Senén Gonzlez, Medwid, Trajtemberg 2011

• Introduction
• Bargaining has become more centralized since the decentralization of the 1990s (155)
• describes three levels: local, sector, and national (with government)
• looking at two time periods, 1990-2002 and 2003-2010 (156)
• checking three types of determinants: economic, legal institutions, and political ideologies that help determine where bargaining will happen
• THESIS: 90s dectralized but in 00s became "cnetralizacion intermedia"
• Determinants in the lit
• economic
• opening to global trade (labor cotsts become important) ( 156-157)
•  geographic dispersement of industries plays a role (157)
• structure of employment plays a role (157-158)
• legal institutions (158-159)
• political/ideological (159-160)
• Structure of Collective bargaining
• collective agreements went WAY up after 2002 (161)
• before 2002, average per year was 177, most was 219.
• after 2002 LEAST was 348 and most, in 2010, 2038
• careful when citing this data, words dont' match grafic
• coverage went from 1 mil in 2004 to 4 mil in 2009
• this contrast with 1990s, when high unemployment led to lots of off-the-books workers (161-162)
• coverage in was roughly 84.5% in 2008
• in 1991 negotiations between union adn employer were only 19% of contracts, all the rest were sector-level (163)
• by 1998 this had risen to 80%
• after 2003 a jump to sector-level being about 30% of contracts, hovered there through 2010 (163-164)
• between 2004 and 2008, sector negotiations rose by 291%, but decentralized, enterprise level also rose 236% (164)
• sector-level contracts are important, because they set the minimum wage levels and day length
• Content of Contracts and salary
• in teh 1990s, all contracts tended to focus on felixbilization
• entre 2003 and 2010, bigger deal was pay issues
• almost all included pay increases, but many of these were thanks to increase in legal minimum wage
• also, government stepped in to get employers and unions at the table to try and iron out issues before neogitiations (165)
• data on salary increases (165)
• salaries paid began to match those in sector agreements, meaning local employers had less flexibility in what they paid workers (165)
• this means that workers pay is being determined on a collective basis, not and individual basis (166)
• Legal Institutions
• state has two major interventions:
• personaria gremial: uniosn have the right to bargain (167)
• inscripcion gremial: union exists, can represent its workers, but only its workers, and cannot take precedent over a union with personaria gremial
• approving collective contracts
• these are very strong (168)
• unions
• generally pyramidal and vertical
• have a double game: national level/political and local level through comisiones internas o delegados
•  three levels: local, federation (sector, state), national (CGT)
• 1st two levels do all the bargaining
• CGT at third level is a political entity, doesn't do any direct bargaining for wages
• changes in the 1990s
• all three things changed, laws, economics, and political ideologies (169)
• each of these led to decentralization of bargaining, sometimes down to individual level (168-172)
• but since 2003 all three things have changed to slow the decentralization
• laws
• Néstor increased freedom of unions to strike, though he did keep the government's right to regulate strikes of "servicios esenciales" (173)
• but the new law included that strikers could not be replaced or face retribution from employers
• economic
• debt default and growing economy in the 00s
• ...and all of this came because Kirchner had a new political ideology
• and his drive to create alliances with unions (174)
• conclusions
• in Argentina the law is the major variable in explaining the differences between the 1990s and 2000s, but the other determinants also played a role (174)
• personaria gremial helps prevent fragmentation of the labor movement (175)
• now the government is acting like a coordinador of the disparate demands of workers and employers

Stokes 2006

Do Informal Rules Make Democracy Work? Accounting for Accountability in Argentina" Susan C. Stokes 125-139

in editors Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky 2006. Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

• likens some informal rules of democracy to language rules, where we learn to follow them before we learn what they actually are  (125)
• two central premises of the chapter:
• the way people vote in elections is rule-governed, and individuals rules for making voting decisions should be taken seriously (126)
• voters decision rules are grammatical: they are known and diffused through social mechanisms and rarely discussed openly, but are still not violated
• informal institutions and rules do not just describe what people do, but also what the expect other people to do (128)
• In Argentina, author suggests, democratic institutions are weak (128-129)
• Argentine democracy actually functions better in places where informal rules enforce accountability (129)
• people in places where democracy works pretty well display a heightened appreciation for mechanism of accountability AND expect others to follow decision-rules that make accountability possible (mar del Plata)
• in clientelisitic areas, people expect others to vote in ways that support clientelism (BA, Córdoba, Misiones)
• uses survey evidence
• "Expectations of accountability, when they do occur in Argentina, focus both on formal institutions and on informal rules and behaviors." (131, emphasis added)
• in places where democracy works, voters vote on whether a politician was accountable and expect others to do the same (132)
• none of this comes from any inherent belief (in Mar del Plata) that people are more trustworthy (135) or because they think perpetrators will be caught (136) but because they think people will lose support, voters, whatever if they aren't accountable (136-137)
• Authors hunch: beliefs in accountability are both a cause and a consequence of well-functioning democracy (138-139)
• 
  

