Tuesday, October 22, 2013

Stronk 2013


Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

"Neoliberal Class Formation(s): The Informal Porletariat and "new" Workers' Organizations in Latin America" Susan Spronk 75-94


  • Applies EP Thomspons "class struggle without class" ideas
  • notes other authors (murillo 2001) saying that unions just tried to surivive, not fight enoliberalism
    • But during the neoliberal period the locus of class struggle has moved out of the factory and into the streets/communities (82)
      partially because many people are employed informally/self-employed
    • the focus of class strgugle has shifted from demands over wages to demands for basic subsistence
  • piqueteros born of those who weren't represented by traditional unions
    • at first hey were very radical, non-hierarchical, etc. etc.
    • but then they were coopted by employment plans from Kirchner (except for more radical splinter) (83-84)
  • Oscar Olivera and gas war people: start with everyday struggle, get imporved conditions, and then work towards socialism (85)
    • but actual gains in both cases have been minimal
  • CRITIQUE OF BOTH these organizations arises from an argument about "treating the symptoms versus treating the cause"
  • (86-88) plant takeovers in Argentina and Venezuela face issues with government and with (previous) business owners
    • but even outside of these issues, cooperativism doesn't undo the bad social relations, it just makes the workers their own bosses

Webber and Carr 2013


Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

Introduction: the Latin American Left in Theory and Practice, Jeffrey R. Webber and Barry Carr 1-30


  • Social contradictions of the neoliberal model generated a series of crises in the closing years of the 1990s and the opening moments of the current decade (3)
  • Authors situate contemporary Latin American Left on continuum of "radical Left" to "izquierda permitida" (5)
    • izquierda permitida signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to US impoerial strategies.  In its regime form, it seeks to divide and coopt radical left social movements and parties"
    • the radical left sees liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life" (6)
    • admittedly draws on Castaneda for this idea, but repurposes "bad" left as "really really awesomely radical" Left (my words)
  • neostructuralism idea:  that commodities aren't what will compete on teh world market, but whole social systems (7)
    • rejects market as god of all
    • but admits an international market, suggests that the national institutions can be shaped (by heavy hand of government, if so desired) to make the nation as a whole produce things competitively
    • somewhere between pure world market and pure national protection
      • this is the izquierda permitida
      • focus on redistributing wealth, not on undoing the market which causes inequality in the first place (8)

Monday, October 21, 2013

Hochstetler, Smith, Silva 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"The Road Traveled" Kathryn Hochstetler, William C. Smith, and Eduardo Silva (Conclusion to edited volume)

Concluding remarks for the book, most of which connect different chapters

  • ALternations to political opportunity structure ideas (Sikkink)
    • must also include "levels of threat" as a factor
      • when/if a threat disappears, a transnational network can fold (see FTAA fight for examples)
    • also, even when both domestic and international arenas seem "closed", activists can/will still attempt to change things (not be discouraged, as Sikkink suggests)
    • also whether "opportunities" can even bee objectively defined in the moment is challenged, undermining Sikkink's framework as a way to do anything but analyze post facto
    • questions also about the ability to clearly distinguish between international and national levels...fights can be simultaneously about both
    • Also, activists themselves can be brokers between national/international level, which can be problematic...if the activist/broker leaves the fight, the network may crumble
  • Effects of the Left Turn
    • easy to assume left would be good, but not always the case
    • The impact of shifts in domestic opportunity structures hinge on the interaction of three factors (191):
      • evolution of specific threats and international opportunities
      • the perceptions of movement leaders
      • and the relationship of activists to institutionalized politics
        • if the Left helps us nationally, will activists abandon transnational moves?

