Eaton and Dickovick 2004

Eaton, Kent, and Tyler Dickovick. 2004. "The politics of re-centralization in Argentina and Brazil." Latin American Research Review 39(1): 90-122.

• about the recentlralization moves after the 1990s decentralization
• decentralization often involved giving subnational governments the power to control spending, which took a lot of power away from national-level politicians, who now want it back (91)
• this has also made it more difficult for national governments to insure macroeconomic stability (91)
• this article focuses on uncovering teh factors that influence the ways politicians pursue re-centralization, and their relative success or failure (92)
• must remember that Brazil and Argentina are still really decentralized countries, despite this article's talk of re-centralization
• four possible recentralizing factors:
• economic crisis (93)
•  division of powers between branches
• presidential partisan power
• conflict within the bureaucracy
• three measures of decentralization, changes in (94):
• revenue autonomy
• expenditure autonomy
• borrowing autonomy
• presidents have heightened their control over healthcare and schools even as they haven't rolled back rearlier decentralization measures (95)
• stylized review of de- and re-centralization in Arg (97) and Brazil (98)
• economic crises only indirectly led to recentralization, despite the fact that we would expect presidents to take more control in a hyperinlfation crisis (99)
• Arg: interestingly, de la Rua's presidency resulted in little recentralization, despite big economic crises (101)
• the crisis actualy made Peronist governors even more in need of federal transfers, adn thus unwilling to give them up with dlR needed to pay creditors instead of giving money to the provinces (101-102)
• in Brazil subnational governments had borrowed liek crazy for pork, expecting national government ot bail them out (102)
• Cardoso changed this with Real plan
• recentralization only started happening when the governors' bad habits became public, adn this issue outweighed the gains made through patronage spending
• formal/decree powers (aka presidential partisan powers) were not really used to recentralize in Argentina (105), though president's personal power gave hims some leverage (106)
• didn't help at all in Brazil, as constitution laid out most of the rules here (107)
• Menem's power and popularity in teh party gave him a lot of control over who got nominated and elected, which helped his recentralization efforts (108-109)
• but he was a lame duck after 1995, and lost a lot of this power (109)
• none of this happenened in Brazil, as there is little party discipline for Cardoso, but he did have popular support which was helpful (110)
• the cabinet and bureaucracy is important, hurt Menem in his second term (112-113), helped Cardoso throughout (113-114)
• COnclusion
• need to remember not just look at elections, but look at bureaucracis!!! (115)
• economic crisis did not drive re-centralization efforts (115)
• table of findings on page 116

Gentili, Suárez, Stubrin, and Gindín 2004

• Introduction
• teachers have gone on strikes a lot in LA recently, as have university students (1252)
• these fights and negotiations happened in places where the economy was in crisis, the education sector wasn't in great shape, and many went through processes of reform to improve education system (1253)
• authors suggest that the conflict over education system is about the fact that many of the reforms were very ambitious and didn't take into account economic crises that came or traditions of the sector
•  these authors want to create an integrated theory about teacher protest, not just assume it's all about salary (1253-4)
• it seems cyclical (1254)
• it's hard to divorce it from larger economic crises that occurred
• but a big part of the problem is that tensions would arise with any reform, but in this case most of the reforms didn't include teachers at all, which provoked greater protest (1256-7)
• the lack of democratic discussion about education reform was a common issue throughout the region (1257)
• Education conflict: creating a definition is theoretically ambitious
• thinking about education conflict as a place for active adn dynamic contestation that creates the agents and strategies of the agents....that is to say, it's not a place of pure reaction due to sructural factors (1258)
• obviously this also means that interests will conflict and will be complex, even within what one might imagine would be a similar group....it's economic and poltiical but also has to do with cultural and psychology of a person/group
• aha....1257-1260 is sort of relating the various theories of social conflict, transplanting them to education a bit, and then saying the authors are going to look across LA to see which themes come up most often (1260)
• 1998-2003: a chronology of union action around education reforms in LA
• education reform processes have generated a lot of conflict in LA, pretty much across the board, though reactions to this conflict have differed (1261)
• 863 conflicts during this time, 40% of which were started by base-level unions (1262)
• during this time 54% of the conflicts were aimed at teh central government, while 31% were at provincial governments (the latter usually from decentralized education systems
• none were exclusively against private schools!
• private school unions tend to be less combatitive
• when they are combative, it's usually as part of larger confederations that are dominated (in numbers) by public school teachers (1263)
• private-school battles are usually very small and circumscribed
• most often working conditions and salary are basically set by the state anyway, so it makes more sense to go after government, and to do so you need lots of help, not just private sector (1263)
• Argentina had the most conflict, with 1491 days lost in this time period (1264)
• data! (1265)
• the reforms were not undertaken in a democratic way, which resulted in higher levels of conflict, though all the governments who undertook these reforms were certainly democratically elected (for the most part) (1266)
• of the actiosn taken
• 79% had labor demands
• 28% were based on larger demands of education politics, like those against decentralization
• 12% were against teh political system en total
• usually salary demands were linked to larger, more theoretical demands
• teachers strikes have a very high level of adhesion in teh region (1266-7)
• unions led practically all the manifestations, and a lot of them included wage/pay demands (1268)
• Conclusions
• much of the traditions and norms of education and education politics were greatly changed by the reforms across LA, and they did so with very little consultation with the teachers (1269)
• this resulted in a lot of conflcit aroudn education, which tended to become the center of even larger social conflcits (1270)
• 
  

