Auyero 2000

Auyero, Javier. 2000. "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account". Latin American Research Review. 35 (3): 55-81.

• Story of Norma, who opens a unidad basica (grassroots Peronism center) and her relationshi pwith rising politician Gustavo Pedele
• Norma is the puntera, Pedele the referente
• at first Norma has minimal access to state resources
• "the important thing to know is the right person" (56) -- mobilize people and know the right person and you can get access to resources
• the "red peronista" operates a problem-solving network that institutes a web of material and symbolic resource distribution (57)
• Clientelism must be approached from its least known and least specatcular side: the everyday dealings, the practices and perspectives of clients, the problem solving network that links clients, brokers, and patrons (58)
• fieldwork from the 1990s
• Argument: as neoliberalism was decreasing the role of the state in providing for society, clientelism and political networks became increasingly important for gaining access...indeed, clientelist networks began to replace the functions that the state was abandoning (60)
• hyper-unemployment has drained the slum economy, causing informal reciprocal netowrks to bleed to death (62)
• in Villa Paraíso survival strategies are increasingly embedded in political networks
• this is reinforced when there simply isn't a formal economy for these people to ever refill their private funds with
• political party has become the most reliable means of satisfying the poor's basic needs (63)
• the punteros similarly can't find resources outside of the party
• Brokers and their networks
• the punteros closest helpers stick around in hopes that the puntero may find them a job
• the inner circle does a lot of the legwork for solving everyday problems of the slum dwellers (66)
• the outer circle has contacts with the puntero, but they are looser (67)
• punteros function as gatekeepers between the municipal government and the people
• the differences in brokers stems from their control of resources from above
• sometimes brokers specifically give incorrect information to their clients in order to maintain their role as the only channel through which resources can be found (68)
• social workers, NGOs, and other community activists get angry with this (69)
• in neighborhoods where social organizations have disappeared (due to deep poverty), punteros become the only place to access information, thus becoming indispensable problem solvers for neighborhood dwellers
• punteros also work hard to reinforce their necessity in this regard
• The client's perspective
• punteros are sometimes seen as using the people, or corrupt politicians, especially by those who don't use their services (70)
• but to members of their inner circle, and those who rely on them as problem solvers, punteros are usually caring people who personally solve problems for others
• the punteros become the ones distributing the resources, not the state (71)
• elections are seen as times to solve problems...(we have to wait for an election) (72)
• but many others see assistance as a more consistent thing, not a part of "politics"
•  norms of assistance and problem solving become understood...i get this, i go to a rally (73)
• brokers present their job as deriving from a passion for helping people...those in a broker's network agree, though those outside of a network suggest brokers are simply in it for themselves
• the tie between client and broker is only maintained as long as the broker seems/is able to deliver! (74)
• 
  

Lapegna 2013

Lapegna, Pablo. 2013. "Social Movements and Patronage Politics: Processes of Demobilization and Dual Pressure". Sociological Forum. 28 (4): 842-863.

