Donaire 2012

Donaire, Ricardo. 2012. Los docentes en el siglo XXI: ¿empobrecidos o proletarizados? Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

• Introduction
• while education coverage has increased greatly since 1960, we are also seeing more people with precarious work relations (23)
• between 2002 and 2007 22% of protests have included "intellectual" workers, including teachers (23) citing another report
• 2009 Ministry of labor report: 454 000 teachers in the the 5 national teachers unions, 2/3 of which are in CTERA (24)
• teachers have done about 1/4 of all strikes between 1994 and 2008
• check out the "Programa de Investigacion sobre el Movimiento de la Sociedad Argentina
• but traditionally teachers aren't thought of as the working class, yet they are going on stikes and stuff
• the governemnt then and now has tried to delegitmize teachers strikes as an attack on the poor (by the teachers), thereby separating teachers from the identity of "poor" (25)
• ARGUMENT: showing teachers have descended to become a proletariat, but not just because they have a union or don't make as much money as they used to. Rather, this is a larger story abuot how this middle class was turned into a proletariat, and how many other of the middle/intellectual classes are also being turned into proles (25-6)
• chapter 2: theories of proletarianization
• proletarianization as deskilling, Braverman (30-34)
• ideological proletarianization, where proles lose the ability to choose how to do their work, has a lot more to do with proeltarianization of the middle class (Derber)
• teachers are becoming de-skilled due to the number of pre-made lessons and the rules set out by the state that teacher smust follow (37-38)
• but specialization could mean actually GREATER skill for teachers, rather than a deskilling (39)
• then something about ideological proletarianization that i didn't understand...i think it's something about misunderstanding WHY they do work (think they are helping, but actually just recreating classes and their own domination, despite being a middle class)
• chapter 3: lit on what class teachers on in
• generally they are seen as part of the middle classes, in Marxian thought
• some studies note that at teachers are making less money, that poorer people are becoming teachers, but still see teachers as middle class, just not doing as well as they used to (47-49)
• in major part this is happening thanks to precarious contracts, and worsening labor conditions (45-46)
• though some scholars still see teachers as a privileged middle class, relative to workers (47-8)
• but importantly there are lots of teachers who are identified as part of the "new poor" (51), those who lost out (in terms of salary and working conditions) a lot during the 1990s
•  
• in the official classifications, docentes de primaria y secundaria are technical workers, whereas university profs are the only professionals (73)
• teachers make up about 30% of formal wage workers that have professional or technical expertise in the country (74)
• in 2001 CABA teachers were about 55% public, 45% private, rest of the country was more like 76/24 (75-77)
• to decide whether or not teachers are becoming part of the proletariat, subseuquent chapters will look at : living conditions, working conditions, work process, and perceptions of class among teachers (79), going to look at primary and secondary, private and public, did data gathering in 2007 (80)

• Chapter 6: condiciones de vida
• overall this chatper suggests that teachers are getting poorer, even when they come from middle class backgrounds (which most do), but can’t quite prove they are becoming proles (103)
•  chapter 7 working conditions
• a report from 2008 said that 65% (460) of the school buildings in CABA were deteriating, 50 of which were totally ununsable (105)
• 52% were older than 50 yrs (106)
• the poorest neighborhoods tend to have the wrost schools (106
• there is a syndrome or burnout that has affected teachers and been noted by pyschiatrists (107-8)
• tables on precarity 128, 125
• 141-143: teachers are in more precarious work relationships becaues they are being proletarianized
• public school teachers earn less than other public sector workers of similar qualifications, and private school teachers earn even less than that (147-148)
• labor process, chapter 8
• teachers haven’t lost the skills of teaching, their jobs haven’t been deskilled, but they have experiecned a sort of “ideological proletarianization”, where they have lost control o the politics behind what they teach, essentially they seem to be passing on the norms without being able to fight them (152-3
• issues facing teachers in teh classroom, including what to teach, what to do when students don’t care, etc (153-167
• perceptions of teachers of theri class location, chapter 9
• most teachers 59.6% think they are part of middle class, but only 46% think teachrs in general are in middle class...for working class it is 12 and 14% resectively (181)
• 2004 study found 63% thought they were in middle class, but 28% thought working class (182)
• many teachers think strikes are fine to use (186) and about 33% said they would g out with a spontaneous strike, while 11% they wouldn’t and the rest had no opinion (185)
• 58% of teachers suggested that teachers were like “salaried workers”, and thus close to the working class if not exactly a part of it (195)
• sees tehe strike as an important symbol of teachers as working class as opposed to anything else
• history of teachers unions 197-204, with data on memebr #s on 200
• teachers at least seem to be moving closer to identifying with the working class, even if they see themselves as professionals/workers (206), it seems like teachers aren’t actually ebing robbed of their ideologies, but rather their ideologies are moving closer to those that favor the working class (207)
• conclusions
• 60% of teachers can be removed at will (210-211)
• it doesn't seem like teachers have lost control of their work process in a real, fundamental way, but they do have a lot fo expectations about student achievement and subjects taught that is at les enchroaching on these things (214-2158), meaning teachers aren't whollyautonomous
• teachers are being proleatrianized, though they aren't there fullly yet (234-238)

Donaire 2006

Donaire, Ricardo. 2006. "Trabajo docente:¿ servicio o fuerza de trabajo? Algunas reflexiones a partir de un ejercicio empírico." Educere 10.35: 561-660.

