Martin 1968

Martin, R. 1968. "Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework". Sociology. 2 (2): 205-220.

• Studies unions in England
• constraints = thigns that inhibit the union exectuive from destroying internal opposition (205)
• definition of "democracy" = the status of opposition (207)
• democracy exists where organized opposition is tolerated
• it is admitted, however, that faction within a union may harm a union's bargaining position
• 12 constraints on the executive (208)
• political culture (208-209)
• whether internal union culture emphasizes democracy or not
• government attitudes and behavior (209)
• sees effect of whether government wants wage constraint or not, if it wants leaders to discipline members
• membership distribution (209-210)
• the more homogeneous the demands of membership, the more likely democracy will prevail
• strong leaders/bureaucratization arises so that professionals can balance interests of many different groups
• industrial environment (210)
• ownership structures: oncentrated biz deamnds unions to also be pyramids
• employer hostility may increase union solidarity, decrease willingness to allow faction in union
• economic environment
• opposition is OK when economy is good
• technoogy (211)
• for example, work where people have time to chat, are close to one another can build solidarity, opposition groups....divided workers less likely to have time/ability to engage in political discussion
• source of bargaining power
• mass (industrial) power = strong exec
• craft power/local workshop power = weak exec
• membership characteristics
• "political skills" and education, moang other things (211-212)
• Membership beliefs (212)
• about what executive can legitimately do 
• opposition resources and expertise (212-213)
• ability and resources to generate and maintain opposition in a union 
• Leadership Attitudes
• how committed leader is to democracy, etc. (213)
• union structure (213-214)
• does formal structure limit disagreement? allow it to be articulated?
• sub-structural autonomy can help breed democracy
• looks at two cases, from England, RR workers and an engineers union (non-RR, I believe) (214-216)
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Turner 1991

Turner, Lowell. 1991. Democracy at Work: Changing World Markets and the Future of Labor Unions. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Big question:  sure, there is union decline, but not everywhere and not to the same extent (some places fine!)  why not?

The argument:  “Markets matter, but so do Institutions”

• markets are more interdependent, competitive, and change faster than ever before (led by Japanese)
• work reorganization has also become an important issue for bargaining
• wages still important
• but now unions/workers not interested in ‘just letting managers manage’
• local reorganization means more bargaining done at local level, hard to ‘upscale’ bargaining
• the decline in number of workers (thanks to productivity increases) is a slightly better explanation for union decline than manager opposition
• explanation for differences across countries, however, lies in “the way interest representation is institutionalized, or more precisely, the structures that represent workers’ interests.” (12)
• where unions already had power in managerial areas, unions doing OK
• W. Germany there are statutes, which protect union’s autonomy
• Japan ‘collaboration’ is simply a practice, not a law, thus it is more on management’s terms
• in Sweden, corporatists bargain allowed unions to used political clout to increase their ability to be a part of management in 1980s
• doing well despite not having historical role in management
• US, Britain, France, Italy have neither, see big declines
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Fernie and Metcalf 2005

Fernie, Sue, and David Metcalf. 2005. Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge.

GREAT BRITAIN!

Susan Fernie:  “The Future of British Unions: Introduction and Conclusions”

• Problematic union policies to members (in Great Britain):
• recruitment campaigns in service industries not strategically supported
• concerns of female members never were addressed
• not doing well courting youth
• unions didn’t offer much more than businesses might (extra benefits)
• unions    did not realize how weak their position was, totally unraveled when they lost the support of government

John Kelly “Social Movement theory and Union Revitalization in Britain”

• question:  why not much better outcomes now that Labour is in power? (in 2005)
• micro level:  it is not merely a sense of unhappiness at work, but a sense of INJUSTICE that triggers unionization/desire to be in movement
• macro-level is about opportunity structures
• micro happenings:
• employee discontent (in GB) seemed to peak in early 90s, but then decrease a bit well before Labour Government came to power
• employees are less critical of their bosses
• workers don’t seem to think unions are effective, anyway
• macro happenings:
• unions seem to be too weak to influence Labour government
• unions even less able to influence party internal machinations
• Labour has strong, large enough coalition in Parliament to be able to handle a revolt from union wing
• AND unions don’t have many allies in civil society

Turner 2003

Lowell Turner “Reviving the Labor Movement:  A Comparative Perspective”, p. 23-58

in Cornfield, Daniel B, and Holly J. McCammon. 2003. Labor Revitalization: Global Perspectives and New Initiatives. Amsterdam: JAI.

1. “Periods of protest and mass demonstration are followed by quieter, usually longer periods of institutional consolidation” (23)
2. Central argument:  Periods of popular protest, including rank and file mobilization and broad coalition building, are necessary for the revitalization of labor movements (24)
1. contradicts the “too much democracy” thesis (crozier, huntington, watanuke 1975)
2. institutions stagnate over time
3. mobilization refreshes/ revitalizes institutions
4. institutions themselves can reduce incentives for mobilization (see Germany!)
5. causal lines between institutions and social movements run both ways
3. employers and the state play a central role in shaping the prospects for for workplace representation
4. by 1980s, unions realized firm level initiatives were too insignificant to reverse decline
5. UK example
1. origins in trade unions, like US
2. 1960s social movements revitalized unions
1. unions participated in anti-war movements
2. unions radicalized a bit
3. unions have great political power in 1970s, elect a number of Labour governments
4. why, then, did UK unions suffer so many defeats?
1. weak institutionalization, decentralized structure...
2. which led to over-reliance on mobilization (shopfloor steward as locus of power)...
3. which in turn decreases when economy got bad
5. NOW, working more with government, legislation, social partnership efforts
1. BUT for this to work need to
1. be able to mobilize still
2. organize new workers
3. go international as well
6. GERMANY
1. Revitalization in 1960s because
1. grew to dominate works councils, even though these were meant to weaken unions
2. 1960s social movements
1. by 1970s students were actually in unions, with jobs
3. periodic, large-scale mobilization
2. BUT today, they are not organizing the unorganized
3. German unions are almost TOO institutionalized, too embeded in the political economy of the nation
7. US
1. business unionism replaced social movement unions, unions became service providers
2. Did not align with social movements
1. too focused on bread and butter, internal demands
2. too worried about anti-communism
3. some exceptions, like AFSCME in Memphis, and UAW
8. Social movement mobilization and power can be used to boost labor union power
9. institutions and institutionalization can strengthen movements and prepare for their long-term survival, but it can also harm movements, restrict them