized by Vandor, and Perón's candidate beat vandor's in the 1966 governor election in Mendoza (18-19)
• this first cycle of routinization ailed, and the specter of Perón's growing power led to military coup (19)
• the second cycle of (attempted) institutionalization came after Luder lost the 1983 election, led by the Renovation wing, Menem had ambiguous but existent ties with the old wing, so the 2nd attempt also failed (19-22)
• this study contends Perón's and Menems unwillingness to institutionalize the party was a big cause PJ never institutionalized (22)
• union leaders were key to both party building movements and the groups that thwarted these movements (26)
• "struggles among Peronist unionists, along with the power-preservation and power-enhancement interests of Peronism's plebiscitarian leaders, have contributed to Peronism's weak party institutionalization.
• Chapter 7, the rise and fall of renovation peronism
• Alfonsin's presidency helped the isntitutionalization of the PJ, for three reasons
• the military had lost legitimacy, so there was a feeling democracy would be around a while (187)
• public opinion seemed to favor adn support political parties (instead of, say corporatism) (187-188)
• Radical Party gained some legitimacy as well, didn't look liek the party that always lost to PJ or always allowed military to take over (188)
• PJs loss in presidential election of 1983 meant the party had to build party from the legislature, not be headed by a super strong prez (188-189)
• leader of the metalworkers had been major power, leader in the party for this election, loss discredited him
• renewal faction of PJ wanted internal elections, less backroom maneuvering (190)
• in the midterm elections the UCR won 43 to 35%, with the renewal faction of the PJ winning by 2-1 margin
• the July 1984 union reform law helped to democratize unions a bit, even if peronists still maintained a lot of control in elections (192)
• with the PJ 62 unions were old school, wanted to control the party, while the "25" ceded leadership of the party to politicians, but also used more leftist talk, opposing hegemony of the US and transnational capital (192-193)
• 13 general strikes against Alfonsin 
• between 1984 and 88 there wre 2721 local strikes (199)
• general strikes may have been an effort on the part of union leaderhsip to contain, channel protests from the base (200)
• neither the 15 (conciliated with Alfonsin) nor the Ubaldinistas (current in CGT) saw the PJ as a useful vehicle for making a mark on politics and society, they wanted to get direct influence on the national executive
• the 15 tried to control the labor ministry
• Ubaldini tried to mobilize unionists with pure economic/societal power to influence the exec (205-6)
• "The "62" liked the tercio because the financial and organizationl weakness of of nonunion Peronism assured them control of nominations in the women's and men's branches of the movement as well as in the union sector." (209)
• Menem did not have the support of hte party but did have the support of the unions (210)
• when Menem won presidential primary in 1988, renovadores lost power in the PJ (211)
• Menem's style reflected Peron's a bit, willing to disregard the rules
• "Above all, Menem defended the notion that Peronism was, first and foremost, a national movement, not a party preoccupied with democracy..." (212)
• for the 15 Menem's victory gave them a chance to get power that their weakness in the CGT and the PJ had long denied them (215)
• left Ubaldini forced to pursue general strike strategy against a peronist, not a great idea
• Chapter 8 free=market reform and political shenanigins
• some peronist leaders opposed Menem's reforms, but most went along with them thansk to the many inducements involved (216), these, of course, meant declines in union membership and deterioration of finances, as well as a new limit on the right to strike
• by 1995 when the growth had slowed, many unions now wanted to oppose menem, but the reforms had already progressed far enough tht there was litlte chance of stopping them (217)
• Menem's rule by decree deinstitutionalized the PJ and, despite runnign fiar elections, did many things that udnermined democratic consolidation
• Menem's economic reforms, content and impact
• Menem's economic reforms were implemented in bad ways, especially privatization which broke most of the UN's "Seven Sins of Privatization", especially the use of discretionary/nontransparent procedures (220)
• currency overvaluation meant wages went down while productivity rose (221)
• main cost was a huge surge in unemployment (223)
• mainly caused by massive layoffs, wage cuts in public sector, capital repalcing waged laborers, and increased import competition (223)
• unions:
• employment dropped in public and private sector, so membership dropped (223-4)
• curtailed right to strike (224)
• collective bargaining was decentralized a bit (by decree, law never quite made it out of congress) (224-5)
• also a decree to reform obras sociales, though labro leaders fought off real reform (226)
• union responses
• union leaders had differing responses to these reforms, from strong opposition to cooperation with tepids of both
• actual responses simply came about because union leaders were very autonomous and just ended up responding differently to conflicting imperatives (protect union versus be loyal to PJ) (226)
• turf battles also played a role (227)
• CGT splits when menemists (allied, oddly enough, with anti-menemists) try to get Ubaldini out of Sec gen position in 1989 (228)
• surprisingly, some of the more combative "25" union leaders became menemists (230)
• when Menem went after the obras sociales, CGT reunited (though with lots of internal conflicts remaining) to fight this (231)
• and the same time the leaders of the state workers ATE and teachers CTERA broke to form the CTA
• CGT called for a General strike in in 1992, but it was weakly attended, and afterwards they adopted a conciliatory tone, whcih didn't win them much (231-232), CTA was combative of all Menem's reforms (232)
• when Menem went after obras sociales in 1993/4 CGT called for a general strike, but called it off after neogtiations were started
• MTA, within CGT, was more combative and untied with CTA for some general strikes and protests against obras changes in 1994 (233)
• CGT acquiesced to Menem because reforms were pretty good, in some instances, for the economy (234-5)
• also menem was head of PJ, adn workers supported the PJ (235)
• hyperinflation had been rough, so fixing it made workers OK with other things (236-237)
• also, privatizations were new opportunities for unions to make money (237)
• suggests decline in normal strike activity was because telephone workers lost a showdown strike (a la PATCO), and economic growth then made future strikes less likely (240-241)
• The Deinstitutionalization of the PJ


