Hochstetler, Smith, Silva 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"The Road Traveled" Kathryn Hochstetler, William C. Smith, and Eduardo Silva (Conclusion to edited volume)

Concluding remarks for the book, most of which connect different chapters

• ALternations to political opportunity structure ideas (Sikkink)
• must also include "levels of threat" as a factor
• when/if a threat disappears, a transnational network can fold (see FTAA fight for examples)
• also, even when both domestic and international arenas seem "closed", activists can/will still attempt to change things (not be discouraged, as Sikkink suggests)
• also whether "opportunities" can even bee objectively defined in the moment is challenged, undermining Sikkink's framework as a way to do anything but analyze post facto
• questions also about the ability to clearly distinguish between international and national levels...fights can be simultaneously about both
• Also, activists themselves can be brokers between national/international level, which can be problematic...if the activist/broker leaves the fight, the network may crumble
• Effects of the Left Turn
• easy to assume left would be good, but not always the case
• The impact of shifts in domestic opportunity structures hinge on the interaction of three factors (191):
• evolution of specific threats and international opportunities
• the perceptions of movement leaders
• and the relationship of activists to institutionalized politics
• if the Left helps us nationally, will activists abandon transnational moves?
• 
  

Rossi 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed.. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"Juggling Multiple Agendas:The Struggle of Trade Unions against National, Continental, and International Neoliberalism in Argentina" Frederico M. Rossi

• Focused on resistance to FTAA in Argentina
• focusing on main coalition against this, whose central actor was the CTA (141)
• BUT the CTA's participation in block the FTAA and other intternational efforts was conditioned by their nationally focused agenda (142)
• "The CTA is a paradigmatic case of a national actor involved in transnational activism against neoliberalism operating with an exclusively domestic logic."
• the CTA saw the FTAA as an act of American imprialism that would undermine Argentina as a nation (144)
• so the frame was both international and national
• in Argentina the major coalition opposed to the FTAA was the Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA (FTAA in esp.), No a la Deuda, No a la Militarización y No a la Pobreza (144-145) formed in 2002
• linked regional groups, Catholic grops, unions, political parties (small ones) na dother social movement organizations (see, e.g 146 table)
• 2005 big summit held in Argentina against the FTAA (Hugo Chávez and Kirchner had already come out against the agreement (148)
• CTa in this instance joined a transnational/international movement, but nevertheless did not shift its national focus (150)
• FTAA essentially dead by 2006
• ORIt dissolved by 2008, in favor of new regional union, the CSA, so CTA OK with joiningit because it doesn't ahve Cold War history.  At the same time, CTA bows out of Autoconvocatoria (which had been renamed) because the grop couldn't figure out a positive plan (only a negative one: boo to neoliberalism) (153)
• yet CSA hasn't made a big splash yet, are still trying to get their feet under them
• since 2009 CTA has done a lot more south-south coordination, though not much has really happened so far
• CTAs interaction with Kirchner led to a general shift toward focus on domestic policies to the detriment of international actions (154)
• YET THROUGHOUT AL OF THIS CTA REMAINED INVOLVED IN MERCOSUR, implementing social accords, etc. etc. (154)
• CTA has simultaneous and PARALLEL agendas (155)
• some domestic focus, some international focus, some regional focus, but the three rarely ever connect
• made some gains on domestic front with Kirchner
• gains on international front mostly due to gains with domestic front
• so why still with Mercosur? (156)
• gets CTA working with Arg. foreign policy
• is some recognition that CTA could play into better domestic recognition
• and Mercosur seems like a vaiable alternative to FTAA, allows CTA some power whereas FTAA probably wouldn't
• 
  

Nolan Garcia 2013

Silva, Eduardo. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia,  Network Dynmaics and Local Labor Rights Movements in Puebla, Mexico 106-140

