Cook and Bensusan, “Political Transition and Labor Revitalization in Mexico”, p. 226-267
in Cornfield, Daniel B, and Holly J. McCammon. 2003. Labor Revitalization: Global Perspectives and New Initiatives. Amsterdam: JAI.
- In Mexico, labor revitalization is to be understood in terms of
- the creation of a political-institutional framework that allows for “real” trade union activity
- the presence of labor groups able to take advantage of this framework
- BASICALLY, expect revitalization = emergence of an independent and representative trade union movement operating under a fair labor law
- For revitalization to occur:
- instead of just simple alternation power need a pacted transition in which all political parties agree to reform political institutions
- labor reform needs to be on this agenda, and not simply deregulation!
- independent unions need tp have/build the capacity to take advantage
- Labor was not active in the movement to remove the PRI, and especially not in favor of the PAN!
- Need a pacted transition as a way to ‘refound’ the state, as countries coming out of military dictatorships have been able to do
- Current institutions (labor law) favor official unions to the detriment of other unions
- Economic transition (neoliberal) weakened unions and improved power of business, thus weakening chance to unions to be able to take advantage of transition
- unions fare best when democracy comes before neoliberal turn
- JCAs tripartite, but until recently union member was often member of official union, meaning independent unions totally lose out
- tough to challenge organizing
- law is ambiguous, giving boards a lot of power, in turn another way to give independent unions the run around
- have the power to declare strikes and organizing illegal, dampening militancy across all unions, but especially independent ones
- issue of protection contracts in the maquilas
- there is no public registry for union contracts
- exclusion clause, gives union some control over worker firing
- As labor begins to lose its ability to control the votes of workers, it loses stature in the party
- political liberalization makes it tough for unions to control its workers vote...there are actually other options, now!
- also erodes the sectoral organization of PRI
- in 1980s many sites that were strongholds of more militant independent unions were shut down in favor of greenfield sites without independent unions, weakening independent unions
- official unions use these moves and growth of maquila sector to actually expand their membership rolls, though many new members likely had no idea they were organized!
- Salinas dealt harshly with labor protest
- keep resistance to economic changes low
- also, labor’s inability to control votes meant that it could attack labor without fear of losing too many more votes.
- punish labor by marginalizing them within the party, fewer electoral seats
- FESEBES and new unionism (telefonistas and electricistas)
- go along with employer goals
- this made Salinas happy
- but he was back to the CTM by 1994 because they were bigger, could promise more votes
- Peso crisis and less authoritarian Zedillo creates political opportunity for independent unions
- Foro Sindicalismo wants to be more proactive that CTM
- May 1st movement wants to be more radical
- Even some CT unions begin moving a bit, becoming a tad more democratic
- “new labor culture” agreements
- Some CT/Foro members found UNTin 1997
- UNT became increasingly critical of distribution issues with neoliberalism, but never really challenged underlying system
- UNT officially non-partisan
- UNT unions have vast political differences, weakness!
- Fox as candidate:
- signed a document said he devoted himself to more democratic unions and changes in labor law
- added important labor people to transition team
- Fox as prez (1 year in)
- filled Labor Ministry and cabinet with businessmen
- Bunch of anti-union things occur early in Fox presidency (see page 250)
- CTM resists changes to labor laws
- employers don’t seem to mind current system, don’t want to change it
- corporatist flexibility allows CTM to exist AND employers to initiate flexibilization of work and wages
- UNT not pushing hard either
- UNT has made some suggestions, supported PRd labor law proposal
- BUT UNT has also moderated its demands on government, not been willing to confront government directly
- this is especially the case for unions like telefonistas who tried to position themselves as cooperative but independent, and want to maintain good relationship with government
- Conclusion: three factors limiting revitalization
- alternation of power, not transition/refounding of state, political institutions
- labor divided
- CTM staying corporate
- UNT trying to be a bit more independent, but even then limited by internal differences
- neoliberal economic model has enhanced employer power and weakened unions
- PESSIMISM!
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