Levitsky and Murillo 2008

Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2008. "Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner". Journal of Democracy. 19 (2): 16-30.

• Election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was a foregone conclusion in 2007 (16)
• PJ emerged from election in dominant position
• Néstor left office has the most popular outgoing president in modern Argentine history (17)
• success came from:
• export-led growth rooted in a competitive exchange rate and commodity boom
• largest debt haircut in history in 2001
• encouraged CB and increased minimum wage
• extended social security to unemployed and informal sector workers
• undid court packing by Menem (17-18)
• Cristina won thanks to continuing strength of PJ party machine (18)
• and massive opposition weakness
• UCR collapsed after 2001, and no party has risen to replace it
• Why Argentina is not Venezuela
• Néstor concentrated power in the executive (19)
• provincial governments lost control of funds to the national executive, now have to get money from above
• but lopsided victories in 2005 and 2007 were more about opposition weakness, not abuse by PJ
• strong civil society and infrastructure to protect civil liberties (20)
• governors are counterweights to presidents
• Néstor improved democracy
• Néstor improved quality of Supreme Court
• improved legitimacy
• in 2001, 22% of voters cast blank or spoiled ballots (22)
• in Buenos Aires + Sante Fe, two largest districts, total spoiled was more than all the parties COMBINED
• expanded government’s ability to maneuver re: IMF, foreign captialists
• Challenges to Argentine Democracy
• there has been a partial collapse of party system (22)
• UCR collapsed and nothing replaced it (23)
• PJ is the only party left with a viable party structure
• even when opposition can win, it cannot govern (24)
• PJ overrepresented in rural areas, would likely remain in control of legislature
• no opposition diminishes executive accountability, which in turn increases chance of corruption
• Persistent institutional weakness (24-25)
• institutions have strength along two dimensions, enforcement and stability (25)
• most Argentine institutions lack strength in at least one of these areas
• Néstor’s impeachment of judges was, though well-meaning, just another example of SC’s non-autonomy
• Since 1989, and continuing during Néstor’s reign, legislature has repeatedly delegated lawmaking ability to president (26)
• Unfinished business
• Néstor unwilling to combat price hikes (27)
• looming energy crisis
• issue of public security
• tough to balance tighter security and respect for civil rights (28)
• neglected social policies aimed at combating poverty
• Jefes y Jefas scaled back
• levels of poverty and inequality remained higher in 2007 than during the mid-1990s
• Néstor did not strengthen political institutions