Levitsky 2003a

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. "From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-1999". Latin American Research Review. 38 (3): 3-36.

1. Introduction
1. The decline of mass production and expansion of service and informal sectors weakened labor movements, limited their ability to deliver votes, resources, and social peace (4)
1. PJ in Argentina adapted to loss of labor-strength very well
2. clientelist networks and linkages replaced old union-based linkages between parties and working/lower classes
3. erosion of union influence increased party leaders’ autonomy, allowed them to attract independent and middle-class voters
4. yet consolidation of clientelist networks allowed PJ to hold on to working class constituents
2. PJ seemed an unlikely candidate for such radical adaptation, since labor had a lot of sway over the party (4-5)
1. but PJ’s weakly institutionalized rules allowed PJ to adapt quickly to changing circumstances (5)
2. AND as PJ gained access to public office, politicians/party able to substitute state-resources for union resources
3. Article highlights the role of clientelism as a new party-voter linkage in the post-industrial world (6)
1. PJ’s turn started when reformers came to power in the party in 1987 (5), so before Menem’s neoliberal turn in 1989 (6)
2. despite labor’s declining influence in PJ, unions continued to invest in the party in the 1990s
2. The Crisis and Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Latin America
1. Labor based parties depend on labor for votes, resources, social peace...thanks to this leverage, unions usually gain sway over party (7)
1. uses number of unionists in party leadership as an indicator of this
2. globalization, etc etc hurt labor based parties
3. depending on labor allies became a detriment, since it limited ability to adopt market-oriented reforms and the capacity of the party to appeal to new constituents (Koelbe 1992; Kitschelt 1994)
2. Working class begins to split
1. some move up to white collar jobs
2. others pushed down to informality (8) (Castells and Portes 1989)
3. One way to make up for labor weakness is to replace corporatist linkages with clientelistic linkages (8)
1. PROS:
1. clientelism is a low-cost way to appeal to low-income voters in the context of de-industrialization (Gibson and Calvo 2000) (9)
2. can win votes eve when unemployment is a problem (labor-based linkages can’t do this)
3. machines can be more programmatically flexible
2. CONS:
1. generally associated with corruption and inefficiency
3. Explaining Labor-Based Party Transformation
1. #1 = labor parties that suffered a setback in the 1980s were more likely to reform/transform (10)
1. Also, clientelistic networks can only be built in contexts where (Shefter 1994: 27-28)
1. party has access to public office
2. state lacks the bureaucratic autonomy necessary to resist cooptation
2. #2 = Institutionalized party-union linkages tend to be sticky (11), so less institutionalization = more flexibility for transformation
4. The Case of Peronism
1. Incentives to Adapt
1. In the 1980s, PJ in large industrial areas dominated by unions, unions imposed presidential ticket in 1983 (11)
2. BUT increasingly informal workers’ interests were not represented by labor unions (12)
3. PJ platform inward looking, labor based
4. incentive: PJ totally crushed in 1983, 1985 because could not win any middle-class voters
2. Capacity to Adapt
1. PJ did not have stable nor well-defined procedures to include unions (13)
1. the two informal methods were “tercio and “62”
1. tercio: labor gets 1/3 of party candidates
2. 62: labor’s encompassing representative on the executive committee of PJ
2. INFORMAL, NOT INSTITUTIONALIZED!!!! (14)
5. Peronist Renovation (1983-1989)
1. Renovation Wing of party had two goals (14)
1. broaden PJ’s electoral appeal to middle class and independent voters
2. democratize PJ internally
2. Because PJ won a bunch of governorships and other offices in 1982, able to use state resources and not rely on union resources (15)
3. Renovation wing gets control of all party branches in major industrial districts between 1985 and 1987, take control of party in 1987
4. By 1990s “62” was an empty name according to unionists
5. Renovation also rewrote party rules in 1987, ends tercio in favor of “more democratic” internal procedures....actually just means local party bosses draw up electoral tickets (16)
6. The Consolidation of Machine Politics
1. State resources became the primary linkage between the PJ and its activists (17)
2. labor also fragmented, individual labor factions negotiating with PJ factions
3. In Federal Capital, for example, as union power diminished to did number of labor candidates (2 in 1989, one in 1991 and 1993, zero thereafter) (18)
4. Duhalde also concentrated power on himself in the 1990s, which meant labor influence dropped (19)
7. The Decline of Union INfluence
1. As patronage machines get going, no longer need labor resources, so labor can’t get spots in party leadership (19)
2. tables with drop in representatives from unions on page 20, 21
3. those unionists that were elected increasingly owed their seats to party bosses, not unions (20), CGT is increasingly unable to corral its representatives in Congress (21)
4. labor has no say in PJ strategy (21), can’t even get Pj leadership to listen to their opposition to deregulate health insurance in 1992 (22)
8. Changing Patterns of Union Participation
1. Some white collar unions created Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) created by defectors from CGT and PJ (22)
2. Most unions stuck with PJ
1. Metalworkers (UOM) and some others continued corporatist strategy
2. Some others sponsored local “agrupaciones”, municipal-based organizations (23)
1. these were successful at times (23) BUT
2. fragmented movement (24)
3. still meant agrupaciones leaders had to negotiate with other local bosses
3. third strategy: Labor Roundtable
1. momentary groups to support a single (often national/regional) candidate
2. tended to fall apart after elections
3. lacked autonomous resources, couldn’t discipline member unions
4. NONE of these were very effective, why did unions stick around?
1. personal loyalties at the individual level (25)
2. leaders still doing OK in PJ
9. Coalitional Adaptation and Political Success
1. First, the erosion of union influence enhanced the autonomy of party leaders, which in turn allowed them to broaden the party’s electoral appeal (25)
1. PJ distanced from labor issues, increased use of mass media
2. Second, PJ consolidated its clientelist networks, allowing it to hold on to most of its lower income constituents (26)
3. Thus the party was able to both attract new constituents and hold on to old ones
4. YET PJ became associated with corruption and inefficiency, which opened it up to (ultimately successful) reformist challenges in 1999-2000 (26-27)
10. Machine Politics and Neoliberal Reform
1. clientelist networks helped diffuse popular sector protests by distributing material goods and services (28)
2. client networks also provided a degree of social control in urban poverty zones
3. finally, research by Auyero (1998, 2000) suggests that PJ identities are less class based and more “client” based (29)
11. Conclusion
1. Emergence of piqueteros maybe a problem?  signal that PJ-client linkages are eroding? (30)
2. But as of 2003, new PJ still going strong (31)