McEwan 2002

McEwan, Patrick J. 2002. Public subsidies for private schooling: A comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 4(2), 189-216.

• Uses 1997 data to compare effectiveness of public schools, non religious private schools, and Catholic Schools (189-190)
• Argentina Institutional framework
• government has provided subsidies for the payment of private school teachers since the 1940s, but these were codified in 1958 (190)
• the law says that private schools that charge tuition can get up to an 80% subsidy for teacher pay, free private schools can get 100% (190-191)
• wage subsidies can also based on SES of students (191)
• but this gives a lot of leeway of local authorities, which can result in pure clientelism
• in 1998 21% of primary school students went to private schools (nationally)
• of these 63% are in Catholic school
• in 1998 in private schools:
• 45% of students went to schools with teachers 100% subsidized
• another 28% went to schools with partial subsidies
• leaves 27% with no subsidies
• chile (191-193)
• the hard part in this analysis is the fact that SES and shool type tend to correlate (195)
• in general, without controlling for SES, there are big differences between pub and priv schools (199)
• private schools are more likely ot be in rich neighborhoods (204)
• private school students are less likely to repeat a grade (207)
• results are fairly consistent that Catholic subsidized schools have better outcomes in both arg and chile (208)
• but many of the other results seem to suggest that the differences in schools are based on SES (208)
• hypotheses for explanations: (209-211)
• 
  

Narodowski and Nores 2002

Narodowski, Mariano, and Milagros Nores. 2002. "Socio-economic segregation with (without) competitive education policies. A comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile." Comparative Education 38(4): 429-451.

• Argentina is a quasi monopoly while Chile is a quasi market (430)
• trying to figure out why social segmentation happens pretty equally in both chile adn Argentina, despite different education systems (ie former has vouchers) (431)
• chile (423-438)
• some found evidence that private schools were better, but others found that controlling for SES makes this difference go away (436-8)
• might be thaqt the market mechanism has actually brough tparity? (438)
• Argentina
• "After the 1950s, the educational system faced a strong legitimacy loss related to the fact that the system was not able to fulfill its promise of social mobility.\" (441)
• in 1964 subsidies for teacher pay were finally set down in objective parameters (before they were a bit willy nilly), but even still these subsidies can get paid out in clientelistic fashion (441)
• decentralization reforms of 1978 sent primary schools to be under provinces, 1992 was the rest of them and secondary schools.
• "The last thrity years have generated a hyper-regulated impoverished state system coexstient with a highly autonomous and expanded private sector." (442)
• private schools are a state subsidized exit option for students (442)
• decentralization did not change teh form of school regulation, just its locus
• enrollment is highly segmented by income...rich go to private, poor go to public (443)
• Conclusions....nothing big
• the paper suggests that vouchers themselves don't necessarily increase social segmentation in schools, since both countries have it but only Chile has vouchers (447)
• also questions/denies the assumption that SES variables can be taken as independent from school choice variables in quant studies

Betancur 2008

Bentancur, Nicolás. 2008. "La nueva agenda de las políticas educativas en el Cono Sur (Argentina, Chile y Uruguay 2005-2008)." Revista Debates 2.2: 272-298.