Gindin 2011

Gindin, Julián. 2011. "La Tradición Sindical y la Explicación de las Prácticas Sindicales: Conclusiones de una Comparición Internacional Sobre los Docentes delSecotr Publico." Revista Latinoamericano do Trbalho, año 16 no. 26, 119-143.

• Introduction
• comparing Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico throughout the length of the 20th century
• this article proses the idea of "teacher unionism of the base", which is defined by a gravitation of the unions to the union base (in teachers unions), labor demands as the axis of activity, and open collective conflict with the government (120)
• this article presents how the union tradition can explain how a union works
• seven elements go into structural elements of the union (121)
• political relation with the state
• expansion and development of education system
• local work realities
• ideas of decent employment
• recruitment of teachers
• gender
• social image of the public school and teacher
• history of the union is also a key part of how/what a union does, as it often informs values and norms of the union
• its a little bit working class culture, a little bit union history
• two parts to the idea of "sindicalismo docente de base (122)
• union base includes leaders whose power is not taken by upper level leaders
• willingness to have open and strong conflict with, opposition to the government
• uses critical junctures to compare time periods that aren't actually the same across countries (123)
• notices three junctures:
• one, the existence of some sort of group that says it will represent workers (124)
• two, that group must become the representative of a large base of teachers
• three, consolidation of sindicalismo docente de la base, where the union is able to free or reorganize itself as independent from the state
• Critical junctures in teacher union history
• first, unions in Mex, Arg, Brz form as part of popular mobilization for democracy against the oligarchy (125)
• for Argentina this was the first radical government, Revolution in Mexico, and jsut before Estada Novo in Brazil (125-126)
• groups become solid as opposed to small, marginal
• these weren't necessarily unions, just teachers groups
• second, these groups became real unions, attached to a base
• either through state of mobilization of the teachers themselves (127-8)
• in Mexico it seemed like teachers were mobilizing themselves, but int he end the state was able to impose  union (128)
• in Argentina Peron started to organize through state, but coup meant that teachers ended up mobilizing themselves
• Brazil teachers mobilized themselves weakly and failed to consolidate in the face of government repression (128, 130)
• third, unions serve the base, can count on leaders in the base, are autonomous from government
• Mex: 1974-83, with CNTE emerging and the SNTE, for the first time, using its power within the SEP to not implement government changes (131-132)
• for Argentina and Brazil this happened in the 1980s with the return of democracy, both places unions willing to mobilize against the government (132)
• THE KEY IS A NETWORK OF LEADERS AMONG THE BASE
• Brazil uniosn join PT, but it becomes unclear if uniosn serve party or vice versa (133)
• SNTE plays politics, but its clear that union does so as a pragmatic way to gain power, since it doesn't succumb to too many political demands (133)
• national strikes are rare in Argentina, but happen at the state level depending on union history and political situation (133-4)
• conclusions
• union tradition is a mediating factor between teachers demands and union actions (134)
• union tradition is a legacy of critical junctures, and as such is also... (135)
• a mechanism of that explains path dependence (135)

