Donaire 2012

Donaire, Ricardo. 2012. Los docentes en el siglo XXI: ¿empobrecidos o proletarizados? Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

• Introduction
• while education coverage has increased greatly since 1960, we are also seeing more people with precarious work relations (23)
• between 2002 and 2007 22% of protests have included "intellectual" workers, including teachers (23) citing another report
• 2009 Ministry of labor report: 454 000 teachers in the the 5 national teachers unions, 2/3 of which are in CTERA (24)
• teachers have done about 1/4 of all strikes between 1994 and 2008
• check out the "Programa de Investigacion sobre el Movimiento de la Sociedad Argentina
• but traditionally teachers aren't thought of as the working class, yet they are going on stikes and stuff
• the governemnt then and now has tried to delegitmize teachers strikes as an attack on the poor (by the teachers), thereby separating teachers from the identity of "poor" (25)
• ARGUMENT: showing teachers have descended to become a proletariat, but not just because they have a union or don't make as much money as they used to. Rather, this is a larger story abuot how this middle class was turned into a proletariat, and how many other of the middle/intellectual classes are also being turned into proles (25-6)
• chapter 2: theories of proletarianization
• proletarianization as deskilling, Braverman (30-34)
• ideological proletarianization, where proles lose the ability to choose how to do their work, has a lot more to do with proeltarianization of the middle class (Derber)
• teachers are becoming de-skilled due to the number of pre-made lessons and the rules set out by the state that teacher smust follow (37-38)
• but specialization could mean actually GREATER skill for teachers, rather than a deskilling (39)
• then something about ideological proletarianization that i didn't understand...i think it's something about misunderstanding WHY they do work (think they are helping, but actually just recreating classes and their own domination, despite being a middle class)
• chapter 3: lit on what class teachers on in
• generally they are seen as part of the middle classes, in Marxian thought
• some studies note that at teachers are making less money, that poorer people are becoming teachers, but still see teachers as middle class, just not doing as well as they used to (47-49)
• in major part this is happening thanks to precarious contracts, and worsening labor conditions (45-46)
• though some scholars still see teachers as a privileged middle class, relative to workers (47-8)
• but importantly there are lots of teachers who are identified as part of the "new poor" (51), those who lost out (in terms of salary and working conditions) a lot during the 1990s
•  
• in the official classifications, docentes de primaria y secundaria are technical workers, whereas university profs are the only professionals (73)
• teachers make up about 30% of formal wage workers that have professional or technical expertise in the country (74)
• in 2001 CABA teachers were about 55% public, 45% private, rest of the country was more like 76/24 (75-77)
• to decide whether or not teachers are becoming part of the proletariat, subseuquent chapters will look at : living conditions, working conditions, work process, and perceptions of class among teachers (79), going to look at primary and secondary, private and public, did data gathering in 2007 (80)

• Chapter 6: condiciones de vida
• overall this chatper suggests that teachers are getting poorer, even when they come from middle class backgrounds (which most do), but can’t quite prove they are becoming proles (103)
•  chapter 7 working conditions
• a report from 2008 said that 65% (460) of the school buildings in CABA were deteriating, 50 of which were totally ununsable (105)
• 52% were older than 50 yrs (106)
• the poorest neighborhoods tend to have the wrost schools (106
• there is a syndrome or burnout that has affected teachers and been noted by pyschiatrists (107-8)
• tables on precarity 128, 125
• 141-143: teachers are in more precarious work relationships becaues they are being proletarianized
• public school teachers earn less than other public sector workers of similar qualifications, and private school teachers earn even less than that (147-148)
• labor process, chapter 8
• teachers haven’t lost the skills of teaching, their jobs haven’t been deskilled, but they have experiecned a sort of “ideological proletarianization”, where they have lost control o the politics behind what they teach, essentially they seem to be passing on the norms without being able to fight them (152-3
• issues facing teachers in teh classroom, including what to teach, what to do when students don’t care, etc (153-167
• perceptions of teachers of theri class location, chapter 9
• most teachers 59.6% think they are part of middle class, but only 46% think teachrs in general are in middle class...for working class it is 12 and 14% resectively (181)
• 2004 study found 63% thought they were in middle class, but 28% thought working class (182)
• many teachers think strikes are fine to use (186) and about 33% said they would g out with a spontaneous strike, while 11% they wouldn’t and the rest had no opinion (185)
• 58% of teachers suggested that teachers were like “salaried workers”, and thus close to the working class if not exactly a part of it (195)
• sees tehe strike as an important symbol of teachers as working class as opposed to anything else
• history of teachers unions 197-204, with data on memebr #s on 200
• teachers at least seem to be moving closer to identifying with the working class, even if they see themselves as professionals/workers (206), it seems like teachers aren’t actually ebing robbed of their ideologies, but rather their ideologies are moving closer to those that favor the working class (207)
• conclusions
• 60% of teachers can be removed at will (210-211)
• it doesn't seem like teachers have lost control of their work process in a real, fundamental way, but they do have a lot fo expectations about student achievement and subjects taught that is at les enchroaching on these things (214-2158), meaning teachers aren't whollyautonomous
• teachers are being proleatrianized, though they aren't there fullly yet (234-238)

