Palomino and Silvana 2009

Caracterization de las nuevas inscriciones y personiaerias gremiales aen la argentina (2003-208)

• Introduction
• literature points to a revitalization of the labor movement (149)
• after a decade of other social conflicts predominating, industrial conflict (against private sector )seems to be regaining its central importance for unions
• thsi article focuses on the new unions that have ben registered, what they look like, how they act (150)
• looks at:
• the extent to which unions are centralizing
• what industries are being newly organized
• difference between public and private in demanding union recognition
• OVERALL: suggests a possilbe change in teh role of the state in granting personaria gremial, and that the institutions are beomcing more fluid, not as politically-focused as the used to be
• are we seeing a new generation question the old unions, and demand changes in the old unions, or perhaps whole new unions?!
• list of rights of personiaria gremiale (151)
• Some numbers
• applications:
• entre 2005 and 2008, 348 new unions (151), of which 95.4% were local level unions (151)
• 34% were for state-employer places (teachers, etc)
• Service industry 4%
• breakdown of industry, numbr of unions, etc (153-155)
• personarias gremiales
• approved 133 applications (155)
• Historical perspective
• historical numbers 158-170
• conclusions
• since 1983 much of the growth has been state-level unions, esepcailly among minucipal workers (171)
• education workers are the most powerful, most often strikers ()172)
• 
  

Senen Gonzalez 2011

• Introduction
• after 2003, unions became a much stronger player
• government began being more involved in economy
•  collective contracts grew a great deal, from and average or 197 per year in the 1990s, to 406 in 2003, 568 in 2005, 930 in 2006, 1654 in 2009
• question of the article: are unions revitalizing themselves, or are they just reacting to the changing context? (42)
• comparing the years 1990-2001 and 2002-2008
• articles suggests that there aren't only more collective contracts, but that the content of these contractsis also better
• there is a transformation of of the interior structures of unions, too, thanks to the presence of delegados in the workplace
• Nuevas Reglas del juego: politicas publicas
• Nestor Kirchner importantly tried to boost internal consumption among Argentines, and of course the debt default and the end of the convertibility plan (43)
• the state is aiming to take an active role in promoting ethical employment and social inclusion of workers (44)
• suggests that the old (and new) state-labor colatiion is based on the negotiation of salaries (46)
• state promotes salary increases, while unions make demands within inflation targets of the government
• mostly with CGT, since CTA does not have personaria gremial
• creates pattern bargaining (47)
• Consejo de Salario Minimo, Vital, y Movil includes CGT, CTA and business leaders (47)
• 2004 labor law change tries to consolidate some of the post-2001 changes in labor, including giving a stronger right to strike (though the right to strik eof "essential services" is still limited)
• also, some limitation of manager discretion, esepcailly around firing without just cause and arbitrary layoffs (49)
• El actor sindical: tradiciones y nuevas percepciones
• CTA was acting more like a social movement union, while CGT is bureaucratic thanks to strong labor institutions (50)
• seems like the revitalization in collective bargaining is less about getting more members, and more about improving union (leaders) position in poliitcs (51)
• BUT that's not the whole story, adn there are some challengers to this story
• Los indicadores de la revitalizaction
• workplaces with delegados have a much higher unionization rate (53)
• Collective contracts
• in teh 1990s, most common demand was about flexibilit yo employment
• in 2000s, wage levels became the most common thing in bargaining, and included social dialogue to figure out correct level (55)
• fighting back against "individualization" of salary
• coverage went from 3 million to 5 million between 2003 and 2008 (no citation)
• labor conflict
• more of them, peaking in 2007/2008 (56-57)
• state is still the most important target, but private sector is growing as a target (and state is shrinking, slightly (58)
• Conclusion
• most of this revitalization is coming from opportunities in a new context (59)
• CGT is doing top-down revitalization 
• 
  

Martin and Brady 2007

Martin, Nathan D., and David Brady. 2007. "Workers of the Less Developed World Unite? A Multilevel Analysis of Unionization in Less Developed Countries". American Sociological Review. 72 (4): 562-584

