Notes!: labor law

Showing posts with label labor law. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

Carnes 2014

Theory (chapter 1)

questions on differences between labor codes and stability of labor codes are interrelated (20)
Argument(s)

higher skill levels lead to, in the long term, more protective and generous laws governing individual employment relations
greater organizational potential relates to, in the short to medium term, political action and better collective laws
short term disruptions are fragile, likely forced by undemocratic governments or bait and switch
overall, economic constraints (skills) are the foundation of laws, and political action (unions) can change them in the medium term (21)

typology of labor regimes: variation in indivdual and collective law (27-29)

Corporatist =individual high + collective high = mex and arg
Encompassing = individual low + collective high = peru
Professional - individual high + collective low = chi and uru
Market = no regulation

Labor policies that last and achieve consensus do so because their provisions are consonant with the prevailing economic order (32)
"skill distributions are entrenched in local economic institutions, and as a result tend to be very slow to change." (33)

relative ratio of high to low skill workers will affect labor law (35)
lots of high skill workers = individual protections, job stability
lots of low skill workers = high employment favored over protections

strong labor movement improves hand of workers demanding labor legislation (36-40)
earlier laws, political history, international institutions, and national political regimes also affect labor law promulgation (40-42)
same typology as above, except repalce indiv protxns with "skill endowment" and collective protxns with "union/organizational strength" (42-44)
also, even though regime may change, labor law may create feedback loop to constrain transformations in skill endowment, legislation: meaning corporatism begets groups that are good at corporatism, etc. (path dependence) (43-46)

chapters 2 and 3 code, quant analyze labor codes...looks pretty cool.

Saturday, June 14, 2014

Tokman 2007

Tokman, Víctor E. 2007. "The informal economy, insecurity and social cohesion in Latin America". International Labour Review. 146 (1-2): 81-107.

Social cohesion comes when a country has achieved economic progress and redistributed the fruits of that growth to the whole of society (81)

social cohesion helps ensure fairer development and involve all the population in efforts to achieve that growth
social protection is still limited in LA
social cohesion provides the causal link between mechanisms of integration and well-being and individuals feeling of belonging to society (82)

this articles measures this by looking at labor marker participation, social protection and public perception of the effectiveness of instruments about these two issues

Open markets and their effect

open markets have meant employment is more closely linked to external demand

this means the possibilities for increasing wages above productivity or expanding internal demand is limited

instability is high and particularly affects smaller countries with more open economies, which in turn usually have inadequate instruments to deal with this instability
informality and precariousness grew. even when poverty retreated, high-income groups shifted some of the adjustment costs to the middle-income groups. Thus, inequality did not diminish and wide income disparities grew (83)

Employment tenure

decline in employment tenure and high labor turnover
but the time spent unemployed tended to be shorter

but people worried about being unemployed: 75% worried about it, while only 59% of households experienced some unemployment during the previsous year (citing Latinobarometer from 2005)
only 18% felt protected by labor legislation

the informal economy

insecurity affects the whole population, but it tends to affect the socially excluded even more (84)
informal sector became the informal economy

precarious work was mostly concentrated in the informal sector, but was increasingly seen in formal-sector enterprises (85)
only Chile, Argentina, Brazil and El Salvador have seen a decrease in informal-sector activities in the past 15 years (no citation for this, seems to get it from ECLAC) (86)
the larger the informal sector, the larger public perception of insecurity...more unequal countries also have a larger informal sector (87)

labor market participation determines eligibility for social security which determines cohesion, and obviously informal sector workers don't participate in labor market (89)

Strategies favoring social cohesion

workers in informal sector are often workers and entrepreneurs (92)

they are socially excluded by low incomes, lack of social protections, and employment isntability
they are integrated into the labor market but on a precarious basis

need to extend social protections in order to make people feel like they belong (92-93)

entry into the formal sector opens the door to social and economic citizenship which, in turn, is a prerequisite for belonging and integration (93)

issues of micro-enterprises being able to absorb the costs associated with formal employment (95)

perhaps create a dual system, one for small biz and one for big ones

"fundamental rights are inalienable even if the necessary compliance involves some job losses" (96)

Three strategies to address social tension (105)

incorporate the informal sector into the modern sector
fix problems with "disguised" employment and/or emloyment not initially included under labor legislation (105-106)
do flexicurity (106)

my take: this dude is from Europe, and wants the rest of the world to look like Europe

