Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89. 

•  Introduction
• argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):
• pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
• this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments
• other explanations are incomplete
• authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
• corporatism is too party/politics focused
• the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
• moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions
• labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which  in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law
• Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics
• Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
• the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)
• that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups
• pluralist system allows autonomy
• corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
•  state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)
• A Note on Case Selection
• Uruguay (64)
• pluralist labor relations system
• class-based unionism
• strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
• Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention
• this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.
• Chile
• historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
• argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)
• decentralizing influence of labor law
• state has a lot of power over unions
• parties have control of unions
• THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship
•  Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion
• Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)
• meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
• Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)
• Uruguay
• unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
• gave them and independent streak
• they also formed a number of labor-based parties
• before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)
• this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created
• Meant that:
• in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
• while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties
• Authoritarian Labor Regimes
• Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
• Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)
•  Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
• military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations
• Transitional Context
• Chilean transition was controlled (72)
• left parties and unions still outlawed
• in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
• the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)
• decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)
• In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)
• initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
• contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)
• Return of Elected Rule
• Chile
• "concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
• inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
• state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
• union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
• business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so
• Uruguay
• reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
• return to 1968 labor relations system
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
•  entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)
• manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
• most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)
• with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)
• Conclusion
• one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)
• BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)
• strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
• "institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
• testable hypothesis:  regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched
• my take:  makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle
• under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)