Kosack 2012

Kosack, Stephen. 2012. The Education of Nations : How the Political Organization of the Poor, Not Democracy, Led Governments to Invest In Mass Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Chapter 1:
• education is important for development, development without education leads to low-road economies (3)
• Argument: Government will choose to expand quality education based on two factors: (3-4)
• a tight but flexible skilled labor market, with little ability to attract skilled foreign workers
• government engagement in political entrepreneurship of the poor...that is, government subsidized collective action on the part of poor people
• looks at Ghana, Taiwan, Brazil to show theory
• (7-8) governments don't seem to invest in education based only on the needs of businesses...shows some poorer countries spend way more on tertiary education than they should
• most scholars think democratic regimes are more interested in educating citizens. This book suggests that overall and throughout recent history regime hasn't been as important a variable as others think (9-10)
• he suggests that it is less the regime type and more the existence of collective action demanding education that will result in education spending (11)
• the key is political entrepreneurship, where collective actions problems and costs are overcome (12-14)
• government needs the support of a "vital constituency", and political entrepreneurship will determine if the poor are part of this constituency or not (14-15)
• employer demands for labor (skilled, unskilled, trained by govt or not) also affect govt motivations for providing education (15-16)
• (17) 3x3 matrix of when government will provide mass education. short story: any time poor are part of the vital constituency (either as part of it or as all of it) AND when employers need workers in a flexible skilled labor market
• Chapter 2: the government's educational goals
• education is NOT a public good (24)
• education as "bad collateral" (Milton Friedman), and thus banks don't want to invest in individual's education (26)
• demands of families
• the richer the family, the more they can afford education, the more they want government to subsidize TERTIARY/higher levels of education, and low enrollments overall (30-31)
• poor families are the opposite, they can't afford much of anything, so they want govt to spend lots of money on primary (and maybe every other level, too), high enrollments at every level (30-31)
• demands of employers:
• three types of demands for worker training:
• none: from biz that either doesn't need skilled workers or can import them (34)
• broad: biz needs skilled workers, can't import them, and wants a lot of them to lower wages of skilled workers (35)
• selective: biz needs skilled, can't import, and can't expect wages to be lowerd (thanks to unions or govt employment or sthg) (35)
• type of education system created depending on vital consituency:
• bottom up = more spending on primary, when VC is only poor
• all levels = equal spending, when VC is cross-class
• top-down = more spending on tertiary, when VC is elites (45-48)
•  
• see also 69-71
• chapter 3
• lots of tools in the governments use, like fees, buildings, outsourcing, to point educational resources toward the vital consituency (49-60)
• but constraints like budget size, inherited school systems, and need to keep social peace affect how govts allocate schooling resources (61-67)
• chapters on Taiwan, Ghana, and then...
• Brazil!
• Vargas era
• cross class alliance, Vargas as the political entrepreneur for the poor, but not the VERY poor (228-230)
• Vargas and his direct successors created an All-Levels system, but enrollment was limited so basically only those in the vital constituency (workers, middle class) had access to education (about 42% enrollment rate, rural sectors had low enrollment) (235)
• middle class had the access, also had high quality teachers, making the eudcation system pretty nice, but tradeoff was that it didn't serve many people (236-7)
• some intra national differences during the dictatorship, state-level becomes important when federal level politics are sort of cut off (253-254)
• top-down education system built between 1964 and 1990 to serve the agricultural elites who were the vital consituency (254-267)
• education projects were also a great way to dole out jobs in a clientelistic style, meanign rural landowners used education spending more for the sake of remaining in power than for actual education...foreign education grants were essentially wasted funding these patronage networks (259-262)
• soem equalizing after return to democracy, post 1990, but system still retains many of the private school advantages, better track for elites, it just opened up primary schools to more people (278-287)
• analysis stops at 2000, so doesn't include PT's rise to power, not sure how that affects the edcuation system
• Conclusion:
• regime type does not predict improvements in mass education, at times democracies don't fund education and yet autocrats do (300)
• could be that pro-poor collective action is what spurs any sort of pro-poor policymaking, rather than relying on ideological feelings of the leaders or some sort of platform: if the poor take to the streets adn demand things, they are more likely to get them! (302-4)

Gindin 2008

Gindin, J. 2008, "Sindicalismo docente en México, Brasil y Argentina: una hipótesis explicativa de su estructuración diferenciada", Revista mexicana de investigación educativa, Abril-junio 2008 volume 13 number 37, p 351-375.