Rossi 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed.. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"Juggling Multiple Agendas:The Struggle of Trade Unions against National, Continental, and International Neoliberalism in Argentina" Frederico M. Rossi
  • Focused on resistance to FTAA in Argentina
    • focusing on main coalition against this, whose central actor was the CTA (141)
    • BUT the CTA's participation in block the FTAA and other intternational efforts was conditioned by their nationally focused agenda (142)
    • "The CTA is a paradigmatic case of a national actor involved in transnational activism against neoliberalism operating with an exclusively domestic logic."
  • the CTA saw the FTAA as an act of American imprialism that would undermine Argentina as a nation (144)
    • so the frame was both international and national
  • in Argentina the major coalition opposed to the FTAA was the Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA (FTAA in esp.), No a la Deuda, No a la Militarización y No a la Pobreza (144-145) formed in 2002
    • linked regional groups, Catholic grops, unions, political parties (small ones) na dother social movement organizations (see, e.g 146 table)
  • 2005 big summit held in Argentina against the FTAA (Hugo Chávez and Kirchner had already come out against the agreement (148)
  • CTa in this instance joined a transnational/international movement, but nevertheless did not shift its national focus (150)
  • FTAA essentially dead by 2006
  • ORIt dissolved by 2008, in favor of new regional union, the CSA, so CTA OK with joiningit because it doesn't ahve Cold War history.  At the same time, CTA bows out of Autoconvocatoria (which had been renamed) because the grop couldn't figure out a positive plan (only a negative one: boo to neoliberalism) (153)
    • yet CSA hasn't made a big splash yet, are still trying to get their feet under them
  • since 2009 CTA has done a lot more south-south coordination, though not much has really happened so far
  • CTAs interaction with Kirchner led to a general shift toward focus on domestic policies to the detriment of international actions (154)
  • YET THROUGHOUT AL OF THIS CTA REMAINED INVOLVED IN MERCOSUR, implementing social accords, etc. etc. (154)
  • CTA has simultaneous and PARALLEL agendas (155)
    • some domestic focus, some international focus, some regional focus, but the three rarely ever connect
    • made some gains on domestic front with Kirchner
    • gains on international front mostly due to gains with domestic front
    • so why still with Mercosur? (156)
      • gets CTA working with Arg. foreign policy
      • is some recognition that CTA could play into better domestic recognition
      • and Mercosur seems like a vaiable alternative to FTAA, allows CTA some power whereas FTAA probably wouldn't

Saturday, October 19, 2013

Nolan Garcia 2013

Silva, Eduardo. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia,  Network Dynmaics and Local Labor Rights Movements in Puebla, Mexico 106-140

  • suggests that most labor movements tried to get protective legislation in the face of neoliberalism, and still do (106)
  • whole story is about alliances...when transnational movement returned to wield power at the local level, positive/negative unionization outcomes were decided (mainly) by who was allowed to stay in the alliance...when some members were excluded, unions lost important resources which in turn led to defeat (107)
    • looking at maquilas, especially Kukdong
    • transnational network built over Kukdong fight, then after that was done network leadership was transferred to Mexicans in Matamoros (where they lost)...in two other places, Johnson Contorls and Vaqueros Navarra, national alliances supplied resources that were once supplied by internaional allies, leading to success (107-8)
  • (109) local groups seek international allies in hopes of garnering some resources (put broadly) that would allow them to overcome domestic obstacles
  • an important key to positive outcomes is what happens when transnational movements "come home"
  • starting on 112, account of Kukdong issue, official union is the CROC
    • workers at Kukdong became center of a convergence of other groups who became a transnational movement, including USAS, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Maquila Solidarity Network, a local (new) workers center (CAT) and many others (114)
    • Kukdong eventually liquidated itself to create a new identity, thus nulling contract with the CROC and allowing independent union to be formed (117)
    • though transnational allies wanted to leverage this win into new organizing, members of the new union just wanted to keep their jobs, and withdrew from organizing efforts once they had a contract.  eventually the union lost its own control of the factory to another PRI organization
  • CAT then took the lead as this network (minus USAS and a couple others) took on a plant in Matamoros...the network specifically had CAT take the lead so it would be a Mexican-led charge ...goal was to form an independent union (118)
    • CAT decided to go after PUMA (because they made clothes at Matamoros Garment) and sought German allies (119)
    • but then Matamoros Garment just closed their plant, ending the struggle (120)
  • then CAT moved on to Tarrant Ajalpan (TA)
    • again goal was to get independent union
    • CAT took the lead, but informed the transnational network (121)
      • MY IDEAS: "informed"?  is this really transnational cooperation anymore
    • took the route of trying to enforce codes on conduct, not mexican law
      • early brand targets don't really pan out (122)
    • CAT never really got any traction, meanwhile the owners began taking orders to other shops, TA was heading for closure (123)
    • everyone gets impatient, workers get tired of waiting for CAT, everyone bickers, and TA closes (123-124)
  • CAT COMES OFF WIN AT KUDONG JUST TO LOSE TWICE
  • CAT failed after Kukdong because they weren't able to leverage brands the same way that transnational network idd at Kukdong (125)
    • brand focus provided all the economic leverage, which is utterly necessary
  • at Johnson Controls and Vaqueros Navarra, workers decided to register with Mineros and FAT (resp.), meaning they got to skip first step of union registration process nad could go straight to the election process! (126)  in this case the weaker local groups were able to get help from stronger, though national, groups, and work around local hurdles (127)
    • SO WHY DOESN'T EVERYONE DO THIS? why doesn't everyone just affiliate with a national union?!
  • Conclusion:  IN THE END, ALL THESE FACTORIES WERE CLOSED, or the unions were busted (128)