• Monte Azul (Arg), 2003, herbicides dropped on families, results in protests by Movimiento Campesino de Formosa, MoCaFor (842-843)
• Monte Azul and Moreno, 2009, same thing, no protests!
• this in spite of the fact that administrations between 2003 and 2011 were generally nice to protest movements (843)
• Argument: processes of demobilization result from the pervasiveness of patronage/clientelism (uses interchangeably) and from a relational process of "dual pressure" on popular movements
• dual pressure: from below: poor participate in movements as a problem-solving mechanism (ie get money and food), so when they join movements they expect something in return
• from above: when movements finally make alliances with politicians, politicians expect movement to eschew collective actions (844)
• Article attempts to find the toolkit that keeps SMOs alive even when they aren't protesting
• Distribution of resources in LA is embedded in a long standing traditional expectation of reciprocity and mutual obligation -- author describes this as a "cultural" thing (845)
• "I focus here on the links between clientelism and social movements, because they offer a window to see how those symbolic aspects are connected to material grievances and expressed in quotidian interactions, while shedding light on the agentic aspects and strategic choices of popular actors.
• Contention, Patronage Politics, and Popular Demobilization in Argentina and Formosa
• After 2001, then 2003 and Kirchner, the relationship between the state and movements changed strikingly, and many movements demobilized (849)
• Argument: demobilization is less a function of cooptation and more of the dual pressures from members and the political allies of an SMO
• Popular movements and Patronage Politics
• public employment is a BIG driver in Formosa, which is driven by patronage
• welfare benefits + public employment is the main source of income for most Formosa residents (850)
• MoCaFor was created when a previous agrarian movement become an client/appendage of the provincial government in the 1990s
• in order to maintain themselves, they allied with the national FTV (851)
• When FTV joined Kirchner, MoCaFor found itself as an ally of the nattional government and enemy of the provincial government
• Demobilization as Dual Pressures
• Pressure from below
• people who join the movement expect something in return (852)
• as time goes on they specifically look for planes  money
• MoCaFor becoming to look like a client machine itself (852-853)
• leaders feel like they are constantly trying to fix peoples problems (853)
• to get things from MoCaFor, people had to have individual meetings with leaders, a very clientelistic sort of relationship!
• Just as exchange of goods and services may eschew collective action, expectations of reciprocity may subdue internal dissent (854)
• Pressure from above
• MoCaFor planned a march that was cancelled when head of FTV (and memebr of K government) comes to help negotiations
• governor eventaully backs out of this deal, negotiates with FTV at national level rather than with MoCaFor (855)
• Mocafor are distributors of resources, but also recipients from their national olitical allies, so they have to follow the lead of those above them
• in the end, Mocafor is just like it sown members, it relies on funds from above and demobilizes at the behest of national allies (856-857)
• "if we (leaders) confront the government, then we just make our people suffer along with us"
• Clientelism in this case is a bit exploitative, but also a strategy to achieve the movements goals (857)
• Discussion
• Paradox: social movement leaders reject clientelism while inadvertently reproducing similar practices within their own organizations (858)
• important to note that Mocafor does what it does so that it can continue as a social movement organization...what good is ideals without money for food?
• 
  

Arnold and Samuels 2011

Jason Ross Arnold and and David J. Samuels 2011, "Evidence from Public Opinion" (31-51)

in  Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts. 2011. The resurgence of the Latin American left. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

• Based on Latinobarimetro survey
• Big conclusions:
• No mass-level shift to the left of voters in LA (32)
• citizens see current wealth distribution as a problem, but also don't seem to be more unhappy with it than they ever have been before
• unhappy with performance of democracy, but not democracy itself (32-33)
• left vote is strongly correlated with anti-American sentiment (33)
• No region-wide leftward trend (35)
• voters did increasingly identify as left in Chile, El Salvador, Hoduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela
• Even after left came to power, roughly 75% of respondents in the region believe distribution of wealth was unfair (36-37)
• Democracy:
• everyone unhappy with performance of democracy
• though even that score has decreased slightly, it's still high (38)
• mostly people are unhappy with the institutions as they exist (40)
• generally LAs Ok with democracy as a form of government, but this is often based on incumbent performance (43)
• most Latin Americans seem tot define democracy along liberal-type lines, not populist lines (Mexico is a notable exception) (45)
• Conclusion: Left turn is a bit of a misnomer, as because surveys do not show mass ideological shifts to the left among LA voters

Roberts 2009

Kenneth M. Roberts, Chapter 1: Beyond Neoliberalism: Popoular Responses to Social Changes in Latin America ,1-13

Burdick, John, Philip Oxhorn, and Kenneth M. Roberts. 2009. Beyond neoliberalism in Latin America?: societies and politics at the crossroads. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

• new era has seen the "repoliticization" of development (1-2)
• neoliberalism broke collective actors, but as labor unions declined new "popular subjects", like community-based organizations and indigenous movements, rejected com modification of their lives (2)
• this volume looks toward grassroots level to see uneven development, and uneven responses to market and societal change
• development conditions political and social change (see, e.g. neoliberalism and ISI, which both shaped society as well as the economy/development) (4-6)

