Katz 1971

Katz, Michael B. 1971. Class, bureaucracy, and schools: The illusion of educational change in America. New York: Praeger University Series.

• schools in the 20th century US have been designed with teh purpose of ulculcating values adn aceptance of the dominant classes...chicldren are taken, processed adn put into generally the same social class as their parents (xviii)
• the system serves the interests of the powerful, so there has been no real need/desire to actually reofrm them (xxiii-xxiv)
• arguemtn of the book is that the educational system was basicallly designed in the 19th century and hasn't been changed in any fundamental way since then

Donaire 2012

Donaire, Ricardo. 2012. Los docentes en el siglo XXI: ¿empobrecidos o proletarizados? Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

• Introduction
• while education coverage has increased greatly since 1960, we are also seeing more people with precarious work relations (23)
• between 2002 and 2007 22% of protests have included "intellectual" workers, including teachers (23) citing another report
• 2009 Ministry of labor report: 454 000 teachers in the the 5 national teachers unions, 2/3 of which are in CTERA (24)
• teachers have done about 1/4 of all strikes between 1994 and 2008
• check out the "Programa de Investigacion sobre el Movimiento de la Sociedad Argentina
• but traditionally teachers aren't thought of as the working class, yet they are going on stikes and stuff
• the governemnt then and now has tried to delegitmize teachers strikes as an attack on the poor (by the teachers), thereby separating teachers from the identity of "poor" (25)
• ARGUMENT: showing teachers have descended to become a proletariat, but not just because they have a union or don't make as much money as they used to. Rather, this is a larger story abuot how this middle class was turned into a proletariat, and how many other of the middle/intellectual classes are also being turned into proles (25-6)
• chapter 2: theories of proletarianization
• proletarianization as deskilling, Braverman (30-34)
• ideological proletarianization, where proles lose the ability to choose how to do their work, has a lot more to do with proeltarianization of the middle class (Derber)
• teachers are becoming de-skilled due to the number of pre-made lessons and the rules set out by the state that teacher smust follow (37-38)
• but specialization could mean actually GREATER skill for teachers, rather than a deskilling (39)
• then something about ideological proletarianization that i didn't understand...i think it's something about misunderstanding WHY they do work (think they are helping, but actually just recreating classes and their own domination, despite being a middle class)
• chapter 3: lit on what class teachers on in
• generally they are seen as part of the middle classes, in Marxian thought
• some studies note that at teachers are making less money, that poorer people are becoming teachers, but still see teachers as middle class, just not doing as well as they used to (47-49)
• in major part this is happening thanks to precarious contracts, and worsening labor conditions (45-46)
• though some scholars still see teachers as a privileged middle class, relative to workers (47-8)
• but importantly there are lots of teachers who are identified as part of the "new poor" (51), those who lost out (in terms of salary and working conditions) a lot during the 1990s
•  
• in the official classifications, docentes de primaria y secundaria are technical workers, whereas university profs are the only professionals (73)
• teachers make up about 30% of formal wage workers that have professional or technical expertise in the country (74)
• in 2001 CABA teachers were about 55% public, 45% private, rest of the country was more like 76/24 (75-77)
• to decide whether or not teachers are becoming part of the proletariat, subseuquent chapters will look at : living conditions, working conditions, work process, and perceptions of class among teachers (79), going to look at primary and secondary, private and public, did data gathering in 2007 (80)

• Chapter 6: condiciones de vida
• overall this chatper suggests that teachers are getting poorer, even when they come from middle class backgrounds (which most do), but can’t quite prove they are becoming proles (103)
•  chapter 7 working conditions
• a report from 2008 said that 65% (460) of the school buildings in CABA were deteriating, 50 of which were totally ununsable (105)
• 52% were older than 50 yrs (106)
• the poorest neighborhoods tend to have the wrost schools (106
• there is a syndrome or burnout that has affected teachers and been noted by pyschiatrists (107-8)
• tables on precarity 128, 125
• 141-143: teachers are in more precarious work relationships becaues they are being proletarianized
• public school teachers earn less than other public sector workers of similar qualifications, and private school teachers earn even less than that (147-148)
• labor process, chapter 8
• teachers haven’t lost the skills of teaching, their jobs haven’t been deskilled, but they have experiecned a sort of “ideological proletarianization”, where they have lost control o the politics behind what they teach, essentially they seem to be passing on the norms without being able to fight them (152-3
• issues facing teachers in teh classroom, including what to teach, what to do when students don’t care, etc (153-167
• perceptions of teachers of theri class location, chapter 9
• most teachers 59.6% think they are part of middle class, but only 46% think teachrs in general are in middle class...for working class it is 12 and 14% resectively (181)
• 2004 study found 63% thought they were in middle class, but 28% thought working class (182)
• many teachers think strikes are fine to use (186) and about 33% said they would g out with a spontaneous strike, while 11% they wouldn’t and the rest had no opinion (185)
• 58% of teachers suggested that teachers were like “salaried workers”, and thus close to the working class if not exactly a part of it (195)
• sees tehe strike as an important symbol of teachers as working class as opposed to anything else
• history of teachers unions 197-204, with data on memebr #s on 200
• teachers at least seem to be moving closer to identifying with the working class, even if they see themselves as professionals/workers (206), it seems like teachers aren’t actually ebing robbed of their ideologies, but rather their ideologies are moving closer to those that favor the working class (207)
• conclusions
• 60% of teachers can be removed at will (210-211)
• it doesn't seem like teachers have lost control of their work process in a real, fundamental way, but they do have a lot fo expectations about student achievement and subjects taught that is at les enchroaching on these things (214-2158), meaning teachers aren't whollyautonomous
• teachers are being proleatrianized, though they aren't there fullly yet (234-238)

Donaire 2006

Donaire, Ricardo. 2006. "Trabajo docente:¿ servicio o fuerza de trabajo? Algunas reflexiones a partir de un ejercicio empírico." Educere 10.35: 561-660.

• this is a lot like a simplified version of the 2012 book
• is there evidence of teachers being in a "reduced" (less well paid) middle class, or descending to becoming part of the proletariat? (652)
• in 2001 there were more than 640,000 teachers (652)
• theory on what determines proletarianization, see 2012 (652-653)
• there seems to be a reserve labor force that could be teachers, that is to say, they have the minimum qualificacions or more, but its a hetergenous group, so its unclear if they are truly a reserve army of laborers for capitalists to use to replace teachers (654)
• lots of data from 2001

