Moore Johnson and Kardos 2000

Moore Johnson, Suan and Susan M Kardos "Reform Bargaining and Its Promise for School Reform"
in

Loveless, Tom. 2000. Conflicting missions. Teachers Unions and Educational Reform The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

• reform Bargaining: teachers unions recognizing common interests with schools, working collaboratively with school administrators (8)
• in teh US, there was teh factory model of schooling, which has since been replaced by the professional model of schooling (8-9)
• "Teachers must approach their work as a craft or prfession rather than as routine labor, and schools must be organized to encourage them to do so." (9)
• bureaucracy, union or otherwise, can stifle innovation and make teachres and schools unable to respond to the varied needs of students and communites (11-12)
• but importantly one urban principal once declared that the thick, phone-book size contracts were actually an indictment of past administrations, namely their wilingness to abuse teachers (12)
• industrial bargaining led to better pay and faier, more reasonable work environment, yet they also limited the roels teachers could play, overly supported weak teachers (tenure), etc (17)
• good for dividing resources, bad for facing educational challenges (19)
• negotiators who improved edcuation suggested it was only possible once unions/teachers had already attained bread adn butter items that regulate basic working conditions (25)

never really gets into community, but one could see how industrial bargaining would limit community interaction as well...though reform bargaining may also limit this, if the community isn't specifically invted to be invovled

Varela 2013

Varela, P. (2013). Los sindicatos en la Argentina kirchnerista. Entre la herencia de los’ 90 y la emergencia de un nuevo sindicalismo de base. Revista Archivos de Historia del movimiento obrero y la izquierda, (2), 77-100.

• Introduction
• lots of scholars are suggesting growth of unions in the 2000s is the result of state-driven change in industrial relations (77)
• one problem with this is it overemphasizes the large, national, institutional scale, and ignores the very important role of conflicts and unions at the firm leve: internal commissions and bodies of delegados (77)
• secodn proble, it overemphasizes the polarization between the "new" unionism and the "old" unionism, when in fact these groups lots of similarities and have some ruptures
• the article has three hypotheses for debate:
• the strong recomposition of working class as a social and union thing after 2003 are thanks to the continuing of the exploitation begun in the 1990s (78)
• it is on this contradiction, strong unionism without change in exploitation, that has been teh foundation for strong unionism from the base
• the presents of younger workers and strong Trotskyite influences are altering unionism of the base in important ways
• Contradictions of a return
• the relegitimation of colecltive bargaining and negotiation at the high level has made workers realize how bad their conditions still are, and helped explain why Cristina had an anti-union turn after 2011 (78-9)
• between 2002 and 2004 there were a number of increases in minimum wages, negotiated directly between labor leaders and capital, though started by and arbitrated by the Néstor, these were mainly attempts to soothe people and get them money they lost during devaluations (79)
• 2004 was the real start of re-legit of unions, esp CGT and Hugo Moyano
• this happened due to economic growth, combined with growing union conflict due to the emergence of unionism of the base (80)
• this was new because there were lots of surprise conflicts started and led by delegados and leaders within the base openly against the higher up leadership of the union
• this article suggests that Moyano was helped, becamea  strategic ally of the Ks because unions of the base were already getting strong, and government wanted a way to channel that momentum, not the other way around (81-2)
• until 2011 the formula was crate peer groups and set wage ceilings (82-3)
• this sort of got disrupted in 2007 when the government started messing with statistics to cover up inflation (83)
• AND when unions outside of Moyano's circle started being repressed
• 2009 brought Cristina needing help of Moyano against Ag strike, financial crisis which made inflation go down, and strong conflict of the base at Kraft foods (84)
• this resulted in government not setting a limit on salary negotiations
• Kraft workers continued to fight, and a union thug from the Union Ferrovaria killed a militant from teh Partido Orbrero, whcih revealed the violence used by traditional unions (85)
• After 2011 Cristina began pushing back on unions, undoing some of the thigns that had made unions adn important political representation post-2003
• number of collective contracts went down in 2011
• suggests this happens because of inflation issues, and...
• break between CK and Moyano
• whie there was GDP growth in 2011, it shrank in 2012 (86)
• 2011 elections didn't have a lot of union candidates, but did have a lot of territorial candidates, which was teh start of the rupture between CK and Moyano
• in 2012 this caused a rupture among the major union confederations, ended up with 3 opositoras and 2 oficialistas
• in 2013, docentes demanded a 30% wage increase, and the Ministry of Trabajo arbitrarily closed discussions and just said they woudl get 22%
• since 2003 the growth of union strngth has run into the fact that labor precarity and fragmentation, both begun in 1990s, continues to happen (87)
• Ks made unions stronger at the top, but didn't roll back the gains won by capital during the 1990s
• all fo this came to a head when the economy started having trouble...before then wages could just be increased and keep people relatively happy without rolling back management power
• this is felt most often at the workplace, so conflicts happen at the workplaces more often (88)
• informality and work precarity continues during the 200s (88-89) with DATA
• because collective contracts DON'T talk about flexibilization liek they did in teh 1990s, it is fair to assuem that flexibilization continues (ie CCT shudl have rolled it back!) (90)
• lower unionization rate has more to do with the fact that unions are really engaging with their base (90-1)
• Younger workers aren't necessarily leftist, don't really have a lot of political connections
• but they grew up during the time of the resurgence of lefty groups into social and class struggles (92-3)
• but CTA has statsistics that note thigns like, in 2007, 14% of labor conflicts were undertaken without the presence of unions (93)
• leftist people, members of PTS and others, began winning elections to be delegados (94)
• conclusions
• the basic contradiction of the Ks is the increased power of uniosn whiels working conditions and exploitation remained exactly the same/unchanged (95)
• possible to see some sindicalismo de base as a possibility of unionism outside of Peronism (96)
• the question for the new generation is how to expand unions to include other groups, precariosu workers, desocupados, and how to inegrate lefties into the movement/create a new movement? (96)

Solinger 2009

Solinger, Dorothy J. States' Gains, Labor's Losses: China, France, and Mexico Choose Global Liaisons, 1980-2000. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.