Friday, June 13, 2014

Senén González and Borroni 2011

Introduction

this article questions the extent to qhich context creaqtes social dialogue, versus strategic action of the actors involved, or if it's a combination of these variables (34)

Strategic Focus

looking at the role external circumstances play and what actors do to understand how revialization is happening (35)
the context changed greatly between teh 90s adn the 00s (36), and much of that change was caused by change in politics (37)
in general, actors respond to these new circumstances in different ways, meaning that external circumstances do not force change, there is some strategic choice involved (37-38)
what happens is a combination of context, institutions, historical paths, and strategic options available (38)

some history of social dialogue

1994 CGT and employers made an agreement that focused mainly on employment and labor reform, but most of these points were not put into practice (41)
1997 there was an attempt to dialogue over flexbilization, but it totally failed
2001: social dialogue about how to ameliorate, end the crisis, resulted in Jefes y Jefas de Hogar and other things (42)
after 2003 the government recuperated its role as a labor regulator, respecting labor institutions, and pushing for social dialogue

El Consejo Nacional del Empleo, la Productividad, y el Salario Minimo, vital, y Movil

the minimujm wage council is the best example of new social dialogue (43)
it aims to increase formal employment and improve inequality
includes both the CGT and the CTA

also, collective bargaining

(44-47) numbers of colective agreements, same as the Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg (2011) article

labor conflict

way more strikes after 2003 (47)
in 1990s and early 00s, labor wasn't strong enough bu saw piqeuteros and other actions as an outgrwoth of labor union weakness/inability to strike
2006 strikes = 770, 2010 strikes = 940, growth each year (see data page 48)
though proportionally most strikes are in public sector, number of people and days lost in private sector grew a lot, while public sector was fairly consistent 2006-2010 (49)

Conclusion

suggest that social dialogue is increasing, point to collective bargaining and minimum wage council (50)
experience in Argentina shows that revitalization doesn't necessarily have to look like what people say in Global North
actors made the difference in this case, as social dialogue mechanisms existed in teh 1990s, they were just ignored, started to be used when K's decided to use them (51)
Argentina is still looking for a grand Social Pact, but I think this is just playing games with teh Global North/Germany literature

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg 2011

Introduction

Bargaining has become more centralized since the decentralization of the 1990s (155)
describes three levels: local, sector, and national (with government)
looking at two time periods, 1990-2002 and 2003-2010 (156)
checking three types of determinants: economic, legal institutions, and political ideologies that help determine where bargaining will happen
THESIS: 90s dectralized but in 00s became "cnetralizacion intermedia"

Determinants in the lit

economic

opening to global trade (labor cotsts become important) ( 156-157)
geographic dispersement of industries plays a role (157)
structure of employment plays a role (157-158)

legal institutions (158-159)
political/ideological (159-160)

Structure of Collective bargaining

collective agreements went WAY up after 2002 (161)

before 2002, average per year was 177, most was 219.

after 2002 LEAST was 348 and most, in 2010, 2038

careful when citing this data, words dont' match grafic

coverage went from 1 mil in 2004 to 4 mil in 2009

this contrast with 1990s, when high unemployment led to lots of off-the-books workers (161-162)
coverage in was roughly 84.5% in 2008

in 1991 negotiations between union adn employer were only 19% of contracts, all the rest were sector-level (163)

by 1998 this had risen to 80%
after 2003 a jump to sector-level being about 30% of contracts, hovered there through 2010 (163-164)
between 2004 and 2008, sector negotiations rose by 291%, but decentralized, enterprise level also rose 236% (164)

sector-level contracts are important, because they set the minimum wage levels and day length

Content of Contracts and salary

in teh 1990s, all contracts tended to focus on felixbilization
entre 2003 and 2010, bigger deal was pay issues

almost all included pay increases, but many of these were thanks to increase in legal minimum wage
also, government stepped in to get employers and unions at the table to try and iron out issues before neogitiations (165)
data on salary increases (165)
salaries paid began to match those in sector agreements, meaning local employers had less flexibility in what they paid workers (165)
this means that workers pay is being determined on a collective basis, not and individual basis (166)

Legal Institutions

state has two major interventions:

personaria gremial: uniosn have the right to bargain (167)

inscripcion gremial: union exists, can represent its workers, but only its workers, and cannot take precedent over a union with personaria gremial

approving collective contracts
these are very strong (168)

unions

generally pyramidal and vertical
have a double game: national level/political and local level through comisiones internas o delegados
three levels: local, federation (sector, state), national (CGT)