Collier and Handlin 2009

chapter 1,

·         Changes in economic models in the 1990s came along with important changes in the urban popular interest regime (4)

o   Labor unions used to be number one

o   Now new community based groups, NGOs, etc. are most likely actors

·         Shift from UP hub to A Net involves three main points on contrast

o   Base units different (unions versus associations) (5)

o   Role of parties different, as parties play a less central role

o   Structure/internal order: hierarchy under UPhub, Anet is less well define, less hierarchical

·         (18) many interests of the popular sectors have material basis, ie people need food shelter water, so popular sector interests could hardly be seen as “postmaterialist”

·         (21) their survery defines popular sectors as those who have not completed high school

Chatper 2

·         Analytics themes acorss chapters (37)

o   Individual problem solving repertoires (37-38)

o   Representational distortion (38) how does popular sector representation compare with middle class rep

o   Associational strategies

o   Scaling

o   State-association ties

Chapter 3, Logics of Collective Action, State Linkages, and Aggregate Traits: The UP-Hub versus the A-Net

• Comparing the UP-Hub (union-party hub) to A-Net (association net) to understand how they work in terms of problem solving and interest mediation for the popular sectors (61-63)
• comparing scope, scaling, access, and autonomy
• IMPORTANT: Comparison between individual collective action (people forming groups) and organizational collective action (groups forming larger groups) is the main difference here
•  two comparisons
• the patterns of collective action, individual (creating groups) and organizational (groups cooperating)
• UP-Hub is more likely to be able to do "organizational collective action", but bad at individual
• A-Net is more likely to be able to do "individual collective action", but bad at organizational
• the state reinforces these differences, but in a way that depends on the time period we are talking about (ISI government versus neoliberal government)
• nature of the relationship between popular organizations and the state
• close, extensive relations in UP-Hub
• slightly more arms length, but increasingly more institutionalized linkages as time passes
•  Logics of collective action
• Resources
• unions need lots of resources, since the strike is their main form of action (66-7)
• membership becomes formalized in order to gather resources
• means there are high barriers to form a union, but once one exists its easier to have organizational collective action (68)
• popular associations are usually resource poor, have trouble holding on to members since the cost of exit is low, but also don't need to coerce members usually (not sure I believe this...when they need members, they need them!)
• easier to form associations, but harder to have collective action because it's expensive (68)
• same relationship holds true in having a convergence of interests
• unions are hard to create consensus, but easier to have organizational collective action because issues are similar
• associations can gather people to work on a project, but its not easy to get cross-organizational action
• the effect of demands (types) on collective action is ambiguous
• 
  

Dinerstein 2010

Dinerstein, Ana Cecilia. 2010. "Autonomy in Latin America: between resistance and integration. Echoes from the Piqueteros experience". Community Development Journal. 45 (3): 356-366.

• Intro:
• new social movements have been reluctant to allow traditional left ideologies to frame their movements
• there is a contradiction in the way movemetns are depicted, either they are
• basis of wider collective action, changing the world without taking power (Holloway 2002), or
• dismissed as contributing to the problem of the World Banks efforts to reduce the role of the state and re-frame social policies in neoliberal terms (357)
• Argument: this is a false dilemma: autonomy from state, market is contested
• focus: how unemployed in Argentina navigated the tension between resistance and integration (357-358)
• focus is on Unemployed Workers' Unions (UTD)
• they maintain autonomy and independence from all political and labor organizations (358)
• created by a group of highly skilled ex-YPF workers
• had become a quasi-city council
• funded by money from state programs, by fighting for re-appropriation of these monies from the state, by mobilizing and receiving social spending (359)
• roadblocks
• State has tried to depoliticize the UTD and other organizations
• early on repression of roadblocks, now simply consistence harassment by the police against the UTD (360)
• government trying to force UTD to become an NGO
• UTD has become the bargainer for workers employed under social programs (361)
• UTD's strategy avoids identification with political power, but gets the state to comply through resistance
• importantly: has no connections to parties or labor unions
• creating new forms of solidarity among the unemployd (362)
• fights back against paternalism
• Downsides:
• women are the majority of members, but aren't in leadership
• has some personalism in leadership
• UTD is in danger of simply replacing politicians as head of client-patron relationship (363)
• also these groups have had trouble moving beyond their local context
• Conclusion
• important difference between accepting the state's invitation tto join social policies and inviting the state to accept their demands for social policy

