Gentili, Suárez, Stubrin, and Gindín 2004

• Introduction
• teachers have gone on strikes a lot in LA recently, as have university students (1252)
• these fights and negotiations happened in places where the economy was in crisis, the education sector wasn't in great shape, and many went through processes of reform to improve education system (1253)
• authors suggest that the conflict over education system is about the fact that many of the reforms were very ambitious and didn't take into account economic crises that came or traditions of the sector
•  these authors want to create an integrated theory about teacher protest, not just assume it's all about salary (1253-4)
• it seems cyclical (1254)
• it's hard to divorce it from larger economic crises that occurred
• but a big part of the problem is that tensions would arise with any reform, but in this case most of the reforms didn't include teachers at all, which provoked greater protest (1256-7)
• the lack of democratic discussion about education reform was a common issue throughout the region (1257)
• Education conflict: creating a definition is theoretically ambitious
• thinking about education conflict as a place for active adn dynamic contestation that creates the agents and strategies of the agents....that is to say, it's not a place of pure reaction due to sructural factors (1258)
• obviously this also means that interests will conflict and will be complex, even within what one might imagine would be a similar group....it's economic and poltiical but also has to do with cultural and psychology of a person/group
• aha....1257-1260 is sort of relating the various theories of social conflict, transplanting them to education a bit, and then saying the authors are going to look across LA to see which themes come up most often (1260)
• 1998-2003: a chronology of union action around education reforms in LA
• education reform processes have generated a lot of conflict in LA, pretty much across the board, though reactions to this conflict have differed (1261)
• 863 conflicts during this time, 40% of which were started by base-level unions (1262)
• during this time 54% of the conflicts were aimed at teh central government, while 31% were at provincial governments (the latter usually from decentralized education systems
• none were exclusively against private schools!
• private school unions tend to be less combatitive
• when they are combative, it's usually as part of larger confederations that are dominated (in numbers) by public school teachers (1263)
• private-school battles are usually very small and circumscribed
• most often working conditions and salary are basically set by the state anyway, so it makes more sense to go after government, and to do so you need lots of help, not just private sector (1263)
• Argentina had the most conflict, with 1491 days lost in this time period (1264)
• data! (1265)
• the reforms were not undertaken in a democratic way, which resulted in higher levels of conflict, though all the governments who undertook these reforms were certainly democratically elected (for the most part) (1266)
• of the actiosn taken
• 79% had labor demands
• 28% were based on larger demands of education politics, like those against decentralization
• 12% were against teh political system en total
• usually salary demands were linked to larger, more theoretical demands
• teachers strikes have a very high level of adhesion in teh region (1266-7)
• unions led practically all the manifestations, and a lot of them included wage/pay demands (1268)
• Conclusions
• much of the traditions and norms of education and education politics were greatly changed by the reforms across LA, and they did so with very little consultation with the teachers (1269)
• this resulted in a lot of conflcit aroudn education, which tended to become the center of even larger social conflcits (1270)
• 
  

Betancur 2008

Bentancur, Nicolás. 2008. "La nueva agenda de las políticas educativas en el Cono Sur (Argentina, Chile y Uruguay 2005-2008)." Revista Debates 2.2: 272-298.