Helmke and Levitsky 2006

 Introduction, Helmke and Levitsky, 1-30

editors Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky 2006. Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

• lots of literature, the "unrule of law" scholars, question the extent to which focus on "parchment" rules of law actually misses important on-the ground realities (1)
• "informal rules shape how democratic institutions work" (2)
• some informal rules compete with and subverts democracy (dedazo in Mexico), others can complement and help sustain them (Chilean Concertacion) (3)
• informal institutions definition: socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels (5)
• they must be enfored in some fashion (5)
• four distinctions: informal institutions should be distinguished from (6)
• weak institutions
• other informal behavioral irregularities: a patterned behavior must be accompanied by a rule and social sanction (if not done) for it to be an informal institution
• informal organizations (7): separate rules from players
• culture. these are not culture, though it can at times be hard to tell them apart
• why informal rules matter: (8) (can be good and/or bad)
• Political representation can be affected in both directions
• programmatic links can be broken
• sometimes looks like the tradeoff in clientelism
• democratic accountability (9):
• vertical accountability (citizens can punish officials), and
• horizontal (officials are responsible to other agencies, officials)
• informal rules can provide more accountability, but it might not provide the right type of public accountability (10-11)
• democratic governance
• informal rules of accommodation, power-sharing, and coalition building can prevent intractability problems (11)
• at times these may improve governance and stability, but not democracy
• citizenship and the rule of law
• brown areas = places where citizens do not actually possess the rights they should, especially indigenous (12)
• informal institutions can both violate and advance citizenship rights in areas not fully controlled by the state
• typology (13)
• two dimensions:
• degree of convergence between informal and formal institutions
• effectiveness of relevant formal institutions
• page 14:

	Effective formal institutions	Ineffective formal institutions
Convergent	Complementary	Substitutive
Divergent	Accommodating	Competing

• some final points on this typology
• Substitutive may be able to achieve things that formal rule fail to (17)
• same informal rules may be in different box depending on the formal institutions discussed
• the relationship between formal/informal institutions is dynamic, both can cause decay and/or institutionalization of the other, can cause stability or instability in formal rules

