Flores-Macias, Gustavo. 2012. After Neoliberalism?: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Introduction
- Two findings
- left tide in Latina America does not have one unified economic policy (duh)
- some accept the market more, some are more statist (4)
- key factor in governments' ability to undertake drastic economic policy shifts depends on degree of party-system institutionalization
- stronger institutions, less radical shift possible (5)
- two types of party systems (low institutionalized and high) based on two factors
- type of candidate likely to reach power
- parties ability to influence executive's policies
- Chapter 2:
- five areas to show change in economic policy
- privatizations/nationalizations (26-27)
- if privatizations continued = promarket, interrupted=neutal, natioanlizatoins =statist
- government spending (27-28)
- deficit/surplus divided by GDP, compared to previous administration
- statist if this ratio decreased in percentage points, promarket if increased
- Tax Reform (28-29)
- more taxes = statist
- poverty alleviation (29-30)
- means-tested programs are pro-market, non-means tested is statist, and continuing/slightly changing programs of previous administration is neutral
- table 2.1 (32)
| Country/ Administration (book in 2012) |
Privatization/ Nationalization
|
Taxation
|
Govt Spending
|
Trade/ Financial/
Monetary Liberalization
|
Poverty Alleviation
|
Overall Score
|
| Venezuela Chavez (1999-) |
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
-5
|
| Ecuador Correa (2007-) |
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
-4
|
| Bolivia Morales (2006-) |
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
-3
|
| Argentina N Kirchner (2003-07) |
Statist (-1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
-1
|
| Nicaragua Ortega (2007-) |
Neutral (0)
|
Statist (-1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
+1
|
| Brazil Lula (2002-10) |
Neutral (0)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Neutral (0)
|
+1
|
| Uruguay Vazquez (2005-10) |
Neutral (0)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
+2
|
| Chile Lagos (2000-06) |
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
+3
|
| Mexico Fox (2000-06) |
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
+3
|
| Colombia Uribe (2002-10) |
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Pro-market (+1)
|
Neutral (0)
|
+4
|
- Left governments varied in their economic policy, from very statist to very pro-market (56-57)
- Importantly, ALL the cases remained within the borders of the market economy...the variation was in the amount of state interaction. No country went to full-on socialism/planned economy (57-58)
- Chapter 3
- While other explanations are helpful (natural resources, prevailing economic conditions, depth of market reforms, interests groups, and executive power) (61)...
- Argument: Level of party system institutionalization is most explanatory across all cases
- derives from Flores-Macías (2010)
- institutionalization defines how likely anti-system candidate is to be elected and consensual/contentious politics
- paraphrasing 2010 article: high inst = less radical change, consensual = policy moderation (62-63)
- level institutionalization is agnostic..."radical" policy changes can go in teh statist or pro-market direction (66-67)
- e.g when neoliberal transformation happened, countries with the greatest institutionalization of party systems saw the least radical change (67)--authoritarian regimes are a little different story
- Other authors suggest that polarization and fragmentation of political paries can make a political system intractable, nothing can get done (71)
- but author argues that these ideas must be based on relative institutionalization of the party sytem (72)
- fragmentation and polarization only limit president when that fragmentation results in multiple veto points (72)
- if these parties do not play a consequential role in national politics, then polar/fragmentation will not stop radical change in policy
- (73) most fragmented party systems are Brazil (moderate reform), Colombia (no reform), and Ecuador and Venezuela (radical reform)
- pages 75-90 go through other authors' explanations
- while other explanations can be helpful in comparing single cases, across the whole set of cases in this book, party system institutionalization has the greatest cross-case explanatory leverage (92)
- Chapter 4: Venezuela
- argument: the political system deteriorated starting in the 1980s, and that led to strengthened anti-system candidates and weakened opposition to these candidates and Chávez's subsequent power
- Chávez certainly weakened it further
- AD's Pérez went bait and switch for neoliberalism, unions and parties in Congress stopped neoliberal turn under Pérez, economy eventually got worse, everyone lost faith in traditional parties
- Brazil
- argument: Brazio's gradual institutionalization of the party system led to PT becoming less radical, thus Lula being less lefty in office
- evidence: no anti-system candidates, though some personalistic candidates have been able to switch parties and still win
- moderating of PT came as Lula lost on more radical platforms/demands
- also, moderate petistas who won office early on could funnel resources to other moderate buddies
- and importance/need of legislative coalitions moderated PT
- the way Congress is in Brazil a party needs at least one ally to get through legislation, so radical reforms could not be done
- Chile
- Chile has a highly institutionalized party system, which plays major moderating effects
- creates incentives for moderate candidates to become president
- incentives to reach compromise and build consensus in the legislature
- Conclusion
- some specific causes are helpful in individual case, but party-system institutionalization has a better, broader cross-case record of prediction
- leftist government have 'expanded the realm of what is economically feasible within a framework of general market orthodoxy' (186)
- type of party system (stable/unstable) is becoming an important predictor of economic instability (instability breeds instability)
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