• Menem bypassed the party in filling government posts and picking candidates for office, increased isolation of party leadership from government and party members (241)
• internal elections continued, but above meant that party was more deinstitutionalized that insti'ized
• during Alfonsin, everyone had to try and gain power through teh legislaturem, but with Menem everyone could skip legislature adn go straight to the top (241-242)
• Menem imposed lots of extraparty candidates (243)
• "menem thus desintitutionalized the PJ in part by ignoring and then capturing and subordinating a party leadership whose ties to party members, union chiefs, and provincial presidents were in any case tenuous at best." (248)
•  Menem and democratic institutions
• "Some conditions became more propitious for the development of a principles commitment to democracy during Menem's first term in office. Menem presided over six years of electoral activity, proposed or backed legal and constitutional reforms that increased the resilience, fairness, and relevance of certain democratic arenas and procedures, and reduced the level of overt military contestation.
• Against these credits, however, one must weigh Menem's manipulation of electoral rules, bypassing of congress with executive decrees, stacking of the supreme court, tolerance for administrative corruption, lackadaisical respo0nse to physical attacks on journalists critical of the government, and pardons of military officers convicted of human rights violations." (252)
• On the one hand, Menem's policies may grow the national pie, making it easier to settle claims for distribution (260)
• on teh other hand, the party is now less able to actually channel distributive claims, meaning the outcome could still be conflict of distributional issues (261)
• Chapter 9: conclusion
•  weak party institutionalization encouraged union leaders to express their demands through strikes and protests, not the party or elections (262)
• also meant unions weren't devoted to democratic institutions, meaning they didn't necessarily always oppose military dictatorship
• the party became dispensable in union leaders' eyes
• the argument of this book is that, like the rural elites who controlled votes of peasants, the working class leaders could mobilize enough votes to dominate politics, and thus was uninterested in creating strong political democracy (263)
• union power and democratic consolidation are not necessarily at odds, but strong unions can increase distributive conflict and wield a stronger ability to sway political system, meaning democratic consolidation can come down to the level that union leaders want democratic consolidation (266)
• at times union power can have ambiguous results for the poor, who may bear the costs of the creation of a privilege working class
• 1980s union density data (268)
• the strong labor movement from 1955-1983, coupled with weak parties, meant that the labor unions contributed to a strong distributional conflict without any institutional ways to channel it, which created instability (270-271)
• why is it a problem that democracy is not institutionalized? it makes crises and nondemocratic responses to these crises more likely (281)
• 
  