Betancur 2008

Bentancur, Nicolás. 2008. "La nueva agenda de las políticas educativas en el Cono Sur (Argentina, Chile y Uruguay 2005-2008)." Revista Debates 2.2: 272-298.

• Introduction
• reforms of the 1990s tended to
• involve centralization of curriculum creation, but decentralization of administration (273)
• schemes of "positive discrimination" in favor of the poor
• introduction of business ideas into education
• expansion of the role of families and businesses in education
• Argentina: decentalization of secondary teachings and teacher training (273-4)
• Chile: introduction/perfection of market regulation of education (275)
• Uruguay: maintained the national state as central head of education
• recently all these countries have begun to talk/change these reforms again, thanks to left of center governmetns (274)
• Argentina
• 2006 law came out of Néstor having a big open discussion with large numbers of people in society (275)
•  2006 law rescinded parts of 1993 law, resulted in
• returning federal state as the guarantor of access to and right of education (276)
• made secondary school obligatory, and created systemwhere provinces can choose to do 6 years each of primary and secodnary, ot 7 and 5 (respectively)
• created a Consejo Federal de Educacion, with consultative councils that include teachers (276-7)
• this reform didn't roll back decentalization totally (277)
• nor did it end the financing of private education
• CTERA like this reform, law included a lot of things that CTERA suggested should be in there, and it got a lot of things it has watned for a while, like (278)
• declaration that education is a right and should be free
• growth of financing of schools to 6% GDP (PBI)
• the right to free teacher training
• the right of colelctive negotiation at the provincial AND national level
• Catholic schools were also a fan of the bill (279), more or less
• Chile
• student protests in 2005 demanded free schooling and transportation to school (280)
• teachers eventually joined protests and there was a national strike
• there was a council to solve these issues, that woudl include students, but at first it was stalled because students became a bit radicalized, and strike grew as more social groups joined the students' cause (280-1)
• once the council finally got together, including social groups, parties, and student representatives, it became clear that everyoen was unhappy, but great divergence in ideas on how to fix the system...some wanted more martket, some wanted less (281)
• Colegio de Profesores, union, was with the students (282) they wanted more centralization, better pay, shorter hours
• on the other end of the spectrum, private schools wanted fewer laws, more flexibility
• teachers groups did make some deamdns on private schools, not that thy be nationalized, but at least that they would be regulated more closely, including their entrance requirements (284)
• government in Chile did not try to replace the private system set up by Pinochet and perfected in the 1990s, but it dis try to smooth out some of the issues with it, make it a bit more equitable (286-287)
• Uruguay
• new law in teh 1990s didn't change tehcentalized, hierarchical nature of education, but was undertaken without any input from social groups, and the unions were against it, so a new law in the 2000s with the new left government was likely (287-8)
• the government convened a large Congress to figure out the new education law, parties were not allowed to be involved, only social actors, though unions were allowed and they tended to hav ea large say in the matter (288-290)
• new law reaffirmed much of old law, and said that funding could not go below 6% GDP (292)
• created autonomy and co-governance of schools by parents, teachers, students, and administrators (293)
• Conclusion: is there a new paradigm of education politics in teh Southern Cone?
• none of these reofrms were massive changes, refoundations (294)
• non of the reforms really chagne public/private relationship in their country (295)
• all reformers seem preoccupied with making the porcess inclusive of social actors
• teachers and students growing in power, technocrats and private sector losing power
• see tables on page 296 for some quick conclusions