• Introduction
• reforms of the 1990s tended to
• involve centralization of curriculum creation, but decentralization of administration (273)
• schemes of "positive discrimination" in favor of the poor
• introduction of business ideas into education
• expansion of the role of families and businesses in education
• Argentina: decentalization of secondary teachings and teacher training (273-4)
• Chile: introduction/perfection of market regulation of education (275)
• Uruguay: maintained the national state as central head of education
• recently all these countries have begun to talk/change these reforms again, thanks to left of center governmetns (274)
• Argentina
• 2006 law came out of Néstor having a big open discussion with large numbers of people in society (275)
•  2006 law rescinded parts of 1993 law, resulted in
• returning federal state as the guarantor of access to and right of education (276)
• made secondary school obligatory, and created systemwhere provinces can choose to do 6 years each of primary and secodnary, ot 7 and 5 (respectively)
• created a Consejo Federal de Educacion, with consultative councils that include teachers (276-7)
• this reform didn't roll back decentalization totally (277)
• nor did it end the financing of private education
• CTERA like this reform, law included a lot of things that CTERA suggested should be in there, and it got a lot of things it has watned for a while, like (278)
• declaration that education is a right and should be free
• growth of financing of schools to 6% GDP (PBI)
• the right to free teacher training
• the right of colelctive negotiation at the provincial AND national level
• Catholic schools were also a fan of the bill (279), more or less
• Chile
• student protests in 2005 demanded free schooling and transportation to school (280)
• teachers eventually joined protests and there was a national strike
• there was a council to solve these issues, that woudl include students, but at first it was stalled because students became a bit radicalized, and strike grew as more social groups joined the students' cause (280-1)
• once the council finally got together, including social groups, parties, and student representatives, it became clear that everyoen was unhappy, but great divergence in ideas on how to fix the system...some wanted more martket, some wanted less (281)
• Colegio de Profesores, union, was with the students (282) they wanted more centralization, better pay, shorter hours
• on the other end of the spectrum, private schools wanted fewer laws, more flexibility
• teachers groups did make some deamdns on private schools, not that thy be nationalized, but at least that they would be regulated more closely, including their entrance requirements (284)
• government in Chile did not try to replace the private system set up by Pinochet and perfected in the 1990s, but it dis try to smooth out some of the issues with it, make it a bit more equitable (286-287)
• Uruguay
• new law in teh 1990s didn't change tehcentalized, hierarchical nature of education, but was undertaken without any input from social groups, and the unions were against it, so a new law in the 2000s with the new left government was likely (287-8)
• the government convened a large Congress to figure out the new education law, parties were not allowed to be involved, only social actors, though unions were allowed and they tended to hav ea large say in the matter (288-290)
• new law reaffirmed much of old law, and said that funding could not go below 6% GDP (292)
• created autonomy and co-governance of schools by parents, teachers, students, and administrators (293)
• Conclusion: is there a new paradigm of education politics in teh Southern Cone?
• none of these reofrms were massive changes, refoundations (294)
• non of the reforms really chagne public/private relationship in their country (295)
• all reformers seem preoccupied with making the porcess inclusive of social actors
• teachers and students growing in power, technocrats and private sector losing power
• see tables on page 296 for some quick conclusions

Kingstone, Young, Aubrey 2013

Kingstone, Peter, Joseph K. Young, and Rebecca Aubrey. 2013. "Resistance to Privatization: Why Protest Movements Succeed and Fail in Latin America". Latin American Politics and Society. 55 (3): 93-116