Del Bono and Henry 2008

• Introduction
• this article looks at the circumstances that accompanies the development of companies that outsource call center/service jobs to Argentina (8)
• the call centers are unionize but these unions pose little threat to the use of subcontracting by employers
• by refraining from trying to get better conditions for workers, a place becomes more likely to have flexible work relationships, whcih in turn weakens the unions
• argument: the unions contribute, either by action or omission, to the consilidation of the call center sector in Argentina
• and then businesses can threaten to move their operations if workers become strong or if they lose flexibility
• argument: it is the labor/EMPLOYMENT relations that strongly affect the general charactersistics of union action in the call center sector (9)
• looks at two companies, one from US one from France
• unions involved: FAECyS, FOEESITRA, FOETRA in Buenos Aires
• Call centers and services for export in Argentina
•  call center jobs are growing a lot (10)
• since the devaluation, the call center industry has been segmented, with local companies who cal to Argentina and multinationals who call outside Argentina (11-12)
• BA, Cordoba, and Rosario are the big centers for call centers (12)
• call centers looking mostly for cheap labor costs (13)
• Strategies and Responses from unions
• call center businesses leave places with expensive workers and look for places with low cost worekrs with few legal rights
• this challenges unions, as it can be hard to keep employment and make it a decent job
• call centers, tertiarization, and delocalization of work fragment unions and leaders (14)
• responses:
• FAECyS
• the collective agreements that exist leave many workplace issues untouched, including length of day, work conditions, etc (15)
• FAECyS hasn't changed their contract with employers since 1975
• this union was important, even through the 1990s, and negotiated with the government in the 1990s about the conditions of structural change, not oppose them (16)
• call centers hire young workers, and they meet a union that is unwilling to organize and doesn't have a strong enough identity to strengthen their position against employers
• there is NO connection communication between workers in call centers and unions, unions have no presence at work
• BUT unions note that the minute they demand anything, the company can just move somewhere else, like Peru or chile (17)
• contracts are very short term, sometimes use mentoring/internships to get young workers to work (18)
• but this means that there is a lot of turnover, which can be a problem for employers
• businesses think employees move on because the want experience in other businesses, less because there is no career path, no worklife balance, and low wages
• workers are hired to work 30 hours a week, and collective contracts in other telephone work limits work horus to 6 or 7 horus aday, but call center workers usually work more like 8 or 9 in a day, signalling a loss of rights only because the contracts for other telephone work are written too specifically (19)
•  wages also vary a great deal
• THE COLLECTIVE CONTRACT IN THIS CASE acts more as a way for teh business to develop, a "legal cover", rather than true collective representation (20)
• FOETRA
• they seem more willing to demand changes, want tercerization to end (20-21)
• proposed a law that would define telephoe employees as the same as long as they used telephone for three hours a day, this is a way to stop division among different groups of worekrs in telecom (21)
• this would allow FOETRA to expand the good conditions found in other places to call centers and other workplaces that have gotten through with loopholes (22)
• but, of course, this law had little chance of passing
• thsi seems mostly to be an attempt to get the workers who were spun off from ENTEL back into FOETRA (23)
• FOETRA did some strieks, protests, etc against a group called Atento between 2004 and 2006 (24)
• but there was little fixed capital, so the strikes were broken pretty easily, work was moved quickly to other places
• other workers didn't join in with this, as workforce is fragemented (25)
• same story with another company, an internet company, from 2005-2007 (25)
• thus it is becoming increasingly clear that classic, local responses to issue in call centers won't work, and they need much more unity across the sector (26)
• Conclusions
• government may be prolabor now, but unions still dealing with leftover burdens of neoliberalism (26)
• though unions have regained power, they still face a big challenge of the demand by employers for flexible work (27)
• in this case, fleixiblization of work has allowed businesses to push back some labor rights, and unions at the national level haven't been able to effectively push back
• local institutions do affect call centers, and unions have a chance to improve things (just seem to want to end on a high note) (27-28)