• Argument: the fundamental variable that explains the difference between the cases in Brazil/Argentina and Mexico is the relationship with the sate established at the period of consolidation of labor relations systems (353)
• Argentina
• CTERA created in 1973 (367)
• generally CTERA has been pretty fragmented and weak
• in 1987 there was a split in the CTERA, half were under a UCR leader and half under a PJ leader
• but the PJ half essentially dissolved after it started and lost a big national strike in 1988 (367-8)
• CTERA helped create CTA (368) and bolstered its own power by allowing for leadership at every level to be elected directly, making them the most centralized of the teachers unions (369)
• White tent in 1997 against Menem (369)
• stayed up unti lthe UCR-led coalition won in decemeber 1999
• CTERA got close to NK after his election, but this closeness allowed the teachers to be a sort of internal opposition and still be militant (370)
• the differenc ein that the SNTE was a mediator between teh government and teachers, while in ARgentina and Brazil the government(s) didn't incorporate teachers into the coproate system, and simply ruled them directly when it wanted to. (370-371)
• the mobilization of the 1980s restructured Argentina and Brazil docente unions, while it didn't have this effect on teh SNTE (372)
• said another way, SNTE in Mexico was part of corporatism, and not in Arg and Brazil
• author suggest this starting point helps us understand current teachers' unions

Seidman 1994

Seidman, G. 1994. Manufacturing militance workers' movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970-1985. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Conclusion:

Some differences between the cases:

o   Business leaders

§  Brazil: by 1980s they had joined unions in opposition to dictatorship, assuming there would be some negotiated transition

§  South Africa: white business leaders remained opposed to unions, as they would have demanded ending of racial hierarchy laws (256-257)

o   Opposition movement in South Africa had deeper racial persecution to unite them

·         BUT striking similarities about the socioeconomic demands made by both movements….each seemed to want to change capitalism, not just gain citizenship in capitalism (257-258)

·         Explaining similar dynamics

o   Both countries were late industrializers, peripheral economies

o   Both ended up producing mostly for export, meaning wages did not increase over the years (this is, supposedly, in comparison to earlier industrializers where wages did increase as production increased…even Seidman says this is a weird comparison) (260-1)

o   Militant labor movements in both cases arose during times of conflict between industrialists and authoritarian governments (brought on by recessions) (261)

o   CRUCIAL PART: change in labor process that increased numbers of semi-skilled and skilled (black, in SA case) workers, and better technology, meant industrialists were less willing to repress (261-262)

o   WORKERS SAW FACTORY AND COMMUNITY GRIEVANCES AS CLOSELY LINKED (262)

§  Relatively skilled did not act like labor aristocracy, made larger, encompassing demands

o   Social Movement unionism (263):

§  emerged from rapid authoritarian industrialization

·         state policies designed to attract capital and control labor during growth periods

·         urban poor really lost out in these policies

§  when international capital dried up (during oil crisis), the elite bargain broke

§  semi-skilled took advantage of this elite crisis, so industrialists were demanding inclusion in policy processes and workers were demanding inclusion in the benefits of growth at the same time

§  built not on old identities, but on new created ones based on similar experiences (264)

o   Suggests that instead of looking at the unions themselves, we should look at the structural conditions that promote and shape potential for militance (273)

o   “At a very general level, dependent development may limit the willingness of states and dominant classes to respond to demands fromt eh popular sector for distributive policies: in their effort to attract foreign capital and technology, and to sell industrial products internationally, state and employers may be especially unwilling to share the benefits of economic growth, or to raise real wages.” (274)

