Levitsky and Murillo 2009

Levitsky, S., and M.V. Murillo. 2009. "Variation in Institutional Strength". Annual Review of Political Science. 12: 115-134.

• formal institutions vary widely along two dimensions (116):
• enforcement
• stability
• Figure 1 page 117

			Enforcement
		High	Low
	High	Strong formal institutions	Stable (but weakly enforced) formal institutions
Stability	Low	unstable (but enforced) formal institutions	weak formal institutions

• Upper left: strong institutions or “pure” case characterized by tight coupling of formal rules and actual behavior (117)
• Lower Left: parchment rules are followed widely, but are modified comparatively often (118)
• upper right: “window dressing” institutions -- stable but ignored
• lower right: institutions do little to actually constrain actors or shape their behavior (118-119)
• All four patterns have the opportunity to be ENDURING...Mexico and 1917 Constitution is a great example or upper right (119)
• Enforcement can, at times, undermine institutional stability
• example: as the election rules were followed in Argentina after 1943, resulted in institutional instability (thanks to coups)
• formal institutions are often “born weak” (120)
• created intentionally:
• window dressing:  power holders want the rules on the books, but will not benefit from enforcing them
• stability is based on shared expectation that rules will not be followed
• often a response by the developing world to international demands
• could also improve domestic legitimacy
• created unintentionally (121)
• actors who created the institutions may not have the power to make them binding, due to:
• low bureaucratic capacity
• resulting lack of “state reach”
• formal and de facto powers may not be neatly fused (e.g. army could topple whole system, or not be ruled by it)
• unintended but not unexpected
• “future goals/rules” that may be implemented via the courts
• varying levels of societal compliance could create institutional weakness (121-122)
• quasi-voluntary compliance occurs when everyone generally expects everyone else to obey the law (122) (Levi 1988, 57-70; Levi 1997, 19-25)
• inequality can create weak institutions, if poor don’t have resources to fully access institutions they will go around them (122)
• Instability is often rooted in disjuncture between rule writes and power holders
• in transitional settings, new institutions will more likely endure when rule writers either
• gain acceptance of powerful actors who remain outside the the rule-writing process
• decisively defeat major opponents, thereby destroying opposition
• ex: Perón did not incorporate Radicals in 1949 Constitution, so they let it be discarded by military dictatorship
• STABILITY is rooted in (123)
• time:
• going through a slow process of rulemaking usually results in greater organized support
• longstanding rules allow actors to specialize their abilities under them
• path dependence reinforces this
• BUT SIMILARLY, long periods of weak institutions may reinforce patterns of institutional weakness, if actors invest in skills that are extra-institutional
• Weak institutions exist everywhere, but are especially prevalent in developing countries because of (124):
• institutional borrowing from abroad, which can easily become window dressing
• disjuncture between rule writers and social power holders
• developing states usually have limited bureaucratic capacity
• high levels of social and economic inequality
• Weak institutions mean that actors cannot assume others will comply with the rules
• low enforcement limits cooperation and collective actions (125)
• actors expectations about enforcement and stability shape how they approach institutional design (127)
• weak institutions are more open to repeated and radical change (128)
• cost of replacement in these cases is relatively low