• this is a lot like a simplified version of the 2012 book
• is there evidence of teachers being in a "reduced" (less well paid) middle class, or descending to becoming part of the proletariat? (652)
• in 2001 there were more than 640,000 teachers (652)
• theory on what determines proletarianization, see 2012 (652-653)
• there seems to be a reserve labor force that could be teachers, that is to say, they have the minimum qualificacions or more, but its a hetergenous group, so its unclear if they are truly a reserve army of laborers for capitalists to use to replace teachers (654)
• lots of data from 2001

Solinger 2009

Solinger, Dorothy J. States' Gains, Labor's Losses: China, France, and Mexico Choose Global Liaisons, 1980-2000. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.


Compares China, France, Mexico response to globalization and changes in labor-state partnership

• "This book is about how an enduring legacy of revolution in these apparently dissimilar places structures state-labor relations in a time of crisis. In all of them, revolutionary-era outcomes left their mark on the roles and functions of unions, vis-á-vis their own states' moves after 1980; repercussions from workers them set the style for subsequent state welfare replies." (4)
• China started internally liberalizing in the 1980s, ans seemingly abandoned labor, but then "Though the old communist, state-labor alliance at first appeard to be wholly abandoned, public militancy reawakened the bond, if in starkly altered form (5)
• France hit some trouble in the 1980s, but 1997 total job losses affected a "stunning" 41.6% of the original labor force; the labor movement didn't do much to protest, and the state didn't do much to help
• similarly Mexican Labor movement didn't fight much, and the state subsequently didn't offer them much for their losses
• Conclusion
• Mexico, France, and China all jettisoned labor allies at the behest/to join Supranational Economic Organizations (208), a proxy for joining global economy
• How labor unions were joined to politics after the revolution was important -- Chinese unions were SUPER weak, meaning workers had a freer hand in starting their own protests! (209)
• "In short, it was the nature of the job that the states permitted--or coerced--their unions to perform that liberated the worker (in China), left them relatively passive (in France), or clamped down on them (in Mexico), once the eliminitation of formerly protective regulations meant removing workers from their positions and once the restrictiveness imposed by austerity rewrote the terms of old welfare contracts." (209-210)

Levitsky 2003b

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties In Latin America: Argentine Peronism In Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: 
• The PJ's flexibility contributed to its adaptation and survival in teh neoliberal era (3)
• the weakly institutionalized labor-party link permitted the traditional mechanisms f labor participation in the party to be quickly dismantled
• the absence of stable career paths and secure tenure patterns meant it was easy to get rid of old-guard leaders
• the absence of stable norms of accountability in the party allowed Menem the freedom to design and implement a radical economic program (3-4)
• the decline of postwar ISI brought on a programmatic and a coalitional challenge to labor based parties (5)
• programmatic: slowdown of economic growth, globalized trade, and debt-crisis helpers (IMF, World Bank) made it very difficult for parties to enact policy that wasn't orthodox neoliberal (5-6)
• coalitional: economic changes hanged class, labor had fewer votes to trade (6)
• Look at party change (organizational change) in terms of a two-level, nested game, in which party leaders are located at the intersection of environmental and intraorganizational dynamics (12)
• leaders who seek to increase their power must respond to changes in the external environment, but their strategies to do so are mediated by the power game within the party and the party's strucutre
• "Yet the flexibility-stability tradeoff may not be as steep as the literature suggests.  ... Although the Pj is unquestionably a mass party, its mass organization is informal rather than bureaucratic, and the rules and procedures that govern the internal life of the party are fluid, contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored." (14)
• "A central claim of this book is that routinization limits the capacity of organizations to respond quickly to environmental challenges, and that weakly routinized organizations may be better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than highly routinized organizations." (18)
• routinization affects strategic flexibility in three ways: (19)
• leadership renovation (ease of changing old-guard)
• leadership autonomy
• structural pliability, or ease of changing a party's structure
• Chapter 2
• This chapter sets up the book's central argument,, which is that the PJ's fluid internal structure can be traced to its formative phase (36)
• but also, it's proscription after the first coup meant that it was highly decentralized, had a "movement" structure, which continues to this day (36-37)
• decentralization during proscription period meant peronist movement essentailly in anarchy, allowed for many autonomous units to self-direct, also allowed for groups to seek very divergent goals, from leftist to conservative, all under name of peronism (41-43)
• "partyization" occurred during teh 1980s, where the movement focused mainly on winning elections (minus a few revolutionary groups and the Ubaldinist labor unions), but it did not result in routinization (49-57)
• chapter 3;
• the PJ is an "informal mass party" (59-60)
• mass because: it maintains an extensive membership (60)
• it has a dense organizational strucutre, partucularly in working class neighborhoods (61)
• it has lots of informal structures that help it embed deeply into working-and lower-class neighborhoods (62)
• the party is informal (doesn't rely on bureaucracy), segemented (few insitutionalized horizontal ties between groups) and decentralized (65-76)
• chapter4: populism in crisis: environmental change and party failure, 1983-1985
• chapter5: union-party links: see levitsky 2003a
• in peripheral provinces where hte uniosn were weak, union leaders had only gotten their tercio thanks to the good will of hte party bsoses, so in the provinces it was much easier to dismantle this (114)
• the 25 organizations, which was allied with the Renovators, didn't demand any institutional linkages to the party, just assumed the renovadores would reward them. in the end, they didn't and the 1987 Congress did not establish any body/org to represent labor inside the party. party leaders ended up choosing who the few remaining labor representatives would be  (116-118)
• int eh face of union politics, some uniosn set up their own territorial based agrupaciones, but these end up being fixed investments which helps entrench teh system of union political fragmentation (131)
• chapter 6: Menemism and Neoliberalism: Programmatic adaptation in teh 1990s
•  chapter 7: the view from below, party activists and the transformation of base-level peronism
• argument: two factors that allowed teh PJ to maintain its activists base even as it programmatically changed (and experience litlte intra-party dissent for this change) (186)
• increase access to state resources
• decentralized party structures
• the combo of sate resources and local autonomy allowed some local groups to engage in traditional peronist practices even as the national aprty abandonded them
• but by relying on state resources the personal, ideological, and union-based ties that had sustained local peronist organizations began to erode
• this left he party more reliant on state resources than it ever had been before
• chapter 8: the paradox of menemism: party adaptation and regime stability in the 1990s
• chapter 9: crisis, party adaptation, and democracy: argentina in comparative perspective

