England 2005

England, P. (2005). "Emerging Theories of Care Work." Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 381-399.

• this article reviews different theories of care work. 
• Gender bias and teh devaluation of care work
• care work is paid poorly because women do it, and women are looked down upon (explicitly or implicitly) in societal norms (382-383)
• the correlation between women being low paid and care work being low paid is seen as an important correlation, though causation is hard to come by (383)
• this can apply to race as well (384-5)
• Care work as a public good
• the idea here is that care work produces public goods, which are by definition udnervalued by the market (385)
• education, e.g., can create more productive workers or people who function within societal rules better, which is a public good (385)
• but it is hard to find direct evidence of this line of theory, since it presumes mistakes in the market which can't really be proven without relying on outside, unprovable reasons (386)
• prisoners of love (389-391)
• if a job has intrinsic benefits, people willaccept less money for doing it (389-90)
• "This perspective suggests an equity problem of taking advantage of altruistic motives.) (390)
• The commodification of emotion: see Hothschild, alienation from one's own emotions (391-2)
• Rejecting the dichotomy between love and money
• other theories implicitly assumes a dichotomy based on gender (women = love and care, men = money) (393)
• this one suggests profit-making or waged labor doesn't necessarily "contaminate" care work/love (393)

Varela 2013

Varela, P. (2013). Los sindicatos en la Argentina kirchnerista. Entre la herencia de los’ 90 y la emergencia de un nuevo sindicalismo de base. Revista Archivos de Historia del movimiento obrero y la izquierda, (2), 77-100.

• Introduction
• lots of scholars are suggesting growth of unions in the 2000s is the result of state-driven change in industrial relations (77)
• one problem with this is it overemphasizes the large, national, institutional scale, and ignores the very important role of conflicts and unions at the firm leve: internal commissions and bodies of delegados (77)
• secodn proble, it overemphasizes the polarization between the "new" unionism and the "old" unionism, when in fact these groups lots of similarities and have some ruptures
• the article has three hypotheses for debate:
• the strong recomposition of working class as a social and union thing after 2003 are thanks to the continuing of the exploitation begun in the 1990s (78)
• it is on this contradiction, strong unionism without change in exploitation, that has been teh foundation for strong unionism from the base
• the presents of younger workers and strong Trotskyite influences are altering unionism of the base in important ways
• Contradictions of a return
• the relegitimation of colecltive bargaining and negotiation at the high level has made workers realize how bad their conditions still are, and helped explain why Cristina had an anti-union turn after 2011 (78-9)
• between 2002 and 2004 there were a number of increases in minimum wages, negotiated directly between labor leaders and capital, though started by and arbitrated by the Néstor, these were mainly attempts to soothe people and get them money they lost during devaluations (79)
• 2004 was the real start of re-legit of unions, esp CGT and Hugo Moyano
• this happened due to economic growth, combined with growing union conflict due to the emergence of unionism of the base (80)
• this was new because there were lots of surprise conflicts started and led by delegados and leaders within the base openly against the higher up leadership of the union
• this article suggests that Moyano was helped, becamea  strategic ally of the Ks because unions of the base were already getting strong, and government wanted a way to channel that momentum, not the other way around (81-2)
• until 2011 the formula was crate peer groups and set wage ceilings (82-3)
• this sort of got disrupted in 2007 when the government started messing with statistics to cover up inflation (83)
• AND when unions outside of Moyano's circle started being repressed
• 2009 brought Cristina needing help of Moyano against Ag strike, financial crisis which made inflation go down, and strong conflict of the base at Kraft foods (84)
• this resulted in government not setting a limit on salary negotiations
• Kraft workers continued to fight, and a union thug from the Union Ferrovaria killed a militant from teh Partido Orbrero, whcih revealed the violence used by traditional unions (85)
• After 2011 Cristina began pushing back on unions, undoing some of the thigns that had made unions adn important political representation post-2003
• number of collective contracts went down in 2011
• suggests this happens because of inflation issues, and...
• break between CK and Moyano
• whie there was GDP growth in 2011, it shrank in 2012 (86)
• 2011 elections didn't have a lot of union candidates, but did have a lot of territorial candidates, which was teh start of the rupture between CK and Moyano
• in 2012 this caused a rupture among the major union confederations, ended up with 3 opositoras and 2 oficialistas
• in 2013, docentes demanded a 30% wage increase, and the Ministry of Trabajo arbitrarily closed discussions and just said they woudl get 22%
• since 2003 the growth of union strngth has run into the fact that labor precarity and fragmentation, both begun in 1990s, continues to happen (87)
• Ks made unions stronger at the top, but didn't roll back the gains won by capital during the 1990s
• all fo this came to a head when the economy started having trouble...before then wages could just be increased and keep people relatively happy without rolling back management power
• this is felt most often at the workplace, so conflicts happen at the workplaces more often (88)
• informality and work precarity continues during the 200s (88-89) with DATA
• because collective contracts DON'T talk about flexibilization liek they did in teh 1990s, it is fair to assuem that flexibilization continues (ie CCT shudl have rolled it back!) (90)
• lower unionization rate has more to do with the fact that unions are really engaging with their base (90-1)
• Younger workers aren't necessarily leftist, don't really have a lot of political connections
• but they grew up during the time of the resurgence of lefty groups into social and class struggles (92-3)
• but CTA has statsistics that note thigns like, in 2007, 14% of labor conflicts were undertaken without the presence of unions (93)
• leftist people, members of PTS and others, began winning elections to be delegados (94)
• conclusions
• the basic contradiction of the Ks is the increased power of uniosn whiels working conditions and exploitation remained exactly the same/unchanged (95)
• possible to see some sindicalismo de base as a possibility of unionism outside of Peronism (96)
• the question for the new generation is how to expand unions to include other groups, precariosu workers, desocupados, and how to inegrate lefties into the movement/create a new movement? (96)