• suggests that most labor movements tried to get protective legislation in the face of neoliberalism, and still do (106)
• whole story is about alliances...when transnational movement returned to wield power at the local level, positive/negative unionization outcomes were decided (mainly) by who was allowed to stay in the alliance...when some members were excluded, unions lost important resources which in turn led to defeat (107)
• looking at maquilas, especially Kukdong
• transnational network built over Kukdong fight, then after that was done network leadership was transferred to Mexicans in Matamoros (where they lost)...in two other places, Johnson Contorls and Vaqueros Navarra, national alliances supplied resources that were once supplied by internaional allies, leading to success (107-8)
• (109) local groups seek international allies in hopes of garnering some resources (put broadly) that would allow them to overcome domestic obstacles
• an important key to positive outcomes is what happens when transnational movements "come home"
• starting on 112, account of Kukdong issue, official union is the CROC
• workers at Kukdong became center of a convergence of other groups who became a transnational movement, including USAS, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Maquila Solidarity Network, a local (new) workers center (CAT) and many others (114)
• Kukdong eventually liquidated itself to create a new identity, thus nulling contract with the CROC and allowing independent union to be formed (117)
• though transnational allies wanted to leverage this win into new organizing, members of the new union just wanted to keep their jobs, and withdrew from organizing efforts once they had a contract.  eventually the union lost its own control of the factory to another PRI organization
• CAT then took the lead as this network (minus USAS and a couple others) took on a plant in Matamoros...the network specifically had CAT take the lead so it would be a Mexican-led charge ...goal was to form an independent union (118)
• CAT decided to go after PUMA (because they made clothes at Matamoros Garment) and sought German allies (119)
• but then Matamoros Garment just closed their plant, ending the struggle (120)
• then CAT moved on to Tarrant Ajalpan (TA)
• again goal was to get independent union
• CAT took the lead, but informed the transnational network (121)
• MY IDEAS: "informed"?  is this really transnational cooperation anymore
• took the route of trying to enforce codes on conduct, not mexican law
• early brand targets don't really pan out (122)
• CAT never really got any traction, meanwhile the owners began taking orders to other shops, TA was heading for closure (123)
• everyone gets impatient, workers get tired of waiting for CAT, everyone bickers, and TA closes (123-124)
• CAT COMES OFF WIN AT KUDONG JUST TO LOSE TWICE
• CAT failed after Kukdong because they weren't able to leverage brands the same way that transnational network idd at Kukdong (125)
• brand focus provided all the economic leverage, which is utterly necessary
• at Johnson Controls and Vaqueros Navarra, workers decided to register with Mineros and FAT (resp.), meaning they got to skip first step of union registration process nad could go straight to the election process! (126)  in this case the weaker local groups were able to get help from stronger, though national, groups, and work around local hurdles (127)
• SO WHY DOESN'T EVERYONE DO THIS? why doesn't everyone just affiliate with a national union?!
• Conclusion:  IN THE END, ALL THESE FACTORIES WERE CLOSED, or the unions were busted (128)
• 
  

Greer, Stevens, and Stephens 2007

Greer, Stevens, Stephens 2007

GREER, CHARLES R., CHARLES D. STEVENS, and GREGORY K. STEPHENS. 2007. "The State of the Unions in Mexico". Journal of Labor Research. 28 (1): 69-92.
Overview:

• Mostly relies on other literature, not much new analysis
  
• Covers declining union density, composition of employment in Mexico (70-74
  
• Description of power union lost as PRI marginalized labor, and CTM leaders still held on to PRI (75-76)
  
• Uses Bensusán’s typology to show how state-corp unions losing power means the whole movement is losing power (80-83)
  
• Relative Deprivation theory suggests workers should be more active (86)
  
• Transnational alliances (87-88)
  