Palomino 2005

• Introduction:
• social movements existed before 2001, came from the social de-structuring brought on by neoliberalism, not by the crisis of 2001 (20)
• The construction of the social ties of the movements
• the context
• the 1990s saw increased precarity in teh popular classes, but also reached up to the middle classes, who became the "new poor" (20)
• early demands of teh movements were about necessities of subsistence
• the barter clubs and big flea markets in the BA acted as a way to link the middle and lower classes, as everyone shopped there (21)
• origins of the movements also came from the erosion of social integration policies, like retirement, current retirees were "sacrificied" to create new privatized systems
• many of the movements were attempts for the disconnected members of society to make social and labor demands
• but they did so as they also experimented with new ways of organizing themselves! (21-22)
• the cycles of protest and the crisis of the neoliberal model
•  first rounds of protest, in the interior mostly, against the negative outcomes of adjustment (22)
• second round of protest comes in when the promises of the adjustment aren't borne out
• often attached to previous human rights movements
• but included piquteros and workers who were recupterating closed businesses
• crisis was a big third cycle, with asambleas barriales joining other movements
• also, the breakdown of national political institutions allowed for new forms of political represenation, like direct democracy in neighbrohood assemblies (23)
• the movements created conditions for the development of new forms of social integration
• CTA very involved in this, became an umbrella group as they welcomed in groups of informal workers, unemployed, and social movements
• the implementation or new values
• one common charatersistic of the new movements in their focus on organizational form and governance, as well as organizational norms (23)
• their openness was a response to tradiational movements, that often ended up as clientelistic groups (24)
• list of autonomy goals, including from the state, from hierarchy, etc.
• but there were differences, too
• piqueteros relied on the state to privde for them, even as they protested the state
• piqueteros had minor demands (subsistence) but did major actions (blocked roads)
• asambleas barriales had major demands (reform democracy) but did minor actions (local soup kitchens, job posting in neighborhoods, etc)
• the workers in recuperated plants, despite being a small minority, showed that they could have a major affect on the discussion of work at the national level (25)
•  new identities are being created, not just revitalizing old ones
• it is possible that these movements' future depends on changing the whole of society, but it is also not necessary to think that these movements need to make obvious change, but could think of changing the minds of the people rather than gaining political power
• Autogestion and social economy
• two parts of autogestión: (26)
• a dimension of public ownership but not state-ownership
• solidarity and reciprocity, not a market relationship, as the basis of work
• an attempt to fix the situations which liberal economics cannot fix, like the high open unemployment
• authors admit is it a bit utopian, but for those facing unemployment it seems like it could work, and certianly work better than waiting on a state/economy that can't provide for them (27)
• The movement of workers in recuperated businesses
• Intro:
• started by workers with little other option for work (28)
• challenges private property rights and traditional division between capitalist and worker
• these actually started in the late 1990s, but this looks at 2002 and after
• Diversity of the movement
• most of the closings preceded by breaking contracts, lowering wages, etc (29)
• not all workers want to be part of the movement, but they all want the recuperated factory to stay open (31)
• but there is usually a nucleus that seeks out, forms connections with other factories, movements, and the neighborhood
• after December 2001 recuperadas got the help of piqueteros and asambleas barriales (32)
• at first unions had varied responses, some helped, some were passive, some sided with employers (32)
• but eventually as the movement grew, all the big unions at least started talking about adding these groups to their organizations
• employer groups have (to 2005) been pretty silent about these things (33)
• but the threat of recuperating a business that might close has been a bargaining tool for workers
• the universe of recuperated businesses
• some have been recuperated, some are headed there, and others have been fighting to recuperate (34)
• legally workers in a cooperative are redefined and need to remake ties with union, even if union is involved in recuperation of a business
• about 98 (see page 34-35 for some numbers, breakdown of biz)
• these are esepcially powerful because they make the strike weapon stronger, in that bankruptcy is not necessarily a bad thing for the workers, so the company can't threaten it (36)
• The conflicts that precede recuperation
• three phases: conflict between workers and management, takeover, and either reopening or ensuring continuation of business (37)
• first thing to usually go is payment of salaries
• call of creditors to close the business tends to radicalize workers
• before  takeover, demands in labor courts are about back wages, after demands are more genreally about the owners ability to run the firm (38)
• sometimes workers are able to generalize their demands, get help from lots of different (other0 social movements (39)
• "lucha, resistencia, solidaridad" is the motto
•  The role of unions
• individual supporters came out with these recuperated enterprises... (40)
• but only one union immediately offered institutional support (the cnfiteros, pasteleros, pizzeros, alfajoreros, y afines)
• most swung between ambiguity and abandoning these locals
• two studies cases:
• in Rosario a union struggled against the closing of a supermarket, helped create a community market in its place
• UOM was against one at IMPA, but some dissidents helped make it happen (40-41)
• but some uniosn abandoned their locals, and we see traditional uniosn relying on old tactics when faced with something news (41)
• but without unions workers find themselves with only weak and fragile access to social services, as thse services are often teh basis of their union identity (42)
• Some legal aspects
• 42-44
• How it all works
• to get supplies, workers suggest old owner defaulted, but they won't, or seeks solidarity loans from other groups (44)
• the key is whether their clients stick around or not (44-45)
• sometimes other groups, movements, or parties help supply startup funding (45)
• usually these businesses end up running below their total possible production, do just in time of day-order work, because they can't find workers, workers work slower, or can't find clients for their products
• most of the money is spent mostly trying to keep production going, meaning wages tend to be at a subsistence level, meaning its hard to find new workers (46)
• workers are paid using what the company has made, and usually only weekly, meaning workers sometimes have to carry debt from week to week
• skilled workers are not paid more (47)
• workers try lots of new forms of organization, often very democratic ones see page 48-49
• New identities
• still tend to define themselves as workers (49)
• but at the same time, there is also a belief that there is something different, that new employees need a "education" on cooperatives and that they should be connected to larger society as well (50)
• paternal practices of old boss are replaced by a "family relation" among cooperative workers
• these are examples of CREATED collective identity, both between workers and between businesses and community (51)

Lopreite 2014

not yet published, politics of reproductive rights

• Introduction
• variation in domestic policy re: reproductive rights in Arg, Mex (1)
• both are federal countries with subnational mobilization on these issues
• looks at role of women legislators and political parties in understanding success of gender legislation (2)
• separates contraception and abortion, as they engender different responses (3)
• Explaining Legislative outcomes
• would expect:
• number of women in legislature to increase bills on women's issues
•  party ideology and fragmentation will also come into play: strong ideology drives legislators, fragmentation suggests parties will be less liekly to take a stand on the issue (4)
• National level politics in favor of women's reproductive rights was bleak with Menem, Fox (4-5)
• In Mexico, PRD control of DF meant that DF allowed contraception and abortion (6)
• this resulted in conservative backlash in other parts of the country
• ability of states to create own penal code allowed for political opportunities in both directions (7)
• Starting with Duhalde, women legislators in Argentina able to get federal government ot OK contraception rights (8)
• Women in Congress and Preferences toward Reproductive Rights
• Lots of Women in Arg parliament (9)
• Mexico doesn't follow quotas well (11)
• Political parties fragmentation in Argentina means parties don't take strong stand, women able to form cross-party coalitions (11-12)
• Conclusions:
• number of women in legislature was not a determining factor for policy success (13)
• party ideology was key
• 
  