Nardacchione 2012

• In Neuquen in 1997 protets against Menemismo came through alliances between piquteros and teachers (2)
• on the one hand they were unhappy with unepmloyment, etc
• on the other hand they were trying to defend public education
• this allowed the union to push against provincialization in a national way, create a political movement, and demand national support for public edcuation as a universal justice demand
• provincialization caused
• wages to go down (3)
• working conditions to get worse
• CTERA found itself unable to coordinate its demands to the national level, stuck in a fragmented opposition
• some governments started paying teachers under the table, meaning they did not contribute to obras sociales (4)
• CTERA had trouble of articulating provincial demands at the national level
• for example: SUTEBA would strike, but SADOP and FEB didn't help
• Provincial crises
• at first the provincialization of education caused a drop in militancy and strikes, but eventually problems at the province level made the edcuation adn fiscal crisis worse (5)
• fiscal crisis occurred in many provinces because the national government was an important source of money for the provinces (5)
• not only were education budgets low, but they were set up irrationally (6)
• this strong problem a the provincial level led to deepening and expanding labor protest at the provincial level
• soon the teachers in some provinces were striking more against general issues facing society as a whole, not just for specific issues in regard to their own salaries or working conditions (7)
• this general protest, combined with the fact that it was happenign in many different provinces and the fact that there was some violence result in the re-nationalization of the conflict in 1997 (7)
• when other unions didn't join SUTEBA protests, they found allies outside the union sector, and eventually with UCR and FREPASO (8)
• The nationalization and politicization of the conflict
• the first is a recentralization of the deabte, the second is a move away from technical questions to social/citizenship ones (8)
• the CTERA wanted to do a national strike in 1996, but was having trouble convincing its uniosn to follow, and to get the government to talk to them...the government eventually agreed to talk about these things... (10)
• but hte union in Nequen decided to go on strike anyway, it was a broad colaition against lowering salaries across public sector workers, and the closing of YPF...
• violence to clear roadblock, bystander killed by police (10)...
• in response to this violence, CTERA called  anational strike (80% adhesion) and quit negotiating with teh government (11)
• BIG strike with lots of help, carpa blanca, and after this the idea of nationalizing education demands became a reality (11)
• this also helped the politicization of the cause, as non-union groups joined the fight after this (11-12)
• national ministry wanted to focus the talks on techinical aspects of teaching, while CTERA changed the topic to political and social-economic role of teaching (12)
• CTERA starts doing a lot of social actions, whole eudcation question became way bigger than just a union issue (13)
• 
  

Gindin 2011

Gindin, Julián. 2011. "La Tradición Sindical y la Explicación de las Prácticas Sindicales: Conclusiones de una Comparición Internacional Sobre los Docentes delSecotr Publico." Revista Latinoamericano do Trbalho, año 16 no. 26, 119-143.

• Introduction
• comparing Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico throughout the length of the 20th century
• this article proses the idea of "teacher unionism of the base", which is defined by a gravitation of the unions to the union base (in teachers unions), labor demands as the axis of activity, and open collective conflict with the government (120)
• this article presents how the union tradition can explain how a union works
• seven elements go into structural elements of the union (121)
• political relation with the state
• expansion and development of education system
• local work realities
• ideas of decent employment
• recruitment of teachers
• gender
• social image of the public school and teacher
• history of the union is also a key part of how/what a union does, as it often informs values and norms of the union
• its a little bit working class culture, a little bit union history
• two parts to the idea of "sindicalismo docente de base (122)
• union base includes leaders whose power is not taken by upper level leaders
• willingness to have open and strong conflict with, opposition to the government
• uses critical junctures to compare time periods that aren't actually the same across countries (123)
• notices three junctures:
• one, the existence of some sort of group that says it will represent workers (124)
• two, that group must become the representative of a large base of teachers
• three, consolidation of sindicalismo docente de la base, where the union is able to free or reorganize itself as independent from the state
• Critical junctures in teacher union history
• first, unions in Mex, Arg, Brz form as part of popular mobilization for democracy against the oligarchy (125)
• for Argentina this was the first radical government, Revolution in Mexico, and jsut before Estada Novo in Brazil (125-126)
• groups become solid as opposed to small, marginal
• these weren't necessarily unions, just teachers groups
• second, these groups became real unions, attached to a base
• either through state of mobilization of the teachers themselves (127-8)
• in Mexico it seemed like teachers were mobilizing themselves, but int he end the state was able to impose  union (128)
• in Argentina Peron started to organize through state, but coup meant that teachers ended up mobilizing themselves
• Brazil teachers mobilized themselves weakly and failed to consolidate in the face of government repression (128, 130)
• third, unions serve the base, can count on leaders in the base, are autonomous from government
• Mex: 1974-83, with CNTE emerging and the SNTE, for the first time, using its power within the SEP to not implement government changes (131-132)
• for Argentina and Brazil this happened in the 1980s with the return of democracy, both places unions willing to mobilize against the government (132)
• THE KEY IS A NETWORK OF LEADERS AMONG THE BASE
• Brazil uniosn join PT, but it becomes unclear if uniosn serve party or vice versa (133)
• SNTE plays politics, but its clear that union does so as a pragmatic way to gain power, since it doesn't succumb to too many political demands (133)
• national strikes are rare in Argentina, but happen at the state level depending on union history and political situation (133-4)
• conclusions
• union tradition is a mediating factor between teachers demands and union actions (134)
• union tradition is a legacy of critical junctures, and as such is also... (135)
• a mechanism of that explains path dependence (135)

Carnes 2014

• Theory (chapter 1)
• questions on differences between labor codes and stability of labor codes are interrelated (20)
• Argument(s)
• higher skill levels lead to, in the long term, more protective and generous laws governing individual employment relations
• greater organizational potential relates to, in the short to medium term, political action and better collective laws
• short term disruptions are fragile, likely forced by undemocratic governments or bait and switch
• overall, economic constraints (skills) are the foundation of laws, and political action (unions) can change them in the medium term (21)
• typology of labor regimes: variation in indivdual and collective law (27-29)
• Corporatist =individual high + collective high = mex and arg
• Encompassing = individual low + collective high = peru
• Professional - individual high + collective low = chi and uru
• Market = no regulation
• Labor policies that last and achieve consensus do so because their provisions are consonant with the prevailing economic order (32)
• "skill distributions are entrenched in local economic institutions, and as a result tend to be very slow to change." (33)
• relative ratio of high to low skill workers will affect labor law (35)
• lots of high skill workers = individual protections, job stability
• lots of low skill workers = high employment favored over protections
• strong labor movement improves hand of workers demanding labor legislation (36-40)
• earlier laws, political history, international institutions, and national political regimes also affect labor law promulgation (40-42)
• same typology as above, except repalce indiv protxns with "skill endowment" and collective protxns with "union/organizational strength" (42-44)
• also, even though regime may change, labor law may create feedback loop to constrain transformations in skill endowment, legislation: meaning corporatism begets groups that are good at corporatism, etc. (path dependence) (43-46)
• chapters 2 and 3 code, quant analyze labor codes...looks pretty cool.
• 
  

Torre 1998

Juan Carlos Torre 1998 "The Amibivalent Giant: The Peronist Labor Movement, 1945-1995" 125-137

in

Brennan, James P., Peronism and Argentina. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998.

