Palcios-Valladares 2010

Palacios-Valladares, Indira. 2010. "From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in Contemporary Chile". Latin American Politics and Society. 52 (2): 73-102.

• Introduction
• While union membership decline was initially caused by the 1973 and repression, the neoliberal turn created increasing union fragmentation and job precariousness which, in the long run, weakened unions’ capacity to attract members (73)
• Limitations of current research
• focus on national confederations,  yet about 70% of unionized workers are organized by firm-level unions (Dirección del Trabajo nd), fewer than half of these unions below to confederations, and only a little more than a quarter of these worker are in unions that are in national confederations (Arrieta 2003) (74)
• Rely too heavily on structural causes to explain current unionization rates
• This Article:
• differences in individual union strategy re: management played a key role in shaping variation in unionization rates (75)
• specifically, more accommodating unions gained a recruiting edge
• BUT these strategies that helped increase membership also undermined union strength
• as union members fled more militant unions, more accommodating unions benefitted from this flow, but consequently did little to reach out to unorganized workers
• Overall, strategies matter, but are highly dependent on the broader institutional political, and economic context
• MY TAKE: strategies matter, but only if unions accommodate, and then they are weak anyway
• Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary Union Membership Decline
• Although the democratic transition provided opportunities for labor, the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores) had trouble shaping the broader, national economic and labor relations context (Cook 2007, Frank 2004, Haagh 2002) (75)
• as a result, Chilean unions operate in a labor relations system that tends to weaken them (cook 2007, Haagh 2002)
• deindustrialization, etc will mean that blue collar unions face different pressure than white-collar unions (77)
• in the larger, international context, it has become common for unions to simply try and rely on union raiding to increase membership (Milkman and Voss 2004)
• THIS STUDY finds that strategic decisions at specific points of firm restructuring were a major determinant of the trajectory of a union’s membership rate (78)
• BUT this study also highlights the limitations of partnership strategies in a fragmented union environment with weak bargaining power
• workers migrate from union ot union, but labor isn’t better off
• Research Design
• 13 unions across a telecom firm and bank (79)
• each firm has a relatively high unionization rate, but also a lot of different unions representing workers
• skilled-ish workers
• Union Member Trajectories: The Bank
• between 1990 and 2004 union density declined at the Bank by one-quarter (80)
• initially six unions, all in one federation
• threatened strike in 1990, but federation quickly decided to accomodate management:  unions get a say in decisions, deliver labor peace and collaborate in firm restructuring (81)
• the dominant, more militant union does not join this agreement, management takes a hard line with this union, militant union cannot gain concessions, loses member to other unions (81)
• in two other mergers (1994 and 2000-2002), federation gets the inside track on bargaining, unions from other merging firms (many more militant) get shut out of the process, end up capitulating or being broken (81-5)
• Telecommunications Firm
• 1990-2004, density declined by one-fifth (85)
• 1980s had been a rough time for labor management relations, 1990-98 the unions and management agree to accommodation, unions felt like this was “co-governance” of the firm
• but this accommodation caused tensions between unions (86)
• 1999: top management changed, took a hard line against unions, lots of layoffs (87)
• Massive strike in 2002 when management continued hard line during new CB rounds, all workers joined, it still failed (87-88)
• lots of workers defected from the strike
• some unions gave up, others held up longer before giving up (in 2003)
• two of the unions competed with all the others, raided for blue and white collar workers (respectively) (88-89)
  these two unions became the firm’s favorites, got better access to management (89)
• Results:
• if a union accommodates during restructuring, it is likely to get ahead (90)
• in the tough context of job losses, intensifying work, and weak institutional and political support for unions, getting on management’s good side is almost the only way to get concessions for one’s membership (91)
• Strategic calculations of union leaders are most conditioned by past experiences, whether workers have been willing to fight the company, strength of management, etc. (92)
• Management doesn’t choose favorite union, thy let unions react and pick the one whose reaction they like best (93)
• All this accommodation leads to weak unions that are increasingly dependent on management to provide a sense of legitimacy (93)
• Conclusion
• the real Achilles’ heel for these unions is the tough institutional framework they face, combined with the lack of political support (94)