Quotes:
“The once powerful alliance of government, unions, and business is becoming more tilted against union and workers’ rights and is losing power in the global marketplace.” (82)
“Thus, with the emergence of broad economic and political change, labor unions and the workers they are supposed to represent are at a decided disadvantage and are struggling to find ways to promote the kind of change in labor institutions and support of workers’ rights that is necessary to ensure adequate wages, safety, and other workplace conditions (Gillespie and Tergen 1995).” (84)
‘Relative deprivation theory may partially explain the actions of individuals and workers’ rights organizations oriented toward labor unrest and disputes (Greer and Stephens 1996). More specifically, relative deprivation may lead to increasing collective action, such as growing membership in and support for independent unions. However, obstacles are in the way of such action, such as the traditional ineffectiveness of union intervention, unfriendly legislation, government interpretation of existing laws in favor of company positions, and the prevalence of protectionist company unions…Spontaneous, unofficial, and even violent worker responses to some employer actions should not be entirely unexpected” (86)
“Despite the rhetoric for cross0border solidarity such alliances have not had much success in the past. Reasons for their failures include divergent interests of workers, at least as perceived in the short-run; absence of international expertise or program infrastructure in most unions…; reactive efforts as opposed to strategic initiatives…There are fewer reasons to expect successful alliances between the United States and Mexico given the differential wages and the past hostility of the Mexican government…” (88-89)

“We predict that more independent unions will grow stronger because they meet worker instrumentality needs and because of perceptions of relative deprivation. A country can pursue an economic development strategy based on low wages for only so long. Workers will replace the state-corporatist unions…with independent unions (Bensusán’s terms…) that better represent their interests” (89)

Bensusán and Middlebrook 2012

Bensusán and Middlebrook 2012

Overview

• Partisan alternation of power has not resulted in any significant transformation of state-labor relations (5)
  
  • Unions weaker at mobilizing political power
    
  • All parties find this regime convenient for them
    
• BIG, CONTINUING STORY: Labor unions weak politically
  
• CH. 2: Contradictory terms of corporatist agreement
  
  • Initial bargain: labor peace for subsidies and labor power
    
  • Became: Entrenched leaders and political control for subsidies, clientelism
    
• CH 3. Economic Restructuring and Political democratization hurts unions
  
  • ISI: business and union interests converge
    
  • Financial crisis, ISI breaks: business and union interests diverge
    
    • Shift to privatized business limits government control over business and labor
      
  • Labor tries to, and does, block legal flexibilization, so employers use informal means to achieve their goals
    
  • Unions pact with government, workers cannot effectively fight wage drops because leaders not responsive
    
  • UNT fragments labor movement, despite best intentions
    
  • Labor gets many fewer candidates in primary system
    
    • SNTE (PANAL) and union representing UNAM staff (PRD) the only two exceptions
      
  • Most unions simply deploy their (much reduced) political influence to block policy reforms. Even then, did not reverse long-term erosion of labor power.
    
• CH. 4:
  
  • Fox and Calderón dependent on old-guard labor leaders who promise to toe the line
    
  • Mineros, Electricistas
    
  • Labor law reform:
    
    • fails in 2001-2
      
    • Almost goes through in 2011
      
      • PRI agrees with PAN
        
      • PRI holds back for 2012 elections
        
• CH. 5
  
  • Possibilities of international help
    
  • NAALC, FAT/UE alliance, etc. etc.
    
• Conclusions:
  
  • Official unions declining
    
  • Independent unions doing OK?
    
  • CT/UNT divides labor movement, but allows some need pluralism
    
  • PRI still dominant labor party, no other party has developed systematic labor support, few labor delegates in PRD or PAN (99)
    
  • Growing autonomy of judicial branch helpful
    
    • Supreme Court coming down against local boards that are acting incorrectly (101)
      
  • Low wage model has no future, unions have no future in low wage model.
    

Quotes:
“Most unions remained dominated by leaders whose entrenched position was underpinned by labour law provisions that effectively blocked rank-and-file efforts to hold them accountable.. This same legal regime granted government officials extensive controls over both formation of unions and their actions…” (1)
“…parties across the entire partisan spectrum have found political advantage in preserving the institutional controls on worker participation that are embedded in the established labour relations regime.” (6)
“The PRI’s Chamber delegation in 2009 included more labour representatives…than all other parties combined.” (42-43) (except for PANAL, 70%) PRI: 8.4%, PT: 7.7%, PRD 4.3%, PAN 3.5%

Carty 2006

“Transnational Labor Mobilizing in Two Mexican Maquiladoras”, Victoria Carty, 215-229.

in Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. Latin American social movements: globalization, democratization, and transnational networks. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

• The few, small victories that have been won in Mexican maquilas were achieved through grassroots mobilization that was internationalized, and were able to persuade corporate actors to respect workers’ rights (217)
• Mobilization from Above
• Codes of Conduct (217-218) -- exist, but standards are weak
• institutional solutions through trade agreements -- no one has pursued this rigorously (218-219)
• Mobilization from Below
• a decisive factor in each case is whether or not the host government can be forced into taking a proactive role in helping to resolve conflict (219)
• Kukdong
• workers forced to join CROC, also bad conditions (219)
• struck, sent representatives to the North (219-220)
• North and South student, worker, and human rights groups mobilized
• mobilizations were multi-level targeting local, national, and international actors (220)
• independent union replaced CROC (221)
• Kukdong supports idea that corporations can have positive impact on host governments
• BUT corporations only did this after intense PR, international pressure
• Duro Bag
• contested union election
• Hallmark had a code of conduct, so naming and shaming (223)
• mobilization from below worked
• NAFTA side accord procedure didn’t help much (223)
• Discussion:
• the state does not necessarily have to be the target (224), pressure from other sectors can be brought to bear on corporations, which can bring pressure on the government
• NAFTA has strengthened ties across borders because it created common interests among workers: we’re all getting screwed
• globalization doing the same thing
• My take: easy for you to say
• grievances that are ignored by government, managers at the local level can be pushed up to the national and international level (226)
• important to HUMANIZE the conflict...show that no worker actually wins over another in the global system of capital (228)
• Conclusion: grassroots mobilizing was more effective than top-down efforts, but only successful when efforts could get governments involved (229)

Bandy and Bickham Mendez 2006

“A Place of Their Own? Women Organizers in the Maquilas of Nicaragua and Mexico”, Joe Bandy and Jennifer Bickham Mendez, pp 131-144

in Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. Latin American social movements: globalization, democratization, and transnational networks. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

• Authors examine the opportunities and obstacles that women workers’ movements have faced, specifically surrounding gender differences, as the seek social change via national and transnational coalitions (132)
• EPZs in Nicaragua and Mexico
• important to see power relations between women and male-dominated labor unions and NGOs
• US-Mexico border
• Women labor activists act as brokers between communities and workplaces, local and national organizations (133)
• the strategy here has evolved in four steps (134)
• 1st: get codes of conduct
• 2nd litigation
• third, use international institutions (NAFTA NAO) (134-135)
• 4th, direct action and unionization, because last three weren’t effective enough (135)
• but women find they have had to struggle to voice their perspectives and gendered critiques (135)
• community-based concerns, which are noted alongside/as gendered concerns (by the authors), have been ignored/not been engaged fully by male-dominated labor organizations (135-136)
• WHY?
• unions have taken the lead on many cross-border collaborations
• not uncommon to see union tendencies lean towards bravado, machismo, gendered divisions of labor activism, and resentment of women’s public voice (136)
• females activists have found it difficult to work their way up hierarchical and/or less participatory forms of organization, especially as they privilege shopfloor interests over community interests
• unions tend toward strikes and litigation, which are more masculine forms of confrontation (137)
• men more willing to confront since they are less threatened by physical and sexual coercion
• therefore unions seek out militant factories, which tend to be more male workers
• Nicaragua
• Central Sandinista de Trabajadores (CST), main labor union, started women’s programs in 1992 (137)
• BUT male leadership of CST limited gendered demands (137), women actively prevented from attaining leadership roles (138)
• some women left, formed the Maria Elena Cuadra, an organization by and for women
• MEC has turned away from unionization and strikes
• focuses more on political lobbying and public awareness
• has created regional connections with Central American Network of Women in Solidarity with Maquila Workers, and is sustained by its financial support
• focused on a campaign to get a code of ethics for maquilas
• don’t want maquilas to leave, just want them to be better places to work (138-139)
• BUT MEC has faced a lot of obstacles
• other organizations not excited about expanding their work outside labor/workplace specific issues (139)
• also, MEC adamantly refuses to join boycotts, fearing the loss of jobs (140)...self-limiting radicalism (Cohen and Arato 1992)
• “we are asking for the minimum.  We aren’t even questioning the exploitation of workers”
• MEC active in late 1990s, early 2000s, in more recent years has been less active combatting employers, some MEC activists have returned to labor movement (141)
• A Place of the Own, Global-Local Resistance
• women in both regions have struggle for accountability, but have also sought to maintain the empowering aspects of new political opportunities (141)
• public attention has fixed some issues in both places (142)
• BUT women have discovered that labor movement is highly gendered at evey level
• Conclusion
• as transnational social movements resist global inequality, they also face an awkward negotiation between their own unequal structures
• if civil societies weaken the position of diverse stakeholders they only succeed in mobilizing activists, and limiting the possibility for a more inclusive, democratic alternative to neoliberalism (144)