Tello 2013

Tello, César. 2013. "Las políticas docentes y la perspectiva sindical en Argentina, México y Chile: debates y negociaciones. Los casos de CTERA, SNTE y el Colegio de Profesores en los últimos veinte años." Educar em Revista, (48), 149-166.

• Introduction
• in the 1990s education systems started being changed to follow neoliberal ideas, but in the 200s some governments began putting the state back in charge of education (150-151)
• Chávez (2010) showed:
• continued neoliberalism: Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, and others (151)
• concertacion: Arg, Brazil, Guatemal, Uruguay, Paraguay (152)
• rupture from neoliberal: Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela
• argument seems to be that the historical relationship between the unions and government in Mexico and Chile can help us understand what happened in those cases, but that in Argentina the more recent political scenario is explanatory (152)
• the debate: World Bank versus the unions
• teachers unions said reforms would make teaching worse, make salary go down, working conditions worse
• IFIs thought teachers needed someone to hold them accountable, finally, like parents, pushed for school autonomy (154)
• specifics of each case
• Chile
• has had decentralized education since 1990, thanks to the military dictatorship (156)
• unions helped kick out Pinochet
• the Colegio de Profesores was traditionally a group that sought to limit conflict, negotiate, but started acting more like a real union when they got some ability to do so after Pinochet left in 1991 (156-157) 
• the union traded improved salaries for some accountability measures with Lagos, but then subsequently demanded Bachelet and Pinera change the education system (157-9)
• but suggests this is more about the awakening of the union and its demanding what it was promised at the start of democracy (159)
• Mexico
• SNTE is super powerful in education sector, thanks ot historic relations with the PRI (160)
• change in relations and mobilization with SNTE came when PAN in power, though union tried to make-up with PRI in 2012, article doesn't know about EEG getting arrested, but it sstill uncolear ot author if old allinace will be renewed or not (161)
• Argentina
• anti Menem hard in 1990s (162)
• Marcha and Carpa Blancha made thema national force (162)
• friends with Ks, for a while, thanks to laws that gave them tons of money and national negotiations, but when this started to break down they had more strikes (162)
• Conclusions:
• in Chile, union was against the dictatorship and onyl after 20 years of alliance with those parties decided to break from them (163)
• in Mexico union never conronts the government, except as an oligarchic group
• in Argentina union was agisnt the government but has now been friends with Ks and moderated between 2003 and 2011

