Levitsky 2003b

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties In Latin America: Argentine Peronism In Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: 
• The PJ's flexibility contributed to its adaptation and survival in teh neoliberal era (3)
• the weakly institutionalized labor-party link permitted the traditional mechanisms f labor participation in the party to be quickly dismantled
• the absence of stable career paths and secure tenure patterns meant it was easy to get rid of old-guard leaders
• the absence of stable norms of accountability in the party allowed Menem the freedom to design and implement a radical economic program (3-4)
• the decline of postwar ISI brought on a programmatic and a coalitional challenge to labor based parties (5)
• programmatic: slowdown of economic growth, globalized trade, and debt-crisis helpers (IMF, World Bank) made it very difficult for parties to enact policy that wasn't orthodox neoliberal (5-6)
• coalitional: economic changes hanged class, labor had fewer votes to trade (6)
• Look at party change (organizational change) in terms of a two-level, nested game, in which party leaders are located at the intersection of environmental and intraorganizational dynamics (12)
• leaders who seek to increase their power must respond to changes in the external environment, but their strategies to do so are mediated by the power game within the party and the party's strucutre
• "Yet the flexibility-stability tradeoff may not be as steep as the literature suggests.  ... Although the Pj is unquestionably a mass party, its mass organization is informal rather than bureaucratic, and the rules and procedures that govern the internal life of the party are fluid, contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored." (14)
• "A central claim of this book is that routinization limits the capacity of organizations to respond quickly to environmental challenges, and that weakly routinized organizations may be better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than highly routinized organizations." (18)
• routinization affects strategic flexibility in three ways: (19)
• leadership renovation (ease of changing old-guard)
• leadership autonomy
• structural pliability, or ease of changing a party's structure
• Chapter 2
• This chapter sets up the book's central argument,, which is that the PJ's fluid internal structure can be traced to its formative phase (36)
• but also, it's proscription after the first coup meant that it was highly decentralized, had a "movement" structure, which continues to this day (36-37)
• decentralization during proscription period meant peronist movement essentailly in anarchy, allowed for many autonomous units to self-direct, also allowed for groups to seek very divergent goals, from leftist to conservative, all under name of peronism (41-43)
• "partyization" occurred during teh 1980s, where the movement focused mainly on winning elections (minus a few revolutionary groups and the Ubaldinist labor unions), but it did not result in routinization (49-57)
• chapter 3;
• the PJ is an "informal mass party" (59-60)
• mass because: it maintains an extensive membership (60)
• it has a dense organizational strucutre, partucularly in working class neighborhoods (61)
• it has lots of informal structures that help it embed deeply into working-and lower-class neighborhoods (62)
• the party is informal (doesn't rely on bureaucracy), segemented (few insitutionalized horizontal ties between groups) and decentralized (65-76)
• chapter4: populism in crisis: environmental change and party failure, 1983-1985
• chapter5: union-party links: see levitsky 2003a
• in peripheral provinces where hte uniosn were weak, union leaders had only gotten their tercio thanks to the good will of hte party bsoses, so in the provinces it was much easier to dismantle this (114)
• the 25 organizations, which was allied with the Renovators, didn't demand any institutional linkages to the party, just assumed the renovadores would reward them. in the end, they didn't and the 1987 Congress did not establish any body/org to represent labor inside the party. party leaders ended up choosing who the few remaining labor representatives would be  (116-118)
• int eh face of union politics, some uniosn set up their own territorial based agrupaciones, but these end up being fixed investments which helps entrench teh system of union political fragmentation (131)
• chapter 6: Menemism and Neoliberalism: Programmatic adaptation in teh 1990s
•  chapter 7: the view from below, party activists and the transformation of base-level peronism
• argument: two factors that allowed teh PJ to maintain its activists base even as it programmatically changed (and experience litlte intra-party dissent for this change) (186)
• increase access to state resources
• decentralized party structures
• the combo of sate resources and local autonomy allowed some local groups to engage in traditional peronist practices even as the national aprty abandonded them
• but by relying on state resources the personal, ideological, and union-based ties that had sustained local peronist organizations began to erode
• this left he party more reliant on state resources than it ever had been before
• chapter 8: the paradox of menemism: party adaptation and regime stability in the 1990s
• chapter 9: crisis, party adaptation, and democracy: argentina in comparative perspective