• Introduction
• Study seeks to understand why unionization varies across LDCs and across different types of workers (563)
• argument: variation in union membership is a function of more than the worker's individual characteristics, but is also constrained by country-level institutions, industrialization, and globalization
• Expectations
• Individual characteristics that will increase unionization probability
• middle-age (not young) (564)
• male
• lower class...though there are more white collar unions in LA
• Country-level characteristics
• ex-communist regime (565)
• result in high unionization AND distinctive relations between unions and nascent democratic institutions
• democracy
• higher unionization rate
• size of state
• more government = more unions
• influence of IMF
• will result in smaller government
• influence of ILO
• Industrialization should increase unionization (566)
• this assumes LDCs industrialize int eh same way that First World industrialized (567)...too simple!
• Globalization
• arguments go both ways...can create transnational linkages in labor movements, but also give capital greater leverage
• measured as amount of trade
• Data and Methods
• regional pattern is discernible: greater unionization in Eastern Europe (post-communist) than any other region (569)
• construct a class schema using earnings level, occupational category, and educational attainment when appropriate (570)
• uses GDP per capita to measure industrialization (572): WOULDN'T THIS BE INFLATED BY FINANCIALIZATION, IF PRESENT?
• but also include % of labor force in industry versus agriculture
• decompose the analysis into post-communist and not, since post-communist has such a strong effect
• Results
• workers in ex-communist countries 2.75 times more likely to be unionized (574)
• democracy is not significant
• government expenditure as % of GDP not significant
• ILO not significant
• IMF is significant in expected way (a person is 50-60% less likely to be unionized)
• most globalization variables not significant (575)
• WHICH MEANS THAT inflation and institutional variation are more important predictors of unionization across LDCs
• in ex-communist countries the unskilled proletariat is WAY more likely to be unionized (578)
• Discussion
• industrialization isn't creating new union members! weird!/DUH! (580)
• but also globalization had no effect...is that a problem with data?

Aguilar García and Vargas Guzmán 2006

Aguilar García, Javier, and Reyna Vargas Guzmán. 2006. La CTM en el periodo de la globalización: del sexenio de Carlos Salinas al gobierno de Vicente Fox. Toluca, Estado de México: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.