• Introduction
• reforms of the 1990s tended to
• involve centralization of curriculum creation, but decentralization of administration (273)
• schemes of "positive discrimination" in favor of the poor
• introduction of business ideas into education
• expansion of the role of families and businesses in education
• Argentina: decentalization of secondary teachings and teacher training (273-4)
• Chile: introduction/perfection of market regulation of education (275)
• Uruguay: maintained the national state as central head of education
• recently all these countries have begun to talk/change these reforms again, thanks to left of center governmetns (274)
• Argentina
• 2006 law came out of Néstor having a big open discussion with large numbers of people in society (275)
•  2006 law rescinded parts of 1993 law, resulted in
• returning federal state as the guarantor of access to and right of education (276)
• made secondary school obligatory, and created systemwhere provinces can choose to do 6 years each of primary and secodnary, ot 7 and 5 (respectively)
• created a Consejo Federal de Educacion, with consultative councils that include teachers (276-7)
• this reform didn't roll back decentalization totally (277)
• nor did it end the financing of private education
• CTERA like this reform, law included a lot of things that CTERA suggested should be in there, and it got a lot of things it has watned for a while, like (278)
• declaration that education is a right and should be free
• growth of financing of schools to 6% GDP (PBI)
• the right to free teacher training
• the right of colelctive negotiation at the provincial AND national level
• Catholic schools were also a fan of the bill (279), more or less
• Chile
• student protests in 2005 demanded free schooling and transportation to school (280)
• teachers eventually joined protests and there was a national strike
• there was a council to solve these issues, that woudl include students, but at first it was stalled because students became a bit radicalized, and strike grew as more social groups joined the students' cause (280-1)
• once the council finally got together, including social groups, parties, and student representatives, it became clear that everyoen was unhappy, but great divergence in ideas on how to fix the system...some wanted more martket, some wanted less (281)
• Colegio de Profesores, union, was with the students (282) they wanted more centralization, better pay, shorter hours
• on the other end of the spectrum, private schools wanted fewer laws, more flexibility
• teachers groups did make some deamdns on private schools, not that thy be nationalized, but at least that they would be regulated more closely, including their entrance requirements (284)
• government in Chile did not try to replace the private system set up by Pinochet and perfected in the 1990s, but it dis try to smooth out some of the issues with it, make it a bit more equitable (286-287)
• Uruguay
• new law in teh 1990s didn't change tehcentalized, hierarchical nature of education, but was undertaken without any input from social groups, and the unions were against it, so a new law in the 2000s with the new left government was likely (287-8)
• the government convened a large Congress to figure out the new education law, parties were not allowed to be involved, only social actors, though unions were allowed and they tended to hav ea large say in the matter (288-290)
• new law reaffirmed much of old law, and said that funding could not go below 6% GDP (292)
• created autonomy and co-governance of schools by parents, teachers, students, and administrators (293)
• Conclusion: is there a new paradigm of education politics in teh Southern Cone?
• none of these reofrms were massive changes, refoundations (294)
• non of the reforms really chagne public/private relationship in their country (295)
• all reformers seem preoccupied with making the porcess inclusive of social actors
• teachers and students growing in power, technocrats and private sector losing power
• see tables on page 296 for some quick conclusions

Tello 2013

Tello, César. 2013. "Las políticas docentes y la perspectiva sindical en Argentina, México y Chile: debates y negociaciones. Los casos de CTERA, SNTE y el Colegio de Profesores en los últimos veinte años." Educar em Revista, (48), 149-166.

• Introduction
• in the 1990s education systems started being changed to follow neoliberal ideas, but in the 200s some governments began putting the state back in charge of education (150-151)
• Chávez (2010) showed:
• continued neoliberalism: Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, and others (151)
• concertacion: Arg, Brazil, Guatemal, Uruguay, Paraguay (152)
• rupture from neoliberal: Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela
• argument seems to be that the historical relationship between the unions and government in Mexico and Chile can help us understand what happened in those cases, but that in Argentina the more recent political scenario is explanatory (152)
• the debate: World Bank versus the unions
• teachers unions said reforms would make teaching worse, make salary go down, working conditions worse
• IFIs thought teachers needed someone to hold them accountable, finally, like parents, pushed for school autonomy (154)
• specifics of each case
• Chile
• has had decentralized education since 1990, thanks to the military dictatorship (156)
• unions helped kick out Pinochet
• the Colegio de Profesores was traditionally a group that sought to limit conflict, negotiate, but started acting more like a real union when they got some ability to do so after Pinochet left in 1991 (156-157) 
• the union traded improved salaries for some accountability measures with Lagos, but then subsequently demanded Bachelet and Pinera change the education system (157-9)
• but suggests this is more about the awakening of the union and its demanding what it was promised at the start of democracy (159)
• Mexico
• SNTE is super powerful in education sector, thanks ot historic relations with the PRI (160)
• change in relations and mobilization with SNTE came when PAN in power, though union tried to make-up with PRI in 2012, article doesn't know about EEG getting arrested, but it sstill uncolear ot author if old allinace will be renewed or not (161)
• Argentina
• anti Menem hard in 1990s (162)
• Marcha and Carpa Blancha made thema national force (162)
• friends with Ks, for a while, thanks to laws that gave them tons of money and national negotiations, but when this started to break down they had more strikes (162)
• Conclusions:
• in Chile, union was against the dictatorship and onyl after 20 years of alliance with those parties decided to break from them (163)
• in Mexico union never conronts the government, except as an oligarchic group
• in Argentina union was agisnt the government but has now been friends with Ks and moderated between 2003 and 2011