• Introduction
• Broad Defense in Peru, coalition of many civil society organizations, was able to block privatization in 2002 (93-94)
• Article focuses on privatization because it fidrectly affest jobs and consumers, and national industries can be symbolic (94)
• Argument: protest tend to succeed under two conditions
• when protesters engage in "brokerage" across multiple sectors of society (94-95)
• (95) protests are most successful when civil rights are protected but political representation is weak
• this model accounts well for failure, but not so well for success...will discuss example of Bolivia and Uruguay to play this out
• Privatization in Latin America
• Privatization can have diffuse and uneven effects, improving the experience of some while decreasing jobs and increasing prices as well (96)
• the perception of corruption can increase hostility to privatization
• this is likely due to or increased by lack of transparency and public scrutiny in these privatizations (97)
• authors identify 104 protest cases in 18 countries between 1990 and 2000
• 25 successfully reversed the sale
• protests were frequent in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, though few succeeded in any of these places, and were less frequent but more successful in Costa Rica and Uruguay
• Successful Resistance
• political opportunity
• hypothesis 1: and open civil rights climate is associated with greater likelihood of success for protest (99)
• hypothesis 2: the level of political rights is negatively associated with success of protest movements
• assume that high political representation will result in grievances going through "proper channels"
• brokerage
• occurs when previously unconnected groups cooperate in seeking a common goal
• hypothesis 3: brokerage increases probability of protest success (100)
• alternative explanations
• protest became more frequent and successful later in period as neoliberal project lost steam
• no trend in this direction in data
• certain sectors are more likely to generate protest
• protest were more successful and had more linkages if a public utlity
• but suggest that overall success is high enough that this doesn't really pan out in data either.
• could make argument they're making a molehill out of a mountain here!
• Research Design:  uses a bunch of third party measures (101-103). tests political, economic, and brokerage variables
•  Results
• all hypotheses proven (103), economic variables hard to gauge, and their seem to be some country effects as well (104) (through discussion on 106)
• Democracy, Neoliberalism, and Protest
• the modal case of a successful protest is one where civil rights are protected but political representation is weak enough to demand groups use outside channels (106)
• Bolivian Water War
• 107-109
• privatization of water company done without consultation of the polity (108)
• Earlier protests against privatization had failed, in Cochabamba there was brokerage
• protesters barricaded, took over parts of city when government failed to negotiate
• police leveraged this situation for a pay raise...is this significant to success?
• importantly, the political exclusion of indigenous people led to this successful mobilization (109)
• Protecting ANTEL in Uruguay
• ultimately the protest was channeled through a national plebiscite (109)
• generally the country is seen as politically open, but Elite parties were losing groudn to Frente Amplio at this point
• notes brokerage between PIT-CNT union confedration and the Frente Amplio's civil society org (110)
• does this really count as two civil society orgs?!
• protesters took advantage of national plebiscite rule in Constitution (110-111)
• Conclusions
• privatization, especailly when its done undemocratically, may tap into deeper, already held feelings of political exclusion (111)
• this political exclusion may predate privatization effort, and even neoliberalism for that matter (though likely not the latter)
• high success in Costa Rica and Uruguay occured because of brokerage between CSOs, unions, and political parties (111-112)...protests are eventually channeled into political institutions
• these stand in contrast to Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico where protest has taken place almost entirely outside of formal political institutions  (112)

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89. 

•  Introduction
• argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):
• pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
• this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments
• other explanations are incomplete
• authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
• corporatism is too party/politics focused
• the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
• moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions
• labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which  in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law
• Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics
• Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
• the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)
• that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups
• pluralist system allows autonomy
• corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
•  state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)
• A Note on Case Selection
• Uruguay (64)
• pluralist labor relations system
• class-based unionism
• strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
• Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention
• this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.
• Chile
• historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
• argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)
• decentralizing influence of labor law
• state has a lot of power over unions
• parties have control of unions
• THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship
•  Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion
• Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)
• meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
• Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)
• Uruguay
• unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
• gave them and independent streak
• they also formed a number of labor-based parties
• before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)
• this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created
• Meant that:
• in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
• while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties
• Authoritarian Labor Regimes
• Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
• Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)
•  Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
• military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations
• Transitional Context
• Chilean transition was controlled (72)
• left parties and unions still outlawed
• in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
• the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)
• decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)
• In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)
• initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
• contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)
• Return of Elected Rule
• Chile
• "concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
• inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
• state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
• union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
• business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so
• Uruguay
• reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
• return to 1968 labor relations system
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
•  entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)
• manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
• most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)
• with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)
• Conclusion
• one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)
• BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)
• strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
• "institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
• testable hypothesis:  regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched
• my take:  makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle
• under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Luna 2010

"The left turns : why they happened and how they compare", Juan Pablo Luna 2010 

in Cameron, Maxwell A, and Eric Hershberg. 2010. Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change. Boulder [Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

“Available narratives fail to identify and explain the important political and policy divergences that occur within each type, not distinguishing between cases pertaining to different leftist types and to crucial intragroup divergences.” (25)

To understand what (left) governments do while in office, need to consider partisan constraints and nonpartisan ones

in terms of partisan constraints:  Interest group fragmentation in LA means that parties need to cobble together heterogeneous coalitions to win elections.  This, in turn, means that once a governing left party is in office, it  faces stark distributive conflicts and usually competing interests from base.