§  But if this happens, workers can find that they can use their newly expanded capacity to create militant and politicized labor movements

Roberts 2012

• Introduction
• one the one hand, democratic regimes from the 1980s have proven remarkably durable adn resilient to crises (2)
• On the other hand, party systems have been far less stable
• Paradoxically, democratic consolidation has coincided with a crisis of representation and general disillusionment with the political establishment
• but this crisis affects different countries differently
• Critical junctures:
• neoliberal turn (3)
• reactive sequences against neoliberalism!
• Modes of political representation based in ISI were undermined by its collapse, specficially among the popular classes
• and party systems varied widely in their ability to channel these issues
• Broadly, these critical junctures dealigned parties, made their programmatic promises seem less sincere (especially thanks to bait and switch)
• Argument:
• when a populist/mass-based party undertook economic reform
• it often made the transition more politically viable
• but also dealigned the party from its constituents (4)
• when a right party undertook economic reform
• left party was able to channel dissent through the insittuions
• party alignment was "reinforced"
• in both cases, parties that undertook reforms were vulnerable to leftist challenges
• The Puzzle of Party System Stability in Latin America
• Presidentialized party systems may result in parties with unaccountable elites, ambiguous programmatic stands, but it doesn't help explain the wide variation in strength and durability of party systems (5)
• electoral competition has not stabilized party systems or crystallized partisan identities
• During neoliberal transition programmatic differentiation was tough, since there were such acute constraints on policy options available (7)
• by contrast, the left turn helped realign some of these party systems
• "neoliberal critical junctures and teh reactive sequences they spawned dislodged and reconfigured historic party systems, altering their programmatic alignments in was that heavily conditioned the stability ot partisan competition in the aftermath period" (8)
• Market Liberalization and Part system alignments during neoliberal critical junctures
• Critical junctures are designed to explain why similar types of political or economic challenges produce different, path dependent patterns of institutional change across a range of cases
• suggest neoliberal critical juncture from 1973-1998 (Chavez ended it) (9)
• it altered:
• the character and purpose of state power
• the patterns of association in civil society
• the ways in which societal interests and claims were articulated and represented in the political arena (Collier and Handlin 2009, Yashar 2005)
• Party systems before market adjustment: (10)
• labor mobilizing
• elitist (with clientelistic relations to popular sectors)
• these preconditions weighed heavily on results of critic juncture, but did not define them entirely
• three basic requirements of programmatic structuring of party systems
• parties must adopt relatively coherent stands on salient issues that divide teh body politic (11)
• policies adopted in office must bear resemblance to election platform
• bait and switch severs relationship between electoral verdicts and the content of public policy (12)
• there must be meaningful differences/policy alternatives between the competing parties
• often not true during ISI crisis
• The regionwide transition undermined all three of these basic conditions (13)
• lots of policy switching, left/populist parties went along with reforms, or did bait and switch (13)
• created internal party dissension among leftish parties
• often meant that popular sector connections to parties were severd, replaced with clientelistic relations (14)
• BUT if a conservative party initiated transition, and left remained in opposition, no dealignment
• Three possible outcomes: table on page 16
• parties aligned (contested liberalism), outcome was a durable party system (15)
• Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Uruguay
• Mexico, thanks to creation of PRD which replaced PRI as left
• ambiguously Nicaragua (17)
• dealigned (bait and witch), or neutral (no real left to contest) results on part system (neoliberal convergence), outcome was not a durable part system
• dealigned: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
• Neutral: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay
• contested liberalism allowed for dissent to be challenged through stable forms of electoral competition (17)
• neoliberal convergence resulted in systems susceptible to destabilizing reactive sequences
• 17-25 goes through cases and uses electoral data, etc to prove this story
• 
  

Cook 2002

Cook, María Lorena. 2002. "Labor Reform and Dual Transitions in Brazil and the Southern Cone". Latin American Politics and Society. 44 (1): 1-34.