Garay 2011

in Collier and handlin 2011

Focuses on GROUPS and ASSOCIATIONS, not people/participants

·         Union-linked associations are more likely to coordinate with other associations (262, )

o   Meaning associations linked to unions in Arg and Chile tend to be central in mobilizing associations and creating linkages across them

·         Party association linkages

o   Parties see these associations as possible electoral support (262,)

o   Associations tend to seek issue-based interactions with parties, meaning associations try to get things from parties

§  Arg and chile associatiosn support parties, peru supports candidates, and venzuela is multifaceted

·         Associations tend to not have links with corp unions, more with social movement orgs like CTA, and often (in Peru, Chile, and Arg) with public sectors unions (267)

·         Union connection makes little to no difference on the use of state resources, though union-linked associations are more likely to gain access to state resources (271-272)

·         Popular assocaitions and political parties:

o   Parties seek help during elections (276)

o   Associations have three types of connections, issue-based (one issue), candidate based (connected to candidate) or multifaceted (work with a party in multiple was in multiple arenas) (276-280) countries see a mix of these (278)

o   Overall suggests assocaitions weakness to clientelism MAY be overstated (I don’t buy it)

·         Arg and Chile show some continuity between old and new interest regimes (288)

Roberts 2012

• Introduction
• one the one hand, democratic regimes from the 1980s have proven remarkably durable adn resilient to crises (2)
• On the other hand, party systems have been far less stable
• Paradoxically, democratic consolidation has coincided with a crisis of representation and general disillusionment with the political establishment
• but this crisis affects different countries differently
• Critical junctures:
• neoliberal turn (3)
• reactive sequences against neoliberalism!
• Modes of political representation based in ISI were undermined by its collapse, specficially among the popular classes
• and party systems varied widely in their ability to channel these issues
• Broadly, these critical junctures dealigned parties, made their programmatic promises seem less sincere (especially thanks to bait and switch)
• Argument:
• when a populist/mass-based party undertook economic reform
• it often made the transition more politically viable
• but also dealigned the party from its constituents (4)
• when a right party undertook economic reform
• left party was able to channel dissent through the insittuions
• party alignment was "reinforced"
• in both cases, parties that undertook reforms were vulnerable to leftist challenges
• The Puzzle of Party System Stability in Latin America
• Presidentialized party systems may result in parties with unaccountable elites, ambiguous programmatic stands, but it doesn't help explain the wide variation in strength and durability of party systems (5)
• electoral competition has not stabilized party systems or crystallized partisan identities
• During neoliberal transition programmatic differentiation was tough, since there were such acute constraints on policy options available (7)
• by contrast, the left turn helped realign some of these party systems
• "neoliberal critical junctures and teh reactive sequences they spawned dislodged and reconfigured historic party systems, altering their programmatic alignments in was that heavily conditioned the stability ot partisan competition in the aftermath period" (8)
• Market Liberalization and Part system alignments during neoliberal critical junctures
• Critical junctures are designed to explain why similar types of political or economic challenges produce different, path dependent patterns of institutional change across a range of cases
• suggest neoliberal critical juncture from 1973-1998 (Chavez ended it) (9)
• it altered:
• the character and purpose of state power
• the patterns of association in civil society
• the ways in which societal interests and claims were articulated and represented in the political arena (Collier and Handlin 2009, Yashar 2005)
• Party systems before market adjustment: (10)
• labor mobilizing
• elitist (with clientelistic relations to popular sectors)
• these preconditions weighed heavily on results of critic juncture, but did not define them entirely
• three basic requirements of programmatic structuring of party systems
• parties must adopt relatively coherent stands on salient issues that divide teh body politic (11)
• policies adopted in office must bear resemblance to election platform
• bait and switch severs relationship between electoral verdicts and the content of public policy (12)
• there must be meaningful differences/policy alternatives between the competing parties
• often not true during ISI crisis
• The regionwide transition undermined all three of these basic conditions (13)
• lots of policy switching, left/populist parties went along with reforms, or did bait and switch (13)
• created internal party dissension among leftish parties
• often meant that popular sector connections to parties were severd, replaced with clientelistic relations (14)
• BUT if a conservative party initiated transition, and left remained in opposition, no dealignment
• Three possible outcomes: table on page 16
• parties aligned (contested liberalism), outcome was a durable party system (15)
• Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Uruguay
• Mexico, thanks to creation of PRD which replaced PRI as left
• ambiguously Nicaragua (17)
• dealigned (bait and witch), or neutral (no real left to contest) results on part system (neoliberal convergence), outcome was not a durable part system
• dealigned: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
• Neutral: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay
• contested liberalism allowed for dissent to be challenged through stable forms of electoral competition (17)
• neoliberal convergence resulted in systems susceptible to destabilizing reactive sequences
• 17-25 goes through cases and uses electoral data, etc to prove this story
• 
  

