Seidman 1994

Seidman, G. 1994. Manufacturing militance workers' movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970-1985. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Conclusion:

Some differences between the cases:

o   Business leaders

§  Brazil: by 1980s they had joined unions in opposition to dictatorship, assuming there would be some negotiated transition

§  South Africa: white business leaders remained opposed to unions, as they would have demanded ending of racial hierarchy laws (256-257)

o   Opposition movement in South Africa had deeper racial persecution to unite them

·         BUT striking similarities about the socioeconomic demands made by both movements….each seemed to want to change capitalism, not just gain citizenship in capitalism (257-258)

·         Explaining similar dynamics

o   Both countries were late industrializers, peripheral economies

o   Both ended up producing mostly for export, meaning wages did not increase over the years (this is, supposedly, in comparison to earlier industrializers where wages did increase as production increased…even Seidman says this is a weird comparison) (260-1)

o   Militant labor movements in both cases arose during times of conflict between industrialists and authoritarian governments (brought on by recessions) (261)

o   CRUCIAL PART: change in labor process that increased numbers of semi-skilled and skilled (black, in SA case) workers, and better technology, meant industrialists were less willing to repress (261-262)

o   WORKERS SAW FACTORY AND COMMUNITY GRIEVANCES AS CLOSELY LINKED (262)

§  Relatively skilled did not act like labor aristocracy, made larger, encompassing demands

o   Social Movement unionism (263):

§  emerged from rapid authoritarian industrialization

·         state policies designed to attract capital and control labor during growth periods

·         urban poor really lost out in these policies

§  when international capital dried up (during oil crisis), the elite bargain broke

§  semi-skilled took advantage of this elite crisis, so industrialists were demanding inclusion in policy processes and workers were demanding inclusion in the benefits of growth at the same time

§  built not on old identities, but on new created ones based on similar experiences (264)

o   Suggests that instead of looking at the unions themselves, we should look at the structural conditions that promote and shape potential for militance (273)

o   “At a very general level, dependent development may limit the willingness of states and dominant classes to respond to demands fromt eh popular sector for distributive policies: in their effort to attract foreign capital and technology, and to sell industrial products internationally, state and employers may be especially unwilling to share the benefits of economic growth, or to raise real wages.” (274)

§  But if this happens, workers can find that they can use their newly expanded capacity to create militant and politicized labor movements

Senen Gonzalez 2011

• Introduction
• after 2003, unions became a much stronger player
• government began being more involved in economy
•  collective contracts grew a great deal, from and average or 197 per year in the 1990s, to 406 in 2003, 568 in 2005, 930 in 2006, 1654 in 2009
• question of the article: are unions revitalizing themselves, or are they just reacting to the changing context? (42)
• comparing the years 1990-2001 and 2002-2008
• articles suggests that there aren't only more collective contracts, but that the content of these contractsis also better
• there is a transformation of of the interior structures of unions, too, thanks to the presence of delegados in the workplace
• Nuevas Reglas del juego: politicas publicas
• Nestor Kirchner importantly tried to boost internal consumption among Argentines, and of course the debt default and the end of the convertibility plan (43)
• the state is aiming to take an active role in promoting ethical employment and social inclusion of workers (44)
• suggests that the old (and new) state-labor colatiion is based on the negotiation of salaries (46)
• state promotes salary increases, while unions make demands within inflation targets of the government
• mostly with CGT, since CTA does not have personaria gremial
• creates pattern bargaining (47)
• Consejo de Salario Minimo, Vital, y Movil includes CGT, CTA and business leaders (47)
• 2004 labor law change tries to consolidate some of the post-2001 changes in labor, including giving a stronger right to strike (though the right to strik eof "essential services" is still limited)
• also, some limitation of manager discretion, esepcailly around firing without just cause and arbitrary layoffs (49)
• El actor sindical: tradiciones y nuevas percepciones
• CTA was acting more like a social movement union, while CGT is bureaucratic thanks to strong labor institutions (50)
• seems like the revitalization in collective bargaining is less about getting more members, and more about improving union (leaders) position in poliitcs (51)
• BUT that's not the whole story, adn there are some challengers to this story
• Los indicadores de la revitalizaction
• workplaces with delegados have a much higher unionization rate (53)
• Collective contracts
• in teh 1990s, most common demand was about flexibilit yo employment
• in 2000s, wage levels became the most common thing in bargaining, and included social dialogue to figure out correct level (55)
• fighting back against "individualization" of salary
• coverage went from 3 million to 5 million between 2003 and 2008 (no citation)
• labor conflict
• more of them, peaking in 2007/2008 (56-57)
• state is still the most important target, but private sector is growing as a target (and state is shrinking, slightly (58)
• Conclusion
• most of this revitalization is coming from opportunities in a new context (59)
• CGT is doing top-down revitalization 
• 
  