• During democratic transitions governments are under pressure to restore civil and political rights, unions can make gains
• During economic transitions, unions face a variety of constraints, focus on survival
• Order of transition effects process and outcome of labor law reform
• In Brazil and Argentina, democracy then neoliberalism
• democracy led to greater, pro-labor reforms for unions
• later consolidation of neoliberal tried to roll back some of these labor protects
• In Chile, neoliberalism then democracy
• neoliberalism (and dictatorship) severely weakened labor movement
• later democratic transition brought some civil protections, but entrenched economic interests resisted strong labor protections
• Democratic Transitions
• both Argentina and Brazil inherit democratization and economic crisis
• Argentina
• First democratic government did not want to empower Peronist unions
• but business interests divide, labor not that divided, able to win demands
• Brazil
• CUT was oppositional to government, worked through the PT
• business divided here as well
• though able to beat some proposals, watered down others
• in the end, new Constitution was a bit of a labor relations hybrid
• WHEN DEMOCRACY FIRST, LABOR CAN BE MORE MILITANT
• Economic Transitions
• Argentina
• Menem had support of labor in the election
• first term:
• labor divided, some support Menem (in exchange for some concessions in law), others more combative
• CGT could not strongly resist flexibilization, but able to strongly resist losing obras sociales
• CGT focused on saving organizational resources, waited to fight another day!
• second term
• Menem threatens organization resources!
• unions mobilize
• favorable climate, because lots of popular discontent
• LABOR ABLE TO RESIST REFORMS THAT THREATENED IT’S RESOURCES, BUT NOT LIMIT NEOLIBERAL TURN
• Brazil
• Collor then Cardoso both beat Lula, no labor backing for them!
• political climate not favorable for unions
• labor divided, Forca Sindical willing to accept flexibility
• similarly to Argentina, labor has a lot of losses but is able to maintain significant resource reservoirs
• CHILE
• Story above
• Pinochet decimated unions
• employers unified
• even though labor had legitimacy going into democratic transition, too weak to do much
• political allies of labor accepts neoliberal model

Ramalho 2007

Ramalho “Trade Unions and Politics in Brazil”

in Phelan, Craig. 2007. Trade union revitalisation: trends and prospects in 34 countries. Oxford: Peter Lang. 

• Brazilian trade unionism grew up under dictatorship, has always been a movement for human rights
• PT similarly brings together lots of civil society/human rights groups, not just unions
• Brazil is an example of a place where an unfavorable context (dictatorship) demanded new apporaches
• shop-floor representation important
• respect for rights grounded in performance on the job
• New context
• need to include women more
• need to expand in (growing) service sector
• unions need to broaden movement, include community, not just focus on wages and hours
• even Lula arguing for this:  trade union must become representative on the shopfloor and in the community (O Globo, 30 Jul 2003)

Abreu and Ramalho 2003

Abreu and Ramalho, “Regional Development and New Labor Strategies:  Trade Unions and the New Car Plants in Resende, Brazil”, p. 131-152

in Cornfield, Daniel B, and Holly J. McCammon. 2003. Labor Revitalization: Global Perspectives and New Initiatives. Amsterdam: JAI.

1. Auto plants came to Resende, did modular consortium-style production to try and weaken the union
2. unions able to gather workers in all the parts of the local chain
1. aided by very different wages along the line, as well as an unpopular hours bank proposal that sparked a lot of mobilization
3. unions able to alter their tactics, mobilize and organize, to survive and thrive despite new environment

Flores Macias 2012

Flores-Macias, Gustavo. 2012. After Neoliberalism?: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Introduction
• Two findings
• left tide in Latina America does not have one unified economic policy (duh)
• some accept the market more, some are more statist (4)
• key factor in governments' ability to undertake drastic economic policy shifts depends on degree of party-system institutionalization
• stronger institutions, less radical shift possible (5)
• two types of party systems (low institutionalized and high) based on two factors
• type of candidate likely to reach power
• parties ability to influence executive's policies
• Chapter 2:
• five areas to show change in economic policy
• privatizations/nationalizations (26-27)
• if privatizations continued = promarket, interrupted=neutal, natioanlizatoins =statist
• government spending (27-28)
• deficit/surplus divided by GDP, compared to previous administration
•  statist if this ratio decreased in percentage points, promarket if increased
• Tax Reform (28-29)
• more taxes = statist
• poverty alleviation (29-30)
• means-tested programs are pro-market, non-means tested is statist, and continuing/slightly changing programs of previous administration is neutral
• table 2.1 (32)