Senén González and Borroni 2011

• Introduction
• this article questions the extent to qhich context creaqtes social dialogue, versus strategic action of the actors involved, or if it's a combination of these variables (34)
• Strategic Focus
• looking at the role external circumstances play and what actors do to understand how revialization is happening (35)
• the context changed greatly between teh 90s adn the 00s (36), and much of that change was caused by change in politics (37)
• in general, actors respond to these new circumstances in different ways, meaning that external circumstances do not force change, there is some strategic choice involved (37-38)
• what happens is a combination of context, institutions, historical paths, and strategic options available (38)
• some history of social dialogue
• 1994 CGT and employers made an agreement that focused mainly on employment and labor reform, but most of these points were not put into practice (41)
• 1997 there was an attempt to dialogue over flexbilization, but it totally failed
• 2001: social dialogue about how to ameliorate, end the crisis, resulted in Jefes y Jefas de Hogar and other things (42)
• after 2003 the government recuperated its role as a labor regulator, respecting labor institutions, and pushing for social dialogue
•  El Consejo Nacional del Empleo, la Productividad, y el Salario Minimo, vital, y Movil
• the minimujm wage council is the best example of new social dialogue (43)
• it aims to increase formal employment and improve inequality
• includes both the CGT and the CTA
• also, collective bargaining
• (44-47) numbers of colective agreements, same as the Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg (2011) article
• labor conflict
•  way more strikes after 2003 (47)
• in 1990s and early 00s, labor wasn't strong enough bu saw piqeuteros and other actions as an outgrwoth of labor union weakness/inability to strike
• 2006 strikes = 770, 2010 strikes = 940, growth each year (see data page 48)
• though proportionally most strikes are in public sector, number of people and days lost in private sector grew a lot, while public sector was fairly consistent 2006-2010 (49)
• Conclusion
• suggest that social dialogue is increasing, point to collective bargaining and minimum wage council (50)
• experience in Argentina shows that revitalization doesn't necessarily have to look like what people say in Global North
• actors made the difference in this case, as social dialogue mechanisms existed in teh 1990s, they were just ignored, started to be used when K's decided to use them (51)
• Argentina is still looking for a grand Social Pact, but I think this is just playing games with teh Global North/Germany literature