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89. 

•  Introduction
• argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):
• pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
• this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments
• other explanations are incomplete
• authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
• corporatism is too party/politics focused
• the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
• moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions
• labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which  in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law
• Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics
• Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
• the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)
• that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups
• pluralist system allows autonomy
• corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
•  state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)
• A Note on Case Selection
• Uruguay (64)
• pluralist labor relations system
• class-based unionism
• strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
• Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention
• this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.
• Chile
• historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
• argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)
• decentralizing influence of labor law
• state has a lot of power over unions
• parties have control of unions
• THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship
•  Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion
• Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)
• meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
• Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)
• Uruguay
• unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
• gave them and independent streak
• they also formed a number of labor-based parties
• before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)
• this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created
• Meant that:
• in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
• while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties
• Authoritarian Labor Regimes
• Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
• Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)
•  Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
• military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations
• Transitional Context
• Chilean transition was controlled (72)
• left parties and unions still outlawed
• in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
• the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)
• decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)
• In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)
• initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
• contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)
• Return of Elected Rule
• Chile
• "concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
• inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
• state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
• union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
• business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so
• Uruguay
• reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
• return to 1968 labor relations system
• there was a resurgence of  union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
• early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
•  entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)
• manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
• most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)
• with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)
• Conclusion
• one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)
• BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)
• strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
• "institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
• testable hypothesis:  regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched
• my take:  makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle
• under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Cook 2002

Cook, María Lorena. 2002. "Labor Reform and Dual Transitions in Brazil and the Southern Cone". Latin American Politics and Society. 44 (1): 1-34.

• During democratic transitions governments are under pressure to restore civil and political rights, unions can make gains
• During economic transitions, unions face a variety of constraints, focus on survival
• Order of transition effects process and outcome of labor law reform
• In Brazil and Argentina, democracy then neoliberalism
• democracy led to greater, pro-labor reforms for unions
• later consolidation of neoliberal tried to roll back some of these labor protects
• In Chile, neoliberalism then democracy
• neoliberalism (and dictatorship) severely weakened labor movement
• later democratic transition brought some civil protections, but entrenched economic interests resisted strong labor protections
• Democratic Transitions
• both Argentina and Brazil inherit democratization and economic crisis
• Argentina
• First democratic government did not want to empower Peronist unions
• but business interests divide, labor not that divided, able to win demands
• Brazil
• CUT was oppositional to government, worked through the PT
• business divided here as well
• though able to beat some proposals, watered down others
• in the end, new Constitution was a bit of a labor relations hybrid
• WHEN DEMOCRACY FIRST, LABOR CAN BE MORE MILITANT
• Economic Transitions
• Argentina
• Menem had support of labor in the election
• first term:
• labor divided, some support Menem (in exchange for some concessions in law), others more combative
• CGT could not strongly resist flexibilization, but able to strongly resist losing obras sociales
• CGT focused on saving organizational resources, waited to fight another day!
• second term
• Menem threatens organization resources!
• unions mobilize
• favorable climate, because lots of popular discontent
• LABOR ABLE TO RESIST REFORMS THAT THREATENED IT’S RESOURCES, BUT NOT LIMIT NEOLIBERAL TURN
• Brazil
• Collor then Cardoso both beat Lula, no labor backing for them!
• political climate not favorable for unions
• labor divided, Forca Sindical willing to accept flexibility
• similarly to Argentina, labor has a lot of losses but is able to maintain significant resource reservoirs
• CHILE
• Story above
• Pinochet decimated unions
• employers unified
• even though labor had legitimacy going into democratic transition, too weak to do much
• political allies of labor accepts neoliberal model