Compares China, France, Mexico response to globalization and changes in labor-state partnership

• "This book is about how an enduring legacy of revolution in these apparently dissimilar places structures state-labor relations in a time of crisis. In all of them, revolutionary-era outcomes left their mark on the roles and functions of unions, vis-á-vis their own states' moves after 1980; repercussions from workers them set the style for subsequent state welfare replies." (4)
• China started internally liberalizing in the 1980s, ans seemingly abandoned labor, but then "Though the old communist, state-labor alliance at first appeard to be wholly abandoned, public militancy reawakened the bond, if in starkly altered form (5)
• France hit some trouble in the 1980s, but 1997 total job losses affected a "stunning" 41.6% of the original labor force; the labor movement didn't do much to protest, and the state didn't do much to help
• similarly Mexican Labor movement didn't fight much, and the state subsequently didn't offer them much for their losses
• Conclusion
• Mexico, France, and China all jettisoned labor allies at the behest/to join Supranational Economic Organizations (208), a proxy for joining global economy
• How labor unions were joined to politics after the revolution was important -- Chinese unions were SUPER weak, meaning workers had a freer hand in starting their own protests! (209)
• "In short, it was the nature of the job that the states permitted--or coerced--their unions to perform that liberated the worker (in China), left them relatively passive (in France), or clamped down on them (in Mexico), once the eliminitation of formerly protective regulations meant removing workers from their positions and once the restrictiveness imposed by austerity rewrote the terms of old welfare contracts." (209-210)

Torre 1998

Juan Carlos Torre 1998 "The Amibivalent Giant: The Peronist Labor Movement, 1945-1995" 125-137

in

Brennan, James P., Peronism and Argentina. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998.

• from 1955 to 1973 the peronist working class was in a curious position. "on the one hand, the unions needed to represent the workers in collective bargaining negotiations and service their needs--through social welfare programs, retirement plans, and vacation colonies--in a country in which the state had abandoned any pretensions to such concerns. On the other hand, organized labor was effectively the political representative of the Peronist movement in these years, with Perón as its recognized leader. So the working class played a rather conventional role in the country's economy, as well as socially, but an adversarial, destabilizing role within the political system." (130)
• after the Resistance subsided uniosn became pragmatic, but co-optation by the state and acceptance as an independent actor were prevented by the political dimension of peronism (131)
• "If the Radical government was a godsend for perpetuating these patterns of behavior, the election of a Peronist government in 1989 and its recent reelection in 1995 may well constitue a fatal misfortune. As in 1973-1976 the Peronist trade union leadership has been forced to accept policies, in teh name of solidarity with a Peronist government, that threaten their very existence." (134)
• "The decline in the unions' importance in the country's economic structure has had its counterpart in new developments in the political realm. Since the restoration of democracy, the Peronist trade union leaders have experienced repeated reversals in their pretensions of influencing developments within the Peronist movement as a whole." (135)
• 
  

Levitsky 2003b

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties In Latin America: Argentine Peronism In Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: 
• The PJ's flexibility contributed to its adaptation and survival in teh neoliberal era (3)
• the weakly institutionalized labor-party link permitted the traditional mechanisms f labor participation in the party to be quickly dismantled
• the absence of stable career paths and secure tenure patterns meant it was easy to get rid of old-guard leaders
• the absence of stable norms of accountability in the party allowed Menem the freedom to design and implement a radical economic program (3-4)
• the decline of postwar ISI brought on a programmatic and a coalitional challenge to labor based parties (5)
• programmatic: slowdown of economic growth, globalized trade, and debt-crisis helpers (IMF, World Bank) made it very difficult for parties to enact policy that wasn't orthodox neoliberal (5-6)
• coalitional: economic changes hanged class, labor had fewer votes to trade (6)
• Look at party change (organizational change) in terms of a two-level, nested game, in which party leaders are located at the intersection of environmental and intraorganizational dynamics (12)
• leaders who seek to increase their power must respond to changes in the external environment, but their strategies to do so are mediated by the power game within the party and the party's strucutre
• "Yet the flexibility-stability tradeoff may not be as steep as the literature suggests.  ... Although the Pj is unquestionably a mass party, its mass organization is informal rather than bureaucratic, and the rules and procedures that govern the internal life of the party are fluid, contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored." (14)
• "A central claim of this book is that routinization limits the capacity of organizations to respond quickly to environmental challenges, and that weakly routinized organizations may be better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than highly routinized organizations." (18)
• routinization affects strategic flexibility in three ways: (19)
• leadership renovation (ease of changing old-guard)
• leadership autonomy
• structural pliability, or ease of changing a party's structure
• Chapter 2
• This chapter sets up the book's central argument,, which is that the PJ's fluid internal structure can be traced to its formative phase (36)
• but also, it's proscription after the first coup meant that it was highly decentralized, had a "movement" structure, which continues to this day (36-37)
• decentralization during proscription period meant peronist movement essentailly in anarchy, allowed for many autonomous units to self-direct, also allowed for groups to seek very divergent goals, from leftist to conservative, all under name of peronism (41-43)
• "partyization" occurred during teh 1980s, where the movement focused mainly on winning elections (minus a few revolutionary groups and the Ubaldinist labor unions), but it did not result in routinization (49-57)
• chapter 3;
• the PJ is an "informal mass party" (59-60)
• mass because: it maintains an extensive membership (60)
• it has a dense organizational strucutre, partucularly in working class neighborhoods (61)
• it has lots of informal structures that help it embed deeply into working-and lower-class neighborhoods (62)
• the party is informal (doesn't rely on bureaucracy), segemented (few insitutionalized horizontal ties between groups) and decentralized (65-76)
• chapter4: populism in crisis: environmental change and party failure, 1983-1985
• chapter5: union-party links: see levitsky 2003a
• in peripheral provinces where hte uniosn were weak, union leaders had only gotten their tercio thanks to the good will of hte party bsoses, so in the provinces it was much easier to dismantle this (114)
• the 25 organizations, which was allied with the Renovators, didn't demand any institutional linkages to the party, just assumed the renovadores would reward them. in the end, they didn't and the 1987 Congress did not establish any body/org to represent labor inside the party. party leaders ended up choosing who the few remaining labor representatives would be  (116-118)
• int eh face of union politics, some uniosn set up their own territorial based agrupaciones, but these end up being fixed investments which helps entrench teh system of union political fragmentation (131)
• chapter 6: Menemism and Neoliberalism: Programmatic adaptation in teh 1990s
•  chapter 7: the view from below, party activists and the transformation of base-level peronism
• argument: two factors that allowed teh PJ to maintain its activists base even as it programmatically changed (and experience litlte intra-party dissent for this change) (186)
• increase access to state resources
• decentralized party structures
• the combo of sate resources and local autonomy allowed some local groups to engage in traditional peronist practices even as the national aprty abandonded them
• but by relying on state resources the personal, ideological, and union-based ties that had sustained local peronist organizations began to erode
• this left he party more reliant on state resources than it ever had been before
• chapter 8: the paradox of menemism: party adaptation and regime stability in the 1990s
• chapter 9: crisis, party adaptation, and democracy: argentina in comparative perspective