Senen Gonzalez 2011

• Introduction
• after 2003, unions became a much stronger player
• government began being more involved in economy
•  collective contracts grew a great deal, from and average or 197 per year in the 1990s, to 406 in 2003, 568 in 2005, 930 in 2006, 1654 in 2009
• question of the article: are unions revitalizing themselves, or are they just reacting to the changing context? (42)
• comparing the years 1990-2001 and 2002-2008
• articles suggests that there aren't only more collective contracts, but that the content of these contractsis also better
• there is a transformation of of the interior structures of unions, too, thanks to the presence of delegados in the workplace
• Nuevas Reglas del juego: politicas publicas
• Nestor Kirchner importantly tried to boost internal consumption among Argentines, and of course the debt default and the end of the convertibility plan (43)
• the state is aiming to take an active role in promoting ethical employment and social inclusion of workers (44)
• suggests that the old (and new) state-labor colatiion is based on the negotiation of salaries (46)
• state promotes salary increases, while unions make demands within inflation targets of the government
• mostly with CGT, since CTA does not have personaria gremial
• creates pattern bargaining (47)
• Consejo de Salario Minimo, Vital, y Movil includes CGT, CTA and business leaders (47)
• 2004 labor law change tries to consolidate some of the post-2001 changes in labor, including giving a stronger right to strike (though the right to strik eof "essential services" is still limited)
• also, some limitation of manager discretion, esepcailly around firing without just cause and arbitrary layoffs (49)
• El actor sindical: tradiciones y nuevas percepciones
• CTA was acting more like a social movement union, while CGT is bureaucratic thanks to strong labor institutions (50)
• seems like the revitalization in collective bargaining is less about getting more members, and more about improving union (leaders) position in poliitcs (51)
• BUT that's not the whole story, adn there are some challengers to this story
• Los indicadores de la revitalizaction
• workplaces with delegados have a much higher unionization rate (53)
• Collective contracts
• in teh 1990s, most common demand was about flexibilit yo employment
• in 2000s, wage levels became the most common thing in bargaining, and included social dialogue to figure out correct level (55)
• fighting back against "individualization" of salary
• coverage went from 3 million to 5 million between 2003 and 2008 (no citation)
• labor conflict
• more of them, peaking in 2007/2008 (56-57)
• state is still the most important target, but private sector is growing as a target (and state is shrinking, slightly (58)
• Conclusion
• most of this revitalization is coming from opportunities in a new context (59)
• CGT is doing top-down revitalization 
• 
  

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Elbert 2010

Elbert, Rodolfo. 2010. "How Do Unions Respond to Nonstandard Work Arrangements? Relations between Core and Non-Core Workers in a Food Processing Factory (Argentina, 2005-2008)". Journal of Workplace Rights. 15 (3): 387-398.

•  Introduction
• Though the working class is increasingly fragmented, in Argentina  workers in formal labor movements are being a bit more militant now (387-388)
• This paper is about a successful case of non-standard and standard workers cooperating to improve the lives of non-standard wokers
• there are grassroots strategies that non-core workers developed in order to obtain the support of core workers (388)
• Nonstandard work arrangements and Union Strategies in the Global South
• labor protests can include both core and non-core workers, and these protests need to be analyzed in light of this fact (389)
• Context of the Factory Case Study:
• K-Foods
• Production
• two main sections, manufacturing and packaging (390)
• some gender division in labor
• Labor relations = conflictual
• workers say management is too demanding
• management says workers are ideologically set against them (391)
• there is more or less explicit competition between teh company and the union for workers' loyalty
• nonstandard work
• most nonstandard workers are not represented by the union
• union politics
• three main groups (392)
• core workers, aligned with national leaders
• core workers who are more militant
• non-core workers seeking solidarity and core jobs
• Core and Non-core workers during two Labor Conflicts
• Campaign against Labor Outsourcing
• there was labor outsourcing at one of the plants, but the union did not fight it until 2005 (393)
• before this the national union did not intitiate a fight, despite favorable conditions
• in 2005 some grassroots organization began with outsourced workers and activists (394)
• core workers showed solidarity, and eventually (2006) these nonstandard workers were hired as core workers
• Temporary workers win permanent contracts
• temp contracts or those hired through agencies (395), NOT outsourced labor
• some of these workers also joined the grassroots group
• these workers eventually blockaded a highway to get their demands (to be core workers, among others) to be met
• when temp workers were sent home, allegedly because their was no work to be done, WHOLE PLANT went on strike (395-396)
• shop floor union and activist group came together, finally, most temp workers got core contracts (396)
• Union Strategies that Confront Nonstandard work Arrangments
• non-croes workers campagins were grassroots
• involved rank and file, despite teh fact that the union rarely did so
• ruthless in the pursuit of the creation of solidarty across core/non-core
• ALL OF THIS CREATED SOLIDARITY, which won the day
• these actiosn reveresed trend of labor fragmentation
• ME: Where's the government in all this?  They blockaded a highway and nothing bad happened?