• from 1955 to 1973 the peronist working class was in a curious position. "on the one hand, the unions needed to represent the workers in collective bargaining negotiations and service their needs--through social welfare programs, retirement plans, and vacation colonies--in a country in which the state had abandoned any pretensions to such concerns. On the other hand, organized labor was effectively the political representative of the Peronist movement in these years, with Perón as its recognized leader. So the working class played a rather conventional role in the country's economy, as well as socially, but an adversarial, destabilizing role within the political system." (130)
• after the Resistance subsided uniosn became pragmatic, but co-optation by the state and acceptance as an independent actor were prevented by the political dimension of peronism (131)
• "If the Radical government was a godsend for perpetuating these patterns of behavior, the election of a Peronist government in 1989 and its recent reelection in 1995 may well constitue a fatal misfortune. As in 1973-1976 the Peronist trade union leadership has been forced to accept policies, in teh name of solidarity with a Peronist government, that threaten their very existence." (134)
• "The decline in the unions' importance in the country's economic structure has had its counterpart in new developments in the political realm. Since the restoration of democracy, the Peronist trade union leaders have experienced repeated reversals in their pretensions of influencing developments within the Peronist movement as a whole." (135)
• 
  

McGuire 1997

McGuire, James W. 1997. Peronism without Perón: unions, parties, and democracy in Argentina. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

• Chapter 1: Peronism, Party Institutionalization, and Democracy
• "Peronism is a strong collective identity, but weakly institutionalized as a political party. ... Those who have spoken for the Peronist movement, beginning with Juan Perón himself during his 1946-55 presidency, have repeatedly insisted that Peronism is a national movement committed to real democracy, not a political party preoccupied with formal democracy." (1)
• the plebiscitarian leader and the trade unions have always been the core
• "The leaders and members of a national movement, by contrast, think it desirable, and potentially feasible, to establish full ad permanent control of the polity." (4)
• and power can be won in many different ways, electorally or otherwise
• union leaders are not very devoted to the party, meaning they don't have as much at stake for the survival of democracy (5)
• suggestion that the level of party institutionalization is heavily dependent on its origins, and Peróns didn't want or need a strongly institutionalized party (14-15)
• Augusto Vandor tried to create a peronist pary not centered on Perón, but Perón allied with those marginalized by Vandor, and Perón's candidate beat vandor's in the 1966 governor election in Mendoza (18-19)
• this first cycle of routinization ailed, and the specter of Perón's growing power led to military coup (19)
• the second cycle of (attempted) institutionalization came after Luder lost the 1983 election, led by the Renovation wing, Menem had ambiguous but existent ties with the old wing, so the 2nd attempt also failed (19-22)
• this study contends Perón's and Menems unwillingness to institutionalize the party was a big cause PJ never institutionalized (22)
• union leaders were key to both party building movements and the groups that thwarted these movements (26)
• "struggles among Peronist unionists, along with the power-preservation and power-enhancement interests of Peronism's plebiscitarian leaders, have contributed to Peronism's weak party institutionalization.
• Chapter 7, the rise and fall of renovation peronism
• Alfonsin's presidency helped the isntitutionalization of the PJ, for three reasons
• the military had lost legitimacy, so there was a feeling democracy would be around a while (187)
• public opinion seemed to favor adn support political parties (instead of, say corporatism) (187-188)
• Radical Party gained some legitimacy as well, didn't look liek the party that always lost to PJ or always allowed military to take over (188)
• PJs loss in presidential election of 1983 meant the party had to build party from the legislature, not be headed by a super strong prez (188-189)
• leader of the metalworkers had been major power, leader in the party for this election, loss discredited him
• renewal faction of PJ wanted internal elections, less backroom maneuvering (190)
• in the midterm elections the UCR won 43 to 35%, with the renewal faction of the PJ winning by 2-1 margin
• the July 1984 union reform law helped to democratize unions a bit, even if peronists still maintained a lot of control in elections (192)
• with the PJ 62 unions were old school, wanted to control the party, while the "25" ceded leadership of the party to politicians, but also used more leftist talk, opposing hegemony of the US and transnational capital (192-193)
• 13 general strikes against Alfonsin 
• between 1984 and 88 there wre 2721 local strikes (199)
• general strikes may have been an effort on the part of union leaderhsip to contain, channel protests from the base (200)
• neither the 15 (conciliated with Alfonsin) nor the Ubaldinistas (current in CGT) saw the PJ as a useful vehicle for making a mark on politics and society, they wanted to get direct influence on the national executive
• the 15 tried to control the labor ministry
• Ubaldini tried to mobilize unionists with pure economic/societal power to influence the exec (205-6)
• "The "62" liked the tercio because the financial and organizationl weakness of of nonunion Peronism assured them control of nominations in the women's and men's branches of the movement as well as in the union sector." (209)
• Menem did not have the support of hte party but did have the support of the unions (210)
• when Menem won presidential primary in 1988, renovadores lost power in the PJ (211)
• Menem's style reflected Peron's a bit, willing to disregard the rules
• "Above all, Menem defended the notion that Peronism was, first and foremost, a national movement, not a party preoccupied with democracy..." (212)
• for the 15 Menem's victory gave them a chance to get power that their weakness in the CGT and the PJ had long denied them (215)
• left Ubaldini forced to pursue general strike strategy against a peronist, not a great idea
• Chapter 8 free=market reform and political shenanigins
• some peronist leaders opposed Menem's reforms, but most went along with them thansk to the many inducements involved (216), these, of course, meant declines in union membership and deterioration of finances, as well as a new limit on the right to strike
• by 1995 when the growth had slowed, many unions now wanted to oppose menem, but the reforms had already progressed far enough tht there was litlte chance of stopping them (217)
• Menem's rule by decree deinstitutionalized the PJ and, despite runnign fiar elections, did many things that udnermined democratic consolidation
• Menem's economic reforms, content and impact
• Menem's economic reforms were implemented in bad ways, especially privatization which broke most of the UN's "Seven Sins of Privatization", especially the use of discretionary/nontransparent procedures (220)
• currency overvaluation meant wages went down while productivity rose (221)
• main cost was a huge surge in unemployment (223)
• mainly caused by massive layoffs, wage cuts in public sector, capital repalcing waged laborers, and increased import competition (223)
• unions:
• employment dropped in public and private sector, so membership dropped (223-4)
• curtailed right to strike (224)
• collective bargaining was decentralized a bit (by decree, law never quite made it out of congress) (224-5)
• also a decree to reform obras sociales, though labro leaders fought off real reform (226)
• union responses
• union leaders had differing responses to these reforms, from strong opposition to cooperation with tepids of both
• actual responses simply came about because union leaders were very autonomous and just ended up responding differently to conflicting imperatives (protect union versus be loyal to PJ) (226)
• turf battles also played a role (227)
• CGT splits when menemists (allied, oddly enough, with anti-menemists) try to get Ubaldini out of Sec gen position in 1989 (228)
• surprisingly, some of the more combative "25" union leaders became menemists (230)
• when Menem went after the obras sociales, CGT reunited (though with lots of internal conflicts remaining) to fight this (231)
• and the same time the leaders of the state workers ATE and teachers CTERA broke to form the CTA
• CGT called for a General strike in in 1992, but it was weakly attended, and afterwards they adopted a conciliatory tone, whcih didn't win them much (231-232), CTA was combative of all Menem's reforms (232)
• when Menem went after obras sociales in 1993/4 CGT called for a general strike, but called it off after neogtiations were started
• MTA, within CGT, was more combative and untied with CTA for some general strikes and protests against obras changes in 1994 (233)
• CGT acquiesced to Menem because reforms were pretty good, in some instances, for the economy (234-5)
• also menem was head of PJ, adn workers supported the PJ (235)
• hyperinflation had been rough, so fixing it made workers OK with other things (236-237)
• also, privatizations were new opportunities for unions to make money (237)
• suggests decline in normal strike activity was because telephone workers lost a showdown strike (a la PATCO), and economic growth then made future strikes less likely (240-241)
• The Deinstitutionalization of the PJ