Garay 2011

in Collier and handlin 2011

Focuses on GROUPS and ASSOCIATIONS, not people/participants

·         Union-linked associations are more likely to coordinate with other associations (262, )

o   Meaning associations linked to unions in Arg and Chile tend to be central in mobilizing associations and creating linkages across them

·         Party association linkages

o   Parties see these associations as possible electoral support (262,)

o   Associations tend to seek issue-based interactions with parties, meaning associations try to get things from parties

§  Arg and chile associatiosn support parties, peru supports candidates, and venzuela is multifaceted

·         Associations tend to not have links with corp unions, more with social movement orgs like CTA, and often (in Peru, Chile, and Arg) with public sectors unions (267)

·         Union connection makes little to no difference on the use of state resources, though union-linked associations are more likely to gain access to state resources (271-272)

·         Popular assocaitions and political parties:

o   Parties seek help during elections (276)

o   Associations have three types of connections, issue-based (one issue), candidate based (connected to candidate) or multifaceted (work with a party in multiple was in multiple arenas) (276-280) countries see a mix of these (278)

o   Overall suggests assocaitions weakness to clientelism MAY be overstated (I don’t buy it)

·         Arg and Chile show some continuity between old and new interest regimes (288)

McGuire 1997

McGuire, James W. 1997. Peronism without Perón: unions, parties, and democracy in Argentina. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

• Chapter 1: Peronism, Party Institutionalization, and Democracy
• "Peronism is a strong collective identity, but weakly institutionalized as a political party. ... Those who have spoken for the Peronist movement, beginning with Juan Perón himself during his 1946-55 presidency, have repeatedly insisted that Peronism is a national movement committed to real democracy, not a political party preoccupied with formal democracy." (1)
• the plebiscitarian leader and the trade unions have always been the core
• "The leaders and members of a national movement, by contrast, think it desirable, and potentially feasible, to establish full ad permanent control of the polity." (4)
• and power can be won in many different ways, electorally or otherwise
• union leaders are not very devoted to the party, meaning they don't have as much at stake for the survival of democracy (5)
• suggestion that the level of party institutionalization is heavily dependent on its origins, and Peróns didn't want or need a strongly institutionalized party (14-15)
• Augusto Vandor tried to create a peronist pary not centered on Perón, but Perón allied with those marginalized by Vandor, and Perón's candidate beat vandor's in the 1966 governor election in Mendoza (18-19)
• this first cycle of routinization ailed, and the specter of Perón's growing power led to military coup (19)
• the second cycle of (attempted) institutionalization came after Luder lost the 1983 election, led by the Renovation wing, Menem had ambiguous but existent ties with the old wing, so the 2nd attempt also failed (19-22)
• this study contends Perón's and Menems unwillingness to institutionalize the party was a big cause PJ never institutionalized (22)
• union leaders were key to both party building movements and the groups that thwarted these movements (26)
• "struggles among Peronist unionists, along with the power-preservation and power-enhancement interests of Peronism's plebiscitarian leaders, have contributed to Peronism's weak party institutionalization.
• Chapter 7, the rise and fall of renovation peronism
• Alfonsin's presidency helped the isntitutionalization of the PJ, for three reasons
• the military had lost legitimacy, so there was a feeling democracy would be around a while (187)
• public opinion seemed to favor adn support political parties (instead of, say corporatism) (187-188)
• Radical Party gained some legitimacy as well, didn't look liek the party that always lost to PJ or always allowed military to take over (188)
• PJs loss in presidential election of 1983 meant the party had to build party from the legislature, not be headed by a super strong prez (188-189)
• leader of the metalworkers had been major power, leader in the party for this election, loss discredited him
• renewal faction of PJ wanted internal elections, less backroom maneuvering (190)
• in the midterm elections the UCR won 43 to 35%, with the renewal faction of the PJ winning by 2-1 margin
• the July 1984 union reform law helped to democratize unions a bit, even if peronists still maintained a lot of control in elections (192)
• with the PJ 62 unions were old school, wanted to control the party, while the "25" ceded leadership of the party to politicians, but also used more leftist talk, opposing hegemony of the US and transnational capital (192-193)
• 13 general strikes against Alfonsin 
• between 1984 and 88 there wre 2721 local strikes (199)
• general strikes may have been an effort on the part of union leaderhsip to contain, channel protests from the base (200)
• neither the 15 (conciliated with Alfonsin) nor the Ubaldinistas (current in CGT) saw the PJ as a useful vehicle for making a mark on politics and society, they wanted to get direct influence on the national executive
• the 15 tried to control the labor ministry
• Ubaldini tried to mobilize unionists with pure economic/societal power to influence the exec (205-6)
• "The "62" liked the tercio because the financial and organizationl weakness of of nonunion Peronism assured them control of nominations in the women's and men's branches of the movement as well as in the union sector." (209)
• Menem did not have the support of hte party but did have the support of the unions (210)
• when Menem won presidential primary in 1988, renovadores lost power in the PJ (211)
• Menem's style reflected Peron's a bit, willing to disregard the rules
• "Above all, Menem defended the notion that Peronism was, first and foremost, a national movement, not a party preoccupied with democracy..." (212)
• for the 15 Menem's victory gave them a chance to get power that their weakness in the CGT and the PJ had long denied them (215)
• left Ubaldini forced to pursue general strike strategy against a peronist, not a great idea
• Chapter 8 free=market reform and political shenanigins
• some peronist leaders opposed Menem's reforms, but most went along with them thansk to the many inducements involved (216), these, of course, meant declines in union membership and deterioration of finances, as well as a new limit on the right to strike
• by 1995 when the growth had slowed, many unions now wanted to oppose menem, but the reforms had already progressed far enough tht there was litlte chance of stopping them (217)
• Menem's rule by decree deinstitutionalized the PJ and, despite runnign fiar elections, did many things that udnermined democratic consolidation
• Menem's economic reforms, content and impact
• Menem's economic reforms were implemented in bad ways, especially privatization which broke most of the UN's "Seven Sins of Privatization", especially the use of discretionary/nontransparent procedures (220)
• currency overvaluation meant wages went down while productivity rose (221)
• main cost was a huge surge in unemployment (223)
• mainly caused by massive layoffs, wage cuts in public sector, capital repalcing waged laborers, and increased import competition (223)
• unions:
• employment dropped in public and private sector, so membership dropped (223-4)
• curtailed right to strike (224)
• collective bargaining was decentralized a bit (by decree, law never quite made it out of congress) (224-5)
• also a decree to reform obras sociales, though labro leaders fought off real reform (226)
• union responses
• union leaders had differing responses to these reforms, from strong opposition to cooperation with tepids of both
• actual responses simply came about because union leaders were very autonomous and just ended up responding differently to conflicting imperatives (protect union versus be loyal to PJ) (226)
• turf battles also played a role (227)
• CGT splits when menemists (allied, oddly enough, with anti-menemists) try to get Ubaldini out of Sec gen position in 1989 (228)
• surprisingly, some of the more combative "25" union leaders became menemists (230)
• when Menem went after the obras sociales, CGT reunited (though with lots of internal conflicts remaining) to fight this (231)
• and the same time the leaders of the state workers ATE and teachers CTERA broke to form the CTA
• CGT called for a General strike in in 1992, but it was weakly attended, and afterwards they adopted a conciliatory tone, whcih didn't win them much (231-232), CTA was combative of all Menem's reforms (232)
• when Menem went after obras sociales in 1993/4 CGT called for a general strike, but called it off after neogtiations were started
• MTA, within CGT, was more combative and untied with CTA for some general strikes and protests against obras changes in 1994 (233)
• CGT acquiesced to Menem because reforms were pretty good, in some instances, for the economy (234-5)
• also menem was head of PJ, adn workers supported the PJ (235)
• hyperinflation had been rough, so fixing it made workers OK with other things (236-237)
• also, privatizations were new opportunities for unions to make money (237)
• suggests decline in normal strike activity was because telephone workers lost a showdown strike (a la PATCO), and economic growth then made future strikes less likely (240-241)
• The Deinstitutionalization of the PJ