Murillo and Ronconi 2004

Murillo, Maria Victoria, and Lucas Ronconi. 2004. "Teachers' Strikes in Argentina: Partisan Alignments and Public-sector Labor Relations". Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID). 39 (1): 77-98.

• Intro
• Teachers have been the most militant sector since 1989 (77)
• increase in militancy is related to, but can't be fully explained by (78)
• worsening of conditions
• challenges to income security (through decentralization)
• "Patterns of teachers' militancy are better explained by political alignments between public employees' and teachers' unions than by labor institutions (78)
• How does/would this explanation change in the context of no viable parties outside the PJ?
• then partisan alignments are less salient, but alignments with factions of the one party may be important
• at some point this may become clientelism, depending on your definition of clientelism, as unions may ally themselves with personalties or groups within the PJ (as they have in the past)
• Teachers' strikes reflect a larger but uneven trend of provincialization of protests, which happened no doubt because of the decentralization of the education system
• Explaining Public Teachers' Strikes
• economic conditions don't quite play in here, since these are public sector workers (79)
• labor strength can var across provinces, so it could bean important variable
• but political alignments will likely be very salient, given that governors have a high degree of discretion in implementing labor laws (80)
• Argentine Public Education and the Provincial Analysis
•  by 1993 primary and secondary public education administered at the provincial level (81)
• provincial governors now have the power to decide legality of strikes, etc, but also have a lot of discretionon how they use labor laws
• provincial governors also control education expenditures
• CTERA has traditionally been the national union (82)
• teachers caught between government and parents at times 
• A Cross-Provincial Test on Teachers' Militancy
• dependent variable: strike days lost
• independent measures: (82-83)
• political affiliation of union leaders compared to governor, percentage of legislators of governor's party, change in teachers' real earnings, unemployment, attendance bonus, unionization, union fragmentation
• downside: data are for a short period of time, so some independent variables don't really change much (85)
• Political alignment (of union leaders/governors) has the strongest effect, though other variables have an effect as well (86)
• if job stable and unemployment high (ie low exit alternatives), union members will protest for better things
• authors suspect that executive discretion diminishes the effect of institutional and organizational variables, which is why they weren't necessarily strong effects here (88)
• Conclusion
• politicization of labor relations thanks to provincialization of education AND executive discretion re: labor laws
•  suggestion: labor laws should be strengthened to decrease executive discretion, which should in turn decrease strike days (89)

Nolan Garcia 2013

Silva, Eduardo. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia,  Network Dynmaics and Local Labor Rights Movements in Puebla, Mexico 106-140