• Menem bypassed the party in filling government posts and picking candidates for office, increased isolation of party leadership from government and party members (241)
• internal elections continued, but above meant that party was more deinstitutionalized that insti'ized
• during Alfonsin, everyone had to try and gain power through teh legislaturem, but with Menem everyone could skip legislature adn go straight to the top (241-242)
• Menem imposed lots of extraparty candidates (243)
• "menem thus desintitutionalized the PJ in part by ignoring and then capturing and subordinating a party leadership whose ties to party members, union chiefs, and provincial presidents were in any case tenuous at best." (248)
•  Menem and democratic institutions
• "Some conditions became more propitious for the development of a principles commitment to democracy during Menem's first term in office. Menem presided over six years of electoral activity, proposed or backed legal and constitutional reforms that increased the resilience, fairness, and relevance of certain democratic arenas and procedures, and reduced the level of overt military contestation.
• Against these credits, however, one must weigh Menem's manipulation of electoral rules, bypassing of congress with executive decrees, stacking of the supreme court, tolerance for administrative corruption, lackadaisical respo0nse to physical attacks on journalists critical of the government, and pardons of military officers convicted of human rights violations." (252)
• On the one hand, Menem's policies may grow the national pie, making it easier to settle claims for distribution (260)
• on teh other hand, the party is now less able to actually channel distributive claims, meaning the outcome could still be conflict of distributional issues (261)
• Chapter 9: conclusion
•  weak party institutionalization encouraged union leaders to express their demands through strikes and protests, not the party or elections (262)
• also meant unions weren't devoted to democratic institutions, meaning they didn't necessarily always oppose military dictatorship
• the party became dispensable in union leaders' eyes
• the argument of this book is that, like the rural elites who controlled votes of peasants, the working class leaders could mobilize enough votes to dominate politics, and thus was uninterested in creating strong political democracy (263)
• union power and democratic consolidation are not necessarily at odds, but strong unions can increase distributive conflict and wield a stronger ability to sway political system, meaning democratic consolidation can come down to the level that union leaders want democratic consolidation (266)
• at times union power can have ambiguous results for the poor, who may bear the costs of the creation of a privilege working class
• 1980s union density data (268)
• the strong labor movement from 1955-1983, coupled with weak parties, meant that the labor unions contributed to a strong distributional conflict without any institutional ways to channel it, which created instability (270-271)
• why is it a problem that democracy is not institutionalized? it makes crises and nondemocratic responses to these crises more likely (281)
• 
  

Roberts 2002

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. "Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era". Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID). 36 (4): 3-33.

• Introduction
• Social inequality along class "fault lines" is unusually pronounced and appears to be growing (3)
• despite inequality growth and economic insecurity, parties are not cleaving the political arena along class lines, but are building cross-class platforms (4)
• this is especially true in Latin America, which is contiuning historical subordination of the popular classes
• though in the past class cleavages were important, after neoliberal turn party systems now are more elite dominated than before, and the elites dominate the popular classes through diffuse, multi-class forms of representation (5)
• Distinction between "segmented" and "stratified" cleavages
• segmented cleavages are constructed across class lines (ELITE parties)
• stratified cleavages are grounded in class consituencies or organizations (LABOR MOBILIZING parties)
• neoliberal critical juncture was hard on stratified parties, made them seek/create more segmented party structures (5-6)
• Argumetn is that neoliberal juncture realigned party systems across Latin America toward segmented structures (6)
• Economic Crisis, Strucutral Adjustment, and Deepening Social Inequalities
• Given teh growth of inequliaty, one could expect rejuvenation of class-based politics (7)
• but it's not happening
• early protests against neoliberalism were not sustaine
• the economic transition drove new wedges between different sectors of the lower classes, diffusing class cleavages
• Party Systems and Cleavage Structures in Latin America: Historical Patterns
• uses term from European scholars, class cleavages, where a cleavage must: differentiate a group, organize them for political representation, and generate a sense of collective identity (8) (citing Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and Bartolini and Mair 1990)
• this rarely happens so neatly in Latin America
• most economic identities are rather shallow
• labor-backed parties have always had to attract other support as well
• better definiton of segmented versus stratified cleavages (9)
• segmented cleavages may be grounded in social/cultural distinction, or the may be entirely political
• at 1900 modernization began creating a more diversified social structure (10)
• the mobilization of workers created intense class conflict
• nevertheless, class cleavages were never quite as durable in Latin America as the were in Europe
• nor, indeed, were parties organized only within one class...most were at least partially multi-class
• this meant that labor either supported historical parties, or became a major supporter of populist/cross-class parties (11)
• though populism did not generate strict class cleavages, it did create stratified fault lines that differentiated elite adn mass parties (12)
• but the impportance of labor unions as backers for populist and left parties at least meant that some stratficiation occurred in class cleavages for left and labor mobilizing parties
• for elite/traditional parties, the relationship with labor was usually patronage-based, and did not encapsulate voters within a party, could be more personalistic (113)
• labor movemetns were, thus, weaker in elite-party systems
• Countries with l abor-mobilizing parties tended to adopt more and deeper ISI measures, thus the neoliberal turn buffeted both socioeconomic and political connections between parties and popular sectors (14)
• Party Systems in the Transition from ISI to Neoliberalism
• Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico were regional leaders in ISI, joined by Bolivia, Peru, Venzuela
• in all these coutnries, the state became the focal point of social deamnds (15)
• thus the fundamental change in development model (from ISI to neoliberalism), and its commensurate withdrawing of the state from development, posed the greater political and economic shock to parties with labor mobilizing party systems (16)
• (up to that point) the most stable electoral party systems are those that have eschewed the organization of class cleavages and are grounded in intra-elite schisms (Roberts pulls this back and makes a different claim in a 2012 article!) (18)
• Market reforms pose a threat to the resources available for clientelism, but they pose little threat to the segmented organizational logic (19)
• in contrast, beoliberalism produced sharp discontinuities in labor-mobilizing systems with stratified organizations
• the stratified logic have been undermined by the more individualistic nature of neoliberalism
• The Erosion of Class Cleavages in the Neoliberal Era
• Argentina, Chile, and Peru demonstrated (in the past) that all three dimensions of class cleavage can develop in Latin America (20-21)
• But the new economic model has thrown much of that into doubt (21-26)
• the new economic model creates dispersion and segmentation among workers, with only a few having stable jobs, which fragments the labor movement (22)
• unionization has also dropped, meaning unions have a smaller political voice
• many labor-based parties have relaxed their ties to labor (Levitsky 1998, 2001, 2003, Murillo 1997, 2001)(23-24)
• class has also been less important in determining voting patterns (24-25)
• The Transformation of Political Representation in Comparative Perspective
• Brazil seems the last labor-mobilizing party left, but class still hasn't been important recently as it has in the past for voting (26)
• there has been an erosion of stratified axes of electoral competition, and a reinforcement of segmented patterns
• labor unions remain political actors, but their ties to parties and state institutions have loosened, their access to policy-making has narrowed, and their voice has diminished (26-27)
• suggests their is a "re-oligarchization" of politics

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89. 