Nardacchione 2012

• In Neuquen in 1997 protets against Menemismo came through alliances between piquteros and teachers (2)
• on the one hand they were unhappy with unepmloyment, etc
• on the other hand they were trying to defend public education
• this allowed the union to push against provincialization in a national way, create a political movement, and demand national support for public edcuation as a universal justice demand
• provincialization caused
• wages to go down (3)
• working conditions to get worse
• CTERA found itself unable to coordinate its demands to the national level, stuck in a fragmented opposition
• some governments started paying teachers under the table, meaning they did not contribute to obras sociales (4)
• CTERA had trouble of articulating provincial demands at the national level
• for example: SUTEBA would strike, but SADOP and FEB didn't help
• Provincial crises
• at first the provincialization of education caused a drop in militancy and strikes, but eventually problems at the province level made the edcuation adn fiscal crisis worse (5)
• fiscal crisis occurred in many provinces because the national government was an important source of money for the provinces (5)
• not only were education budgets low, but they were set up irrationally (6)
• this strong problem a the provincial level led to deepening and expanding labor protest at the provincial level
• soon the teachers in some provinces were striking more against general issues facing society as a whole, not just for specific issues in regard to their own salaries or working conditions (7)
• this general protest, combined with the fact that it was happenign in many different provinces and the fact that there was some violence result in the re-nationalization of the conflict in 1997 (7)
• when other unions didn't join SUTEBA protests, they found allies outside the union sector, and eventually with UCR and FREPASO (8)
• The nationalization and politicization of the conflict
• the first is a recentralization of the deabte, the second is a move away from technical questions to social/citizenship ones (8)
• the CTERA wanted to do a national strike in 1996, but was having trouble convincing its uniosn to follow, and to get the government to talk to them...the government eventually agreed to talk about these things... (10)
• but hte union in Nequen decided to go on strike anyway, it was a broad colaition against lowering salaries across public sector workers, and the closing of YPF...
• violence to clear roadblock, bystander killed by police (10)...
• in response to this violence, CTERA called  anational strike (80% adhesion) and quit negotiating with teh government (11)
• BIG strike with lots of help, carpa blanca, and after this the idea of nationalizing education demands became a reality (11)
• this also helped the politicization of the cause, as non-union groups joined the fight after this (11-12)
• national ministry wanted to focus the talks on techinical aspects of teaching, while CTERA changed the topic to political and social-economic role of teaching (12)
• CTERA starts doing a lot of social actions, whole eudcation question became way bigger than just a union issue (13)
• 
  

Chiappe 2012

Chiappe, María Mercedes. La conflictividad laboral entre los docentes públicos provinciales: 2006-2010. Diss. 2012.
this isn't the right cite. find the correct one.

• paper about docente labor conflict 2006-2009
• understand the growth and important of national strike in 2008, as well as the development of provincial strikes (295)
• how do salary demands affect other education budget demands
• political alignment between CTERA and the national government
• history
• conflict itn eh 1990s was mostly against reforms adn fiscal adjustments (296)
• in teh late 1990s CTERA moderated demands because they were a part of the government, but then the workers autoorganized their own protests (297)
• teachers demands were not linked to greater politicization post-2003, had already been doing stuff, by post 2003 were demanding work related things
• national state after 2003 began to retake its role as the head of education, even if the provinces were technically still in control of everything (298)
• theory: 298-300
• data
• most conflicts between 2006 and 2009 were strikes, second most common thing were mobilizations (300-1)
• teachers had lots of strikes, not the most of any public sector group, but had way more teachers involved than any other group (and even more after that if you include indiviudal days not worked around the strike among workers who technically weren't out on strike (301-2)
• salary demands are most common (303, 305)
• generic salary demands are also more common than specific demands (305)
• work conditions the most important non-wage demand
• state-level conflicts are more likely than in other industries, which makes sense (306)
• seems like private sector teacher demands are also at state level, which is a bit unusual int eh private sector in general
• see more conflicts with between government/ERs and a coalition of trade unions (307), because education workers are often in different unions (308)
• 5 unions
• CEA:no national confed
• UDA, AMET, SADOP (private): CGT
• CTERA: CTA
• the complex array of unions creates very different union/government relations in different provinces (311)
• CTERA doesn't have the top-down control that other national confederations have (312)
• 2010: big drop in strikes compared to 2009 (312-3)
• DIFFERENCES IN CONFLICT LEVEL by province see 314
•  doesn't seem to be any relation between improvements, level of salary and conlifct levels (216-317)
• CTERA found some common ground with Nestor adn Cristina, so the focus came to be extending federal law implementation at the provincial level (321)
• CTERA stopped doing so much striking, became actions done more by base unions at the provincial level
• when education went down to the provincial level, that meant that provincial governments had the power to determine pay, etc, but also the legality of strikes among the teachers (322)
• differeing levels of institutionalization of rules about these things, though its too early to tell if they are affecting conflict levels (323-326)
• after creation of the paritaria nacional seems like conflict is lessening, though  we can't say for sure quite yet (328), and no other factors seem to have an effect (328)
• this law says that the federal governmetn will pay teachers if the province can't afford the national minimum set
• CTERA might be moderating its provincial level conflicts to focus on this national tool
• thsi national law seems to be a strong tool for province level unions (329)
• Conclusion
• CTERA and government seem to been in alliance, thats to Partiaria Nacional, and that this probably has had the effect of limiting conflict (330)
• 
  

Gindin 2011

Gindin, Julián. 2011. "La Tradición Sindical y la Explicación de las Prácticas Sindicales: Conclusiones de una Comparición Internacional Sobre los Docentes delSecotr Publico." Revista Latinoamericano do Trbalho, año 16 no. 26, 119-143.