Finally, there are exogenous constraints, particular to each country’s long-term development

Chile

• Little relationship between organized labor and Concertacion, creating few endogenous constraints.
• most Chileans seem alienated from politics, don’t identify with any party
• likely that voters switched from conservative vote in 2001 to Socialist in 2005 because both candidacies represented a “renovating swing”
• thus LOWER constraints for Concertacion
• progressive policy change will demand top-down leadership (Lagos or Bachelet will have to want to do it!)
• Moreover, ISI totally demolished, so there are no rents to be taken away
• Social groups marginalized, have become alienated from social mobilization in favor of individual market consumption and targeted poverty relief measures
• Concertacion will have to take the lead on creating a social democratic state
• however, business sectors still have lots of clout, can block lots of things

Uruguay

• party with ‘mass appeal’
• originally allied with organized labor, solidified their link in 1990s
• in 2000s got more support from the poor, who were usually coopted by mainstream parties
• 55% align themselves with party, 65% are ‘sympathizers’
• Overall structure of the party (good regional bases, alliances with interest groups, consolidated leadership, programmatic appeal) translates into higher levels of endogenous constraints
• Vazquez filled cabinet with FA people to keep fighting “inhouse”
• labor has mobilized against FA to get what it wants
• ISI only partially dismantled, so there are three Uruguays
• upper class who are market-oriented, trade with the world
• a group of legacy corporatists who rely on rents
• socially marginalized group who can’t compete on the market, but also don’t have access to rents in corp. system
• second is FA’s traditional base, third becoming more important to them
• CONCLUSION:
• should pay attention to partisan and nonpartisan constraints, shape ability of governments to make changes

Luna 2007

Luna, Juan Pablo. 2007. "Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in Uruguay". Latin American Politics & Society. 49 (4): 1-30.

• The electoral success of the left is “built partly on a broad electoral movement that opposes neoliberal reforms and represents losers in this economic model” (3)
• differences among Left regimes derive from divergent ISI constellations, dissimilar structural reform patterns, and distinct party systems
• Thus:  each case should be examined with regard to:
• sociological opportunity structure
• political opportunity structure
• partisan adaption
• Uruguay has an unusual combination of:
• elite party structure that used ISI
• political party system that didn’t deinstitutionalize in neoliberal transition
• FA overcame tradeoffs between factions of party and across classes
• FA able to keep labor happy, while also extending reach to poor, those usually coopted by clientelistic elite parties
• Party has moderated, while labor movement as radicalized
• may be a future issue
• Data on electoral support for FA by district, class
• cross-class support in Montevideo,
• less, but growing support en el campo
• Sociological opportunity structure
• FA party for those who want to keep ISI
• no breakdown of party system, no electoral dealignment
• FA adopts Batllismo:  social democracy
• Uruguayans have less faith in market
• Clientelism of Colorado and Blanco unhelpful after neoliberal belt-tightening
• As C and B implement neolib, FA gaining votes, do C and B can’t go all the way with neoliberal reforms (trying to keep voters happy!)
• some areas able to protect their ISI benefits (read: labor), thus not destroyed by neoliberal policies
• Political Opportunity Structure
• Fiscal crisis = B and C can’t feed money to political/client machines
• FA ideology passed on through generations
• both of which means FA growing, B and C struggling
• Adaptation patter
• Fa had larger activist apparatus
• in the streets!
• and fomenting in between elections
• party moderates its views
• internal decentralization spread the word, got new areas involved in party
• Asamblea Uruguay and Movimiento de Participación Popular capture FA’s emerging constituency: poor, disaffected
• AU gets lower class, particularly in the interior
• MPP is broad, pragmatic
• also the party of Jose Mujica, another charismatic leader, who would later replace Vazquez as President
• Final conclusions:
• strength comes from keeping old constituents (labor), and attracting new ones (poor, but also middle and upper class)
• HOWEVER, this means party has two divergent factions
• party attempts to contain discontent within itself
• FA may have problem satisfying divergent constituents