•  Introduction
• argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):
• pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
• this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments
• other explanations are incomplete
• authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
• corporatism is too party/politics focused
• the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
• moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions
• labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which  in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law
• Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics
• Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
• the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)
• that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups
• pluralist system allows autonomy
• corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
•  state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)
• A Note on Case Selection
• Uruguay (64)
• pluralist labor relations system
• class-based unionism
• strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
• Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention
• this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.
• Chile
• historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
• argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)
• decentralizing influence of labor law
• state has a lot of power over unions
• parties have control of unions
• THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship
•  Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion
• Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)
• meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
• Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)
• Uruguay
• unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
• gave them and independent streak
• they also formed a number of labor-based parties
• before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)
• this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created
• Meant that:
• in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
• while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties
• Authoritarian Labor Regimes
• Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
• Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)
•  Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
• military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations
• Transitional Context
• Chilean transition was controlled (72)
• left parties and unions still outlawed
• in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
• the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)
• decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)
• In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)
• initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
• contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)
• Return of Elected Rule
• Chile
• "concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
• inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
• state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
• union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
• business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so
• Uruguay
• reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
• return to 1968 labor relations system
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
•  entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)
• manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
• most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)
• with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)
• Conclusion
• one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)
• BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)
• strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
• "institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
• testable hypothesis:  regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched
• my take:  makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle
• under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Middlebrook 1995

Middlebrook (1995)

1. Chapter 1: Mass Politics and Regime formation
   1. On the concept of Post-revolutionary Authoritarian rule
      1. Features:
         1. Prominence of mas actors
            1. May be mobilized less and less over time
            2. Still important base of control for government
         2. Political ideals from revolutionary era
            1. Something referencing social change
            2. Rule is legitimated by invoking these symbols/ideologies
            3. Cannot be empty promises, must deliver the goods as well
         3. Dual importance of state and hegemonic party
            1. Party mobilizes social base
            2. Party can serve to cement social alliances
            3. Party can serve as method through which social allies can gain access to state apparatus
   2. Framework for studying mass politics in authoritarian regimes
      1. Limitations on mass mobilization
         1. Can happen through public apathy, legal restrictions, channeling mobilization through the party.
      2. Limits on sociopolitical pluralism
      3. Limits on Demand articulation
         1. Restrictions creates situation in which groups must negotiate, compromise, or modify their goals
   3. (28) “ The party [PRI (and its predecessors)] has been the principal channel through which leaders of lower class organizations achieve upward political mobility”
      1. BUT: the party never developed autonomous means of limiting its constituents’ political actions, it relied on state power for those controls.
      2. THUS: organized labor enjoyed relative autonomy in the party framework (though certainly not in the state regime)
   4. Central Argument: to understand the bases of elite control over and general character of mass politics, must understand both state and societal controls over the labor movement
      1. State = labor law, etc.
      2. Societal = labor unions’ reliance on state subsidies
         1. Economic structure that influenced patterns of unionization and CB power
         2. Organizational form of the labor movement
         3. Political ideas that influence policy preferences and political response strategies
2. Chapter 2: State Structures and political Control
   1. (42) “On the one hand, expanded state administrative capacity gradually increased governing elites’ ability to control developments in the labor sector. On the other hand, legal recognition of basic labor rights and inclusion of worker representatives in come administrative structures strengthened organized labor by providing important symbolic and material benefits to both unions and individual workers.”
   2. (51-2) 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo institutionalized activist role of government in protection f workers at a time when the unions weren’t strong enough to protect themselves (the CROM had fallen out of power soon before 1930)
      1. Leads to creation of Secretary of Labor (STPS, Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social), as well as the CTM
   3. JCA’s preserves the distinction between federal and local jurisdictions (60)
   4. Labor seat on JCA’s help unions expand their organizations (61-62)
   5. Reconocimiento, official recognition/registration of unions, improves power of unions compared to employers, but also gives state power over unions (65)
   6. State has some ability to meddle in union internal affairs (elections, etc.) but not much. Also, requirements do not safeguard union democracy.
   7. Strikes must be registered, only occur after arbitration proceedings have concluded (69)
3. Chapter 3 – The challenge of mass participation and the origins of Mexico’s state subsidized labor movement
   1. Before the revolution, labor movements were dispersed, and in small enterprises, who had little bargaining power
   2. Morones, while founding the CROM
      1. marginalized the anarchosyndicalists, and
      2. decided they need to ally with the government to have any power
   3. CROM never made inroads in industries with strong unions, like railroad workers and electrical workers
   4. Relations between the CROM and Obregon quickly soured, were eventually charged with assassination of Obregon!