Palomino 2005

• Introduction:
• social movements existed before 2001, came from the social de-structuring brought on by neoliberalism, not by the crisis of 2001 (20)
• The construction of the social ties of the movements
• the context
• the 1990s saw increased precarity in teh popular classes, but also reached up to the middle classes, who became the "new poor" (20)
• early demands of teh movements were about necessities of subsistence
• the barter clubs and big flea markets in the BA acted as a way to link the middle and lower classes, as everyone shopped there (21)
• origins of the movements also came from the erosion of social integration policies, like retirement, current retirees were "sacrificied" to create new privatized systems
• many of the movements were attempts for the disconnected members of society to make social and labor demands
• but they did so as they also experimented with new ways of organizing themselves! (21-22)
• the cycles of protest and the crisis of the neoliberal model
•  first rounds of protest, in the interior mostly, against the negative outcomes of adjustment (22)
• second round of protest comes in when the promises of the adjustment aren't borne out
• often attached to previous human rights movements
• but included piquteros and workers who were recupterating closed businesses
• crisis was a big third cycle, with asambleas barriales joining other movements
• also, the breakdown of national political institutions allowed for new forms of political represenation, like direct democracy in neighbrohood assemblies (23)
• the movements created conditions for the development of new forms of social integration
• CTA very involved in this, became an umbrella group as they welcomed in groups of informal workers, unemployed, and social movements
• the implementation or new values
• one common charatersistic of the new movements in their focus on organizational form and governance, as well as organizational norms (23)
• their openness was a response to tradiational movements, that often ended up as clientelistic groups (24)
• list of autonomy goals, including from the state, from hierarchy, etc.
• but there were differences, too
• piqueteros relied on the state to privde for them, even as they protested the state
• piqueteros had minor demands (subsistence) but did major actions (blocked roads)
• asambleas barriales had major demands (reform democracy) but did minor actions (local soup kitchens, job posting in neighborhoods, etc)
• the workers in recuperated plants, despite being a small minority, showed that they could have a major affect on the discussion of work at the national level (25)
•  new identities are being created, not just revitalizing old ones
• it is possible that these movements' future depends on changing the whole of society, but it is also not necessary to think that these movements need to make obvious change, but could think of changing the minds of the people rather than gaining political power
• Autogestion and social economy
• two parts of autogestión: (26)
• a dimension of public ownership but not state-ownership
• solidarity and reciprocity, not a market relationship, as the basis of work
• an attempt to fix the situations which liberal economics cannot fix, like the high open unemployment
• authors admit is it a bit utopian, but for those facing unemployment it seems like it could work, and certianly work better than waiting on a state/economy that can't provide for them (27)
• The movement of workers in recuperated businesses
• Intro:
• started by workers with little other option for work (28)
• challenges private property rights and traditional division between capitalist and worker
• these actually started in the late 1990s, but this looks at 2002 and after
• Diversity of the movement
• most of the closings preceded by breaking contracts, lowering wages, etc (29)
• not all workers want to be part of the movement, but they all want the recuperated factory to stay open (31)
• but there is usually a nucleus that seeks out, forms connections with other factories, movements, and the neighborhood
• after December 2001 recuperadas got the help of piqueteros and asambleas barriales (32)
• at first unions had varied responses, some helped, some were passive, some sided with employers (32)
• but eventually as the movement grew, all the big unions at least started talking about adding these groups to their organizations
• employer groups have (to 2005) been pretty silent about these things (33)
• but the threat of recuperating a business that might close has been a bargaining tool for workers
• the universe of recuperated businesses
• some have been recuperated, some are headed there, and others have been fighting to recuperate (34)
• legally workers in a cooperative are redefined and need to remake ties with union, even if union is involved in recuperation of a business
• about 98 (see page 34-35 for some numbers, breakdown of biz)
• these are esepcially powerful because they make the strike weapon stronger, in that bankruptcy is not necessarily a bad thing for the workers, so the company can't threaten it (36)
• The conflicts that precede recuperation
• three phases: conflict between workers and management, takeover, and either reopening or ensuring continuation of business (37)
• first thing to usually go is payment of salaries
• call of creditors to close the business tends to radicalize workers
• before  takeover, demands in labor courts are about back wages, after demands are more genreally about the owners ability to run the firm (38)
• sometimes workers are able to generalize their demands, get help from lots of different (other0 social movements (39)
• "lucha, resistencia, solidaridad" is the motto
•  The role of unions
• individual supporters came out with these recuperated enterprises... (40)
• but only one union immediately offered institutional support (the cnfiteros, pasteleros, pizzeros, alfajoreros, y afines)
• most swung between ambiguity and abandoning these locals
• two studies cases:
• in Rosario a union struggled against the closing of a supermarket, helped create a community market in its place
• UOM was against one at IMPA, but some dissidents helped make it happen (40-41)
• but some uniosn abandoned their locals, and we see traditional uniosn relying on old tactics when faced with something news (41)
• but without unions workers find themselves with only weak and fragile access to social services, as thse services are often teh basis of their union identity (42)
• Some legal aspects
• 42-44
• How it all works
• to get supplies, workers suggest old owner defaulted, but they won't, or seeks solidarity loans from other groups (44)
• the key is whether their clients stick around or not (44-45)
• sometimes other groups, movements, or parties help supply startup funding (45)
• usually these businesses end up running below their total possible production, do just in time of day-order work, because they can't find workers, workers work slower, or can't find clients for their products
• most of the money is spent mostly trying to keep production going, meaning wages tend to be at a subsistence level, meaning its hard to find new workers (46)
• workers are paid using what the company has made, and usually only weekly, meaning workers sometimes have to carry debt from week to week
• skilled workers are not paid more (47)
• workers try lots of new forms of organization, often very democratic ones see page 48-49
• New identities
• still tend to define themselves as workers (49)
• but at the same time, there is also a belief that there is something different, that new employees need a "education" on cooperatives and that they should be connected to larger society as well (50)
• paternal practices of old boss are replaced by a "family relation" among cooperative workers
• these are examples of CREATED collective identity, both between workers and between businesses and community (51)