Country/ Administration (book in 2012)	Privatization/ Nationalization	Taxation	Govt Spending	Trade/ Financial/ Monetary Liberalization	Poverty Alleviation	Overall Score
Venezuela Chavez (1999-)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	-5
Ecuador Correa (2007-)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Neutral (0)	-4
Bolivia Morales (2006-)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	Pro-market (+1)	Statist (-1)	Statist (-1)	-3
Argentina N Kirchner (2003-07)	Statist (-1)	Neutral (0)	Pro-market (+1)	Statist (-1)	Neutral (0)	-1
Nicaragua Ortega (2007-)	Neutral (0)	Statist (-1)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	+1
Brazil Lula (2002-10)	Neutral (0)	Neutral (0)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	Neutral (0)	+1
Uruguay Vazquez (2005-10)	Neutral (0)	Neutral (0)	Neutral (0)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	+2
Chile Lagos (2000-06)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	+3
Mexico Fox (2000-06)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	+3
Colombia Uribe (2002-10)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	Pro-market (+1)	Neutral (0)	+4

 

• Left governments varied in their economic policy, from very statist to very pro-market (56-57)
• Importantly, ALL the cases remained within the borders of the market economy...the variation was in the amount of state interaction. No country went to full-on socialism/planned economy (57-58)
• Chapter 3
• While other explanations are helpful (natural resources, prevailing economic conditions, depth of market reforms, interests groups, and executive power) (61)...
• Argument: Level of party system institutionalization is most explanatory across all cases
• derives from Flores-Macías (2010)
• institutionalization defines how likely anti-system candidate is to be elected and consensual/contentious politics
• paraphrasing 2010 article: high inst = less radical change, consensual = policy moderation (62-63)
• level institutionalization is agnostic..."radical" policy changes can go in teh statist or pro-market direction (66-67)
• e.g when neoliberal transformation happened, countries with the greatest institutionalization of party systems saw the least radical change (67)--authoritarian regimes are a little different story
• Other authors suggest that polarization and fragmentation of political paries can make a political system intractable, nothing can get done (71)
• but author argues that these ideas must be based on relative institutionalization of the party sytem (72)
• fragmentation and polarization only limit president when that fragmentation results in multiple veto points (72)
• if these parties do not play a consequential role in national politics, then polar/fragmentation will not stop radical change in policy
• (73) most fragmented party systems are Brazil (moderate reform), Colombia (no reform), and Ecuador and Venezuela (radical reform)
• pages 75-90 go through other authors' explanations
• while other explanations can be helpful in comparing single cases, across the whole set of cases in this book, party system institutionalization has the greatest cross-case explanatory leverage (92)
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• argument: the political system deteriorated starting in the 1980s, and that led to strengthened anti-system candidates and weakened opposition to these candidates and Chávez's subsequent power
• Chávez certainly weakened it further
• AD's Pérez went bait and switch for neoliberalism, unions and parties in Congress stopped neoliberal turn under Pérez, economy eventually got worse, everyone lost faith in traditional parties
•  Brazil
• argument: Brazio's gradual institutionalization of the party system led to PT becoming less radical, thus Lula being less lefty in office
• evidence: no anti-system candidates, though some personalistic candidates have been able to switch parties and still win
• moderating of PT came as Lula lost on more radical platforms/demands
• also, moderate petistas who won office early on could funnel resources to other moderate buddies
• and importance/need of legislative coalitions moderated PT
• the way Congress is in Brazil a party needs at least one ally to get through legislation, so radical reforms could not be done
• Chile
• Chile has a highly institutionalized party system, which plays major moderating effects
• creates incentives for moderate candidates to become president
• incentives to reach compromise and build consensus in the legislature
• Conclusion
• some specific causes are helpful in individual case, but party-system institutionalization has a better, broader cross-case record of prediction
• leftist government have 'expanded the realm of what is economically feasible within a framework of general market orthodoxy' (186)
• type of party system (stable/unstable) is becoming an important predictor of economic instability (instability breeds instability)
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