   5. CTM founded by CROM dissidents and under Cardenas’ hope to unite labor movement to support him, CROM remains relatively pro-Calles
   6. Even while he supported the CTM, Cardenas worked against the CTM
      1. He helped found the FSTSE to keep government workers out of the hands of the CTM
      2. He kept peasants out of the CTM
   7. Cardenas’s PRM first to officially tie labor to an official political party (1938), SECTORS
   8. SME leaves CTM in 1939 after CTM supports presidential candidate Camacho
   9. Subsidies to labor movement
      1. Legal
         1. Exclusion clauses
         2. Separation clauses
      2. Financial
         1. CTM had trouble collecting dues, but stayed solvent
         2. Middlebrook hints at direct monetary subsidies
      3. Political
         1. Preferential access to electoral lists of PRM/PRI and administrative positions
            1. Leverage for union
            2. Personal benefit
         2. No reelection meant constant demand for new and loyal candidates
         3. CTM dominated these positions
         4. Chair in the Chamber of Deputies was most available, some Senate seats, practically no governorships (too important to PRI power structure to give away as spoils)
   10. (106) “The consolidation of the post-revolutionary social pact occurred, then, not with CTM membership in the governing party but with the political triumph of progovernment labor leaders in the aftermath of a major labor crisis in the late 1940s” (emphasis added by me!)
4. Chapter 4: Turning Point the 1947-51 Labor Crisis
   1. Case study on railroad workers
   2. RR, like other protected sectors, autonomous, strong, politically minded
   3. During labor crisis (post-WWII) government supports more pragmatic leadership, alternative/radical paths slowly squelched
   4. Once these unions are turned toward pragmatic (non-radical) ends
      1. CTM dominant, BUT:
      2. Begins period of truly institutionalized social pact
         1. Previously pact had rested on shoulders of President and specific union confederations
   5. Labor movement united under CT in 1966, but only a façade under which fragmentation persists
   6. Social pact:
      1. Unions (leaders) can’t survive without political support
      2. Unions become effective tools of worker control for political leaders
   7. Also, CROC formed in 1952 by Aleman government, “to unite disparate labor groups in an organization that was simultaneously…
      1. …Loyal to the government (it was affiliated with the PRI), and…
      2. …Hostile to the CTM.” (page 250)
      3. United some conservative groups (like the CPN, Confederación Proletaria Nacional) and the CUT (formerly lefty under RR workers leaders)
5. Chapter 5: State Structures, Political Control, and Labor Participation: an Assessment
   1. STRIKES: “…postrevolutionary governments generally maintained strong control over stieks in federal-jurisdiction economic activities, regardless of changes in the political character of different presidential administrations.” (171)
   2. LABOR UNION REGISTRATION: Political influence/action can influence rates of labor union registration, but generally no variables explained differences in time to register, meaning there was NO effect due to
      1. presidential administration
      2. difference in confederation
   3. WORKER DEMAND RESOLUTION:
      1. Includes an in-depth case of RR workers union
      2. Some presidential effect, but also surprising anti-worker effect for Cardenas
6. Chapter 6: Labor Politics and ISI
   1. ISI good and bad
      1. Development, work, but
      2. Balance of payment problems
      3. Inflation problems
      4. Result: people have jobs, but their wages are falling!
   2. CTM often spoke radically, acted pragmatically when ISI stumbled and inflation rose
   3. Section on democracy in Mexican automobile sector
      1. Neither presidential policy nor strength of state labor federations adequately explains democratization (229)
      2. Car mfg. undergoing changes, less paternal relations, just-in-time0ish style prxn, and modern assembly line
      3. Workers viewed democratization seen as a way to gain better bargaining power, as their leaders were initially unable to cope with their new demands
      4. Workplace differences (especially with delegado system) important to explaining variation across auto plants (236)
      5. Democratic unions generally better at gaining control of production, bad at increasing wages, struck more often
7. Chapter 7: Labor Politics under Economic Stress in the 1980s
   1. Failure of ISI
      1. Economic difficulties, interest rates, defaults
      2. Less government spending
      3. Inflation!!!
   2. Organized Labor’s Response
      1. Unions never thought they were adequately compensated for sacrifices during 1976-7 crisis
      2. De la Madrid agrees to price controls in 1983, then immediately breaks his deal
      3. NO strike petitions approved
      4. CROC and CROM used to harass CTM
      5. 1984 CTM threatens general strike, but steps back and agrees to negotiate on de la Madrid’s terms, CT makes demands but never gains anything real
      6. WORKERS LOSE
      7. “The CTM’s historical reluctance to pursue more aggressive collective action in support of workers’ interests is one of the most noteworthy aspects of state-labor relations in Mexico.” (265)
   3. What explains unions’ actions?
      1. Usual suspects
         1. Crisis weakened bargaining power
            1. CTM had heterogeneous members
            2. None/few in strategic industries
         2. Government control over strikes and union recognition
         3. CTM had more deputies in Congress, maybe thought they’d recoup losses later?
      2. New ideas
         1. Internal weakness of CTM, others
         2. Leaders’ (Velazquez’s) political beleifs
            1. (Weakish)
            2. Leaders’ fear that a true mobilization would be a breeding ground for union democracy, undermine their old control over unions
   4. Industrial restructuring in automobile industry
      1. Automakers open new plants, get CTM unions, undermine democratic unions
      2. CTM unions give management much more leeway on production methods, democratic unions able to fight back a bit
      3. Volkswagen at Puebla
         1. Leaders capitulate a bit in secret agreement
         2. Midlevel and rank and file revolt
         3. Union turmoil allows VW (thanks to JFCA decision) to fire everyone, rehire who they want, keep pliable union
      4. Flexible contracts more important than low wages to managers! (286)
   5. Privatization of state-owned firms crushed official unions ability to use political influence to win economic demands
   6. State-subsidized labor organizations lost their ability to win concessions, but maintained their significance as instruments of political control of workers.
8. CONCLUSION
   1. Union/party alliance
      1. Benefitted labor because resulted in subsidies
      2. Benefitted party because party had no other means of controlling mass base
   2. CTM resisted democratic opening: why?! Central question of the chapter
   3. Over time unions had experienced a cumulative weakening after presidents defined and redefined the alliance
   4. Unions weakest point ever in 1980s/90s, and business gains better foothold with government
   5. BUT labor still important for getting out the vote
      1. This control, however, became less reliable (see 1988 prez election)
   6. “Because post-revoutionary authoritarian regimes generally develop distinctive ideologies that give workers a special place in postrevolutionary society…labor has a stronger interest in preserving elements of the status quo…” (317)
      1. Long-term democratization may be a good thing, BUT
      2. Short term democratization may pose significant costs to labor unions
   7. As jobs move north in Mexico, they further weaken unions by
      1. Dispersing labor
      2. Gets far away from political center of country
      3. Move closer to anti-union areas of the country.
   8. Labor leaders also suck at times, protection contracts
   9. Political parties are an important place where labor can get power, but
      1. Have the taint of old style PRI relationships
      2. PRD, rest of left have focused on electoral competitions, not alliances with unions (325-6)
   10. Finally, labor law needs to change, bad!