Senén González and Borroni 2011

• Introduction
• this article questions the extent to qhich context creaqtes social dialogue, versus strategic action of the actors involved, or if it's a combination of these variables (34)
• Strategic Focus
• looking at the role external circumstances play and what actors do to understand how revialization is happening (35)
• the context changed greatly between teh 90s adn the 00s (36), and much of that change was caused by change in politics (37)
• in general, actors respond to these new circumstances in different ways, meaning that external circumstances do not force change, there is some strategic choice involved (37-38)
• what happens is a combination of context, institutions, historical paths, and strategic options available (38)
• some history of social dialogue
• 1994 CGT and employers made an agreement that focused mainly on employment and labor reform, but most of these points were not put into practice (41)
• 1997 there was an attempt to dialogue over flexbilization, but it totally failed
• 2001: social dialogue about how to ameliorate, end the crisis, resulted in Jefes y Jefas de Hogar and other things (42)
• after 2003 the government recuperated its role as a labor regulator, respecting labor institutions, and pushing for social dialogue
•  El Consejo Nacional del Empleo, la Productividad, y el Salario Minimo, vital, y Movil
• the minimujm wage council is the best example of new social dialogue (43)
• it aims to increase formal employment and improve inequality
• includes both the CGT and the CTA
• also, collective bargaining
• (44-47) numbers of colective agreements, same as the Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg (2011) article
• labor conflict
•  way more strikes after 2003 (47)
• in 1990s and early 00s, labor wasn't strong enough bu saw piqeuteros and other actions as an outgrwoth of labor union weakness/inability to strike
• 2006 strikes = 770, 2010 strikes = 940, growth each year (see data page 48)
• though proportionally most strikes are in public sector, number of people and days lost in private sector grew a lot, while public sector was fairly consistent 2006-2010 (49)
• Conclusion
• suggest that social dialogue is increasing, point to collective bargaining and minimum wage council (50)
• experience in Argentina shows that revitalization doesn't necessarily have to look like what people say in Global North
• actors made the difference in this case, as social dialogue mechanisms existed in teh 1990s, they were just ignored, started to be used when K's decided to use them (51)
• Argentina is still looking for a grand Social Pact, but I think this is just playing games with teh Global North/Germany literature

Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg 2011

• Introduction
• Bargaining has become more centralized since the decentralization of the 1990s (155)
• describes three levels: local, sector, and national (with government)
• looking at two time periods, 1990-2002 and 2003-2010 (156)
• checking three types of determinants: economic, legal institutions, and political ideologies that help determine where bargaining will happen
• THESIS: 90s dectralized but in 00s became "cnetralizacion intermedia"
• Determinants in the lit
• economic
• opening to global trade (labor cotsts become important) ( 156-157)
•  geographic dispersement of industries plays a role (157)
• structure of employment plays a role (157-158)
• legal institutions (158-159)
• political/ideological (159-160)
• Structure of Collective bargaining
• collective agreements went WAY up after 2002 (161)
• before 2002, average per year was 177, most was 219.
• after 2002 LEAST was 348 and most, in 2010, 2038
• careful when citing this data, words dont' match grafic
• coverage went from 1 mil in 2004 to 4 mil in 2009
• this contrast with 1990s, when high unemployment led to lots of off-the-books workers (161-162)
• coverage in was roughly 84.5% in 2008
• in 1991 negotiations between union adn employer were only 19% of contracts, all the rest were sector-level (163)
• by 1998 this had risen to 80%
• after 2003 a jump to sector-level being about 30% of contracts, hovered there through 2010 (163-164)
• between 2004 and 2008, sector negotiations rose by 291%, but decentralized, enterprise level also rose 236% (164)
• sector-level contracts are important, because they set the minimum wage levels and day length
• Content of Contracts and salary
• in teh 1990s, all contracts tended to focus on felixbilization
• entre 2003 and 2010, bigger deal was pay issues
• almost all included pay increases, but many of these were thanks to increase in legal minimum wage
• also, government stepped in to get employers and unions at the table to try and iron out issues before neogitiations (165)
• data on salary increases (165)
• salaries paid began to match those in sector agreements, meaning local employers had less flexibility in what they paid workers (165)
• this means that workers pay is being determined on a collective basis, not and individual basis (166)
• Legal Institutions
• state has two major interventions:
• personaria gremial: uniosn have the right to bargain (167)
• inscripcion gremial: union exists, can represent its workers, but only its workers, and cannot take precedent over a union with personaria gremial
• approving collective contracts
• these are very strong (168)
• unions
• generally pyramidal and vertical
• have a double game: national level/political and local level through comisiones internas o delegados
•  three levels: local, federation (sector, state), national (CGT)
• 1st two levels do all the bargaining
• CGT at third level is a political entity, doesn't do any direct bargaining for wages
• changes in the 1990s
• all three things changed, laws, economics, and political ideologies (169)
• each of these led to decentralization of bargaining, sometimes down to individual level (168-172)
• but since 2003 all three things have changed to slow the decentralization
• laws
• Néstor increased freedom of unions to strike, though he did keep the government's right to regulate strikes of "servicios esenciales" (173)
• but the new law included that strikers could not be replaced or face retribution from employers
• economic
• debt default and growing economy in the 00s
• ...and all of this came because Kirchner had a new political ideology
• and his drive to create alliances with unions (174)
• conclusions
• in Argentina the law is the major variable in explaining the differences between the 1990s and 2000s, but the other determinants also played a role (174)
• personaria gremial helps prevent fragmentation of the labor movement (175)
• now the government is acting like a coordinador of the disparate demands of workers and employers