Silva 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Introduction, Eduardo Silva

  • Transnationalism has multilevel charactersitics....national level shapes internal level, adn vice versa (2)
  • see lots of deeply rooted local activities and activists that get involved (at times rather hevily) in transtional politics, but the focus is almost always on the national level (target is national government) (9)
  • Sikkink (2005) (11) set ups 4 types of transnational interaction, based on oppenness of political targets
    • international closed + national closed = activism discouraged
    • international open + national closed = boomerang transnationalism
    • international closed + national open ="democratic deficit", where int'l institutions (IMF, e.g.) not open to democracy), activists look to state for protection from int'l
    • international open + national open = insider/outsider cooperation, transnationalism is often a secondary tactic

Tuesday, October 8, 2013

10/8/13



Why do I study work, labor, unions, workers?

My father's manufacturing plant was closed because of a union drive.  Though the union drive failed miserably, the plant was closed and production was moved to another place (Mexico, I believe) for the simple fact that a union had been there at all.  I took this to mean that management was interested in cooperation with workers, but only to a point.  Once a union threat was seen, workers were immediately either disposable or possible enemies of "the business."

Workers are people, people trying to make a living.  Businesses do not employ people, they employ "employees."

I believe people should be represented by within their political system (government).

People have a right to be treated as human beings at work, meaning their interests shoul dbe considered alongside business interests.

Current business logic (neoliberal market logic) does not allow workers to have any influence at work, nor does it take workers interests to heart.  Everything in neoliberal logic demands a sacrifice of a section of the people.  Neoliberalism is tyranny of the market.

Politics can be used to fight back against tyranny, even in the workplace.

I want to study workers, see how they advance their workplace interests in the political sphere.  Workers/people use the political sphere to advance workers' rights because business can be coerced by national institutions.  But what happens when business are multinational? 

9/24/13



During the first round of political incorporation, unions and the working class accepted political incorporation in major part because they did not have the autonomous power to defeat capital.  That is to say, despite the growth of their organizations they still fought an uphill battle against managers and employers at the workplace.  Political incorporation offered workers the chance to gain political power to supplement their organizational power.  (In many cases political power was or became the vast majority of unions' power, either replacing their preexisting economic power or making up for the fact that they never had any in the first place!)

Now, workers again find themselves weakened in the face of capital,their previous political connections having abandoned them to market-oriented economic policies.  Meanwhile capital has heightened its power.  Even as labor movements have spread nationally, capital has gained the ability to divide workers internationally.  Moreover, the heightened ability for capital flight has left governments also at a disadvantage in teh face of capital.  As workers once faced before, now governments face the authoritarian hand of managers picking up shop in the face of unfavorable rules.

And yet national institutions still matter, and capital is not utterly free to jump from place to place.  Not all industries are hypermobile.

Workers again need to advance their movement politically, access the power of the state to make up for their weakness in bargaining.  (How does national political incorporation work in an international world?)  That is to say, an important well for union power still remains with the state.  In this new incorporation moment, however, unions find themselves weak,  somewhat unattractive allies.

There has to be some connection between international solidarity, national political power, and local bargaining power.  Anner (2010) effectively shows that transnational movements are not effectively institutionalized without local organizing.