Seidman 1994

Seidman, G. 1994. Manufacturing militance workers' movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970-1985. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Conclusion:

Some differences between the cases:

o   Business leaders

§  Brazil: by 1980s they had joined unions in opposition to dictatorship, assuming there would be some negotiated transition

§  South Africa: white business leaders remained opposed to unions, as they would have demanded ending of racial hierarchy laws (256-257)

o   Opposition movement in South Africa had deeper racial persecution to unite them

·         BUT striking similarities about the socioeconomic demands made by both movements….each seemed to want to change capitalism, not just gain citizenship in capitalism (257-258)

·         Explaining similar dynamics

o   Both countries were late industrializers, peripheral economies

o   Both ended up producing mostly for export, meaning wages did not increase over the years (this is, supposedly, in comparison to earlier industrializers where wages did increase as production increased…even Seidman says this is a weird comparison) (260-1)

o   Militant labor movements in both cases arose during times of conflict between industrialists and authoritarian governments (brought on by recessions) (261)

o   CRUCIAL PART: change in labor process that increased numbers of semi-skilled and skilled (black, in SA case) workers, and better technology, meant industrialists were less willing to repress (261-262)

o   WORKERS SAW FACTORY AND COMMUNITY GRIEVANCES AS CLOSELY LINKED (262)

§  Relatively skilled did not act like labor aristocracy, made larger, encompassing demands

o   Social Movement unionism (263):

§  emerged from rapid authoritarian industrialization

·         state policies designed to attract capital and control labor during growth periods

·         urban poor really lost out in these policies

§  when international capital dried up (during oil crisis), the elite bargain broke

§  semi-skilled took advantage of this elite crisis, so industrialists were demanding inclusion in policy processes and workers were demanding inclusion in the benefits of growth at the same time

§  built not on old identities, but on new created ones based on similar experiences (264)

o   Suggests that instead of looking at the unions themselves, we should look at the structural conditions that promote and shape potential for militance (273)

o   “At a very general level, dependent development may limit the willingness of states and dominant classes to respond to demands fromt eh popular sector for distributive policies: in their effort to attract foreign capital and technology, and to sell industrial products internationally, state and employers may be especially unwilling to share the benefits of economic growth, or to raise real wages.” (274)

§  But if this happens, workers can find that they can use their newly expanded capacity to create militant and politicized labor movements

Novick 2006

• Many places in teh world are loking for a new model
• societies can no longer tolerate the level of exlcusion created by old model (53)
• Latin America did neoliberalism the fastest and the furthers (55) and it created a big increase in poor across the region (from 75 mil to 200mil between 1980 and 2000) )56)
• The new model (62)
• sees work in a new way, as the "giver of citizenship", as the basis for social cohesion, not just a "market matter"
• an important part of this is the need to reorient the macroencomic situation AND politics, role of the state, simultaneously (63)
• Model of growth and the role of work: a political economy that favors work
• new relative price levels have priviileged domestic consumption and employment
• need to recognize SOCIAL debts from the past, repay them with dignity at work and quality work
• three levels of action
• get the businesses that are doing well intenrationally to hire more people (63-4)
• do a mini-ISI but favor companies that can win over domestic market AND compete internationally (64)
• use workers and technology together, don't let capital replace workers
• currently the Ministry of Work is trying to promote a growth style that psuhes employment and a more equal discbursement of salaries to make sure povety and exlclusion don't become the norm (69)
• two pilars: reform the institutions of work, and the politics aof income
• instruments of institutional strengthening
• hope to dismantle some of the regressive labor institutions of the 1990s (70)
• efforts to increase collective bargaining, create social dialogue
• increase inspections
• bette rmployment has allowed owkresr to take teh lucha to their employers
• Instruments of Income politics
• minimum wage and other things to improve the income of those with lower salaries, make it anti-cyclical (71)
• Conclusion
• the current growth is based on manufacturing and construction, because they create employment (74)
• but a strong compnent of value added and export-based businesses are neceessary, not just extravitive indutries
•