Notes!

Monday, September 23, 2013

9/23/2013

After the advent of neoliberalism in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (and in Chile in 1973), scholars generally accept that the function, or at least the goal of the state changed fundamentally and radically. Before neoliberalism political incorporation of the popular classes (i.e. peasants and workers, broadly stated) was done through protective-yet-constraining connections between a party or government and popular organizations. The most often used example of this type of incorporation was labor unions and governments, where union leaders earned the privilege of joining the government in exchange for votes for a party and moderating the demands of workers. But the advent of the neoliberal model changed this relationship between the masses and the state. Now the state took a hands-off approach to political incorporation; electoral contests replaced organizations as the connection between parties and the masses. A possible driver of this change was the idea that politicians could connect directly to the masses (both literally, thanks to mass media, but also figuratively, in the sense that politicians felt they had shed the image of themselves as the "elite ruling class", and that having set aside such pretenses they could now connect directly to their constituents without the aid of a interpreter/wrangler, in the form of a union leader or some other such individual). But the result was a shift in the state's goal of incorporation. Previously political incorporation seemed to be defined outcomes; that is to say, the government proved that it has incorporated the masses by wanting/seeking/achieving improvements in the lives of workers, peasants, and generally anyone not considered elite. In this model, the political process is not entirely fair, and the government attempts to achieve more equal (though hardly totally equal) economic outcomes. Now political incorporation was a matter of process (Roberts, I think?), where holding representative and clean(ish) elections was the entire purpose, and the economic health of ones constituents is left to the market.

We are now in a new era of political incorporation, as the 1990s and 2000s exposed the issues with relying solely on voting as political incorporation. Democratization has been uneven, and even where it seems to be complete economic troubles have tainted the progress of electoral opening. Some party systems have collapsed, while others have come to rely (again) and clientelistic methods of incorporation. Democracy has not adequately softened economic struggles, nor has it created societies in which the poor and rich have equal access to the state or rights under the law.

So what now? The idea of a new incorporation moment (which we are currently, in, or perhaps at the tail end of, in some cases) suggests that the political parties and leaders are seeking ways to connect or reconnect to the popular classes. (aha!) In many ways the PRI has already done this, as it won an election after being totally crushed for two elections in a row. In this new incorporation moment, how are people reconnecting with politicians, and vice versa? Where do civil society organizations fit into this? Unions are still around, but are they big enough, important enough to warrant a role in political reincorporation? Unemployed groups in Argentina have become important partners with the government, or at least were under Néstor Kirchner. They haven't replaced unions, but they have come from almost nowhere to become as important, if not more important that unions in the constellation of civil society organizations that supported Kirchner. What, then, occurred in Mexico? Some unions supported Pena Nieto, but they do not have organizations large enough to drive the whoel electoral process (except maybe for the SNTE, which is an important part of Pena Nieto's election story). How did Pena Nieto attract voters? Did he incorporate them, or simply market to them?

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Bogliaccini 2013

Bogliaccini, Juan Ariel. 2013. "Trade Liberalization, Deindustrialization, and Inequality: Evidence from Middle-Income Latin American Countries". Latin American Research Review. 48 (2): 79-105.

Introduction

article shows that trade liberalization reform played an important role in the destruction of formal employment in industry... (79)
...and a concomitant deindustrialization that increased inequality

literature review:

two competing arguments to increase in inequality: opening to international trade, and technological improvement (82)
this article argues that trade destroyed most job opportunities for lower social groups (83)
in every case there was reviewed there was some development of industrial production, usually created through ISI spending
with traded openings, these businesses could not compete and shut down
this brings into question the theoretical claims behind the liberal model, that new export possibilities would trigger greater industrialization (85)

Data and model

author expects the destruction of employment to have a negative effect on inequality, and for the effect to increase as liberalization increases (88)
author expects inequality to increase less in countries with stronger democratic institutions (89)

Results

two broad conclusions (90)

trade liberalization produced significant destruction of employment in industry
the destruction of this employment increased inequality

as trade liberalization advanced, formal employment in industry shrank
membership in Mercosur rsulted in loss of employment (95)
membership in NAFTA resulted in RISE in employment
in this model GDP per capita has a NEGATIVE relationship to employment in industry
decrease in informal employment increases inequality in the long run, and these variables are not independent of one another over time (96)
increase in informal sector is related to increase in inequality (97)
increases in GDP per capita are related to increases in inequality my take: financialization?
increase in length of time under democracy decreases inequality (98)

Conclusions

trade reform had a clear and detrimental effects on equality through its fostering of deindustrialization
in particular, the Latin American version of liberalization failed to include and alternative welfare structure for coping with the deindustrialization and informalization of their economies

Bellinger and Arce 2011

Bellinger,, Paul T., and Moisés Arce. 2011. "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era". Political Research Quarterly. 64 (3): 688-704.