Ranis 1995

Ranis, Peter, and Peter Ranis. 1995. Class, democracy, and labor in contemporary Argentina. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

REACTIONS

• Author went down looking for Marxian style class issues, came back convinced that Marx was basically wrong

1. Introduction
1. Menem has engineered a profound change in Argentina, a shift simila is scope to Peron’s (x)
2. Argentine working class has been predisposed to Menem initiatives (because PJ keeps winning elections) (x)
3. Menem is first president to choose his OWN economic direction and ideological/philosophical positions, not just follow party (xi)
4. Menem appeals to workers as both autonomous and entrepreneurs, not as “unions” (xi)
5. Menem has multi-class alliance, even larger than Perón’s (xii)
6. really improved inflation situation, and economic situation (xii-xiv)
7. negative outcomes: unemployment growth, increased inequality, and increased poverty among the poorest (xiv)
8. Argentine workers don’t associate democracy with the state performing basic economic functions (xvi)
9. changes in obras sociales, labor contracts, and poverty relief  programs (xvii-xix)
10. Opposition weak, because (xx-xxi)
1. PJ has moved to the right to occupy similar space as the Radicals (xxii as well)
2. unions find themselves hoping for a social democratic party that doesn’t exist, choosing between being critical ally or weak opposition
1. union leaders old, inflexible
2. also not allowing young leaders to move up, making them less innovative
11. MTA and CTA opposing privatizations (xxi)
12. workers are not synonymous with neoliberal project, but are “far closer to this orientation than has generally been acknowledged”
13. Menem’s success with anti-inflation policy has outweighed negative economic consequences (xxiv)
14. discussion of class as a subject, not just simple Marxism anymore (xxvii-xxix)
2. Chapter 1: Putting workers in perspective
1. workers are not class, unions, voting blocs, but masses of varied opinions and desires (1-3)
2. “Argentine workers have struggled relatively successfully for their interests over the years by combining demands for social justice with a demand for share political influence” (5)
3. Argentines support democracy because it allows them autonomy (6)
4. Argentine working class able to topple 5 military regimes in two generations: 1962, 65, 69, 75, 82) (7-8)
5. industrial proletariat shrinking, more and more professional workers in the tertiary sector (8)
6. gubernatorial, legislative, and presidential victories in 1987-1989 of PJ represents a new, more authentically pluralistic Peronist party (10-11)
3. Chapter 2: Labor and Peronism: The Historical Connection
1. Lots of immigrants to Argentina, mostly artisans, came to make a better life, not to incite proletarian revolution, THUS most early strikes were simply wage-related (17)
2. despite revolutionary rhetoric through the 1940s, unions sought to be institutions of bargaining, not revolutionary organizations (18)
3. Perón stepped in to aid workers in a meatpacking strike in 1943 (while he was at the Ministry of War, of all things), even as union leaders were calling for end to strike -- creating strong alliance between Perón and workers (18-19)
1. following the pro-worker settlement of this strike, Perón becomes Secretary of Labor (19)
4. Perón’s corporatist scheme was one of class collaboration under the auspices and direction of the state (20)
5. Peronism is nationalist (22), not socialist or marxist, later grew to have three pillars (23):
1. economic independence
2. political sovereignty
3. social justice
6. Peronism: a reject both of the left and the right (24)
7. After Perón’s reelection in 1951, legislative PJ became less powerful, party/power became centered on Perón
8. Paradoxically:  Perón democratized Argentina, in that he allowed/brought the working classes into politics, but then restricted opposition and became authoritarian leader
9. with Perón, capitalist sector still dominant, but now working class involved in social and cultural policy (26)
10. organized labor flourished under Perón
1. 43% unionization rate in 1954
11. unions lost some militancy and autonomy, but traded it in for “political access, social acceptability, and major wage improvements” (27)
12. Perón was overthrown because he had alienated the Church parts of the military, and some fans of liberal political democracy
13. “Because of Perón and since Perón, almost any Argentine worker has a sense of what foreign domination means” citing Hernández Arregui
14. post-Perónism, all significant political parties tried to appeal to unions (28)
15. workers/unions were against increase of foreign capital under military governments (29)
16. In Frondizi years, CGT established itself as a prime corporative actor in society, regardless of regime (29)
17. 1960s had industrial expansion, but increasing employment as well (30)
1. industry becomes dominated by foreign capital
18. 1969 Cordobazo: major revolutionary uprising, one example of true revolutionary spirit since WWI (30)
1. workers and students united (31)
2. rising expectations given booming economy increased societal expectations, but these expectations unfulfilled (31)
3. social rebellion was a challenge to the military government AND to the “reformist” union leadership
19. Student militancy led to guerilla fighting, military regime put on the defensive (32)
20. Perón ally Hector Campora wins presidential election in 1973, Perón returns weeks later
1. his coalition is originally broader than 1940s, includes students, intellectuals, and small business people (32)
2. but Perónism returns to its reofrmist, moderate, welfare capitalist roots pretty quickly (33)
3. labor rank and file seeking democratization of the unions (33)
4. leftist factions of coalition forced out (34)
21. Labor militancy now more political with Perón back (34)
22. Perón dies, Isabel Perón determined to break social pact between labor and business (34)
1. general strike against Isabel and her economic policies
23. El Proceso
1. all out war against subversion (36)\
2. society became largely militarized (36)
3. 1973-1983: high inflation, capital flight, plummeting production, mounting debt
4. devastating reversal of working class fortune (37)
5. early 1976 CGT intervened
6. right to strike abrogated
7. But in mid-1976 CGT starts to resist (38)
8. page 38; quick and dirty about 62, 25, CNT, etc.
4. Chapter 3: The Contexts and Conditions of Labor Under Alfonsín
1. Institutional context
1. Argentina does not have a labor surplus economy (43)
2. urbanization is largely complete
3. many workers are self-employed, and seek self-employment
4. agricultural exporter (44)
5. large internal market, the engine of economic growth
6. many policies since WWII have been pro-labor, minus military dictatorships
7. LPA (45):
1. rights never restricted
1. freedom of association
2. right to have unions as representatives
3. one union per industry
4. employers must pay salaries of union delegates and shopfloor stewards
5. union delegates cannot be fired while they are serving their term
2. rights, but have been restricted at times
1. striking
2. union control of social funds
3. dues checkoff
4. employer contributions to retirement, etc.
8. Discussion of LPA and changes over the years (45-47)
9. Alfonsín law normalized union elections after military dictatorship had controlled them (47)
10. LPA 1953 law has only rarely been totally implemented, thanks to military (48)
11. Alfonsín returned many of CGT’s formal powers, including right to administer its own social programs
2. Sociological and Economic context
1. workers tend to identify with neighborhoods more than class (49)
2. racial and ethnic distinctions are muted (50)
3. Argentina looks like a Western European country (51)
4. In early 1990s 50% of Argentines were service sector workers (52)
5. military period saw a loss of 425,000 jobs (53)
6. 1983 was first defeat of Perónism in free elections (54)
7. Austral Plan initially looks good, but prices slowly rise for workers while CB and wage increases still restricited.  resulted in worker criticism (55)
3. The Union Structure
1. CGT was able to resist the full-blown democratization sponsored by the Radical Party (55)
2. Over 50% of workers in Argentina are unionized (56)
3. unions are seen as the best way to defend themselves against attacks on living standards (57)
4. also unions have become customary means of participating in social and cultural benefits
5. CGT’s political strength has increased unionization
6. CGT’s strength has also allowed it to be relatively undemocratic
1. internal pressures for more rank and file participation have been weak
7. reunification of CGT (58-60)
4. The Alfonsín initiatives
1. unions historically not very democratic (61)
2. in 1980s an increase in union democracy
3. measures to force union democracy defeated by Perónist controlled Senate in 1984 (61)
4. Austral Plan was really hard on workers (63)
5. CGT Responses
1. hard to respond to Radicals, since they were democratically elected and had legitimacy (62)
2. 13 general strikes between 1983 and 1987 (63)
3. CGT took positions but had few concrete proposals
1. 1985 “26 points”, called for debt moratorium (64)
6. CGT leadership split and continue to conflict over confrontational versus conciliatory tactics (65)
7. CGT emerged from Proceso very weak
8. workers’ choice is between “bourgeois democracy” and “bourgeois authoritarianism”
5. Chapter 4: A portrait of 7 contracts
1. 7 different contracts in this chapter, all for unions of interviewees
2. “Argentine workers’ self-confidence about their role in society allows them to speak freely.  Their belief that the CGT is a major social player translates into a sense of self-worth.” (69)
3. textiles and autos having trouble in 1980s (70-75)
4. autoworkers have lots of perks, responsibility (74-75)
5. also members of UOM not doing well
6. SEGBA (electricity and power for BA) allows children of workers preferential hiring (81)
7. Teachers’ union is decentralized (86)
8. workers all shared, to some degree, inhertiance of solid social benefits and protections which dated back to Perón era (88)
6. Chapter 5: The Rank and File Worker
1. self-employed sector acts as a stabilizing mechanism, a safety valve for ARgentine economy (95)
2. 70% of sample said they had trouble making ends meet (98)