• Menem bypassed the party in filling government posts and picking candidates for office, increased isolation of party leadership from government and party members (241)
• internal elections continued, but above meant that party was more deinstitutionalized that insti'ized
• during Alfonsin, everyone had to try and gain power through teh legislaturem, but with Menem everyone could skip legislature adn go straight to the top (241-242)
• Menem imposed lots of extraparty candidates (243)
• "menem thus desintitutionalized the PJ in part by ignoring and then capturing and subordinating a party leadership whose ties to party members, union chiefs, and provincial presidents were in any case tenuous at best." (248)
•  Menem and democratic institutions
• "Some conditions became more propitious for the development of a principles commitment to democracy during Menem's first term in office. Menem presided over six years of electoral activity, proposed or backed legal and constitutional reforms that increased the resilience, fairness, and relevance of certain democratic arenas and procedures, and reduced the level of overt military contestation.
• Against these credits, however, one must weigh Menem's manipulation of electoral rules, bypassing of congress with executive decrees, stacking of the supreme court, tolerance for administrative corruption, lackadaisical respo0nse to physical attacks on journalists critical of the government, and pardons of military officers convicted of human rights violations." (252)
• On the one hand, Menem's policies may grow the national pie, making it easier to settle claims for distribution (260)
• on teh other hand, the party is now less able to actually channel distributive claims, meaning the outcome could still be conflict of distributional issues (261)
• Chapter 9: conclusion
•  weak party institutionalization encouraged union leaders to express their demands through strikes and protests, not the party or elections (262)
• also meant unions weren't devoted to democratic institutions, meaning they didn't necessarily always oppose military dictatorship
• the party became dispensable in union leaders' eyes
• the argument of this book is that, like the rural elites who controlled votes of peasants, the working class leaders could mobilize enough votes to dominate politics, and thus was uninterested in creating strong political democracy (263)
• union power and democratic consolidation are not necessarily at odds, but strong unions can increase distributive conflict and wield a stronger ability to sway political system, meaning democratic consolidation can come down to the level that union leaders want democratic consolidation (266)
• at times union power can have ambiguous results for the poor, who may bear the costs of the creation of a privilege working class
• 1980s union density data (268)
• the strong labor movement from 1955-1983, coupled with weak parties, meant that the labor unions contributed to a strong distributional conflict without any institutional ways to channel it, which created instability (270-271)
• why is it a problem that democracy is not institutionalized? it makes crises and nondemocratic responses to these crises more likely (281)
• 
  

Martin 1968

Martin, R. 1968. "Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework". Sociology. 2 (2): 205-220.

• Studies unions in England
• constraints = thigns that inhibit the union exectuive from destroying internal opposition (205)
• definition of "democracy" = the status of opposition (207)
• democracy exists where organized opposition is tolerated
• it is admitted, however, that faction within a union may harm a union's bargaining position
• 12 constraints on the executive (208)
• political culture (208-209)
• whether internal union culture emphasizes democracy or not
• government attitudes and behavior (209)
• sees effect of whether government wants wage constraint or not, if it wants leaders to discipline members
• membership distribution (209-210)
• the more homogeneous the demands of membership, the more likely democracy will prevail
• strong leaders/bureaucratization arises so that professionals can balance interests of many different groups
• industrial environment (210)
• ownership structures: oncentrated biz deamnds unions to also be pyramids
• employer hostility may increase union solidarity, decrease willingness to allow faction in union
• economic environment
• opposition is OK when economy is good
• technoogy (211)
• for example, work where people have time to chat, are close to one another can build solidarity, opposition groups....divided workers less likely to have time/ability to engage in political discussion
• source of bargaining power
• mass (industrial) power = strong exec
• craft power/local workshop power = weak exec
• membership characteristics
• "political skills" and education, moang other things (211-212)
• Membership beliefs (212)
• about what executive can legitimately do 
• opposition resources and expertise (212-213)
• ability and resources to generate and maintain opposition in a union 
• Leadership Attitudes
• how committed leader is to democracy, etc. (213)
• union structure (213-214)
• does formal structure limit disagreement? allow it to be articulated?
• sub-structural autonomy can help breed democracy
• looks at two cases, from England, RR workers and an engineers union (non-RR, I believe) (214-216)
• 
  
