Tokman 2007

Tokman, Víctor E. 2007. "The informal economy, insecurity and social cohesion in Latin America". International Labour Review. 146 (1-2): 81-107.

•  Social cohesion comes when a country has achieved economic progress and redistributed the fruits of that growth to the whole of society (81)
• social cohesion helps ensure fairer development and involve all the population in efforts to achieve that growth
• social protection is still limited in LA
• social cohesion provides the causal link between mechanisms of integration and well-being and individuals feeling of belonging to society (82)
• this articles measures this by looking at labor marker participation, social protection and public perception of the effectiveness of instruments about these two issues
• Open markets and their effect
• open markets have meant employment is more closely linked to external demand
• this means the possibilities for increasing wages above productivity or expanding internal demand is limited
• instability is high and particularly affects smaller countries with more open economies, which in turn usually have inadequate instruments to deal with this instability
• informality and precariousness grew. even when poverty retreated, high-income groups shifted some of the adjustment costs to the middle-income groups. Thus, inequality did not diminish and wide income disparities grew (83)
• Employment tenure
• decline in employment tenure and high labor turnover
• but the time spent unemployed tended to be shorter
• but people worried about being unemployed: 75% worried about it, while only 59% of households experienced some unemployment  during the previsous year (citing Latinobarometer from 2005)
• only 18% felt protected by labor legislation
• the informal economy
• insecurity affects the whole population, but it tends to affect the socially excluded even more (84)
• informal sector became the informal economy
• precarious work was mostly concentrated in the informal sector, but was increasingly seen in formal-sector enterprises (85)
• only Chile, Argentina, Brazil and El Salvador have seen a decrease in informal-sector activities in the past 15 years (no citation for this, seems to get it from ECLAC) (86)
• the larger the informal sector, the larger public perception of insecurity...more unequal countries also have a larger informal sector (87)
• labor market participation determines eligibility for social security which determines cohesion, and obviously informal sector workers don't participate in labor market (89)
• Strategies favoring social cohesion
• workers in informal sector are often workers and entrepreneurs (92)
• they are socially excluded by low incomes, lack of social protections, and employment isntability
• they are integrated into the labor market but on a precarious basis
• need to extend social protections in order to make people feel like they belong (92-93)
• entry into the formal sector opens the door to social and economic citizenship which, in turn, is a prerequisite for belonging and integration (93)
• issues of micro-enterprises being able to absorb the costs associated with formal employment (95)
• perhaps create a dual system, one for small biz and one for big ones
• "fundamental rights are inalienable even if the necessary compliance involves some job losses" (96)
• Three strategies to address social tension (105)
• incorporate the informal sector into the modern sector
• fix problems with "disguised" employment and/or emloyment not initially included under labor legislation (105-106)
• do flexicurity (106)

my take: this dude is from Europe, and wants the rest of the world to look like Europe

Roberts 2007

"The Crisis of Labor Politics in Latin America: Parties and Labor Movements during the Transition to Neoliberalism". 2007. International Labor and Working-Class History. 72 (1): 116-133.