3. desire of most laborers is that their children have better jobs than they had, move up in the world (100-101)
4. work is necessary, outside-work life is the focus of their world (101)
5. many noted dislike of bureaucratic treatment of workers )104-105), liked being treated like part of the family by their superiors (105)
6. “laborers in the private sector were tangibly more content than their public employee and labor counterparts” (106)
7. 69.1% of workers did not see themselves as being exploited (107)
1. some felt exploited by international economy or the state of the country re: debt obligations, inflation (109)
8. Union is coopted, paralyzed, weak (110)
9. 56.8% noted some reservations about their union leaders (111)
10. yet say 69.8% had participated in a strike (112)
11. some workers thought worker involvement in unions should be strengthened, but many also saw no need for this (113-114)
12. most workers wanted better communication with management, impact on management decisions (114)
7. Chapter 6: Workers as Citizens
1. half blue collar workers supported peronism (116)
2. workers are not usually active party members
3. employees (middle management) more active in both unions and in political parties than workers (117)
4. in 1983 Alfonsín won with a majority of working class support (118)
5. but the Intransigent Party (PI) also won a lot of votes for its overtly anti-military stance
6. Women were more likely to identify with further left and further right parties (119), most people view themselves as centrists (117-119)
7. Workers generally distanced themselves from left parties, like the Communists (121)
1. Communist party not trusted because it was anti-Perón and divided working class
8. Juan and Eva Perón and Alfonsín most often noted as three public figures admired by people (123)
9. most workers did not see the worth in a party focused solely on working class interests (125)
10. Argentines not in favor of communism (126)
11. debt crisis was the fault of:
1. 38%  poor political and economic leadership
2. 30.8% singled out the proceso dictatorship (127)
3. 9% blamed meddling of IMF and international banks\
12. 71% thought privatizing industries was a good thing, but (129)
1. many wanted state to keep “critical” industries (which industries were critical depending on who answered question)
2. those in state-owned industries not always in favor of privatization.  “Privatize them, they need it”
3. belief that private enterprise was more efficient than public (130)
13. Workers generally said unions had a positive role in society (132)
1. but many noted they are poorly run
14. workers responded harshly to Argentine businessmen, saying they had negative feelings toward them (133)
15. foreign companies actually received positive response from 62>7% of workers (133)
1. they create jobs (134), paid better and on time (135)
16. argentina’s landowners viewed with suspicion (135)
17. military also not liked
1. stems rom dirty war (137)
2. though some are equivocal about need/use of military’s tactisc during dirty war (137-140)
3. many reasons why some semi-supported repression
1. subversion = TERRIBLE, akin to rape or another despicable thing
2. maybe disappeared deserved it
3. many disappeared just left the country,
4. etc etc
5. ME: disinformation? some don’t know the extent?
18. Malvinas war was a mistake (140-141)
1. but this is, of course, after the fact (MY comment)
8. Chapter 7: Class Ideology Among Argentine Workers
1. “a Peronist outlook among Argentine workers was translated into a series of ideolgoical convictions that did not conform to the tupical left-right political spectrum” (143)
2. laborers split between identifying themselves as middle and lower class (workingn class term not offered as an option, 144)
3. class distinctions usually associated with material comfort (145-147)
4. virtually all workers felt it was impossible to move into the upper class (149)
5. rigid class structure separated workingn class and upper class (150)
6. “the idea of class struggle was almost totally absent from all reponses.” (150-151)
7. class differences were not a collective matter but a barrier to social mobility, again relating to material distinctions, not social identity distinctions (152)
8. Everyone wants democracy over any other type of government (152)
9. people are equal in a human rights sense, but after that there are differences in everyone and equality is not a goal to be achieved (155-157)
1. workers see themselves, at times, better than others in society (156)
2. people are OK with rewarding those with more education, higher skill (158)
10. laborers took a benign view to foreign industrialists
11. perception is that landowners have lots of power! (161)
1. those who have too much power, top 4:
1. large landowners            44.5%
2. military                    32.7
3. Catholic church                20
4. Large industrialists (NON-foreign)    15.5
12. workers have strongly rooted respect for fair-play and civil liberties (162)
13. “Class consciousness among the Argentine working class as largely expressed in survey responses as demands for improving the lot of laborers and employers under more benign forms of welfare capitalism” (164)
9. Chapter 8: Argentine Workers and the Question of Class Consciousness
1. Long theoretical discussion of class consciousness
2. “the Argentine working class can translate consumption into autonomy, recreation, and the pursuit of what it is to be human.” (175)
3. The argentine case calls into question Marx’s denial of supraclass sentiments like nationalism and ethnic pride among the working class (176)
1. around the world we have seen that “working-class struggles are often expressed politically as nationalism” (177)
4. working class has usually joined revolutionary left not to abolish wage system, but when they think post-revolution they will be able to regain material income denied them by capitalists and capitalism (177)
5. Historically “Argentine working-class agitation has been anti-elitist and antiestablishment rather than anticapitalist” (178)
1. because the target was elitism and not capitalism, worker discontent was channeled through the party and the union ito Peronism, not the left (178)
2. Argentine workers have managed to make real gains by joining the electoral process (179)
6. Ubaldini, leader of CGT, cultivated political consciousness, not simple trade unionism or revolutionary consciousness...goal combined day-to-day interests with fundamental interests of the working class (180)
1. “Workers in Argentina have seemed to understand their role in society as crucial without believing that they are capable of fomenting alternative versions of society” (180-181)
2. the multiclass lessons of early Peronism are still part and parcel of contemporary working-class values” (181)
7. Argentine workers do not see themselves in homogeneous of monolithic terms but conciliatory to other sectors...they expect to share power, not to monopolize it (181)
8. feelings of alienation in workers comes from routinization, repetition, boredom, lack of autonomy (185)
10. Chapter 9: Workers and Democratic Political Culture
1. class differences are not readily definable by factors other than schooling and income (190)
1. cultural mechanism have produced broad social coherence
2. Rosa Luxemburg underestimated how appealing democracy would be to workers (192)
3. note how Lula lost election in 1989 because he highlighted his difficult, poor background....that wasn’t what workers wanted to see/to strive for (193)
4. Striving to own one’s own business seems to be more indicative of a drive for democratic autonomy than for capital accumulation (194)
5. workers are commodified, but fair compensation at least allows them some control over their own lives (195)
1. private lives become the havens of workers, they work to have a comfortable life outside work (196)
2. “the reification of personal and home life has become a major means for softening the rigors of modern work life” (197)
3. alienated work, paradoxically, often leads workers to derive a lot fo satisfaction from consumption, leisure, and cultural pursuits
6. most workers interpret democracy as a guarantee of practical autonomy, attribute the stability and freedom under Alfonsín to democracy, not to Alfonsín (198)
7. Perónism thus faces a challenge, since it historically wasn’t the most democratic of systems
1. Perónism was an authentic movement against a liberal democracy that, in fact, excluded large numbers of people (199)
2. Perónist populism has historically combined two essential concepts of Argentine political culture: social justice and freedom (199)
3. elsewhere in the world, socialist regimes represented LESS democracy, not more (203)
11. Chapter 10: Post-Alfonsín Peronism
1. Menems’ policies brought out (OR CREATED?) existing inconsistencies in Peronism, especially with the militant wing of the CGT (209)
2. Surveyed workers were not in favor of populism (210)
3. Menem has focused exclusively on boosting productivity and national income, not on distributing it (210)
1. as Menem has put it, if Peronism doesn’t change it will disappear like communism
4. Law of Economic Emergency Menem got the right to privatize public-sector enterprises outright in 1989 (211)
1. in October 1990 Menem instituted another emergency measure that limited the right to strike in the public service sector (211)
2. then National Law of employment liberalized labor contract
5. privatization of ENTEL (telephones) and Argentina Airlines was supported by majority in opinion polls (213)
6. abrupt shift toward neoliberalism was accepted much more peacefully by laborers than most expected (214)
1. Menem government continued to receive support from CGT
1. though split in CGT, where Ubaldini faction was more militant but lost control of confederation (214-215)
2. not a single general strike against menem rom 1989-1991 (215)
3. most CGT leaders with Menem
7. there is no real electoral threat from the Left now (218)
8. Belief that workers will still resist rapid modernization if it threatens historical gains in rights at the workplace, job security, and health and vacation benefits (220)
12. Chapter 11: Conclusion
1. “modern democratic systems have offered worker-citizens the chance to bring about redistributive justice through representative channels...” (224)
2. when conditions for workers have worsened, the CGT has moved into the opposition regardless of governmental party (227)