1st two levels do all the bargaining
CGT at third level is a political entity, doesn't do any direct bargaining for wages

changes in the 1990s

all three things changed, laws, economics, and political ideologies (169)

each of these led to decentralization of bargaining, sometimes down to individual level (168-172)

but since 2003 all three things have changed to slow the decentralization

laws

Néstor increased freedom of unions to strike, though he did keep the government's right to regulate strikes of "servicios esenciales" (173)

but the new law included that strikers could not be replaced or face retribution from employers

economic

debt default and growing economy in the 00s

...and all of this came because Kirchner had a new political ideology

and his drive to create alliances with unions (174)

conclusions

in Argentina the law is the major variable in explaining the differences between the 1990s and 2000s, but the other determinants also played a role (174)
personaria gremial helps prevent fragmentation of the labor movement (175)
now the government is acting like a coordinador of the disparate demands of workers and employers

Wednesday, August 14, 2013

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89.

Introduction

argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):

pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments

other explanations are incomplete

authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
corporatism is too party/politics focused

the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions

labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law

Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics

Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)

that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups

pluralist system allows autonomy
corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)

A Note on Case Selection

Uruguay (64)

pluralist labor relations system
class-based unionism
strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention

this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.

Chile

historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)

decentralizing influence of labor law
state has a lot of power over unions
parties have control of unions
THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship

Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion

Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)

meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)

Uruguay

unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
gave them and independent streak
they also formed a number of labor-based parties
before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)

this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created

Meant that:

in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties

Authoritarian Labor Regimes

Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)

Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations

Transitional Context

Chilean transition was controlled (72)

left parties and unions still outlawed
in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)

decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)

In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)

initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)

Return of Elected Rule

Chile

"concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
there was a resurgence of union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so

Uruguay

reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
return to 1968 labor relations system
there was a resurgence of union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)

manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)

with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)

Conclusion

one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)

BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)

strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
"institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
testable hypothesis: regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched

my take: makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle

under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Middlebrook 1995

Middlebrook (1995)