Elbert 2010

Elbert, Rodolfo. 2010. "How Do Unions Respond to Nonstandard Work Arrangements? Relations between Core and Non-Core Workers in a Food Processing Factory (Argentina, 2005-2008)". Journal of Workplace Rights. 15 (3): 387-398.

•  Introduction
• Though the working class is increasingly fragmented, in Argentina  workers in formal labor movements are being a bit more militant now (387-388)
• This paper is about a successful case of non-standard and standard workers cooperating to improve the lives of non-standard wokers
• there are grassroots strategies that non-core workers developed in order to obtain the support of core workers (388)
• Nonstandard work arrangements and Union Strategies in the Global South
• labor protests can include both core and non-core workers, and these protests need to be analyzed in light of this fact (389)
• Context of the Factory Case Study:
• K-Foods
• Production
• two main sections, manufacturing and packaging (390)
• some gender division in labor
• Labor relations = conflictual
• workers say management is too demanding
• management says workers are ideologically set against them (391)
• there is more or less explicit competition between teh company and the union for workers' loyalty
• nonstandard work
• most nonstandard workers are not represented by the union
• union politics
• three main groups (392)
• core workers, aligned with national leaders
• core workers who are more militant
• non-core workers seeking solidarity and core jobs
• Core and Non-core workers during two Labor Conflicts
• Campaign against Labor Outsourcing
• there was labor outsourcing at one of the plants, but the union did not fight it until 2005 (393)
• before this the national union did not intitiate a fight, despite favorable conditions
• in 2005 some grassroots organization began with outsourced workers and activists (394)
• core workers showed solidarity, and eventually (2006) these nonstandard workers were hired as core workers
• Temporary workers win permanent contracts
• temp contracts or those hired through agencies (395), NOT outsourced labor
• some of these workers also joined the grassroots group
• these workers eventually blockaded a highway to get their demands (to be core workers, among others) to be met
• when temp workers were sent home, allegedly because their was no work to be done, WHOLE PLANT went on strike (395-396)
• shop floor union and activist group came together, finally, most temp workers got core contracts (396)
• Union Strategies that Confront Nonstandard work Arrangments
• non-croes workers campagins were grassroots
• involved rank and file, despite teh fact that the union rarely did so
• ruthless in the pursuit of the creation of solidarty across core/non-core
• ALL OF THIS CREATED SOLIDARITY, which won the day
• these actiosn reveresed trend of labor fragmentation
• ME: Where's the government in all this?  They blockaded a highway and nothing bad happened?

Cató and Ventrici 2011

Cató, Juan, and Patricia Ventrici. 2011. "Labor Union Renewal in Argentina: Democratic Revitalization from the Base". Latin American Perspectives. 38 (6): 38-51. 