Garay 2007

Garay, Candelaria. 2007. "Social Policy and Collective Action: Unemployed Workers, Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina". Politics & Society. 35 (2): 301-328.

• Introduction
•  unemployed and informal workers have traditionally been marginalized by labor unions, as they are a threat to formal workers (301)
• but in the 2000s the unemployed in Argentina engaged in an impressive amount of collective action (302)
• and political leaders began to want to integrate these groups into partisan politics
• Argument:  that Plan Trabajar, a national workfare program created in 1996, encouraged collective action among unemployed and informal poor workers (303), because it
• had a short supply of benefits relative to demand
• lack of clear rules to define beneficiaries
• funds were administered to community organizations
• The state responded to protests with more workfare provisions, which in turn brought on more protest!
• Challenges to Popular-Sector Collective Action (Lit Review)
• more informal employment, heterogeneity in people made organization difficult (304)
• belief that most social programs reduced collective action
• despite problem-solving groups being formed, most scholars thought these groups just got pulled into clientelistic networks (305)
• Explaining Collective Action: A Policy Centered Approach
• many of the collective identities of these unemployed only arose after or during protest of policy and state responses
• policies can generate new groups, coalitions, and/or constituencies in, around, and in response to these policies
• this is especially true if policies give money to organizations to disburse, as opposed to state disbursing them directly (306)
• Argument: the program design of Plan Trabajar favored the creation of collective action
• Program Design and Collective Action
• low supply of benefits + no transparency = grievances (306)
• funds disbursed to groups = creation of new collective organizations, and thus identities (307)
• some groups even disbursed benefits based on who showed up to protest
• horizontal linkages between these new groups also sprung up because divided they would lose benefits to more powerful, pre-existing client-machines
• State Responses to Collective action
• repression/confrontation backfired (thanks to democratic context) (308)
• negotiation
• this at first led to more protest, but eventually led to less
• unemployed groups become actors in negotiation with the state, not protesters demanding access
• Protests started before 2001, and by mid-1998 two of these unemployed groups had formed alliances with unions CTA and CCC (311)
• 2000 saw some austerity, limiting number of people who received Plan Trabajar benefits
• new associations emerged from this
• many new and old associations began coordinated nationwide protest (313)
• Duhalde increased beneficiaries despite crisis (313)
• created formal and informal negotiation spaces between state and unemployed
• broader access to benefits meant unemployed groups multiplied, but also fragmented the movement
• Effects of Collective Action
• redefined social policy
• coverage has expanded (314)
• get money instead of a basket of goods
• now you get it until you get a job
• national state came to control this budget and decision on disbursement of these funds 
• but the program seems unable to lift people out of poverty
• changed modes of interest mediation between popular sectors and the state
•  duh, new movement! (315)
• some groups community based, large
• other groups led by social militants
• still others organized from the top down (clientelistic?)
• challenged partisan machines
• popular organizations now have greater access to state resources, as opposed to trying to get them through machines (317)
• reversed normal distance between labor union and unemployed (see CTA alliance)
• created linkages between parties and unemployed groups
• PJ has gotten access to these unemployed, undermining Left parties (318)
• Kirchner tried to get these groups to be his popular sector support (successfully)
• Comparative Context
• Goes against lit, shows that in certain ways policies to alleviate poverty can cause protest, collective action, and increase in social spending (318-320)
• this is happening a bit in Brazil, too (319-320)
• these unemployed groups count as reconfiguration of the PJ (321)