• 
  

Del Bono and Henry 2008

• Introduction
• this article looks at the circumstances that accompanies the development of companies that outsource call center/service jobs to Argentina (8)
• the call centers are unionize but these unions pose little threat to the use of subcontracting by employers
• by refraining from trying to get better conditions for workers, a place becomes more likely to have flexible work relationships, whcih in turn weakens the unions
• argument: the unions contribute, either by action or omission, to the consilidation of the call center sector in Argentina
• and then businesses can threaten to move their operations if workers become strong or if they lose flexibility
• argument: it is the labor/EMPLOYMENT relations that strongly affect the general charactersistics of union action in the call center sector (9)
• looks at two companies, one from US one from France
• unions involved: FAECyS, FOEESITRA, FOETRA in Buenos Aires
• Call centers and services for export in Argentina
•  call center jobs are growing a lot (10)
• since the devaluation, the call center industry has been segmented, with local companies who cal to Argentina and multinationals who call outside Argentina (11-12)
• BA, Cordoba, and Rosario are the big centers for call centers (12)
• call centers looking mostly for cheap labor costs (13)
• Strategies and Responses from unions
• call center businesses leave places with expensive workers and look for places with low cost worekrs with few legal rights
• this challenges unions, as it can be hard to keep employment and make it a decent job
• call centers, tertiarization, and delocalization of work fragment unions and leaders (14)
• responses:
• FAECyS
• the collective agreements that exist leave many workplace issues untouched, including length of day, work conditions, etc (15)
• FAECyS hasn't changed their contract with employers since 1975
• this union was important, even through the 1990s, and negotiated with the government in the 1990s about the conditions of structural change, not oppose them (16)
• call centers hire young workers, and they meet a union that is unwilling to organize and doesn't have a strong enough identity to strengthen their position against employers
• there is NO connection communication between workers in call centers and unions, unions have no presence at work
• BUT unions note that the minute they demand anything, the company can just move somewhere else, like Peru or chile (17)
• contracts are very short term, sometimes use mentoring/internships to get young workers to work (18)
• but this means that there is a lot of turnover, which can be a problem for employers
• businesses think employees move on because the want experience in other businesses, less because there is no career path, no worklife balance, and low wages
• workers are hired to work 30 hours a week, and collective contracts in other telephone work limits work horus to 6 or 7 horus aday, but call center workers usually work more like 8 or 9 in a day, signalling a loss of rights only because the contracts for other telephone work are written too specifically (19)
•  wages also vary a great deal
• THE COLLECTIVE CONTRACT IN THIS CASE acts more as a way for teh business to develop, a "legal cover", rather than true collective representation (20)
• FOETRA
• they seem more willing to demand changes, want tercerization to end (20-21)
• proposed a law that would define telephoe employees as the same as long as they used telephone for three hours a day, this is a way to stop division among different groups of worekrs in telecom (21)
• this would allow FOETRA to expand the good conditions found in other places to call centers and other workplaces that have gotten through with loopholes (22)
• but, of course, this law had little chance of passing
• thsi seems mostly to be an attempt to get the workers who were spun off from ENTEL back into FOETRA (23)
• FOETRA did some strieks, protests, etc against a group called Atento between 2004 and 2006 (24)
• but there was little fixed capital, so the strikes were broken pretty easily, work was moved quickly to other places
• other workers didn't join in with this, as workforce is fragemented (25)
• same story with another company, an internet company, from 2005-2007 (25)
• thus it is becoming increasingly clear that classic, local responses to issue in call centers won't work, and they need much more unity across the sector (26)
• Conclusions
• government may be prolabor now, but unions still dealing with leftover burdens of neoliberalism (26)
• though unions have regained power, they still face a big challenge of the demand by employers for flexible work (27)
• in this case, fleixiblization of work has allowed businesses to push back some labor rights, and unions at the national level haven't been able to effectively push back
• local institutions do affect call centers, and unions have a chance to improve things (just seem to want to end on a high note) (27-28)

Senén González and Borroni 2011

• Introduction
• this article questions the extent to qhich context creaqtes social dialogue, versus strategic action of the actors involved, or if it's a combination of these variables (34)
• Strategic Focus
• looking at the role external circumstances play and what actors do to understand how revialization is happening (35)
• the context changed greatly between teh 90s adn the 00s (36), and much of that change was caused by change in politics (37)
• in general, actors respond to these new circumstances in different ways, meaning that external circumstances do not force change, there is some strategic choice involved (37-38)
• what happens is a combination of context, institutions, historical paths, and strategic options available (38)
• some history of social dialogue
• 1994 CGT and employers made an agreement that focused mainly on employment and labor reform, but most of these points were not put into practice (41)
• 1997 there was an attempt to dialogue over flexbilization, but it totally failed
• 2001: social dialogue about how to ameliorate, end the crisis, resulted in Jefes y Jefas de Hogar and other things (42)
• after 2003 the government recuperated its role as a labor regulator, respecting labor institutions, and pushing for social dialogue
•  El Consejo Nacional del Empleo, la Productividad, y el Salario Minimo, vital, y Movil
• the minimujm wage council is the best example of new social dialogue (43)
• it aims to increase formal employment and improve inequality
• includes both the CGT and the CTA
• also, collective bargaining
• (44-47) numbers of colective agreements, same as the Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg (2011) article
• labor conflict
•  way more strikes after 2003 (47)
• in 1990s and early 00s, labor wasn't strong enough bu saw piqeuteros and other actions as an outgrwoth of labor union weakness/inability to strike
• 2006 strikes = 770, 2010 strikes = 940, growth each year (see data page 48)
• though proportionally most strikes are in public sector, number of people and days lost in private sector grew a lot, while public sector was fairly consistent 2006-2010 (49)
• Conclusion
• suggest that social dialogue is increasing, point to collective bargaining and minimum wage council (50)
• experience in Argentina shows that revitalization doesn't necessarily have to look like what people say in Global North
• actors made the difference in this case, as social dialogue mechanisms existed in teh 1990s, they were just ignored, started to be used when K's decided to use them (51)
• Argentina is still looking for a grand Social Pact, but I think this is just playing games with teh Global North/Germany literature

Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg 2011

• Introduction
• Bargaining has become more centralized since the decentralization of the 1990s (155)
• describes three levels: local, sector, and national (with government)
• looking at two time periods, 1990-2002 and 2003-2010 (156)
• checking three types of determinants: economic, legal institutions, and political ideologies that help determine where bargaining will happen
• THESIS: 90s dectralized but in 00s became "cnetralizacion intermedia"
• Determinants in the lit
• economic
• opening to global trade (labor cotsts become important) ( 156-157)
•  geographic dispersement of industries plays a role (157)
• structure of employment plays a role (157-158)
• legal institutions (158-159)
• political/ideological (159-160)
• Structure of Collective bargaining
• collective agreements went WAY up after 2002 (161)
• before 2002, average per year was 177, most was 219.
• after 2002 LEAST was 348 and most, in 2010, 2038
• careful when citing this data, words dont' match grafic
• coverage went from 1 mil in 2004 to 4 mil in 2009
• this contrast with 1990s, when high unemployment led to lots of off-the-books workers (161-162)
• coverage in was roughly 84.5% in 2008
• in 1991 negotiations between union adn employer were only 19% of contracts, all the rest were sector-level (163)
• by 1998 this had risen to 80%
• after 2003 a jump to sector-level being about 30% of contracts, hovered there through 2010 (163-164)
• between 2004 and 2008, sector negotiations rose by 291%, but decentralized, enterprise level also rose 236% (164)
• sector-level contracts are important, because they set the minimum wage levels and day length
• Content of Contracts and salary
• in teh 1990s, all contracts tended to focus on felixbilization
• entre 2003 and 2010, bigger deal was pay issues
• almost all included pay increases, but many of these were thanks to increase in legal minimum wage
• also, government stepped in to get employers and unions at the table to try and iron out issues before neogitiations (165)
• data on salary increases (165)
• salaries paid began to match those in sector agreements, meaning local employers had less flexibility in what they paid workers (165)
• this means that workers pay is being determined on a collective basis, not and individual basis (166)
• Legal Institutions
• state has two major interventions:
• personaria gremial: uniosn have the right to bargain (167)
• inscripcion gremial: union exists, can represent its workers, but only its workers, and cannot take precedent over a union with personaria gremial
• approving collective contracts
• these are very strong (168)
• unions
• generally pyramidal and vertical
• have a double game: national level/political and local level through comisiones internas o delegados
•  three levels: local, federation (sector, state), national (CGT)
• 1st two levels do all the bargaining
• CGT at third level is a political entity, doesn't do any direct bargaining for wages
• changes in the 1990s
• all three things changed, laws, economics, and political ideologies (169)
• each of these led to decentralization of bargaining, sometimes down to individual level (168-172)
• but since 2003 all three things have changed to slow the decentralization
• laws
• Néstor increased freedom of unions to strike, though he did keep the government's right to regulate strikes of "servicios esenciales" (173)
• but the new law included that strikers could not be replaced or face retribution from employers
• economic
• debt default and growing economy in the 00s
• ...and all of this came because Kirchner had a new political ideology
• and his drive to create alliances with unions (174)
• conclusions
• in Argentina the law is the major variable in explaining the differences between the 1990s and 2000s, but the other determinants also played a role (174)
• personaria gremial helps prevent fragmentation of the labor movement (175)
• now the government is acting like a coordinador of the disparate demands of workers and employers

Palomino 2005

• Introduction:
• social movements existed before 2001, came from the social de-structuring brought on by neoliberalism, not by the crisis of 2001 (20)
• The construction of the social ties of the movements
• the context
• the 1990s saw increased precarity in teh popular classes, but also reached up to the middle classes, who became the "new poor" (20)
• early demands of teh movements were about necessities of subsistence
• the barter clubs and big flea markets in the BA acted as a way to link the middle and lower classes, as everyone shopped there (21)
• origins of the movements also came from the erosion of social integration policies, like retirement, current retirees were "sacrificied" to create new privatized systems
• many of the movements were attempts for the disconnected members of society to make social and labor demands
• but they did so as they also experimented with new ways of organizing themselves! (21-22)
• the cycles of protest and the crisis of the neoliberal model
•  first rounds of protest, in the interior mostly, against the negative outcomes of adjustment (22)
• second round of protest comes in when the promises of the adjustment aren't borne out
• often attached to previous human rights movements
• but included piquteros and workers who were recupterating closed businesses
• crisis was a big third cycle, with asambleas barriales joining other movements
• also, the breakdown of national political institutions allowed for new forms of political represenation, like direct democracy in neighbrohood assemblies (23)
• the movements created conditions for the development of new forms of social integration
• CTA very involved in this, became an umbrella group as they welcomed in groups of informal workers, unemployed, and social movements
• the implementation or new values
• one common charatersistic of the new movements in their focus on organizational form and governance, as well as organizational norms (23)
• their openness was a response to tradiational movements, that often ended up as clientelistic groups (24)
• list of autonomy goals, including from the state, from hierarchy, etc.
• but there were differences, too
• piqueteros relied on the state to privde for them, even as they protested the state
• piqueteros had minor demands (subsistence) but did major actions (blocked roads)
• asambleas barriales had major demands (reform democracy) but did minor actions (local soup kitchens, job posting in neighborhoods, etc)
• the workers in recuperated plants, despite being a small minority, showed that they could have a major affect on the discussion of work at the national level (25)
•  new identities are being created, not just revitalizing old ones
• it is possible that these movements' future depends on changing the whole of society, but it is also not necessary to think that these movements need to make obvious change, but could think of changing the minds of the people rather than gaining political power
• Autogestion and social economy
• two parts of autogestión: (26)
• a dimension of public ownership but not state-ownership
• solidarity and reciprocity, not a market relationship, as the basis of work
• an attempt to fix the situations which liberal economics cannot fix, like the high open unemployment
• authors admit is it a bit utopian, but for those facing unemployment it seems like it could work, and certianly work better than waiting on a state/economy that can't provide for them (27)
• The movement of workers in recuperated businesses
• Intro:
• started by workers with little other option for work (28)
• challenges private property rights and traditional division between capitalist and worker
• these actually started in the late 1990s, but this looks at 2002 and after
• Diversity of the movement
• most of the closings preceded by breaking contracts, lowering wages, etc (29)
• not all workers want to be part of the movement, but they all want the recuperated factory to stay open (31)
• but there is usually a nucleus that seeks out, forms connections with other factories, movements, and the neighborhood
• after December 2001 recuperadas got the help of piqueteros and asambleas barriales (32)
• at first unions had varied responses, some helped, some were passive, some sided with employers (32)
• but eventually as the movement grew, all the big unions at least started talking about adding these groups to their organizations
• employer groups have (to 2005) been pretty silent about these things (33)
• but the threat of recuperating a business that might close has been a bargaining tool for workers
• the universe of recuperated businesses
• some have been recuperated, some are headed there, and others have been fighting to recuperate (34)
• legally workers in a cooperative are redefined and need to remake ties with union, even if union is involved in recuperation of a business
• about 98 (see page 34-35 for some numbers, breakdown of biz)
• these are esepcially powerful because they make the strike weapon stronger, in that bankruptcy is not necessarily a bad thing for the workers, so the company can't threaten it (36)
• The conflicts that precede recuperation
• three phases: conflict between workers and management, takeover, and either reopening or ensuring continuation of business (37)
• first thing to usually go is payment of salaries
• call of creditors to close the business tends to radicalize workers
• before  takeover, demands in labor courts are about back wages, after demands are more genreally about the owners ability to run the firm (38)
• sometimes workers are able to generalize their demands, get help from lots of different (other0 social movements (39)
• "lucha, resistencia, solidaridad" is the motto
•  The role of unions
• individual supporters came out with these recuperated enterprises... (40)
• but only one union immediately offered institutional support (the cnfiteros, pasteleros, pizzeros, alfajoreros, y afines)
• most swung between ambiguity and abandoning these locals
• two studies cases:
• in Rosario a union struggled against the closing of a supermarket, helped create a community market in its place
• UOM was against one at IMPA, but some dissidents helped make it happen (40-41)
• but some uniosn abandoned their locals, and we see traditional uniosn relying on old tactics when faced with something news (41)
• but without unions workers find themselves with only weak and fragile access to social services, as thse services are often teh basis of their union identity (42)
• Some legal aspects
• 42-44
• How it all works
• to get supplies, workers suggest old owner defaulted, but they won't, or seeks solidarity loans from other groups (44)
• the key is whether their clients stick around or not (44-45)
• sometimes other groups, movements, or parties help supply startup funding (45)
• usually these businesses end up running below their total possible production, do just in time of day-order work, because they can't find workers, workers work slower, or can't find clients for their products
• most of the money is spent mostly trying to keep production going, meaning wages tend to be at a subsistence level, meaning its hard to find new workers (46)
• workers are paid using what the company has made, and usually only weekly, meaning workers sometimes have to carry debt from week to week
• skilled workers are not paid more (47)
• workers try lots of new forms of organization, often very democratic ones see page 48-49
• New identities
• still tend to define themselves as workers (49)
• but at the same time, there is also a belief that there is something different, that new employees need a "education" on cooperatives and that they should be connected to larger society as well (50)
• paternal practices of old boss are replaced by a "family relation" among cooperative workers
• these are examples of CREATED collective identity, both between workers and between businesses and community (51)