Chapter 1: Mass Politics and Regime formation
1. On the concept of Post-revolutionary Authoritarian rule
  1. Features:
    1. Prominence of mas actors
      1. May be mobilized less and less over time
      2. Still important base of control for government
    2. Political ideals from revolutionary era
      1. Something referencing social change
      2. Rule is legitimated by invoking these symbols/ideologies
      3. Cannot be empty promises, must deliver the goods as well
    3. Dual importance of state and hegemonic party
      1. Party mobilizes social base
      2. Party can serve to cement social alliances
      3. Party can serve as method through which social allies can gain access to state apparatus
2. Framework for studying mass politics in authoritarian regimes
  1. Limitations on mass mobilization
    1. Can happen through public apathy, legal restrictions, channeling mobilization through the party.
  2. Limits on sociopolitical pluralism
  3. Limits on Demand articulation
    1. Restrictions creates situation in which groups must negotiate, compromise, or modify their goals
3. (28) “ The party [PRI (and its predecessors)] has been the principal channel through which leaders of lower class organizations achieve upward political mobility”
  1. BUT: the party never developed autonomous means of limiting its constituents’ political actions, it relied on state power for those controls.
  2. THUS: organized labor enjoyed relative autonomy in the party framework (though certainly not in the state regime)
4. Central Argument: to understand the bases of elite control over and general character of mass politics, must understand both state and societal controls over the labor movement
  1. State = labor law, etc.
  2. Societal = labor unions’ reliance on state subsidies
    1. Economic structure that influenced patterns of unionization and CB power
    2. Organizational form of the labor movement
    3. Political ideas that influence policy preferences and political response strategies
Chapter 2: State Structures and political Control
1. (42) “On the one hand, expanded state administrative capacity gradually increased governing elites’ ability to control developments in the labor sector. On the other hand, legal recognition of basic labor rights and inclusion of worker representatives in come administrative structures strengthened organized labor by providing important symbolic and material benefits to both unions and individual workers.”
2. (51-2) 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo institutionalized activist role of government in protection f workers at a time when the unions weren’t strong enough to protect themselves (the CROM had fallen out of power soon before 1930)
  1. Leads to creation of Secretary of Labor (STPS, Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social), as well as the CTM
3. JCA’s preserves the distinction between federal and local jurisdictions (60)
4. Labor seat on JCA’s help unions expand their organizations (61-62)
5. Reconocimiento, official recognition/registration of unions, improves power of unions compared to employers, but also gives state power over unions (65)
6. State has some ability to meddle in union internal affairs (elections, etc.) but not much. Also, requirements do not safeguard union democracy.
7. Strikes must be registered, only occur after arbitration proceedings have concluded (69)
Chapter 3 – The challenge of mass participation and the origins of Mexico’s state subsidized labor movement
1. Before the revolution, labor movements were dispersed, and in small enterprises, who had little bargaining power
2. Morones, while founding the CROM
  1. marginalized the anarchosyndicalists, and
  2. decided they need to ally with the government to have any power
3. CROM never made inroads in industries with strong unions, like railroad workers and electrical workers
4. Relations between the CROM and Obregon quickly soured, were eventually charged with assassination of Obregon!
5. CTM founded by CROM dissidents and under Cardenas’ hope to unite labor movement to support him, CROM remains relatively pro-Calles
6. Even while he supported the CTM, Cardenas worked against the CTM
  1. He helped found the FSTSE to keep government workers out of the hands of the CTM
  2. He kept peasants out of the CTM
7. Cardenas’s PRM first to officially tie labor to an official political party (1938), SECTORS
8. SME leaves CTM in 1939 after CTM supports presidential candidate Camacho
9. Subsidies to labor movement
  1. Legal
    1. Exclusion clauses
    2. Separation clauses
  2. Financial
    1. CTM had trouble collecting dues, but stayed solvent
    2. Middlebrook hints at direct monetary subsidies
  3. Political
    1. Preferential access to electoral lists of PRM/PRI and administrative positions
      1. Leverage for union
      2. Personal benefit
    2. No reelection meant constant demand for new and loyal candidates
    3. CTM dominated these positions
    4. Chair in the Chamber of Deputies was most available, some Senate seats, practically no governorships (too important to PRI power structure to give away as spoils)
10. (106) “The consolidation of the post-revolutionary social pact occurred, then, not with CTM membership in the governing party but with the political triumph of progovernment labor leaders in the aftermath of a major labor crisis in the late 1940s” (emphasis added by me!)
Chapter 4: Turning Point the 1947-51 Labor Crisis
1. Case study on railroad workers
2. RR, like other protected sectors, autonomous, strong, politically minded
3. During labor crisis (post-WWII) government supports more pragmatic leadership, alternative/radical paths slowly squelched
4. Once these unions are turned toward pragmatic (non-radical) ends
  1. CTM dominant, BUT:
  2. Begins period of truly institutionalized social pact