delfini, erbes, and roitter 2011

• study about participation of workers in a union, and what determines this participation
• one of the biggest debates is the mobhilization coapcity of unions (375)
• some suggests relation between leadership and rank and file isn't the whole story
• some say partiicpation in union elections is iportant
• some say identification with the union is important
• what determines union affiliation? (the literature, split into 4 types)
• structuralists: employment rate, legal framework, economic cycle
• individual factors: motivation and/or personal characteristics
• socio-laboral: business size/type, labor relations
• interventionist: the link between high leaders and local leaders, the amount that a union actually comes and is invovled in a workplace, helps explain unionization rate
• there is a general hypothesis is that, in the context of reduced participation within unions, there are lots of different factors that help determine the distinct forms of union particiaption (378)
• quick descripiton of labro relations system in Argentina, page 379
• four indicators that a union member is involved in the union:
• if they know their union, and identify themselves as a member
• participate in union activites
• help negotiate a contract
• know what's in a contract (383)
• three types of involvment:
• desvinculado, 43%-- don't do any of the 4
• partial participation, 38% -- very much luck the desvinculados, but get involved in negotiations and know the contract
• integrated participation, 19% -- do all of the 4
• checking other theories
• business size does not affect probablity of union participation style
• desvinculados:
• higher educated, older workers less likely to be desvinculados
• women more likely to be desvinculados
• if the workplace has a long day, or the presence of a delegado, less likely workers will be desvinculados
• integrados
• very much dependent on the presence of a delegado
• the existence of a delegado is important to see idfference between integrados and disvinculados
• but so do some demographic variables (age, gender, education level)

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Stronk 2013

Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

"Neoliberal Class Formation(s): The Informal Porletariat and "new" Workers' Organizations in Latin America" Susan Spronk 75-94

• Applies EP Thomspons "class struggle without class" ideas
• notes other authors (murillo 2001) saying that unions just tried to surivive, not fight enoliberalism
• But during the neoliberal period the locus of class struggle has moved out of the factory and into the streets/communities (82)
  partially because many people are employed informally/self-employed
• the focus of class strgugle has shifted from demands over wages to demands for basic subsistence
• piqueteros born of those who weren't represented by traditional unions
• at first hey were very radical, non-hierarchical, etc. etc.
• but then they were coopted by employment plans from Kirchner (except for more radical splinter) (83-84)
• Oscar Olivera and gas war people: start with everyday struggle, get imporved conditions, and then work towards socialism (85)
• but actual gains in both cases have been minimal
• CRITIQUE OF BOTH these organizations arises from an argument about "treating the symptoms versus treating the cause"
• (86-88) plant takeovers in Argentina and Venezuela face issues with government and with (previous) business owners
• but even outside of these issues, cooperativism doesn't undo the bad social relations, it just makes the workers their own bosses
• 
  

Bogliaccini 2013

Bogliaccini, Juan Ariel. 2013. "Trade Liberalization, Deindustrialization, and Inequality: Evidence from Middle-Income Latin American Countries". Latin American Research Review. 48 (2): 79-105.

• Introduction
• article shows that trade liberalization reform played an important role in the destruction of formal employment in industry... (79)
• ...and a concomitant deindustrialization that increased inequality
• literature review:
• two competing arguments to increase in inequality: opening to international trade, and technological improvement (82)
• this article argues that trade destroyed most job opportunities for lower social groups (83)
• in every case there was reviewed there was some development of industrial production, usually created through ISI spending
• with traded openings, these businesses could not compete and shut down
• this brings into question the theoretical claims behind the liberal model, that new export possibilities would trigger greater industrialization (85)
• Data and model
• author expects the destruction of employment to have a negative effect on inequality, and for the effect to increase as liberalization increases (88)
• author expects inequality to increase less in countries with stronger democratic institutions (89)
• Results
• two broad conclusions (90)
• trade liberalization produced significant destruction of employment in industry
• the destruction of this employment increased inequality
• as trade liberalization advanced, formal employment in industry shrank
• membership in Mercosur rsulted in loss of employment (95)
• membership in NAFTA resulted in RISE in employment
• in this model GDP per capita has a NEGATIVE relationship to employment in industry
• decrease in informal employment increases inequality in the long run, and these variables are not independent of one another over time (96)
• increase in informal sector is related to increase in inequality (97)
• increases in GDP per capita are related to increases in inequality my take: financialization?
• increase in length of time under democracy decreases inequality (98)
• Conclusions
• trade reform had a clear and detrimental effects on equality through its fostering of deindustrialization
• in particular, the Latin American version of liberalization failed to include and alternative welfare structure for coping with the deindustrialization and informalization of their economies

Etchemendy 2005

"Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001" Sabastián Etchemendy, p. 62-87