• Introduction
• 2001 crisis involved the collapse of the development formula based on financial accumulation, exhaustion of social model based on exclusion and regressive distribution of income, and delegitimization of political authority (38)
• the persecution of labor leaders during the dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the cooptation of union leaders in the 1990s, significantly weakened labor as a social actor (38-39) 
• BUT the new landscape created by Néstor Kirchner provided a favorable climate for labor union revitalization through union democracy (39)
• look at subway workers to see how rank and file changed their internal procedures, became more democratic, and how the union fared after making these changes
• The Union legacy of the 1990s and the New Situation
• the (neoliberal) changes to the labor market and the deterioration of the norms of protection delegitimized many unions in the 1990s (Marshall and Perelman 2002) (40)
• many unions privileged organizational survival over rank and file interests
• Union Democracy
• paper looks at the ways labor unions as a social actor deal with workers' needs (41)
• the major unions, since 2003, have continued the old model of deeply rooted bureaucracy and top-down control (42)
• the struggle by many leaders to preserve their power closes off the possibility of revitalization
• but the weakening of corporatism also brought the old model of unionism into crisis (citing de la Garza 2008)
• in Argentina unionism is on the defensive, and any attempt and innovation is perceived as a threat to leaders...questioning leaders is seen as a declaration of rivalry (43)
• Resistance to Union Bureaucratization:  The Subway Assembly Delegates
• the new, post-2001 era made possible the emergence and/or consolidation of union renewal from the base
• the Subway union went against the grain of history, as it was
• challenged entrenched union bureaucracy (44)
• was innovative and employed a lot of direct action
• was particularly success in achieving its demands
• Boundary-violating actions by the base revealed the limits of the established rules, and allowed rank and file to supersede them
• 1994: subway privatized
• the union outwardly complained, but internally decided to moderate demands, work with management, limit workers in transition
• unhappy workers started meeting and complaining clandestinely
• in 1997 a worker was unfairly fired and other workers left on an unauthorized strike (45), though most delegates and leadership did not aid them
• after this these militant workers attempted to gain elected positions in the union Assembly as delegates
• in 2000 the militant delegates won 17 of 21 seats
• then, in 2001, after an unpopular management decision supported by the union leadership, and demanded to negotiate this decision
• management found that the Assembly, not the leadership, was the real power, and bypassed negotiating with the leadership in this case (45-46)
• the main challenge for the Assembly was to keep workers invovled and reelecting them (46)
• soon the Assembly had taken over long- and medium-term strategy for the union, and became the main interlocutor with management
• both management (using cooptation) and the official union leadership (using non-recognition) tried to break up the Assembly
•  Assembly's main demands were not on wages, but on improving conditions, lowering hours, including more non-organized workers in contracts, and reducing arbitrary management decisions (47)
• my take:  sounds a lot like job control unionism!
• the Assembly consolidated itself both practically and symbolically, and continued to make gains (47-48)
• Conclusion
• In this case, union democracy was not an obstacle but a prerequisite for increased union power (48)
• the Assembly engaged members in active participation and direct action, which showed them that the traditional institutional limits could be overcome and innovation could occur (49)

Bensusán 2004

Bensusán 2004 in Middlebrook 2004  SEE SECOND TAKE BELOW!!

1. Underlying assumption 1: changing contexts has different effects on unions, based on distinction between old/corporatist and new trade unionism, which are centered on differences of
1. union autonomy vis a vis government and employers
2. characteristics of union leaderships (where they get legitimacy)
3. the extent of internal democracy
4. the existence of these three results in greater availability of resources, strategies, and innovative capacities to meet the challenges of the new political and economic context
2. Underlying assumption 2: export-oriented development has increased power of capital
1. this in turn has led to a decline in unions’ ability to achieve gains for their members
3. Structure of political opportunities
1. political system’s degree of openness, which is the opportunities available for unions to influence political sphere
2. character of elite political alliances, and opportunity for unions to affect these
3. political influence on international actors
4. limits on the capacity of the state for repression
5. space available for labor issues in the national agenda
4. “The Nature of Mexican Trade Unions”
1. CROM (Morones) controlled labor apparatus in state during part of Obregón era (1924-28), set up structures that improved their position but at the cost of heavy state intervention into labor affairs
2. structure of labor interest mediation with state was monopolistic
1. labor unions expected to enforce discipline with regard to government policies
2. this, in turn, meant union democracy ran counter to state structure
1. labor movement focuses on using institutional resources for labor power (judiciary, politics)
2. other power sources not used, like solidarity, mobilization, coordination, and strong identification between leadership and rank and file -- ALL REVITALIZATION IDEAS
3. Result:  Corporatist part of the labor movement grew over time without much grassroots effort
5. Typology of Labor Organization
1. grouped by these characteristics:
1. main source of economic and political resources
2. relationship with the state and stance on neoliberal policies
3. relationship with employers
4. degree of internal democracy and incentives that exist for leaders to seek/have support of rank and file

Type of Labor Organization	Source of resources	Relationship with state	relationship with employers	degree of internal democracy
State Corporatist (CTM, CROM, CROC)	State	subordination and support	cooperation/ complicity	low (predominance of negative incentives)
Social (STRM, FESEBES, UNT) probably SME, too	Societal/state	autonomy and conditional support	cooperation	medium (combo of negative and positive incentives
Movement (CIPM**, CNTE, FAT*)	societal	autonomy and critical positions	resistance and conditional cooperation	high (predominance of positive incentives)