Murillo and Schrank 2005

Murillo, M. Victoria, and Andrew Schrank. 2005. "With a Little Help from my Friends". Comparative Political Studies. 38 (8): 971-999.

• Introduction
• 13 of the 18 collective labor reforms between 1985 and 1998 have enhanced labor’s ability to bargain collectively, despite rampant neoliberal reforms (972)
• two possible explanations
• labor-backed parties are trying to keep their constituents happy
• transnational activism between US and labor repressive states have forced improvements in labor law as a condition to have access to US market
• Both explanations are right, depending on the past institutional context of the country in question (973)...regardless, interestingly enough globalization seems to be improving the influence labor has over collective labor law!
• Labor Rights and Economic Reform in Latin America
• free market reforms have certainly hurt labor, and individual labor codes have gotten worse for workers, but not collective codes (974)
• yet we would expect neoliberal reforms to include deregulation of collective labor codes as well as individual labor codes (976)
• nor are the improvements to collective law merely cosmetic!
• Labor Mobilization Legacies and Labor Reform Strategies
• The process of globalization has altered the costs and benefits of union-friendly labor law reform (979), integration in the global economy and trade have:
• increased the political returns to pro-labor reform in countries with labor-backed parties, as those parties are trying to win-back the allegiance of working class constituencies
• increased the material costs of non-reform in labor repressive countries, who don’t want to lose trading status with the US over labor rights issues
• Quant model (980-985)
• Results:
• Partisan and transnational alliances work through preexisting institutional configurations (985)
• “...partisan alliances foster union-friendly reform in organized labor’s traditional strongholds, but yield indeterminate results elsewhere.” (987)
• “...transnational alliances yield their biggest payoffs...in countries where labor has never achieved enough organizational strength to be considered a serious player in the political arena..” (987)
• Qualitative Case Studies: Argentina and the Dominican Repbulic
• Similarities
• both were model neoliberal reformers (987)
• both adopted union-friendly collective labor law (987-988)
• Differences
• they feature radically different labor relations and party systems (988)
• Argentina
• PJ survived the 1990s by abandoning labor (989)
• pro-labor reform in 1998 BECAUSE:
• 1997 elections saw Pj start to lose electoral support
• new law was opposed by business, IMF, non-PJ labor activists, and the two opposition parties (990)
• also, after Alianza came to power, they tried to deregulate collective labor law
• In 1998 PJ tried to win back it’s friends, My take: but wasn’t successful enough to win next elections
• Dominican Republic
• DR economy based on textiles, other low-cost production in EPZs (990-991)
• In 1989 America’s Watch filed GSP petition against DR (991)
• AFL-CIO threatened similar actions, focusing especially on EPZs
• DR initiated reform in 1992 to not lose trade with US (991-2)
• Granted:  wages, conditions still not great, but better than in a lot of other EPZs (992)
• Conclusion
• though similar outcomes re: collective labor law, there is not a convergence of tactics/strategies in Latin America....still depends on institutional context (994, 993, respectively)
• Important differences
• labor repressive regimes are aligning their labor codes with generally accepted conditions, etc (994)
• labor-backed parties are implementing labor reforms that specifically improve the organizational capacity of unions