Conclusion:
Some differences between the cases:
o
Business leaders
§
Brazil: by 1980s they had joined unions in
opposition to dictatorship, assuming there would be some negotiated transition
§
South Africa: white business leaders remained
opposed to unions, as they would have demanded ending of racial hierarchy laws
(256-257)
o
Opposition movement in South Africa had deeper
racial persecution to unite them
·
BUT striking similarities about the
socioeconomic demands made by both movements….each seemed to want to change
capitalism, not just gain citizenship in capitalism (257-258)
·
Explaining similar dynamics
o
Both countries were late industrializers,
peripheral economies
o
Both ended up producing mostly for export,
meaning wages did not increase over the years (this is, supposedly, in
comparison to earlier industrializers where wages did increase as production
increased…even Seidman says this is a weird comparison) (260-1)
o
Militant labor movements in both cases arose
during times of conflict between industrialists and authoritarian governments
(brought on by recessions) (261)
o
CRUCIAL PART: change in labor process that
increased numbers of semi-skilled and skilled (black, in SA case) workers, and
better technology, meant industrialists were less willing to repress (261-262)
o
WORKERS SAW FACTORY AND COMMUNITY GRIEVANCES AS
CLOSELY LINKED (262)
§
Relatively skilled did not act like labor
aristocracy, made larger, encompassing demands
o
Social Movement unionism (263):
§
emerged from rapid authoritarian
industrialization
·
state policies designed to attract capital and
control labor during growth periods
·
urban poor really lost out in these policies
§
when international capital dried up (during oil
crisis), the elite bargain broke
§
semi-skilled took advantage of this elite crisis,
so industrialists were demanding inclusion in policy processes and workers were
demanding inclusion in the benefits of growth at the same time
§
built not on old identities, but on new created
ones based on similar experiences (264)
o
Suggests that instead of looking at the unions
themselves, we should look at the structural conditions that promote and shape
potential for militance (273)
o
“At a very general level, dependent development
may limit the willingness of states and dominant classes to respond to demands
fromt eh popular sector for distributive policies: in their effort to attract
foreign capital and technology, and to sell industrial products internationally,
state and employers may be especially unwilling to share the benefits of
economic growth, or to raise real wages.” (274)
§
But if this happens, workers can find that they
can use their newly expanded capacity to create militant and politicized labor
movements
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