Carnes 2014

• Theory (chapter 1)
• questions on differences between labor codes and stability of labor codes are interrelated (20)
• Argument(s)
• higher skill levels lead to, in the long term, more protective and generous laws governing individual employment relations
• greater organizational potential relates to, in the short to medium term, political action and better collective laws
• short term disruptions are fragile, likely forced by undemocratic governments or bait and switch
• overall, economic constraints (skills) are the foundation of laws, and political action (unions) can change them in the medium term (21)
• typology of labor regimes: variation in indivdual and collective law (27-29)
• Corporatist =individual high + collective high = mex and arg
• Encompassing = individual low + collective high = peru
• Professional - individual high + collective low = chi and uru
• Market = no regulation
• Labor policies that last and achieve consensus do so because their provisions are consonant with the prevailing economic order (32)
• "skill distributions are entrenched in local economic institutions, and as a result tend to be very slow to change." (33)
• relative ratio of high to low skill workers will affect labor law (35)
• lots of high skill workers = individual protections, job stability
• lots of low skill workers = high employment favored over protections
• strong labor movement improves hand of workers demanding labor legislation (36-40)
• earlier laws, political history, international institutions, and national political regimes also affect labor law promulgation (40-42)
• same typology as above, except repalce indiv protxns with "skill endowment" and collective protxns with "union/organizational strength" (42-44)
• also, even though regime may change, labor law may create feedback loop to constrain transformations in skill endowment, legislation: meaning corporatism begets groups that are good at corporatism, etc. (path dependence) (43-46)
• chapters 2 and 3 code, quant analyze labor codes...looks pretty cool.
• 
  

Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Webber and Carr 2013

Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

Introduction: the Latin American Left in Theory and Practice, Jeffrey R. Webber and Barry Carr 1-30

• Social contradictions of the neoliberal model generated a series of crises in the closing years of the 1990s and the opening moments of the current decade (3)
• Authors situate contemporary Latin American Left on continuum of "radical Left" to "izquierda permitida" (5)
• izquierda permitida signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to US impoerial strategies.  In its regime form, it seeks to divide and coopt radical left social movements and parties"
• the radical left sees liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life" (6)
• admittedly draws on Castaneda for this idea, but repurposes "bad" left as "really really awesomely radical" Left (my words)
• neostructuralism idea:  that commodities aren't what will compete on teh world market, but whole social systems (7)
• rejects market as god of all
• but admits an international market, suggests that the national institutions can be shaped (by heavy hand of government, if so desired) to make the nation as a whole produce things competitively
• somewhere between pure world market and pure national protection
• this is the izquierda permitida
• focus on redistributing wealth, not on undoing the market which causes inequality in the first place (8)

Hochstetler, Smith, Silva 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"The Road Traveled" Kathryn Hochstetler, William C. Smith, and Eduardo Silva (Conclusion to edited volume)

Concluding remarks for the book, most of which connect different chapters

• ALternations to political opportunity structure ideas (Sikkink)
• must also include "levels of threat" as a factor
• when/if a threat disappears, a transnational network can fold (see FTAA fight for examples)
• also, even when both domestic and international arenas seem "closed", activists can/will still attempt to change things (not be discouraged, as Sikkink suggests)
• also whether "opportunities" can even bee objectively defined in the moment is challenged, undermining Sikkink's framework as a way to do anything but analyze post facto
• questions also about the ability to clearly distinguish between international and national levels...fights can be simultaneously about both
• Also, activists themselves can be brokers between national/international level, which can be problematic...if the activist/broker leaves the fight, the network may crumble
• Effects of the Left Turn
• easy to assume left would be good, but not always the case
• The impact of shifts in domestic opportunity structures hinge on the interaction of three factors (191):
• evolution of specific threats and international opportunities
• the perceptions of movement leaders
• and the relationship of activists to institutionalized politics
• if the Left helps us nationally, will activists abandon transnational moves?
• 
  

Greer, Stevens, and Stephens 2007

Greer, Stevens, Stephens 2007

GREER, CHARLES R., CHARLES D. STEVENS, and GREGORY K. STEPHENS. 2007. "The State of the Unions in Mexico". Journal of Labor Research. 28 (1): 69-92.
Overview:

• Mostly relies on other literature, not much new analysis
  
• Covers declining union density, composition of employment in Mexico (70-74
  
• Description of power union lost as PRI marginalized labor, and CTM leaders still held on to PRI (75-76)
  
• Uses Bensusán’s typology to show how state-corp unions losing power means the whole movement is losing power (80-83)
  
• Relative Deprivation theory suggests workers should be more active (86)
  
• Transnational alliances (87-88)
  

Quotes:
“The once powerful alliance of government, unions, and business is becoming more tilted against union and workers’ rights and is losing power in the global marketplace.” (82)
“Thus, with the emergence of broad economic and political change, labor unions and the workers they are supposed to represent are at a decided disadvantage and are struggling to find ways to promote the kind of change in labor institutions and support of workers’ rights that is necessary to ensure adequate wages, safety, and other workplace conditions (Gillespie and Tergen 1995).” (84)
‘Relative deprivation theory may partially explain the actions of individuals and workers’ rights organizations oriented toward labor unrest and disputes (Greer and Stephens 1996). More specifically, relative deprivation may lead to increasing collective action, such as growing membership in and support for independent unions. However, obstacles are in the way of such action, such as the traditional ineffectiveness of union intervention, unfriendly legislation, government interpretation of existing laws in favor of company positions, and the prevalence of protectionist company unions…Spontaneous, unofficial, and even violent worker responses to some employer actions should not be entirely unexpected” (86)
“Despite the rhetoric for cross0border solidarity such alliances have not had much success in the past. Reasons for their failures include divergent interests of workers, at least as perceived in the short-run; absence of international expertise or program infrastructure in most unions…; reactive efforts as opposed to strategic initiatives…There are fewer reasons to expect successful alliances between the United States and Mexico given the differential wages and the past hostility of the Mexican government…” (88-89)

“We predict that more independent unions will grow stronger because they meet worker instrumentality needs and because of perceptions of relative deprivation. A country can pursue an economic development strategy based on low wages for only so long. Workers will replace the state-corporatist unions…with independent unions (Bensusán’s terms…) that better represent their interests” (89)

Bensusán 2004

Bensusán 2004 in Middlebrook 2004  SEE SECOND TAKE BELOW!!

1. Underlying assumption 1: changing contexts has different effects on unions, based on distinction between old/corporatist and new trade unionism, which are centered on differences of
1. union autonomy vis a vis government and employers
2. characteristics of union leaderships (where they get legitimacy)
3. the extent of internal democracy
4. the existence of these three results in greater availability of resources, strategies, and innovative capacities to meet the challenges of the new political and economic context
2. Underlying assumption 2: export-oriented development has increased power of capital
1. this in turn has led to a decline in unions’ ability to achieve gains for their members
3. Structure of political opportunities
1. political system’s degree of openness, which is the opportunities available for unions to influence political sphere
2. character of elite political alliances, and opportunity for unions to affect these
3. political influence on international actors
4. limits on the capacity of the state for repression
5. space available for labor issues in the national agenda
4. “The Nature of Mexican Trade Unions”
1. CROM (Morones) controlled labor apparatus in state during part of Obregón era (1924-28), set up structures that improved their position but at the cost of heavy state intervention into labor affairs
2. structure of labor interest mediation with state was monopolistic
1. labor unions expected to enforce discipline with regard to government policies
2. this, in turn, meant union democracy ran counter to state structure
1. labor movement focuses on using institutional resources for labor power (judiciary, politics)
2. other power sources not used, like solidarity, mobilization, coordination, and strong identification between leadership and rank and file -- ALL REVITALIZATION IDEAS
3. Result:  Corporatist part of the labor movement grew over time without much grassroots effort
5. Typology of Labor Organization
1. grouped by these characteristics:
1. main source of economic and political resources
2. relationship with the state and stance on neoliberal policies
3. relationship with employers
4. degree of internal democracy and incentives that exist for leaders to seek/have support of rank and file

Type of Labor Organization	Source of resources	Relationship with state	relationship with employers	degree of internal democracy
State Corporatist (CTM, CROM, CROC)	State	subordination and support	cooperation/ complicity	low (predominance of negative incentives)
Social (STRM, FESEBES, UNT) probably SME, too	Societal/state	autonomy and conditional support	cooperation	medium (combo of negative and positive incentives
Movement (CIPM**, CNTE, FAT*)	societal	autonomy and critical positions	resistance and conditional cooperation	high (predominance of positive incentives)