    1. Previously pact had rested on shoulders of President and specific union confederations
5. Labor movement united under CT in 1966, but only a façade under which fragmentation persists
6. Social pact:
  1. Unions (leaders) can’t survive without political support
  2. Unions become effective tools of worker control for political leaders
7. Also, CROC formed in 1952 by Aleman government, “to unite disparate labor groups in an organization that was simultaneously…
Chapter 5: State Structures, Political Control, and Labor Participation: an Assessment
1. STRIKES: “…postrevolutionary governments generally maintained strong control over stieks in federal-jurisdiction economic activities, regardless of changes in the political character of different presidential administrations.” (171)
2. LABOR UNION REGISTRATION: Political influence/action can influence rates of labor union registration, but generally no variables explained differences in time to register, meaning there was NO effect due to
  1. presidential administration
  2. difference in confederation
3. WORKER DEMAND RESOLUTION:
  1. Includes an in-depth case of RR workers union
  2. Some presidential effect, but also surprising anti-worker effect for Cardenas
Chapter 6: Labor Politics and ISI
1. ISI good and bad
  1. Development, work, but
  2. Balance of payment problems
  3. Inflation problems
  4. Result: people have jobs, but their wages are falling!
2. CTM often spoke radically, acted pragmatically when ISI stumbled and inflation rose
3. Section on democracy in Mexican automobile sector
  1. Neither presidential policy nor strength of state labor federations adequately explains democratization (229)
  2. Car mfg. undergoing changes, less paternal relations, just-in-time0ish style prxn, and modern assembly line
  3. Workers viewed democratization seen as a way to gain better bargaining power, as their leaders were initially unable to cope with their new demands
  4. Workplace differences (especially with delegado system) important to explaining variation across auto plants (236)
  5. Democratic unions generally better at gaining control of production, bad at increasing wages, struck more often
Chapter 7: Labor Politics under Economic Stress in the 1980s
1. Failure of ISI
  1. Economic difficulties, interest rates, defaults
  2. Less government spending
  3. Inflation!!!
2. Organized Labor’s Response
  1. Unions never thought they were adequately compensated for sacrifices during 1976-7 crisis
  2. De la Madrid agrees to price controls in 1983, then immediately breaks his deal
  3. NO strike petitions approved
  4. CROC and CROM used to harass CTM
  5. 1984 CTM threatens general strike, but steps back and agrees to negotiate on de la Madrid’s terms, CT makes demands but never gains anything real
  6. WORKERS LOSE
  7. “The CTM’s historical reluctance to pursue more aggressive collective action in support of workers’ interests is one of the most noteworthy aspects of state-labor relations in Mexico.” (265)
3. What explains unions’ actions?
  1. Usual suspects
    1. Crisis weakened bargaining power
      1. CTM had heterogeneous members
      2. None/few in strategic industries
    2. Government control over strikes and union recognition
    3. CTM had more deputies in Congress, maybe thought they’d recoup losses later?
  2. New ideas
    1. Internal weakness of CTM, others
    2. Leaders’ (Velazquez’s) political beleifs
      1. (Weakish)
      2. Leaders’ fear that a true mobilization would be a breeding ground for union democracy, undermine their old control over unions
4. Industrial restructuring in automobile industry
  1. Automakers open new plants, get CTM unions, undermine democratic unions
  2. CTM unions give management much more leeway on production methods, democratic unions able to fight back a bit
  3. Volkswagen at Puebla
    1. Leaders capitulate a bit in secret agreement
    2. Midlevel and rank and file revolt
    3. Union turmoil allows VW (thanks to JFCA decision) to fire everyone, rehire who they want, keep pliable union
  4. Flexible contracts more important than low wages to managers! (286)
5. Privatization of state-owned firms crushed official unions ability to use political influence to win economic demands
6. State-subsidized labor organizations lost their ability to win concessions, but maintained their significance as instruments of political control of workers.
CONCLUSION
1. Union/party alliance
  1. Benefitted labor because resulted in subsidies
  2. Benefitted party because party had no other means of controlling mass base
2. CTM resisted democratic opening: why?! Central question of the chapter
3. Over time unions had experienced a cumulative weakening after presidents defined and redefined the alliance
4. Unions weakest point ever in 1980s/90s, and business gains better foothold with government
5. BUT labor still important for getting out the vote
  1. This control, however, became less reliable (see 1988 prez election)
6. “Because post-revoutionary authoritarian regimes generally develop distinctive ideologies that give workers a special place in postrevolutionary society…labor has a stronger interest in preserving elements of the status quo…” (317)
  1. Long-term democratization may be a good thing, BUT
  2. Short term democratization may pose significant costs to labor unions
7. As jobs move north in Mexico, they further weaken unions by
  1. Dispersing labor
  2. Gets far away from political center of country
  3. Move closer to anti-union areas of the country.
8. Labor leaders also suck at times, protection contracts
9. Political parties are an important place where labor can get power, but
  1. Have the taint of old style PRI relationships
  2. PRD, rest of left have focused on electoral competitions, not alliances with unions (325-6)
10. Finally, labor law needs to change, bad!