•  Introduction
• the neoliberal turn dislocated the mode of political representation of the popular (working) class(es), as this incorporation was rooted in the state-led development model (116)
•  domestic consumption was previoulsy the driver of the economy
• this meant that wages generally rose over time, and unions flourished (117)
• "An elective affinity existed, then, between strong developmentalist states, mass party organizations, and dense trade-union movements"
• the neoliberal disruption undercut organized labor both in the political realm and in teh workplace
• Party System Differentiation Under ISI: Elitist and Labor-Mobilizing Patterns
• elitist
• 19th century oligarchic parties (or new, elite-driven parties) (Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay)
• attracted support from the popular classes but did not drive union creation/membership (118)
• Labor-mobilizing
• new parties (usually)
• party could be populist (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela) of leftist (Chile, Nicaragua after 1979)
• in these countries, level of trade union membership and degree of organizational concentration were much higher, which usually is read as meaning unions were much stronger in these places
• labor-mobilizing countires tended to have a deeper commitment to ISI (119), elitist countries didn't stray nearly as far from liberal economic development (120)
• the depth of ISI system also helps predict which countries made neoliberal turn last
• stabilization was frequently delayed until a deep crisis
• needed austerity measures were usually worse, "shock treatment"
• contractions, crises, and disequilibria were not as strong in elite countries(121)
• paradoxically, the places with teh strongest labor movements endured the deepest and most painful wage cuts, adjustment (122)
• But what were the political consequences?!
• Economic Crisis, Market Reform, and the Transformation of Political Representation
• after neoliberal adjustment, there was an erosion of the social alignments and organizational forms that distinguished elite and labor-mobilizing party systems (123)
• the groups (unions) that used to supply grassroots activists, identities, and loyal voters are now much weakers
• at the same time, mass media has become more prevalent
• NEW parties: top-down, largely detached from an increasingly individualized, independent, and more volatile electorate
• with the dominance of neoliberal thinking, party programs have converged a great deal (124)
• bait-and-switch occurrences by many left and populist parties in 1980s and 1990s meant:
• they were saddled with the political costs of the transition, and
• the transition weakened their traditional supporters (125)
• this has forced many of these parties to seek new connections with the electorate, and they tend to do so using patron-clientelism, leadership appeal, or political marketing (instead of offering to change the economic system)
• The Puzzle of Electoral Volatility in Latin America
• lots of intraregional differences in electoral volatility (126)
• volatility increased in the context of growing economic stability and democratic consolidation in the 1990s
• thus volatility is not explained by "tough economic times"
• party systems anchored in mass parties saw lots of dislocation in the 1980s and 1990s during transition, whereas elite party systems were relatively stable (127)
• BUT recent divisions in elite party states f Uruguay and Colombia suggest the elite/mass differentiation isn't perfect either
• Overall, it seems that voters just don't identify with any party nearly as strongly as they used to (128)
• this volatility is especially striking given that many of these parties had all the institutionalization that should have made them very stable (129)
• strong grassroots organizations
• linkages to social blocs
• as labor unions grew weaker and more detached from political parties, electoral competition became less polarize but also less programmatic, less grounded in popular interests, and more fluid and personalistic
• Conclusion
• "Latin America's widely noted 'crisis of representation' is, at least in part, a crisis of a particular type of socialpolitical representation" (130)
• the Left might be able to fix this, but it's a long way away from being able to do that/actually doing that (130-131)

Luna 2007

Luna, Juan Pablo. 2007. "Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in Uruguay". Latin American Politics & Society. 49 (4): 1-30.

• The electoral success of the left is “built partly on a broad electoral movement that opposes neoliberal reforms and represents losers in this economic model” (3)
• differences among Left regimes derive from divergent ISI constellations, dissimilar structural reform patterns, and distinct party systems
• Thus:  each case should be examined with regard to:
• sociological opportunity structure
• political opportunity structure
• partisan adaption
• Uruguay has an unusual combination of:
• elite party structure that used ISI
• political party system that didn’t deinstitutionalize in neoliberal transition
• FA overcame tradeoffs between factions of party and across classes
• FA able to keep labor happy, while also extending reach to poor, those usually coopted by clientelistic elite parties
• Party has moderated, while labor movement as radicalized
• may be a future issue
• Data on electoral support for FA by district, class
• cross-class support in Montevideo,
• less, but growing support en el campo
• Sociological opportunity structure
• FA party for those who want to keep ISI
• no breakdown of party system, no electoral dealignment
• FA adopts Batllismo:  social democracy
• Uruguayans have less faith in market
• Clientelism of Colorado and Blanco unhelpful after neoliberal belt-tightening
• As C and B implement neolib, FA gaining votes, do C and B can’t go all the way with neoliberal reforms (trying to keep voters happy!)
• some areas able to protect their ISI benefits (read: labor), thus not destroyed by neoliberal policies
• Political Opportunity Structure
• Fiscal crisis = B and C can’t feed money to political/client machines
• FA ideology passed on through generations
• both of which means FA growing, B and C struggling
• Adaptation patter
• Fa had larger activist apparatus
• in the streets!
• and fomenting in between elections
• party moderates its views
• internal decentralization spread the word, got new areas involved in party
• Asamblea Uruguay and Movimiento de Participación Popular capture FA’s emerging constituency: poor, disaffected
• AU gets lower class, particularly in the interior
• MPP is broad, pragmatic
• also the party of Jose Mujica, another charismatic leader, who would later replace Vazquez as President
• Final conclusions:
• strength comes from keeping old constituents (labor), and attracting new ones (poor, but also middle and upper class)
• HOWEVER, this means party has two divergent factions
• party attempts to contain discontent within itself
• FA may have problem satisfying divergent constituents