Ynoub 2012

• subcontracting workers from a telehone company
• at first they are demanding better working conditions, salaries, etc, but then they seem to have a foundational moment where they become workers of a certain trade, not just subcontractors. They form their own union, join social movements, etc, but include milestones of institutionalizaiton in their self-histry
• this seems to suggest that workers can construct a profession in their own right
• earlier images of this group didn't show workers as protagonists, just "protests", later we see workers show themselves as protagonists
• workers begin to show pride in their work, and themselves as workers, not just antagonists who need the help of other social movements
• befor eth eimages seemed to reinforce their place in inequality, later the images deamnded more respect, soaw themselves as repectable people and resisting the power

Collado 2010

• Introduction
• unions were weakened in the 1990s, and they seemed even worse off since the social movements that grew in the 2000s did so thanks to the same deindustrialization that weakened the unions! (171)
• the study focuses a on the new significance/importance/change in union practices (172)
• El sindicalismo en Argentina
• the crisis of political representation in the 1990s was also one that hurt uniosn a great deal, since they were supposed to be a political representation group for workers (172-173)
• peronist and corporatist unions became hegemonic (173-174)
• early on unions lost their autonomy, thanks to interventions (174)
• the union movement in Argentina has demonstrated an impressive ability to mobilize even when the military was trying to crush them (175)
• La refundacion de las parcticas sindicales y su resignificacion
• CTA and MTA were new arrivals, efforts to get back to the combativeness of unions int eh 1960s (178)
• CTA states that is is necessary to have autonomy from the state, business owners, political parties, and to value union unity and ethics (178-179)
• with the founding of the CTA, the unions withi teh new confederation needed to do some internal restructuring to improve internal democracy, which faced some obstacles (179)
• this article looks a the ATE in Medoza
• the tension between old bureaucratic leaders and new democracy, and the disruptive potential of these changes
• La Provicnia de Mendoza en el context nacional\
• state workers have very diverse jobs (180)
• lots of restructuring of the state employment during the 1990s, most of it mkaing owrk harder
• there were lots of protests against this restructuring (181)
• but the ATE lost most of these fights, and saw a lot of disaffiliation of union members (182)
• after 2001-2, workers became the main protagonists of social movmenets, no the unemp[loyed (184)
• El sindicalismo en renovacion
• important challenges to the union: (184)
• old delegtimization they have to overcome
• newly atomized workers
• to fight delegitimization, the union refounded itself on democratic and autonomous principles
• started electiosn and things that explicitly trie dot reonnect to the base
• new group of leaders elected in this process (185)
• joined a multisectoral movement in 2008, which had unions, social movements, student groups, etc., which held marches against tightening of protest laws and against increase in prices of public services (186)
• the unions repertoire of action has come ot included piquetes, territorialization, and attempts to be visible, int eh streets (186)
• as part of its dynamic amplification of particiaption, unions have taken to being groups of political formation for their members 9187)
• delegates at the groudn level play an important part in this revitalization (188)
• barriers:
• the meritocratic competition between member 
• public helath owrkers are told their are "responsible" for the health of their patients, and that striking would be a bad thing for the patients (188-189)
• fear that their jobs are vulnerable (189)
•  this fear can lead to inaction, and dlegates face a lot of fear among their constituents
• COnclusions
• this union did a lot of great stuff, is really becoming dynamic
• but internal issues and lack of ties between workers still hinders the union

Palomino and Silvana 2009

Caracterization de las nuevas inscriciones y personiaerias gremiales aen la argentina (2003-208)

• Introduction
• literature points to a revitalization of the labor movement (149)
• after a decade of other social conflicts predominating, industrial conflict (against private sector )seems to be regaining its central importance for unions
• thsi article focuses on the new unions that have ben registered, what they look like, how they act (150)
• looks at:
• the extent to which unions are centralizing
• what industries are being newly organized
• difference between public and private in demanding union recognition
• OVERALL: suggests a possilbe change in teh role of the state in granting personaria gremial, and that the institutions are beomcing more fluid, not as politically-focused as the used to be
• are we seeing a new generation question the old unions, and demand changes in the old unions, or perhaps whole new unions?!
• list of rights of personiaria gremiale (151)
• Some numbers
• applications:
• entre 2005 and 2008, 348 new unions (151), of which 95.4% were local level unions (151)
• 34% were for state-employer places (teachers, etc)
• Service industry 4%
• breakdown of industry, numbr of unions, etc (153-155)
• personarias gremiales
• approved 133 applications (155)
• Historical perspective
• historical numbers 158-170
• conclusions
• since 1983 much of the growth has been state-level unions, esepcailly among minucipal workers (171)
• education workers are the most powerful, most often strikers ()172)
• 
  