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• rather than being unambiguous losers in the neoliberal reforms, some key industrial and labor actors within the old ISI coalition can and do preserve their existing market power in the new "liberal" order (62-63)
•  argument: dominant unions and certain established industrial players were actually part of the reform coalition (63)
• two goals of chapter
• explain why Menem chose to rewared some industries and unions
• assess the consequences of this pattern of transformation of the populist/industrial coalition
• ISI past generated very strong industries that were also potential losers in turn to neoliberalism (64)
• unions had a very clear goal of preserving the corporatist institutions -- ((induced them to be willing to trade liberalization for maintaining this bastion of power))
• Results of Menem's bargains (65)
• Business
• compensations eventually led to a high exchange, which undermined business's ability to compete
• no strategy in the face of global competition was developed...once the side payments were gone, business still couldn't compete on open market
• labor
• benefits funneled only to formal sector
• bureaucratization of unions allowed room for the creation of large, autonomous, powerful groups of unemployed and other actors
• Industry: Political Winners
• the government compensated firms from four tradeable sectors: oil extraction, petrochemicals, autos, and steel (66)
• privatization usually meant directly rewarding state assets to these businesses
• and the pace of deregulation was consistently slowed
• why firms in these sectors?
• mixed sectors, meaning these firms had a higher lobbying capacity because they were partially public (69)
• these firms were the largest and most powerful in economic terms
• these firms were also relatively more concentrated (fewer firms and more economic value per firm) (70-71)
• all of these firms had monopolistic industry associations through which they could bargain (72)
• Working Class: Compensating Leaders and Insiders in the Formal Sector
• the politics of compensation focused on teh leaders (74)
• unemployed and laid off were left to their fate
• there were four payoffs:
• maintenance of corporatist union structure
• while government did get some flexibilization of contracts (75)...
• unions maintained their monopoly of representation in privatized firms 
• preserving labor's administration of healthcare
• deregulation only went so far as to promote competition within the union-run system
• granting unions privileged position in private pension market (76)
• unions were allowed to create/control their own pension funds to compete on the market
• but unions abandoned most of these by 2000 (no explanation given by author)
• granting unions share of privatization
• employee stock ownership programs (76)
• these rpograms were only offered to formal employees (77)
• and the stocks were monaaged by hte unions
• and the stock value totally soared
• generally all four of these payoffs converged on maintaining union leaders' control of unions and increasing the amount of money they controlled (79)
• they faced little danger of being uprooted by competing organizations or their own rank and file
• The Consequences
• the compenstations porlonged the fixed exchange rate (80-81)
• disregarded any strategy for actual export competition (82)
• compensation was based on teh control of domestic markets (82)
• this ended up being a short term strategy, and no one sought a longer term one
• when the compenstations, which were based on the strong exchange rate, were consumed by the end of the decade, firms still could compete on the global market! (83)
• offered nothing to the unemployed (83)
• there was no antional policy to attenuate hardships of neolibreal transformation, specifically focused on working class/poor who lost jobs and purchasing power (84)
• government chose to support unions over the unemployed
• and the unions chose to take their compensations and similarly ignored the poor, which just paved the way for the piquteros and other groups (85)
• Conclusions
• the configuration of labor and industrial interests befor ethe reform determined the pattersn fo compensations during and after the reform (86) ... my take: the rich get richer, sort of
• the compensatory policies were a double edged sword (86-87)
• on the one hand, they made the reform politically viable (87)
• on the other hand, these compensations sowed the seeds of future economic and political instability, which erupted in 2001

Levitsky and Murillo 2005a

"Introduction" Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, p. 1-17

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Federalism and the Link between Subnational and National Politics
• subnational politics are crucial to understanding national-level politics and policymaking in Argentina (9)
• provincial governors have been able to gather enormous power under democratic rule
• The Transformation of State-Society Relations in the Postcorporatist era
• labor protest has been increasingly confined to provincial public sector employees (Farinetti 2002) (12)
• blockade as a new form of protest
• the participants in provincial riots and urban looting are frequently embedded in (and mobilized by) the very clientelistic networks that they are said to replace (13)
• much of the urban poor was incorporated into clientelistic networks during the 1990s
• postcorporatist scenario reveals a trend away from national-level collective bargaining organizations and national definied class identities
• localized, territorial identities are becoming more salient
• most new social actors are resisting close ties to the state
• authors mention the middle class, CTA, and piqueteros....but some of the piqueteros have drawn closer to the state in recent years

Martin and Brady 2007

Martin, Nathan D., and David Brady. 2007. "Workers of the Less Developed World Unite? A Multilevel Analysis of Unionization in Less Developed Countries". American Sociological Review. 72 (4): 562-584

• Introduction
• Study seeks to understand why unionization varies across LDCs and across different types of workers (563)
• argument: variation in union membership is a function of more than the worker's individual characteristics, but is also constrained by country-level institutions, industrialization, and globalization
• Expectations
• Individual characteristics that will increase unionization probability
• middle-age (not young) (564)
• male
• lower class...though there are more white collar unions in LA
• Country-level characteristics
• ex-communist regime (565)
• result in high unionization AND distinctive relations between unions and nascent democratic institutions
• democracy
• higher unionization rate
• size of state
• more government = more unions
• influence of IMF
• will result in smaller government
• influence of ILO
• Industrialization should increase unionization (566)
• this assumes LDCs industrialize int eh same way that First World industrialized (567)...too simple!
• Globalization
• arguments go both ways...can create transnational linkages in labor movements, but also give capital greater leverage
• measured as amount of trade
• Data and Methods
• regional pattern is discernible: greater unionization in Eastern Europe (post-communist) than any other region (569)
• construct a class schema using earnings level, occupational category, and educational attainment when appropriate (570)
• uses GDP per capita to measure industrialization (572): WOULDN'T THIS BE INFLATED BY FINANCIALIZATION, IF PRESENT?
• but also include % of labor force in industry versus agriculture
• decompose the analysis into post-communist and not, since post-communist has such a strong effect
• Results
• workers in ex-communist countries 2.75 times more likely to be unionized (574)
• democracy is not significant
• government expenditure as % of GDP not significant
• ILO not significant
• IMF is significant in expected way (a person is 50-60% less likely to be unionized)
• most globalization variables not significant (575)
• WHICH MEANS THAT inflation and institutional variation are more important predictors of unionization across LDCs
• in ex-communist countries the unskilled proletariat is WAY more likely to be unionized (578)
• Discussion
• industrialization isn't creating new union members! weird!/DUH! (580)
• but also globalization had no effect...is that a problem with data?