*FAT, however, in 1990s moved more towards Social category, joined UNT

**CIPM no longer exists because UNT moved to slightly more radical public policy demands, pushing CIPM out

6. Impact of Neoliberal Restructuring
1. Structure of Economic opportunities
1. informal sector grew, wages stagnated or declined, social benefits were cut, employment fell in most heavily unionized industries
2. PRI not forthcoming with “palliatives”, even as they begin to lose in the polls
3. power of foreign investors takes precedence over all, workers interests have no defense
4. 1972-82: great for unions, thanks to petrodollars
5. 1983-88:
1. sharp reduction in public spending
2. devaluation decimates wages
3. employment not matching population growth
6. 1989-1994: modest recovery
1. inflation held back thanks to pacts with organized labor
2. modest growth in manufacturing wages
3. BUT privatizations and foreign competition limit CB
1. companies want increased flexibility
2. unions not prepared to deal with this transformation
4. wage differences between  unionized and non-unionized workers all-but disappear
5. public spending picks back up a bit, but this focuses on urban poor, does not benefits unions (state corp)
7. Peso devaluation in 1994!
8. MEXICO’s comparative advantage becomes low wages
1. official minimum wages drop precipitously, especially during 1994 peso crisis
2. contract negotiated wages also fall well-below inflation, so unions not able to win back anything lost in economic crises
9. state-corporatist unions dialogue with business, become the preferred unions because they do not oppose business’s desire to modernize, flexibilize, create individual employment relations
10. “Labor legislation proved useless to protect workers’ rights, but it kept the corporatist shackles intact and gave the government a means to repress expressions of non-conformism.  All of this increased the power of capital and weakened trade unions’ bargaining ability.” (252)
1. Prevented creation of counterweight to neoliberal turn:
1. The discretionary character and government control of legal protection based on JCAs
2. government control of wages
3. absence of autonomy for wage-earners’ demands
2. Political Opportunities: Two major changes
1. Increasing transparency and fairness of elections, and rise of opposition parties, placed new competitive pressures on PRI candidates
1. PRI leaders actually have to be elected now, can’t just play favorites, and to be elected you need to be pro-business
2. though many PAN governments don’t mess with CTM
2. Decreasing power of Presidency
1. limits ability of president to give favors
2. presidential initiatives no longer railroaded through Congress
3. Repressive Capacities of the State
1. In the past, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) supports employers and official leaders, to the detriment of independent unions
1. some official leaders targeted:
1. La Quina (Petroleros)
2. Gonzalez Cavazos (maquila union in Tamaulipas)
2. YET, currently the there is much greater opportunity for independent labor unions to mobilize with less threat of repression
1. obviously, though, not 100% correct all the time
4. CTM and others have lost all credibility
5. UNT has become a more legitimate actor, enjoys public support
3. The Space for the Labor Agenda
1. Limited, transition was an alternation
2. conservative CT and business dominating discussion of labor law reform
4. New Allies: NGOS
1. cooperation with USA, blah blah, not much
5. Neoliberal restructuring has eroded all old sources of state-corporatist resources
1. need new unions to be
1. based on voluntary membership
2. autonomous from employers and state
3. and internally democratic
2. but ECONOMIC STATISM and AUTHORITARIAN LABOR LAW still around
1. these controls now used to keep wages low in Mexico
2. corporatist controls useful, helpful in keeping unions docile
3. democracy is new and independent social organization is incipient
1. hard to find allies, and don’t want to become too reliant on allies
2. also, old corp unions don’t want to lose connection to government, fear they won’t be able to keep power any other way
6. Impact on Unions Strategies
1. CTM
1. backed the government at every term, not dissimilar than in many other places
2. but different from other places, CTM had no long-term plan for getting back resources
3. trusted top-down arrangements that would increase its membership
1. but failed to adequately deal with US manufacturers who wanted NO unions
2. PRD and PAN labor legislation proposal threatened exclusion clauses
3. did not increase active commitment to workers
4. OVERALL, CTM unable to protect anything for workers, simply subordinated to government wishes over and over again, bore all the costs of transition
1. still had some seats in Congress which have resulted in some material benefits
2. but these seats prove less and less helpful, as they were gained only by agreeing to be complicit in restructuring
2. New Trade Unionism
1. in the short term, STRM and FAT have been able to bargain and negotiate innovative arrangements in privatization and flexibilization, all without selling out member interests
2. in the long term, there are two choices for UNT
1. broader social movement
2. narrower syndicalist, politically conservative
3. overall, though, UNT looking to be autonomous from government, make CB autonomous from government
3. Social movement tactics
1. STRM used outside alliances to bargain for TELMEX stuff
2. FAT and STRM revived May Day parades when CTM stopped doing them
3. creation of UNT
4. STRM and FAT have started civil society organizations (271)
7. Power resources and Capabilities of Mexican Unions
1. Official
1. Loss of union membership through neoliberal period
2. CTM’s lack of legitimacy means it cannot mobilize
2. New Unionism
1. all sorts of great ideas (see page 279)
2. but all sorts of troubles:  member unions pretty weak (few members)
3. can they turn all their positives into real power?
8. In an increasingly competitive arena, CTM will lose out in truly competitive places, because new unions better protect workers interests
9. BUT not sure given labor institutions how competitive environment will actually be