Senen Gonzalez 2011

• Introduction
• after 2003, unions became a much stronger player
• government began being more involved in economy
•  collective contracts grew a great deal, from and average or 197 per year in the 1990s, to 406 in 2003, 568 in 2005, 930 in 2006, 1654 in 2009
• question of the article: are unions revitalizing themselves, or are they just reacting to the changing context? (42)
• comparing the years 1990-2001 and 2002-2008
• articles suggests that there aren't only more collective contracts, but that the content of these contractsis also better
• there is a transformation of of the interior structures of unions, too, thanks to the presence of delegados in the workplace
• Nuevas Reglas del juego: politicas publicas
• Nestor Kirchner importantly tried to boost internal consumption among Argentines, and of course the debt default and the end of the convertibility plan (43)
• the state is aiming to take an active role in promoting ethical employment and social inclusion of workers (44)
• suggests that the old (and new) state-labor colatiion is based on the negotiation of salaries (46)
• state promotes salary increases, while unions make demands within inflation targets of the government
• mostly with CGT, since CTA does not have personaria gremial
• creates pattern bargaining (47)
• Consejo de Salario Minimo, Vital, y Movil includes CGT, CTA and business leaders (47)
• 2004 labor law change tries to consolidate some of the post-2001 changes in labor, including giving a stronger right to strike (though the right to strik eof "essential services" is still limited)
• also, some limitation of manager discretion, esepcailly around firing without just cause and arbitrary layoffs (49)
• El actor sindical: tradiciones y nuevas percepciones
• CTA was acting more like a social movement union, while CGT is bureaucratic thanks to strong labor institutions (50)
• seems like the revitalization in collective bargaining is less about getting more members, and more about improving union (leaders) position in poliitcs (51)
• BUT that's not the whole story, adn there are some challengers to this story
• Los indicadores de la revitalizaction
• workplaces with delegados have a much higher unionization rate (53)
• Collective contracts
• in teh 1990s, most common demand was about flexibilit yo employment
• in 2000s, wage levels became the most common thing in bargaining, and included social dialogue to figure out correct level (55)
• fighting back against "individualization" of salary
• coverage went from 3 million to 5 million between 2003 and 2008 (no citation)
• labor conflict
• more of them, peaking in 2007/2008 (56-57)
• state is still the most important target, but private sector is growing as a target (and state is shrinking, slightly (58)
• Conclusion
• most of this revitalization is coming from opportunities in a new context (59)
• CGT is doing top-down revitalization 
• 
  

delfini, erbes, and roitter 2011

• study about participation of workers in a union, and what determines this participation
• one of the biggest debates is the mobhilization coapcity of unions (375)
• some suggests relation between leadership and rank and file isn't the whole story
• some say partiicpation in union elections is iportant
• some say identification with the union is important
• what determines union affiliation? (the literature, split into 4 types)
• structuralists: employment rate, legal framework, economic cycle
• individual factors: motivation and/or personal characteristics
• socio-laboral: business size/type, labor relations
• interventionist: the link between high leaders and local leaders, the amount that a union actually comes and is invovled in a workplace, helps explain unionization rate
• there is a general hypothesis is that, in the context of reduced participation within unions, there are lots of different factors that help determine the distinct forms of union particiaption (378)
• quick descripiton of labro relations system in Argentina, page 379
• four indicators that a union member is involved in the union:
• if they know their union, and identify themselves as a member
• participate in union activites
• help negotiate a contract
• know what's in a contract (383)
• three types of involvment:
• desvinculado, 43%-- don't do any of the 4
• partial participation, 38% -- very much luck the desvinculados, but get involved in negotiations and know the contract
• integrated participation, 19% -- do all of the 4
• checking other theories
• business size does not affect probablity of union participation style
• desvinculados:
• higher educated, older workers less likely to be desvinculados
• women more likely to be desvinculados
• if the workplace has a long day, or the presence of a delegado, less likely workers will be desvinculados
• integrados
• very much dependent on the presence of a delegado
• the existence of a delegado is important to see idfference between integrados and disvinculados
• but so do some demographic variables (age, gender, education level)

Trajtemberg, Senen Gonzalez, Borroni, Pontoni 2012

• What is the scope of union representation at the level of the workplace? (4)
• the strong legal framework conditions but does not determine union representation on the shopfloor, other factors come into play
• debates about representation in Argentina: juridical and historical-sociological
• juridical
• representation versus representativeness (7)
• idea that unions should be democratic is representation
• BUT they also tacitly represent non-afilliated workers, so they have to keep them in mind while bargaining, is representividad (8)
• all from Ermida 993
• union can be representatives, but it also has to have the power to demand persnoaria gremial, which may cause destruction of some representativenss (9)
• sociologia hisotirica
• looks more at bureaucratization
• wokrplace delegate can try to minimize distance between the macro level union and the micro level workers through his actions (11)
• issues of representation and representitiveness challenge how to correctly unite differnet levels of uniosn to work for workers! (13)
• data from 2008 survey---seems like a survey of managers
• overall unionization rate was 37% (of population?)
• half of these people were in unions where less that 25% of workers in the plant were unionized
• When a delegado is present, the unioni rate is 49.4%, when there is no delegado, 30.3%
• most unionized workers are in large enterprises
• 3 types of union representation (workers charactersitics)
• Union rep mediated by institutions (18)
• 36% of workers
• 60% are in small shops (less than 50 employees)
• most are covered by a collective contract, probably not a lot of hierarchical positions
•  no local union representatives and no collective conflicts
• no strogn union presence, but are still covered by a contract and are affiliated with a union
• Consolidated Unionism (19)
• 36%
• large establishments
• most of these workers are in a place covered by a collective bargaining contract
• 93% have delegados
• most likely to have collective conflict
• strong union presence, fight out contracts
• Weak union representation
• 28%
• service industry, often subcontractors
• these people are on the margins of collective contracts
• 34% of businesses in the survey negotiated a clause about local union reps between 2007 and 2011...presumably ot make sure they are there, in the plan,t being stewards
• 
  

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203