Gentili, Suárez, Stubrin, and Gindín 2004

• Introduction
• teachers have gone on strikes a lot in LA recently, as have university students (1252)
• these fights and negotiations happened in places where the economy was in crisis, the education sector wasn't in great shape, and many went through processes of reform to improve education system (1253)
• authors suggest that the conflict over education system is about the fact that many of the reforms were very ambitious and didn't take into account economic crises that came or traditions of the sector
•  these authors want to create an integrated theory about teacher protest, not just assume it's all about salary (1253-4)
• it seems cyclical (1254)
• it's hard to divorce it from larger economic crises that occurred
• but a big part of the problem is that tensions would arise with any reform, but in this case most of the reforms didn't include teachers at all, which provoked greater protest (1256-7)
• the lack of democratic discussion about education reform was a common issue throughout the region (1257)
• Education conflict: creating a definition is theoretically ambitious
• thinking about education conflict as a place for active adn dynamic contestation that creates the agents and strategies of the agents....that is to say, it's not a place of pure reaction due to sructural factors (1258)
• obviously this also means that interests will conflict and will be complex, even within what one might imagine would be a similar group....it's economic and poltiical but also has to do with cultural and psychology of a person/group
• aha....1257-1260 is sort of relating the various theories of social conflict, transplanting them to education a bit, and then saying the authors are going to look across LA to see which themes come up most often (1260)
• 1998-2003: a chronology of union action around education reforms in LA
• education reform processes have generated a lot of conflict in LA, pretty much across the board, though reactions to this conflict have differed (1261)
• 863 conflicts during this time, 40% of which were started by base-level unions (1262)
• during this time 54% of the conflicts were aimed at teh central government, while 31% were at provincial governments (the latter usually from decentralized education systems
• none were exclusively against private schools!
• private school unions tend to be less combatitive
• when they are combative, it's usually as part of larger confederations that are dominated (in numbers) by public school teachers (1263)
• private-school battles are usually very small and circumscribed
• most often working conditions and salary are basically set by the state anyway, so it makes more sense to go after government, and to do so you need lots of help, not just private sector (1263)
• Argentina had the most conflict, with 1491 days lost in this time period (1264)
• data! (1265)
• the reforms were not undertaken in a democratic way, which resulted in higher levels of conflict, though all the governments who undertook these reforms were certainly democratically elected (for the most part) (1266)
• of the actiosn taken
• 79% had labor demands
• 28% were based on larger demands of education politics, like those against decentralization
• 12% were against teh political system en total
• usually salary demands were linked to larger, more theoretical demands
• teachers strikes have a very high level of adhesion in teh region (1266-7)
• unions led practically all the manifestations, and a lot of them included wage/pay demands (1268)
• Conclusions
• much of the traditions and norms of education and education politics were greatly changed by the reforms across LA, and they did so with very little consultation with the teachers (1269)
• this resulted in a lot of conflcit aroudn education, which tended to become the center of even larger social conflcits (1270)
• 
  