Cook 2007

Cook, Maria Lorena. 2006. The politics of labor reform in Latin America: between flexibility and rights. University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Chapter 5: Bolivia and Mexico (only Mexico here)

Technical, ambiguous nature of the law allows the JCAs a lot of discretionary power

also makes protection contracts easier to attain

exclusion and separation clauses

make protection unions stronger
protect leadership in unions from rank-and-file revolt

1980s: “The economic crisis weakened all labor unions, but independent unions were hit hardest by industrial restructuring and never regained a presence in manufacturing” (163)
Government devoted to neoliberal model
in 1990s-2000s, “corporatist compromise” granted increased flexibility to employer in exchange for conserving the status quo on unions’ organizational prerogatives and collective rights
First round of labor reform proposals in late 1990s, both for PRD and PAN, tried to take apart corporatist system, demand greater union democracy

labor divided:
official wanted to keep positions
UNT unions divided, because some (SNTE, STRM?) didn’t want to totally demolish system

also fear that once the bill hit Congress, everything would change!

Fox appoints a businessman, Carlos Abascal, to head Labor Ministry

His reform (which fails) would create greater flexibility and not touch internal democracy of unions

Sequence of transition, economic then democratic, may have limited possiblities for democratic labor reform

business now heading the labor ministry!!
official unions can give wage restraint, which managers want, so managers allow official unions to survive

“As long as the PRI remains a significant presence in Mexican politics, labor’s relationship with the party is likely to continue and the party is likely to degfnd the demands of the traditional labor sector” (192)

see labor reform failure in 2012!

MEXICO NOT ABLE TO REALIZE PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR LAWS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Cook 2002

Cook, María Lorena. 2002. "Labor Reform and Dual Transitions in Brazil and the Southern Cone". Latin American Politics and Society. 44 (1): 1-34.

During democratic transitions governments are under pressure to restore civil and political rights, unions can make gains
During economic transitions, unions face a variety of constraints, focus on survival
Order of transition effects process and outcome of labor law reform
In Brazil and Argentina, democracy then neoliberalism

democracy led to greater, pro-labor reforms for unions
later consolidation of neoliberal tried to roll back some of these labor protects

In Chile, neoliberalism then democracy

neoliberalism (and dictatorship) severely weakened labor movement
later democratic transition brought some civil protections, but entrenched economic interests resisted strong labor protections

Democratic Transitions

both Argentina and Brazil inherit democratization and economic crisis
Argentina

First democratic government did not want to empower Peronist unions
but business interests divide, labor not that divided, able to win demands

Brazil

CUT was oppositional to government, worked through the PT
business divided here as well

though able to beat some proposals, watered down others

in the end, new Constitution was a bit of a labor relations hybrid

WHEN DEMOCRACY FIRST, LABOR CAN BE MORE MILITANT

Economic Transitions

Argentina

Menem had support of labor in the election
first term:

labor divided, some support Menem (in exchange for some concessions in law), others more combative
CGT could not strongly resist flexibilization, but able to strongly resist losing obras sociales
CGT focused on saving organizational resources, waited to fight another day!

second term

Menem threatens organization resources!
unions mobilize
favorable climate, because lots of popular discontent

LABOR ABLE TO RESIST REFORMS THAT THREATENED IT’S RESOURCES, BUT NOT LIMIT NEOLIBERAL TURN

Brazil

Collor then Cardoso both beat Lula, no labor backing for them!
political climate not favorable for unions
labor divided, Forca Sindical willing to accept flexibility
similarly to Argentina, labor has a lot of losses but is able to maintain significant resource reservoirs

CHILE

Story above
Pinochet decimated unions
employers unified
even though labor had legitimacy going into democratic transition, too weak to do much
political allies of labor accepts neoliberal model

Caraway 2008

Caraway, Teri. 2008. "Explaining the Dominance of Legacy Unions in New Democracies". Comparative Political Studies. 41 (10): 1371-1397.

Legacy unions

(previously) state-backed unions inherited from a non-democratic regime
support comes from state, not from membership

Democratization usually results in freedom of association, more ifor legacy unions
most legacy unions ride on inherited advantages rather than adopting deep internal reforms

inducements = legacies
switching unions isn’t just a secret ballot, but risks losing workers’ job!
legacies erode over time, however

inclusionary versus exclusionary corporatism

do rival unions have to poach (former), or organize the unorganized (latter)

transition context also important

weak economies make organizing more difficult (opposite in strong)
nature of union competition

competition fragmented? good for legacy unions
new unions can’t deliver benefits to members? good for legacy unions

partisan links

legacy unions have large numbers of members = attractive
but if other unions able to get lots of members, they also become attractive

		Inherited advantages
		Many	Few
Transition context	Favorable	Carrots and Sticks	Carrots, Sticks, and Reform
	Unfavorable	Carrots, Sticks, and Reform	Reform

Sticks

protection unions: leave union, lose job!
close relationship with management
outright intimidation (Indonesia example)

Carrots

can offer resources to members that other unions can’t match
close to centers of power, have seats on labor courts, office buildings, etc.

Reform

allows unions to retain existing members and recruit new members as well
democracy:

direct election of union president
voting rights for plant-level unions in union congresses

true test is not whether rules have changed, but if oligarchy has been dislodged