• Introduction
• comparing Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico throughout the length of the 20th century
• this article proses the idea of "teacher unionism of the base", which is defined by a gravitation of the unions to the union base (in teachers unions), labor demands as the axis of activity, and open collective conflict with the government (120)
• this article presents how the union tradition can explain how a union works
• seven elements go into structural elements of the union (121)
• political relation with the state
• expansion and development of education system
• local work realities
• ideas of decent employment
• recruitment of teachers
• gender
• social image of the public school and teacher
• history of the union is also a key part of how/what a union does, as it often informs values and norms of the union
• its a little bit working class culture, a little bit union history
• two parts to the idea of "sindicalismo docente de base (122)
• union base includes leaders whose power is not taken by upper level leaders
• willingness to have open and strong conflict with, opposition to the government
• uses critical junctures to compare time periods that aren't actually the same across countries (123)
• notices three junctures:
• one, the existence of some sort of group that says it will represent workers (124)
• two, that group must become the representative of a large base of teachers
• three, consolidation of sindicalismo docente de la base, where the union is able to free or reorganize itself as independent from the state
• Critical junctures in teacher union history
• first, unions in Mex, Arg, Brz form as part of popular mobilization for democracy against the oligarchy (125)
• for Argentina this was the first radical government, Revolution in Mexico, and jsut before Estada Novo in Brazil (125-126)
• groups become solid as opposed to small, marginal
• these weren't necessarily unions, just teachers groups
• second, these groups became real unions, attached to a base
• either through state of mobilization of the teachers themselves (127-8)
• in Mexico it seemed like teachers were mobilizing themselves, but int he end the state was able to impose  union (128)
• in Argentina Peron started to organize through state, but coup meant that teachers ended up mobilizing themselves
• Brazil teachers mobilized themselves weakly and failed to consolidate in the face of government repression (128, 130)
• third, unions serve the base, can count on leaders in the base, are autonomous from government
• Mex: 1974-83, with CNTE emerging and the SNTE, for the first time, using its power within the SEP to not implement government changes (131-132)
• for Argentina and Brazil this happened in the 1980s with the return of democracy, both places unions willing to mobilize against the government (132)
• THE KEY IS A NETWORK OF LEADERS AMONG THE BASE
• Brazil uniosn join PT, but it becomes unclear if uniosn serve party or vice versa (133)
• SNTE plays politics, but its clear that union does so as a pragmatic way to gain power, since it doesn't succumb to too many political demands (133)
• national strikes are rare in Argentina, but happen at the state level depending on union history and political situation (133-4)
• conclusions
• union tradition is a mediating factor between teachers demands and union actions (134)
• union tradition is a legacy of critical junctures, and as such is also... (135)
• a mechanism of that explains path dependence (135)

Murillo 1999

Murillo, M. V. (1999). Recovering political dynamics: Teachers' unions and the decentralization of education in argentina and mexico. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(1), 31-57. 