• suggests that most labor movements tried to get protective legislation in the face of neoliberalism, and still do (106)
• whole story is about alliances...when transnational movement returned to wield power at the local level, positive/negative unionization outcomes were decided (mainly) by who was allowed to stay in the alliance...when some members were excluded, unions lost important resources which in turn led to defeat (107)
• looking at maquilas, especially Kukdong
• transnational network built over Kukdong fight, then after that was done network leadership was transferred to Mexicans in Matamoros (where they lost)...in two other places, Johnson Contorls and Vaqueros Navarra, national alliances supplied resources that were once supplied by internaional allies, leading to success (107-8)
• (109) local groups seek international allies in hopes of garnering some resources (put broadly) that would allow them to overcome domestic obstacles
• an important key to positive outcomes is what happens when transnational movements "come home"
• starting on 112, account of Kukdong issue, official union is the CROC
• workers at Kukdong became center of a convergence of other groups who became a transnational movement, including USAS, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Maquila Solidarity Network, a local (new) workers center (CAT) and many others (114)
• Kukdong eventually liquidated itself to create a new identity, thus nulling contract with the CROC and allowing independent union to be formed (117)
• though transnational allies wanted to leverage this win into new organizing, members of the new union just wanted to keep their jobs, and withdrew from organizing efforts once they had a contract.  eventually the union lost its own control of the factory to another PRI organization
• CAT then took the lead as this network (minus USAS and a couple others) took on a plant in Matamoros...the network specifically had CAT take the lead so it would be a Mexican-led charge ...goal was to form an independent union (118)
• CAT decided to go after PUMA (because they made clothes at Matamoros Garment) and sought German allies (119)
• but then Matamoros Garment just closed their plant, ending the struggle (120)
• then CAT moved on to Tarrant Ajalpan (TA)
• again goal was to get independent union
• CAT took the lead, but informed the transnational network (121)
• MY IDEAS: "informed"?  is this really transnational cooperation anymore
• took the route of trying to enforce codes on conduct, not mexican law
• early brand targets don't really pan out (122)
• CAT never really got any traction, meanwhile the owners began taking orders to other shops, TA was heading for closure (123)
• everyone gets impatient, workers get tired of waiting for CAT, everyone bickers, and TA closes (123-124)
• CAT COMES OFF WIN AT KUDONG JUST TO LOSE TWICE
• CAT failed after Kukdong because they weren't able to leverage brands the same way that transnational network idd at Kukdong (125)
• brand focus provided all the economic leverage, which is utterly necessary
• at Johnson Controls and Vaqueros Navarra, workers decided to register with Mineros and FAT (resp.), meaning they got to skip first step of union registration process nad could go straight to the election process! (126)  in this case the weaker local groups were able to get help from stronger, though national, groups, and work around local hurdles (127)
• SO WHY DOESN'T EVERYONE DO THIS? why doesn't everyone just affiliate with a national union?!
• Conclusion:  IN THE END, ALL THESE FACTORIES WERE CLOSED, or the unions were busted (128)
• 
  

Cató and Ventrici 2011

Cató, Juan, and Patricia Ventrici. 2011. "Labor Union Renewal in Argentina: Democratic Revitalization from the Base". Latin American Perspectives. 38 (6): 38-51. 

• Introduction
• 2001 crisis involved the collapse of the development formula based on financial accumulation, exhaustion of social model based on exclusion and regressive distribution of income, and delegitimization of political authority (38)
• the persecution of labor leaders during the dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the cooptation of union leaders in the 1990s, significantly weakened labor as a social actor (38-39) 
• BUT the new landscape created by Néstor Kirchner provided a favorable climate for labor union revitalization through union democracy (39)
• look at subway workers to see how rank and file changed their internal procedures, became more democratic, and how the union fared after making these changes
• The Union legacy of the 1990s and the New Situation
• the (neoliberal) changes to the labor market and the deterioration of the norms of protection delegitimized many unions in the 1990s (Marshall and Perelman 2002) (40)
• many unions privileged organizational survival over rank and file interests
• Union Democracy
• paper looks at the ways labor unions as a social actor deal with workers' needs (41)
• the major unions, since 2003, have continued the old model of deeply rooted bureaucracy and top-down control (42)
• the struggle by many leaders to preserve their power closes off the possibility of revitalization
• but the weakening of corporatism also brought the old model of unionism into crisis (citing de la Garza 2008)
• in Argentina unionism is on the defensive, and any attempt and innovation is perceived as a threat to leaders...questioning leaders is seen as a declaration of rivalry (43)
• Resistance to Union Bureaucratization:  The Subway Assembly Delegates
• the new, post-2001 era made possible the emergence and/or consolidation of union renewal from the base
• the Subway union went against the grain of history, as it was
• challenged entrenched union bureaucracy (44)
• was innovative and employed a lot of direct action
• was particularly success in achieving its demands
• Boundary-violating actions by the base revealed the limits of the established rules, and allowed rank and file to supersede them
• 1994: subway privatized
• the union outwardly complained, but internally decided to moderate demands, work with management, limit workers in transition
• unhappy workers started meeting and complaining clandestinely
• in 1997 a worker was unfairly fired and other workers left on an unauthorized strike (45), though most delegates and leadership did not aid them
• after this these militant workers attempted to gain elected positions in the union Assembly as delegates
• in 2000 the militant delegates won 17 of 21 seats
• then, in 2001, after an unpopular management decision supported by the union leadership, and demanded to negotiate this decision
• management found that the Assembly, not the leadership, was the real power, and bypassed negotiating with the leadership in this case (45-46)
• the main challenge for the Assembly was to keep workers invovled and reelecting them (46)
• soon the Assembly had taken over long- and medium-term strategy for the union, and became the main interlocutor with management
• both management (using cooptation) and the official union leadership (using non-recognition) tried to break up the Assembly
•  Assembly's main demands were not on wages, but on improving conditions, lowering hours, including more non-organized workers in contracts, and reducing arbitrary management decisions (47)
• my take:  sounds a lot like job control unionism!
• the Assembly consolidated itself both practically and symbolically, and continued to make gains (47-48)
• Conclusion
• In this case, union democracy was not an obstacle but a prerequisite for increased union power (48)
• the Assembly engaged members in active participation and direct action, which showed them that the traditional institutional limits could be overcome and innovation could occur (49)