Chapter 2, Zedillo’s sexennio

1. Crash in 1995
1. economy in shambles, throughout sexennio:
2. continued neoliberalism, obeyed WB, IMF, etc.
3. Created IFE
1. regulated political party finances
2. prohibited collective affiliation with parties
3. created freer elections
2. Political Economy
1. reformed IMSS (94)
1. Zedillo promises not to privative (94)
2. CTM agrees reform will be good for workers (94-95)
3. Both promise changes will be minor, but changes are (in fact) fundamental
4. CTM declares this is not a privatization, but author argues it’s an example of stealthy, incremental privatization (95-96)
3. Labor Politics
1. Minimum wage
1. minimum wage pacts continued, inflation grew 164% while salaries only grew 7% (97)
2. CTM assured their members they would get wage hikes of 18-36% in the next pact.... (97-8)
3. But in 1998 wage negotiations: (99)
1. CTM got 14.75% (99)
2. UNT got 18% (99)
3. CROC got 24.5% (99-100)
4. CTMs power was waning (says author) (100)
4. In February 1998 CTM joins a new pact promising to increase productivity, and they say that this is the “end of the era of pacts”, signaling that workers could be getting higher salaries (but this is all show, says author) (100-1)
2. nueva cultura laboral
1. an attempt to make a pact between labor and business without the influence of government, and thus protect the LFT against a assault from alliance of government and business
2. CROC and CROM signed alongside CTM and CT
3. terms:
1. “satisfy material demands of workers” ie let workers earn wages that allow them to survive
2. create employment and preserve current employed workers, but allow for rational use of free resources to adapt business to changing economic climate
3. tie wages to productivity gains
4. make employee training a permanent venture
5. seek harmony between working class and business owners
4. thsi was important because it was an attempt by CTM to remain the most important labor interlocutor with business/government
3. flexibilidad laboral
1. teh CTM and others kept signing collective contracts that were increasingly flexiblilizing labor, but the CTM thought this was necessary so that they could “retain a  window” into the bargaining process (104)
2. number of collective contracts for officail unions rose through 1990s (104-5)
3. number of strikespeittions for ficial unions rose through 1990s (gradually) (105)
1. but strikes not generally over wags, mostly a discursive tool to protect privileges of union and leaders (106)
2. actual strikes plummeted to only 8 in 2000
4. neoliberalism has limited the use of corporatism as a channel for resolving differense in labor isues, now just a way for leaders to maintain their privileges (106)
5. lots of unemployment (107-109)
4. LFT reform
1. employers kept pushing for law reform (109) (and list of what they wanted, mostly flexibilization, subcontracting, etc)
2. PAN also had a proposal, very pro-business (111-112)
3. Velazquez dies, maybe this is the chance for change! 113)
4. but the PRI wasn’t ready to abandon its allies in teh labor movement (114)
5. CTM, CROC, CROM all agreed to sa set of principles that would protect unions, referring to Constitution mostly (115)
1. UNT and others joined them, except they dislike JCAs and CTM’s desire to protect JCAs (115)
6. reform dies
5. CTM in elections, 1997
1. see page 123, everyone loses seats, CTM still has the most, though
2. CTM has obviously lost much of its ability to shape elections, most of its power to shape bargaining, so it can only hope to maintain itself through helping the government, and receiving help in return.
6. The death of Velazquez
1. a few candidates to take over, but all of them really old
2. four factions
1. traditionalists
1. including Alcaine, who was described as an authoritarian who would not permit dissidence
2. head of petrochemical union, “difficult balance” between the traditionalists and the renovationists, would end up with rupture
3. “Decision Vertical” = let Valazquez pick the new leader, but he would likely pick an outside man who had little of his own social base
4. a group that wanted to increase CTM’s ability to dialogue with teh government, but if someone from this faction gained leadership lots of traditionalists would probably leave
3. death of Velazquez seemed to be a chance to renovate the labor movement as a whole (131)
1. STRM’s Hernández Juárez tries to take the lead
4. CTM starts talking about “restructuring” of unionism in the nation (132)
1. then kablooie!  UNT is founded practically the next day
5. Alcaine says leaders in the UNT just after personal power (132-3)
6. some leaders unhappy with Alcaine’s weakness in teh face of the government (133)
7. Rise of the PAN in 2000, a new scenario for social corporatism?
1. numbers of deputies/senators lost/gained (134-136)
2. CTM
1. 11 deputies in 2000, but had 28 in 1997
2. 4 senators in 2000, 8 in 1997
3. CROC had 1 deputy in 2000, 3 in 1997
4. Internal attempt to unseat Alcaine by SUTERM (his own union), demand greater democracy
5. Fox says its the job of the workers to democratize their own unions! (141)
8. section on labor law reform attempt of 2000
4. the CTM under Fox
1. Fox came in saying he was going to change everything, agrarian reform, energy reform (electricity and oil), and labor reform.  NONE of them happened (149)
2. no formal change in labor law, but businesses see that PAN/Fox giving them more leeway, enforcing less (162)
3. STPS starts focusing on “workers and their families”, NOT unions (164)
4. the CTM has no independent plan of its own, so it simply negotiates to be included in Fox’s efforts, to keep their political prizes, PAN agrees since they have no bases in labor sector (165)
1. CTM ratifies Fox’s decisions
2. CTM gets to keep spots on JCAs, in government agencies, etc
5. data on drop in salaries (165-170)
6. between 2000 and 2003 (176)
1. CTM contracts 2423 -->1637 (loss of 32%)
7. between 2001 and 2003
1. CROC contracts 780 --> 572 (27%)
2. CROM contracts 252 --> 156 (38%)
8. WAAAY fewer strikes (178-9)
9. CTM an only protect the power and wealth of its leaders/elites, has no power to improve workers’ lives (180)
10. May 1st 2002 CROC, CROM, CTM come out to Zocalo against LFT reform that overly favors the government, hurts unions (190)
1. “reform is ok, as long as it doesn’t hurt CTm leadership” (192)
11. in 2003 elections the CTM negotiated to have a number of representatives on the ballot for the PRI, inspite of working with PAN in some ways during previous 3 years.
12. unionization rate numbers (203-206)
5. Conclusion
1. CTM had no project of its own, simply becomes a corporatist union with whoever happens to be in power (207-8)