Senen Gonzalez 2011

• Introduction
• after 2003, unions became a much stronger player
• government began being more involved in economy
•  collective contracts grew a great deal, from and average or 197 per year in the 1990s, to 406 in 2003, 568 in 2005, 930 in 2006, 1654 in 2009
• question of the article: are unions revitalizing themselves, or are they just reacting to the changing context? (42)
• comparing the years 1990-2001 and 2002-2008
• articles suggests that there aren't only more collective contracts, but that the content of these contractsis also better
• there is a transformation of of the interior structures of unions, too, thanks to the presence of delegados in the workplace
• Nuevas Reglas del juego: politicas publicas
• Nestor Kirchner importantly tried to boost internal consumption among Argentines, and of course the debt default and the end of the convertibility plan (43)
• the state is aiming to take an active role in promoting ethical employment and social inclusion of workers (44)
• suggests that the old (and new) state-labor colatiion is based on the negotiation of salaries (46)
• state promotes salary increases, while unions make demands within inflation targets of the government
• mostly with CGT, since CTA does not have personaria gremial
• creates pattern bargaining (47)
• Consejo de Salario Minimo, Vital, y Movil includes CGT, CTA and business leaders (47)
• 2004 labor law change tries to consolidate some of the post-2001 changes in labor, including giving a stronger right to strike (though the right to strik eof "essential services" is still limited)
• also, some limitation of manager discretion, esepcailly around firing without just cause and arbitrary layoffs (49)
• El actor sindical: tradiciones y nuevas percepciones
• CTA was acting more like a social movement union, while CGT is bureaucratic thanks to strong labor institutions (50)
• seems like the revitalization in collective bargaining is less about getting more members, and more about improving union (leaders) position in poliitcs (51)
• BUT that's not the whole story, adn there are some challengers to this story
• Los indicadores de la revitalizaction
• workplaces with delegados have a much higher unionization rate (53)
• Collective contracts
• in teh 1990s, most common demand was about flexibilit yo employment
• in 2000s, wage levels became the most common thing in bargaining, and included social dialogue to figure out correct level (55)
• fighting back against "individualization" of salary
• coverage went from 3 million to 5 million between 2003 and 2008 (no citation)
• labor conflict
• more of them, peaking in 2007/2008 (56-57)
• state is still the most important target, but private sector is growing as a target (and state is shrinking, slightly (58)
• Conclusion
• most of this revitalization is coming from opportunities in a new context (59)
• CGT is doing top-down revitalization 
•