Levesque and Murray 2010

Lévesque, Christian, and Gregor Murray. 2010. "Understanding union power: resources and capabilities for renewing union capacity". Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research. 16 (3): 333-350.

• “The historical foundations of union power are shifting” (334) thanks to globalization
• strategies for union renewal must be focused on power (335)
• Thinking Union Power
• resources are understood as fixed or path-dependent assets that an actor can normally access and mobilize (335)
• also need actor capabilities
• and need a combination of resources and capabilities: the tools and the people to use them (336)
• a full account of union power would include:
• union capacity (power resources and actor capabilities)
• institutional arrangements in which the actors operate
• particular opportunity structures
• the capacity of other actors in these sets of relationships
• (the article focuses on union capacity only)
• POWER RESOURCES
• 4 types: internal solidarity, network embeddedness, narrative resources, and infrastructural resources
• Internal Solidarity
• ((cohesive identities, though many say these have become less salient with new identity politics (336, 337)))
• features:
• cohesive collective identity
• deliberative vitality
• links between members, other groups
• active participation of members
• Network embeddedness
• Structural change (globalization...my word) in labor and product markets creates new sources of division between workers/unemployed of all stripes (338)
• Solidarity is built through horizontal and vertical links within and between unions and the community (338)
• trade unions integrated into a larger network are more likely to develop and promote their own agenda (339)
• two dimensions of network embeddedness (339):
• diversity
• extent to which a union is either isolated, connected to other unions (homogenous network), or connected to many different types of organizations (heterogenous networks)
• density = strength of ties with networks
• strong, deep ties are great, but weaker ones may come in handy in certain situations...further research needs to be done on the latter contention
• Narrative resources
• the stories, values that aggregates identities and interests (339)
• Infrastructural Resources
• material and human resources, and organizational practices, policies and programs (340)
• dimensions:
• different ways a union can generate material resources
• dues
• from Mexican experience (outside of paper) state coffers
• people/human resources
• are specialists available in “bridge institutions” (Ganz et al. 2004)
• talents of members
• organizational practices
• change the organizational setup, change (increase?) ability to get infrastructural resources
• STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
• 4 important strategic capabilities:  intermediation, framing, articulating, and learning capabilities (341)
• Intermediation
• ability of a union to mediate between contending interets
• ability to foster collaborative action
• ability to access, create, and activate salient social networks by managing intra-and inter-union channels and by fostering relationships with other networks/groups
• Framing
• “the ability to put forward an agenda that can be more or less inclusive and can be part of a broader social project” (343)
• Articulation
• determining the different levels of action necessary and acting across these levels and through time (343)
• Learning
• learn from teh past and present, change the organization to deal with, anticipate future changes
• make sure learning is done by all members of union, not just leaders (344)
• Hyman (2007): learning is essential to adaptation and innovation, otherwise leaders fall back on familiar strategies (344)
• learning is thus critical to the renewal process (345)
• Conclusion