Introduction

LA has seen a generalized rise in protests (688)
collective actors in LA are highly responsive to changes in economic policy, and democracy ahs given them room to move
central question: do economic reofrms in teh context of democracy demobilize political actors, or RE-mobilize them?
literature notes discord between neoliberlal society and democratic protest
paper is to test and see which effect is greater, demobilization associated with neoliberalism or re-mobilization associated with democracy (689)

Literature review

demobilization literature

increase in poverty, decrease in equality, higher levels of unemployment, and lower standards of living all create "anomie" (Zermeño 1990)
but this literature has trouble explaining the revival of protests in Latin America
in this literature, market policies erode democracy (690)
and state diminishes, leaving it an unhelpful target of economic grievances

Repoliticization literature (690-691)

traditional class-based actors are protesting (labor)
NEW actors are protesting (unemployed, indigenous, regional groups)
elaborating the repoliticization argument (691)

neoliberal turn:

heightened economic insecurities
offered a master frame for protest

democracy enhanced opportunity for collective activity

authors believe regime type is a core component of the political opportunity for collective mobilization

Data and Method

data from 1970-2003 (692)
dependent variable: collective protest
independent variables: economic liberalization, democracy, semi-democracy, autocracy, and interactions between these two categories
Controls include the level of regional protest to account for cyclical, demonstration effect (693)

Results

economic liberalization x democracy and economic liberalization x semi-democracy interaction terms are positive, support repoliticization argument (695)
econ lib x autocracy supports demobilization argument IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS
also protest is shown to be regionally cyclical (697)
index of civil liberties shows that the political opportunities provided by democracy, outside of simple elections, are actually driving remobilization

Conclusion

authors cast doubt on demobilization perspective (699)
Latin American citizens do not seem to be passive, atomized

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

Peruzzotti 2005

"Demanding Accountable Government: Citizens, Politicians, and the Perils of Representative Democracy in Argentina" Enrique Peruzzotti, p.229-249

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Introduction

in the past 20 years a more sophisticated and demanding citizenry has emerged, demanding representation and accountability from Argentine politicians (229-230)
and important actor was the rise of the human rights movement in response to the dictatorship (230)
Menem's disregard of demands for greater accountability also spured the citizenry

Redefinition of Representation

Argentine citizenry switched from "authorization" view of representation, which is connected to populism, to demanding accountability of representatives as in liberal democracy (Pitkin 1972) (231)

populist leaders were given authorization to act in the interests of the people
now citizens demand politicians be directly accountable
this pivoted thanks in part to the emergence of the human rights movement in the 1980s and their demands against the military (231-232)

there is no longer a direct relationship between constituents and representatives...this relationship is mediated by institutions (233)

this is a change driven by leveling off of high expectations for politicians and a new trust in institutions

The partial dissolution of captive electorates has led to more fluid and unpredictable electoral behavior (235)

footnote: the PJ has been able to keep hold of its lower class constituents through clientelism

The Politics of Social Accountability

three main actors

NGOs and advocacy organizations (236-237)
Social movements (237)
watchdog journalism (237-238)

threefold contribution

signalling to population, "what's happening, why its bad" (238-239)
social initiatives can activate a network of horizontal agencies of accountability, gets a movement going (239-240)
establishment of permanent watchdog groups/agencies (240)

2001 buildup and Accountability politics

Alianza promised to renew ties, not be corrupt (241)
then the Senate scandal (241-242)

the scandal cast doubts n the electoral arena as a place where accountability could be found (243)
the bribes went to the very heart of the state's electoral institutions
Alianza was slow to respond, and had a tepid response

this led to electoral protest/null ballots in 2001 (244-245)...
...and mobilizations against leaders, que se vayan todos, (245-246)

and local, representative, unofficial neighborhood "governments" called asambleas sprung up (246-248)
these eventually ran out of steam in 2002 and most were gone by 2003 (248)