TAKE TWO

1.       Uses McAdam’s political opportunity structure framework, but in an odd way

2.       Typology of Labor Organizations

a.       State-corporatist

                                                              i.      dependent on state

                                                            ii.      power arises from

1.       control of rank and file

2.       participation in government agencies

3.       political office holding

                                                           iii.      no internal democracy

                                                          iv.      unions grant many concessions in order to remain the only arbiter between workers and management

b.      social trade unionism

                                                              i.      power from state and from social actors (either rank and file or alliances with other unions)

1.       began distancing themselves from state corporatism in the 1980s

2.       diversified power resources

                                                            ii.      average levels of internal democracy

1.       elected officials, but

2.       national leadership has relatively centralized control over union actions

c.       movement unionism

                                                              i.      openly challenge state

                                                            ii.      very democratic

                                                           iii.      FAT was, but became more social trade union-ish in 1990s; UNT initially seems like this

3.       Discussion on 1980s and 1990s changes to political economy

a.       Employers prefer to work with official unions than individual workers, as the former offered protection contracts

b.      Anti-union trend among employers mirrors US feelings

c.       …Mexican labor legislation (which did not undergo any significant modification whatsoever) protected the interests of capital by guaranteeing its strategy of competing through low wages and high productivity…Thus labor legislation proved useless to protect workers’ rights, but it kept the corporatist shackles intact…” (252)

4.       Limits on Presidentialism

a.       Prez candidates have to actually compete after 1988

                                                              i.      But opposition parties are not including labor leaders on their election lists, or are keeping them low on the list

                                                            ii.      Overall, labor unions have only lost seats in congress since 1979

b.      Neoliberal transformation decreased president’s discretionary power

5.       Decreasing ability of state to be repressive

a.       3b means president/government are simply less able to repress anyone, though it’s still possible

b.      Dissident unions are creating more/better/bigger alliances with political parties, social movements, and international groups

6.       International NGOs can now actually do things

7.       Problem for unions

a.       Neoliberalism diminished old sites of power for unions

b.      Authoritarian nature of old corporatism remains

c.       New union movements still weak

d.      Overall, workers forced to bear the brunt of the transition, and still have no ability to fight these things

8.       CTM’s strategy was wait and see

a.       Capitulate now (except on labor law)

b.      Try and win back concessions later

c.       No push for internal democracy

d.      Stuck to government’s line about productivity, trade liberalization, etc.

e.      CTM now gets fewer seats in Congress, and has less access to Prez

9.       UNT/New trade unionism peeking out its head

a.       Increased voice, gains at local/plant level CB

                                                              i.      Innovative agreements “without selling out members’ interests”

b.      UNT proposes new labor law in 2002, but unable to drum up much support from PRD

c.       FAT/UE as way to use international alliances to gird local power, organize, educate

d.      UNT has radicalized its demands, but still sits alongside official unions in negotiations – what’s the long term strategy?!

10.   Official movement wants to keep corporatist arrangements, otherwise fear independent unions will get their members.

11.   FUTURE UNCLEAR

12.   Not well written

13.   Good discussions of FAT and STRM examples