• this draws out some of the same ideas in her 2001 book, but looks at differences in education reform in Mexico and Argentina, noting the reforms occurred differently due to variation across partisan identities (of the unions), organizational fragmentation (in the unions) and leadership competition (both for union and government officials) (31)
• education reform became an important issues because education was seen as
• important to developing human capital, increasing social equity, and consolidating young democracies (33) see footnote 6 for some citations
• the public felt the edcuation systems were becoming inadequate to mee the countries' needs
• The suggestion made by many groups is that decentralized education is more responsive to local needs, and thus more efficient than hihgly centralized education systems (33-34)
• BUT unions can play an important role in enhancing or sabotaging reforms (34)
• Public sector unions:
• public sector militancy is often more visible to the general public, which would suffer from loss of delivery of public goods thanks to strikes (35)
• "Indeed, strikes often serve the dual purpose of demanding higher wages from the government and mobilizing public opinion to call for greater budget allocations for public services." (35)
• teaching is labor intensive, teachers are distributed across the country, and they can have a great affect on public opinion (36)
• a large proportion of education budgets is directed to salaries (36)
• decentralization reforms in Mexico and Argentina
• The SNTE suppressed it's opposition to decentralization and the government met some of its demands (38)
• CTERA kept unsuccessfully resisitng decentralization and was ignored by Menem (38)
• Stats:
• Law 1,420 of 1881 established free public edcuation and compulsory primary education for all Argentina (39)
• initially the federal government centralized education, by 1952 feds controlled 42.7% of primary, 64.8% of secondary, and 82.5% of vocational schools (Paglianetti 1991)
• military started to decentralize
• By 1987 the national jurisdiction had only 1.9 % of primary schools, 44.7% of secondary schools, and 37.8% vocational schools (40)
• 1991 law enacted in 1992, Law 24,049, transfered all the rest of the schools to provincial jurisdiction (40)
• history of teachers unions (42-43)
• CTERA was with CGT and PJ int eh 1980s, but broke with Menem in 1991 and formed CTA (42)
• CTERA has been strong at province level, but never really centralized enough to be strong national presence (43)
• reform
• most teachers unions rejected Menem's reform (44)
• feared financing would be hurt
• also concerned with declining real wages and wage dispersion once bargaining became decentralized
• teachers struck and demonstrated against reform
• government officials ignored militancy and demands (45)
•  decentralization DID enhance CTERA's position over other competing union confederations (45)
• CTERA joined UCR to form coalition, but meant they found few allies among the mostly PJ provincial governors who didn't want to ally with enemy party (46)
• also competition over teachers weakened all unions, meaning government had no desire to offer concessions (46)
• explaining the difference between SNTE and CTERA
• SNTE was PRI, and not fragmented, CTERA was opposition and fragmented (47-48)
• why not get allies where you can? not really a full explanation here
• conclusion:
• party loyalty can speeed reforms but hinder their effectiveness (see Murillo 2001) (49)
• when there is leadership competition, as there was for SNTE, government will make concessions to keep their leader in power
• CTERA had neither leadership competition (it seems) AND teachers unions were fragmented -- seems a bit weak here

Gindin 2008

Gindin, J. 2008, "Sindicalismo docente en México, Brasil y Argentina: una hipótesis explicativa de su estructuración diferenciada", Revista mexicana de investigación educativa, Abril-junio 2008 volume 13 number 37, p 351-375.

• Argument: the fundamental variable that explains the difference between the cases in Brazil/Argentina and Mexico is the relationship with the sate established at the period of consolidation of labor relations systems (353)
• Argentina
• CTERA created in 1973 (367)
• generally CTERA has been pretty fragmented and weak
• in 1987 there was a split in the CTERA, half were under a UCR leader and half under a PJ leader
• but the PJ half essentially dissolved after it started and lost a big national strike in 1988 (367-8)
• CTERA helped create CTA (368) and bolstered its own power by allowing for leadership at every level to be elected directly, making them the most centralized of the teachers unions (369)
• White tent in 1997 against Menem (369)
• stayed up unti lthe UCR-led coalition won in decemeber 1999
• CTERA got close to NK after his election, but this closeness allowed the teachers to be a sort of internal opposition and still be militant (370)
• the differenc ein that the SNTE was a mediator between teh government and teachers, while in ARgentina and Brazil the government(s) didn't incorporate teachers into the coproate system, and simply ruled them directly when it wanted to. (370-371)
• the mobilization of the 1980s restructured Argentina and Brazil docente unions, while it didn't have this effect on teh SNTE (372)
• said another way, SNTE in Mexico was part of corporatism, and not in Arg and Brazil
• author suggest this starting point helps us understand current teachers' unions

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203