Martins 2013

Martins, Nicolás Horacio. "POLÍTICAS EDUCATIVAS ARGENTINAS DESDE 2003: BUENAS INTENCIONES, IMPLEMENTACIÓN DEFICIENTE." Atlante: Cuadernos de Educacion y Desarollo, 2e epoca, http://atlante.eumed.net/2013/01/ wesbite not a journal

• Question: why didn't the education system in Argentina get better after 2003?
• Argument: though all the reforms were well-intended, some of the reforms were just symbolic while others didn't have enough institutional capactiy to enforce (2)
• reforms (2):
• 2004: miminum number of class days plus better pay for teaches
• 2005: techincial schools were improved and got better funding
• 2006: school funding slowly went from 4% of GDP to 6% by 2010
• # of years of obligatory school went from 10 to 13
• and set up 30% of schools to focus just on improving eduational outcomes of the poorest classes
• but with all of these refrosm adn more spending, education outcomes still not great
• between 2003 and 2012 private school population has grown 25% and public primary education population has dropped 5%
•  some of the new ideas just aren't surrounded by the other sorts of policies they need to work...like the # of days in school, without quality teachers and other things, isn't really helpful...no proof that these policies are designed to work, much less will work (3)
• yearly the national government will negotiate the minimum salary for teachers, but only provide 9% of the mone to pay teacher salaries (citing IDESA 2011) (5) may be a logical fallacy here, they pay up to the minimum, but which is 9% of salary maybe?
• 75% of teacher salary is NOT based on meritocracy (5) (citing LLach 2013)
• the high level of conflict between local officials and the unions has also hurt implementation (5-6)
• conclusions:
• reforms don't have a sound theoretical abas, for example there's not proof throwing money at a problem will help (6)
• there has been a big divide between the goals of the reforms and the hierarchical actions of the various levels of government (6)
• he argues decentralization should be deepened, and real statistics should be kept on performance (6-7)

Donaire 2006

Donaire, Ricardo. 2006. "Trabajo docente:¿ servicio o fuerza de trabajo? Algunas reflexiones a partir de un ejercicio empírico." Educere 10.35: 561-660.

• this is a lot like a simplified version of the 2012 book
• is there evidence of teachers being in a "reduced" (less well paid) middle class, or descending to becoming part of the proletariat? (652)
• in 2001 there were more than 640,000 teachers (652)
• theory on what determines proletarianization, see 2012 (652-653)
• there seems to be a reserve labor force that could be teachers, that is to say, they have the minimum qualificacions or more, but its a hetergenous group, so its unclear if they are truly a reserve army of laborers for capitalists to use to replace teachers (654)
• lots of data from 2001

Narodowski, Moschetti and Silvina 2013

Narodowski, Mariano; Moschetti, Mauro y Alegre Silvina. “Radiografía de las huelgas docentes en la Argentina: Conflicto laboral y privatización de la

educación”. Documento de Trabajo [Área de Educación, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires]: 2013: 1 - 18

• looking to see how and if teachers strikes actually affect the education system (3)
• have a count of strikes, don't have days lost for strike, but do have individuals' days lost for the cause of strikes (5)
• in comparison to other sectors, teachers strike a lot! (public and private put together are 37% of all strikes nationwide between 2006 and 2012
• and if you include non-teaching education workers it becomes 51%
• but there are LOTS of teachers as well, so that's boosting the numbers (6)
• Law 25.864 limits teacher strikes to 180 days per year, but obivously thisw law has been utterly ineffective, since teachers have gone on almost 3 million strike days per year between 2006-12 (7)
• lots of variation of strike days by province (8)
• shows that labor conflict with teachers is more of a provincial problem than a national one
• mroe often than not state teachers go on strike way more often than private sector teachers (8-9)
• there has been a growth in private school enrollment, not massive, but it seems bigger because, for the first time in history, it is causing a net loss in enrollments in public schools (citing another Narodowski)(10)
• at the national level, in broad terms, there doesn't seem to be a relationship between strike days and enrollments (grafico 4, 11)
• BUT ME: if you lag it a year, it might look closer...
• grafico 5 shows there isn't any obvious relationship between strike days and private school growth by province either (12)
• another model shows that the growth of number of total students, and funding levels have an effect of whether students go private or public, but strike days lost does NOT (14)
• Conclusions
• there is no edvidence that teacher strikes have an effect on students going to private schools instead of public ones (15)
• it could still be that families would prefer private school over public school due to teachers strikes, but the statistical evidence shows that if people hold this opinion they don't (or can't) act on it
• but public schools still have a bad institutional image as "closed schools"...need to fight this image (16)