Fairris and Levine 2004

Fairris and Levine 2004

Fairris, D., and E. Levine. 2004. "Declining union density in Mexico, 1984-2000". MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW. 127 (9): 10-17.
Overview:
Data on Declining Union Density in Mexico, drop of 10 percentage points from 1984-2000
Uses old data from 1980s combined with household surveys
Education workers HIGHLY unionized, well higher than any other industry (13-14)
Finds changing composition of workforce is part of the decline (areas of low unionization, gender, etc etc.), but much of the decline is changing institutional context (Unfavorable government, employers)
Quotes:
“For the "formal" sector labor force as a whole, union density declined from just over 30 percent in 1984 to just under 20 percent in 2000.” (11)

Holzner 2007

Holzner, Claudio A. 2007. "The Poverty of Democracy: Neoliberal Reforms and Political Participation of the Poor in Mexico". Latin American Politics & Society. 49 (2): 87-122.

• Introduction
• Focus on core of democratic politics: citizen participation in the political process (87) 
• this paper on the non-electoral forms of political action, such as petitioning activity and protests (88) 
• Free market reforms require governments actively to suppress political participation and citizen voice by weakening trade unions, leftist parties, and other social organizations that advocate redistributive social and economic policies (citing Przeworksi 1991) 
• Though elected officials court the popular vote with promises of redistribution, once in office they face pressures to continue market reforms (citing Stokes 2001) (89) 
• "After an initial surge in political activity and growing feelings of political engagement by the poor during the 1990s [in Mexico], voter turnout, petitioning activity, and feelings of political interest and efficacy have declined overall since 1997” (91) 
• some of this apathy comes from Left’s inability to complete credibly in elections 
• BUT the changing structure and actions of the Mexican state in the 2000s are creating obstacles and disincentives for political mobilization, especially for the poor 
• Net effect of institutional reforms has been to stifle poor peoples political activity, especially in comparison to more affluent
• Political Participation in Mexico
• By 2000, high-income individuals participated in politics more frequently than low-income individuals, reversal from the past (92)
• Frequency of political activity peaked after 1982, declined after 1997
• after narrowing during 1990s participation gap widened between poor and affluent after 1997 
• affluent are now twice as likely to petition than the poor 
• Puzzle: why is political activity decreasing (for the poor) just as democratization should be opening up more avenues? (93) 
• Explanation: changes in the relationship between the state and the poor (95)
• suggestions seems to be that institutional reforms have created obstacles and disincentives to participation that affect the poor more adversely
• three possible mechanisms of discouragement
•  poverty, severity of poverty, and income inequality has worsened, meaning poor people find it difficult to muster the material and organizational resources necessary for petitioning the state
• free-market forces have weakened lower-class mobilization organizations, like labor unions
• technocratic policymaking sends the signal that the state doesn't have the interests of the poor in mind (96) 
•  Poverty and  Declining Resources for Participation
• Graph showing national survey results: (97)
• EVERY income group thinks they are worse off in 2003 compared to 2000
• in income groups 10x minimum wage and below, proportion is between 35 and 45%
• Petitioning government officials for direct assistance has historically been the most common form of participation of Mexico's poor, reflecting clientelism (98)
• this requires an investment of time, money, and lost wages
• but now the cost of petitioning too high for many poor (99)
• by 2003 income = best determinant of petitioning and protest activity. (Positive relationship)
• Declining Resources for Mobilization: Organizations
• organizations in civil society became more diverse in the 1990s as new groups came to fill in vacuum for retreating corporatist groups (101)
• BUT this also meant that political parties became the only/best game in town for articulating interests at the regional/national level
• organizations that now represent the popular sector, replacing old corporatist ones, haven't been able to gather the material resources or aggregate demands enough to become important in regional/national politics (101-102)
• Changing State-Society Relations
• neoliberalism radically changed the relationship between the state and the poor (102)
• by changing the basic functions of the state, neoliberal policies also changed the logic of political participation (103)
• the shrinking state made the state/politics less relevant to the poor
• other reforms have made it clear that the state cannot or will not provide for popular groups
• for example, new targeted poverty relief measures use formulas, which eliminates the discretion of implementing these policies by politicians
• my take: that sounds too naive...politicians can still game the system, no?
• poor people increasingly feel like petitioning is useless because traditional channels are closed (104-105)
• feeling that that government has abandoned their traditional role as caretaker of the poor (106)
• the poor are tired of neoliberal methods for fighting poverty and inequality (106-107)
• by the time the neoliberal changes to civil service institutions had been cemented by the late 1990s, the poor had little confidence in these institutions' ability to actually help them (107)
• poor see little relevance in political action, and thus see little importance in paying attention to politics
• neoliberal policies have alienated the poor to a much greater extent than affluent citizens (108)
• when the poor do act, they are more likely to target the local and state governments than the federal government (109)
• More affluent target federal government, less often state or local governments
• BUT ALL THE MACROECONOMIC DECISIONS ARE MADE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
• the poor simply cannot bear the costs of actually protesting/petitioning the level of government that has control of the economy (110)
• Statistical Analysis
• income is the most important predictor of protesting and petitioning activity (112)...make more money, more likely to petition/protest!...this basically meditated everything!
• membership in traditional corporatist organizations has no effect on petitioning (surprising....)
• respondents who believed the parties would listen to them were more likely to petition, but even then the effect was stronger for higher incomes (114)
• BUT poor people who receive government aid were more likely to petition
• this could be because of clientelism (114) or because the receipt of assistance creates incentives to petition again (115)
• Conclusions
• the decline of corporatism in Mexico has not meant an end to clientelism (116)
• nor have autonomous organizations been capable to mobilizing the poor effectively
• elections are losing their luster for the poor
• politics for the poor increasingly revolves around how to meet basic needs, less about the political ideology or directing reform of the state (117)