*FAT, however, in 1990s moved more towards Social category, joined UNT

**CIPM no longer exists because UNT moved to slightly more radical public policy demands, pushing CIPM out

6. Impact of Neoliberal Restructuring
1. Structure of Economic opportunities
1. informal sector grew, wages stagnated or declined, social benefits were cut, employment fell in most heavily unionized industries
2. PRI not forthcoming with “palliatives”, even as they begin to lose in the polls
3. power of foreign investors takes precedence over all, workers interests have no defense
4. 1972-82: great for unions, thanks to petrodollars
5. 1983-88:
1. sharp reduction in public spending
2. devaluation decimates wages
3. employment not matching population growth
6. 1989-1994: modest recovery
1. inflation held back thanks to pacts with organized labor
2. modest growth in manufacturing wages
3. BUT privatizations and foreign competition limit CB
1. companies want increased flexibility
2. unions not prepared to deal with this transformation
4. wage differences between  unionized and non-unionized workers all-but disappear
5. public spending picks back up a bit, but this focuses on urban poor, does not benefits unions (state corp)
7. Peso devaluation in 1994!
8. MEXICO’s comparative advantage becomes low wages
1. official minimum wages drop precipitously, especially during 1994 peso crisis
2. contract negotiated wages also fall well-below inflation, so unions not able to win back anything lost in economic crises
9. state-corporatist unions dialogue with business, become the preferred unions because they do not oppose business’s desire to modernize, flexibilize, create individual employment relations
10. “Labor legislation proved useless to protect workers’ rights, but it kept the corporatist shackles intact and gave the government a means to repress expressions of non-conformism.  All of this increased the power of capital and weakened trade unions’ bargaining ability.” (252)
1. Prevented creation of counterweight to neoliberal turn:
1. The discretionary character and government control of legal protection based on JCAs
2. government control of wages
3. absence of autonomy for wage-earners’ demands
2. Political Opportunities: Two major changes
1. Increasing transparency and fairness of elections, and rise of opposition parties, placed new competitive pressures on PRI candidates
1. PRI leaders actually have to be elected now, can’t just play favorites, and to be elected you need to be pro-business
2. though many PAN governments don’t mess with CTM
2. Decreasing power of Presidency
1. limits ability of president to give favors
2. presidential initiatives no longer railroaded through Congress
3. Repressive Capacities of the State
1. In the past, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) supports employers and official leaders, to the detriment of independent unions
1. some official leaders targeted:
1. La Quina (Petroleros)
2. Gonzalez Cavazos (maquila union in Tamaulipas)
2. YET, currently the there is much greater opportunity for independent labor unions to mobilize with less threat of repression
1. obviously, though, not 100% correct all the time
4. CTM and others have lost all credibility
5. UNT has become a more legitimate actor, enjoys public support
3. The Space for the Labor Agenda
1. Limited, transition was an alternation
2. conservative CT and business dominating discussion of labor law reform
4. New Allies: NGOS
1. cooperation with USA, blah blah, not much
5. Neoliberal restructuring has eroded all old sources of state-corporatist resources
1. need new unions to be
1. based on voluntary membership
2. autonomous from employers and state
3. and internally democratic
2. but ECONOMIC STATISM and AUTHORITARIAN LABOR LAW still around
1. these controls now used to keep wages low in Mexico
2. corporatist controls useful, helpful in keeping unions docile
3. democracy is new and independent social organization is incipient
1. hard to find allies, and don’t want to become too reliant on allies
2. also, old corp unions don’t want to lose connection to government, fear they won’t be able to keep power any other way
6. Impact on Unions Strategies
1. CTM
1. backed the government at every term, not dissimilar than in many other places
2. but different from other places, CTM had no long-term plan for getting back resources
3. trusted top-down arrangements that would increase its membership
1. but failed to adequately deal with US manufacturers who wanted NO unions
2. PRD and PAN labor legislation proposal threatened exclusion clauses
3. did not increase active commitment to workers
4. OVERALL, CTM unable to protect anything for workers, simply subordinated to government wishes over and over again, bore all the costs of transition
1. still had some seats in Congress which have resulted in some material benefits
2. but these seats prove less and less helpful, as they were gained only by agreeing to be complicit in restructuring
2. New Trade Unionism
1. in the short term, STRM and FAT have been able to bargain and negotiate innovative arrangements in privatization and flexibilization, all without selling out member interests
2. in the long term, there are two choices for UNT
1. broader social movement
2. narrower syndicalist, politically conservative
3. overall, though, UNT looking to be autonomous from government, make CB autonomous from government
3. Social movement tactics
1. STRM used outside alliances to bargain for TELMEX stuff
2. FAT and STRM revived May Day parades when CTM stopped doing them
3. creation of UNT
4. STRM and FAT have started civil society organizations (271)
7. Power resources and Capabilities of Mexican Unions
1. Official
1. Loss of union membership through neoliberal period
2. CTM’s lack of legitimacy means it cannot mobilize
2. New Unionism
1. all sorts of great ideas (see page 279)
2. but all sorts of troubles:  member unions pretty weak (few members)
3. can they turn all their positives into real power?
8. In an increasingly competitive arena, CTM will lose out in truly competitive places, because new unions better protect workers interests
9. BUT not sure given labor institutions how competitive environment will actually be