Betancur 2008

Bentancur, Nicolás. 2008. "La nueva agenda de las políticas educativas en el Cono Sur (Argentina, Chile y Uruguay 2005-2008)." Revista Debates 2.2: 272-298.

• Introduction
• reforms of the 1990s tended to
• involve centralization of curriculum creation, but decentralization of administration (273)
• schemes of "positive discrimination" in favor of the poor
• introduction of business ideas into education
• expansion of the role of families and businesses in education
• Argentina: decentalization of secondary teachings and teacher training (273-4)
• Chile: introduction/perfection of market regulation of education (275)
• Uruguay: maintained the national state as central head of education
• recently all these countries have begun to talk/change these reforms again, thanks to left of center governmetns (274)
• Argentina
• 2006 law came out of Néstor having a big open discussion with large numbers of people in society (275)
•  2006 law rescinded parts of 1993 law, resulted in
• returning federal state as the guarantor of access to and right of education (276)
• made secondary school obligatory, and created systemwhere provinces can choose to do 6 years each of primary and secodnary, ot 7 and 5 (respectively)
• created a Consejo Federal de Educacion, with consultative councils that include teachers (276-7)
• this reform didn't roll back decentalization totally (277)
• nor did it end the financing of private education
• CTERA like this reform, law included a lot of things that CTERA suggested should be in there, and it got a lot of things it has watned for a while, like (278)
• declaration that education is a right and should be free
• growth of financing of schools to 6% GDP (PBI)
• the right to free teacher training
• the right of colelctive negotiation at the provincial AND national level
• Catholic schools were also a fan of the bill (279), more or less
• Chile
• student protests in 2005 demanded free schooling and transportation to school (280)
• teachers eventually joined protests and there was a national strike
• there was a council to solve these issues, that woudl include students, but at first it was stalled because students became a bit radicalized, and strike grew as more social groups joined the students' cause (280-1)
• once the council finally got together, including social groups, parties, and student representatives, it became clear that everyoen was unhappy, but great divergence in ideas on how to fix the system...some wanted more martket, some wanted less (281)
• Colegio de Profesores, union, was with the students (282) they wanted more centralization, better pay, shorter hours
• on the other end of the spectrum, private schools wanted fewer laws, more flexibility
• teachers groups did make some deamdns on private schools, not that thy be nationalized, but at least that they would be regulated more closely, including their entrance requirements (284)
• government in Chile did not try to replace the private system set up by Pinochet and perfected in the 1990s, but it dis try to smooth out some of the issues with it, make it a bit more equitable (286-287)
• Uruguay
• new law in teh 1990s didn't change tehcentalized, hierarchical nature of education, but was undertaken without any input from social groups, and the unions were against it, so a new law in the 2000s with the new left government was likely (287-8)
• the government convened a large Congress to figure out the new education law, parties were not allowed to be involved, only social actors, though unions were allowed and they tended to hav ea large say in the matter (288-290)
• new law reaffirmed much of old law, and said that funding could not go below 6% GDP (292)
• created autonomy and co-governance of schools by parents, teachers, students, and administrators (293)
• Conclusion: is there a new paradigm of education politics in teh Southern Cone?
• none of these reofrms were massive changes, refoundations (294)
• non of the reforms really chagne public/private relationship in their country (295)
• all reformers seem preoccupied with making the porcess inclusive of social actors
• teachers and students growing in power, technocrats and private sector losing power
• see tables on page 296 for some quick conclusions