Frank 2007

Frank “Trade Unionism in Chile”

in Phelan, Craig. 2007. Trade union revitalisation: trends and prospects in 34 countries. Oxford: Peter Lang. 

• devotion to neoliberal model has made all parties not in favor of unions, transition to democracy did not result in reform of neoliberalism
• unions not very strong in this context, have few political allies but depend alot on politics!

Calvo and Murillo 2012

Calvo, E., and M. V. Murillo. 2012. "When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile". Comparative Political Studies.

• Comparing linkages between voters and parties (2)
• clientelistic: “activist networks screen deserving from undeserving voters and mediate access to goods”
• programmatic: “”the group of beneficiaries is defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks”
• Current framework presumes that
• programmatic party elites are responsive to voters with ideological affinity, and will create policies to benefit them
• clientelistic parties specialize in delivery goods to a private menu of voters
• BUT on the ground its tough to tell when parties are being clientelistic or programmatic, or both (2-3)
• This article defines linkages based on VOTER’S EXPECTATIONS of accessing benefits through partisan networks of programmatic policies (4)
• democratization in LAm has been accompanied by non-programmatic parties that rely almost entirely on clientelism
• Distribution expectations have three components (5)
• socioeconomic status drives demand for redistribution through politics
• weight that individual voters attach to the likelihood of receiving benefits based on ideological proximity to parties
• weight that individual voters attach to the likelihood of receiving benefits based on
• proximity to and relationships with party members
• parties without organizational capacity must, then, come almost entirely from programmatic linkages
• neat way to gauge size of networks and party capacity (7)
• General characterization of party systems (8)
• Chile: mainly programmatic (8)
• Chilean voters can easily identify where a party sits on the left/right spectrum (9-10)
• Argentina: mainly clientelistic
• Argentines cannot easily identify left/right program of parties (10)
• General size of parties activists (as a proportion of population) same in both Chile and Argentina (12)
• evenly spread among parties in Chile
• heavily skewed to PJ in Argentina
• Chile has more institutions to block political clientelism, Argentina mainly based on clientelism (14)
• expectations/hypotheses (15-16)
• Argentina
• proximity to party members significant predictor of voters’ expectations of receiving handouts, a job, and public works (17)
• ideological distance has no significance (21)
• proximity to party activists has strong effect for both PJ and UCR (21)
• expectations of voters rely more heavily on proximity to party activists for handouts and jobs, though the effect declines for public works (24)
• Chile
• proximity to party members has no effect in Chile, though ideological distance is a strong predictor for the Concertación parties (17)
• the greater the ideological distance the lower expectation of receiving targeted benefits, effect is significant for Concertación, insignificant for rightist parties (21)
• proximity to party has no significance (21)
• voters rely on ideological cues to gauge expectations of public spending, patronage, etc (24)
• IN BOTH COUNTRIES
• ideological distance and party proximity have important effect on receiving public works (21)
• voters identify networks and ideology as mechanisms that shape their perception of the political distribution of goods (23)
• CONCLUSION
• “the mechanisms determining access to excludable goods...shape voters’ perceptions of subsequent iterations in benefit distribution” (25)