Palcios-Valladares 2010

Palacios-Valladares, Indira. 2010. "From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in Contemporary Chile". Latin American Politics and Society. 52 (2): 73-102.

• Introduction
• While union membership decline was initially caused by the 1973 and repression, the neoliberal turn created increasing union fragmentation and job precariousness which, in the long run, weakened unions’ capacity to attract members (73)
• Limitations of current research
• focus on national confederations,  yet about 70% of unionized workers are organized by firm-level unions (Dirección del Trabajo nd), fewer than half of these unions below to confederations, and only a little more than a quarter of these worker are in unions that are in national confederations (Arrieta 2003) (74)
• Rely too heavily on structural causes to explain current unionization rates
• This Article:
• differences in individual union strategy re: management played a key role in shaping variation in unionization rates (75)
• specifically, more accommodating unions gained a recruiting edge
• BUT these strategies that helped increase membership also undermined union strength
• as union members fled more militant unions, more accommodating unions benefitted from this flow, but consequently did little to reach out to unorganized workers
• Overall, strategies matter, but are highly dependent on the broader institutional political, and economic context
• MY TAKE: strategies matter, but only if unions accommodate, and then they are weak anyway
• Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary Union Membership Decline
• Although the democratic transition provided opportunities for labor, the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores) had trouble shaping the broader, national economic and labor relations context (Cook 2007, Frank 2004, Haagh 2002) (75)
• as a result, Chilean unions operate in a labor relations system that tends to weaken them (cook 2007, Haagh 2002)
• deindustrialization, etc will mean that blue collar unions face different pressure than white-collar unions (77)
• in the larger, international context, it has become common for unions to simply try and rely on union raiding to increase membership (Milkman and Voss 2004)
• THIS STUDY finds that strategic decisions at specific points of firm restructuring were a major determinant of the trajectory of a union’s membership rate (78)
• BUT this study also highlights the limitations of partnership strategies in a fragmented union environment with weak bargaining power
• workers migrate from union ot union, but labor isn’t better off
• Research Design
• 13 unions across a telecom firm and bank (79)
• each firm has a relatively high unionization rate, but also a lot of different unions representing workers
• skilled-ish workers
• Union Member Trajectories: The Bank
• between 1990 and 2004 union density declined at the Bank by one-quarter (80)
• initially six unions, all in one federation
• threatened strike in 1990, but federation quickly decided to accomodate management:  unions get a say in decisions, deliver labor peace and collaborate in firm restructuring (81)
• the dominant, more militant union does not join this agreement, management takes a hard line with this union, militant union cannot gain concessions, loses member to other unions (81)
• in two other mergers (1994 and 2000-2002), federation gets the inside track on bargaining, unions from other merging firms (many more militant) get shut out of the process, end up capitulating or being broken (81-5)
• Telecommunications Firm
• 1990-2004, density declined by one-fifth (85)
• 1980s had been a rough time for labor management relations, 1990-98 the unions and management agree to accommodation, unions felt like this was “co-governance” of the firm
• but this accommodation caused tensions between unions (86)
• 1999: top management changed, took a hard line against unions, lots of layoffs (87)
• Massive strike in 2002 when management continued hard line during new CB rounds, all workers joined, it still failed (87-88)
• lots of workers defected from the strike
• some unions gave up, others held up longer before giving up (in 2003)
• two of the unions competed with all the others, raided for blue and white collar workers (respectively) (88-89)
  these two unions became the firm’s favorites, got better access to management (89)
• Results:
• if a union accommodates during restructuring, it is likely to get ahead (90)
• in the tough context of job losses, intensifying work, and weak institutional and political support for unions, getting on management’s good side is almost the only way to get concessions for one’s membership (91)
• Strategic calculations of union leaders are most conditioned by past experiences, whether workers have been willing to fight the company, strength of management, etc. (92)
• Management doesn’t choose favorite union, thy let unions react and pick the one whose reaction they like best (93)
• All this accommodation leads to weak unions that are increasingly dependent on management to provide a sense of legitimacy (93)
• Conclusion
• the real Achilles’ heel for these unions is the tough institutional framework they face, combined with the lack of political support (94)