TAKE TWO

1.       Uses McAdam’s political opportunity structure framework, but in an odd way

2.       Typology of Labor Organizations

a.       State-corporatist

                                                              i.      dependent on state

                                                            ii.      power arises from

1.       control of rank and file

2.       participation in government agencies

3.       political office holding

                                                           iii.      no internal democracy

                                                          iv.      unions grant many concessions in order to remain the only arbiter between workers and management

b.      social trade unionism

                                                              i.      power from state and from social actors (either rank and file or alliances with other unions)

1.       began distancing themselves from state corporatism in the 1980s

2.       diversified power resources

                                                            ii.      average levels of internal democracy

1.       elected officials, but

2.       national leadership has relatively centralized control over union actions

c.       movement unionism

                                                              i.      openly challenge state

                                                            ii.      very democratic

                                                           iii.      FAT was, but became more social trade union-ish in 1990s; UNT initially seems like this

3.       Discussion on 1980s and 1990s changes to political economy

a.       Employers prefer to work with official unions than individual workers, as the former offered protection contracts

b.      Anti-union trend among employers mirrors US feelings

c.       …Mexican labor legislation (which did not undergo any significant modification whatsoever) protected the interests of capital by guaranteeing its strategy of competing through low wages and high productivity…Thus labor legislation proved useless to protect workers’ rights, but it kept the corporatist shackles intact…” (252)

4.       Limits on Presidentialism

a.       Prez candidates have to actually compete after 1988

                                                              i.      But opposition parties are not including labor leaders on their election lists, or are keeping them low on the list

                                                            ii.      Overall, labor unions have only lost seats in congress since 1979

b.      Neoliberal transformation decreased president’s discretionary power

5.       Decreasing ability of state to be repressive

a.       3b means president/government are simply less able to repress anyone, though it’s still possible

b.      Dissident unions are creating more/better/bigger alliances with political parties, social movements, and international groups

6.       International NGOs can now actually do things

7.       Problem for unions

a.       Neoliberalism diminished old sites of power for unions

b.      Authoritarian nature of old corporatism remains

c.       New union movements still weak

d.      Overall, workers forced to bear the brunt of the transition, and still have no ability to fight these things

8.       CTM’s strategy was wait and see

a.       Capitulate now (except on labor law)

b.      Try and win back concessions later

c.       No push for internal democracy

d.      Stuck to government’s line about productivity, trade liberalization, etc.

e.      CTM now gets fewer seats in Congress, and has less access to Prez

9.       UNT/New trade unionism peeking out its head

a.       Increased voice, gains at local/plant level CB

                                                              i.      Innovative agreements “without selling out members’ interests”

b.      UNT proposes new labor law in 2002, but unable to drum up much support from PRD

c.       FAT/UE as way to use international alliances to gird local power, organize, educate

d.      UNT has radicalized its demands, but still sits alongside official unions in negotiations – what’s the long term strategy?!

10.   Official movement wants to keep corporatist arrangements, otherwise fear independent unions will get their members.

11.   FUTURE UNCLEAR

12.   Not well written

13.   Good discussions of FAT and STRM examples