Etchemendy and Collier 2007

Etchemendy, Sebastián, and Ruth Collier. 2007. "Down but Not Out: Union Resurgence and Segmented Neocorporatism in Argentina (2003-2007)". Politics & Society. 35 (3): 363-401.

1. Introduction
1. vignettes of union power, mobilization (363-364), images which would have been unthinkable in the 1990s (364)
2. Workers promoting conflict are not those most affected to the economic crisis (ie the unemployed), but “relatively privileged” formal sector workers
3. Formal-sector workers have regained offensive
4. New model of “segmented corporatism” (365)
1. Argentine labor movement not being controlled from above (ie not a throwback to old corporatism)
2. not like neocorporatism in Europe, because
1. it only affects the formal sector (about 40% of the working class, 60% of wage earners)
2. it focuses on targeted gains for unions, not broader social policy for entire working class (366)
3. defined as: “a pattern of peak-level negotiation in which monopolistic unions, business associations, and the government coordinate on inflation-targeted, sectorwide wage agreements and minimum wage floors, which apply to a substantial MINORITY of the labor force.” (emphasis mine)
5. Context that allowed segmented neocorporatism to emerge:
1. marketization and deindustrialization did NOT entail a shift in production to traditionally non-unionized and hard-to-organize sectors
1. rather, the boom industries are those that have historically been highly unionized (366-367)
2. Traditional unions were able to forge deals to save important institutional concessions during market turn (367) (see Cook 2007)
3. also, labor market tightening helped (check this in the conclusion, it’s odd...)
2. An Empirical Puzzle: Globalization Optimists, Pessimists, Social Movement Unionism, and the Argentine Case
1. traces three theories of globalization effects on unions
2. Surprising to the SMU literature: the main protagonist of labor resurgence in Argentina has been the traditional CGT (368)
3. The Resurgence of Union Mobilizational Power
1. Unions have regained their capacity for mobilization (369)
1. 2001-2002 crisis protest was dominated by non-unions, but by 2004 most protests were working-class/union-led (370)
2. in wake of 2001, social programs targeted the unemployed, and unemployed organizations were coopted by Kirchner in 2003 (371)
3. after 2002, with economic growth and stagnating wages, protest locus changed to industrial action (371)
2. Four points on labor conflict:
1. it has shifted toward private sector workers
2. causes of labor conflict have shifted to wage disputes (372)
3. strikes are economic in nature, not political
4. has been directed more toward business sector (373)
4. Collective Bargaining
1. Incidence
1. low level and stable through 1990s, but grew after 2000 (373)
1. partially due to the fact that many agreements had been signed before the structural adjustment, and unions took advantage of the fact that they could just extend these relatively-better contracts
2. devaluation and economic growth after 2002 meant that context for bargaining was less-hostile for unions (374)
2. coverage
1. don’t really know, no good data, although new survey in 2005
3. centralization
1. number of sector-level agreements grew after 2002 (376)
2. see chart on page 376, sector level agreements grew 168%, firm-level shrank by 25%
3. these numbers may underestimate nation-level agreements, and national leaders often sign, and thus are involved in (assumption) firm-level agreements (377)
4. could be that firm-level informal agreements are underreported, but authors don’t think this is true (377-378)
5. National labor organizations very important in negotiations now, though business side still decentralized! (378)
5. The Emergence of Segmented Neocorporatism
1. between 2004 and 2007 unions were central actors in emergence of a series of pacts that increased the minimum wage, which in turn increased wages generally, but still hit inflation targets (379)
1. union leaders managed to control pressure from rank and file re: wage increases AND pressure from government re: inflation (380)
2. Tripartite Minimum Wage Council also resurrected in 2004
2. three traits atypical of past Argentine corporatism
1. relative autonomy of CGT (381)
2. wage gains that are also moderate, within inflation targets
3. Business is actually involved in these negotiations (382)
3. Different than Europe: union demands are target, self-interested, have no accompanying social policy demands
1. My Take: Does this mean that unionized workers get wage increases, and cost pressure are simply passed on to nonunion sectors?
6. Organizational Preservation and Sectoral Shifts during Adjustment
1. unions able to protect important parts of labor law that subisidized them (385-386)
2. there were changes to Argentina’s economy, but often expansion was into sectors that also had history of militant unionism (ie away from metallurgy, but toward oil and food workers) (386-387)
3. also, service sector workers highly unionized (banks, teachers, etc).
4. ALSO, some places where unionism wasn’t strong experience INCREASED MILITANCY seemingly for no reason (387)
7. Immediate Causes, helpful but not necessary
1. labor markets tightened because neoliberalism and unemployed deskilled much of labor force, so tight market for those with skills, most of whom were unionized (388-389)
2. also, pro-union Kirchners! (390-391)
8. Conclusion
1. Segmented Neocorporatism in Argentina is an atypical result for Latin America (393)
2. Long-run sustainability is an open question
1. inflation, slow growth, and/or unfriendly government could undermine all of this
3. Also, PJ still deunionized (394)
1. this may have led to CGT’s moderation
2. but may also lead to their eventual abandonment by PJ
4. Finally, SegNeoCorp simultaneously fosters social equality and inequality
1. greater equality for formal-sector workers
2. but greater inequality for those who aren’t covered, employed, etc.
3. To fix this, unions will need to find a way to preserve their associational power, find way to incorporate other sectors into their agreements/social policy (which could drive inflation up!), but also find a way to keep inflation tolerable