Conclusion

shared concern of the quality of democratic institutions connects the politics of social accountability, the cacerolazos (pot banging protests), and the asambleas (249)
importantly, though, these mobilizations were triggered by the spread of frustration that the government wasn't listening/wasn't accountable

Levitsky 2005

"Crisis and Renovation: Institutional Weakness and the Transformation of Argentine Peronism, 1983-2003" Levitsky, p181-206

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Introduction

although the PJ is well-organized it's internal structures are weakly institutionalized, its lacks stable internal rules and bureaucracy (181)
the PJs weakly institutionalized party-union linkages allowed reformers to dismantle traditional mechanism of labor participation (182)
this enabled the party to

attract the middle class
create a clientelistic relationship with the urban poor

The fluidity of the PJ sent it into crisis in 2000-2001 along with the rest of the country, but this fluidity also allowed it to adapt and survive the crisis

Institutionalization and Party Adaptation

institutionalization creates stable expectations, rules of the game (O'Donnell 1994) (182)
but institutionalization also inhibits organizational change (Zucker 1977) (183)

they are sticky

The PJ as a Weakly Institutionalized Party

PJ is well-organized with deep roots in working- and lower-class society (184)

but it lacks even a minimal bureaucratic structure
in the years following Perón's death, no faction was able to impose an organizational structure or binding rules (185)
The Renovators in the 1980s tried to create more rules, but essentially failed

"We use the party statutes when they are useful. When they are not useful, we don't use them."

Three areas of institutional weakness

Weak leadership bodies (186)

the party's national leaders are routinely ignored by lower-level branches and officeholders
the government runs the party, especially when their is a seated executive

Fluid Party Hierarchy

politicians and those with power have often parachuted into top leadership/electoral positions (187)
in many provinces internal elections are negotiated or imposed by party bosses

Loosely Structured party-union linkage

62 organizations and the tercio (188)

The effects of weak institutionalization

the PJ suffers from low levels of trust in the organization (188-189)
the PJ is highly malleable, and may be changed quickly to line up with short-term goals of dominant actors (189)
Pj experiences bandwagoning effect (190)
PJ officeholders have substantial autonomy from the party

Peronism's dual transformation int eh 1980s and 1990s

Crisis:

working class had eroded (191)
debt crisis and exhaustion of ISI left the PJ without the ability to continue a statist program

to adapt the PJ dismantle union-party inks and replaced them with clientelistic links

labor participation had been based entirely on need of party leaders for the resources unions had (192)

62 orgs and tercio were often imposed by union leaders

as PJ won office, politicians were able to use state resources instead of union resources

Erosion of union influence enhanced the PJ's autonomy, allowing it to attract the middle class... (195)
...meanwhile it created clientelistic networks to maintain ties to urban poor in era of de-industrialization, and shrinking working class

but clientelism generated political costs, as the Pj became the part of corruption (196)

though most of the Party didn't agree with Menem and neoliberal turn, bandwagon was created since he had control over appointments to office/government (197-198)
The Crisis

The PJ's fluid structure meant the party had no unified response to the 2000 crisis, sending Pj into its own internal conflict/crisis (200)

no one had enough power to find a unified program or to discipline party members (201)

Menem and Duhalde were bitter enemies and fought over control of the party (202)

this rivalry meant there was no agreement on primaries, candidates
in 2003 PJ supported no presidential candidate, allowed all three to run outside the party (202-203)

Kirchner's victory pushed the party to the center-left (204)

even though the PJ had undertaken the neoliberal reforms themselves, the internal fluidity allowed this leftist, dark horse candidate (Kirchner) to rise and have a chance in the election
Kirchner realigned the PJ with leftist politicians, progressive intellectuals, and humans rights groups (205)

Conclusion

Peronisms current coalition change seem to be more permanent (ie away from labor unions) (206)
PJ remains the party of the poor, but will likely never again be a labor backed party

Etchemendy 2005

"Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001" Sabastián Etchemendy, p. 62-87

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Introduction

rather than being unambiguous losers in the neoliberal reforms, some key industrial and labor actors within the old ISI coalition can and do preserve their existing market power in the new "liberal" order (62-63)
argument: dominant unions and certain established industrial players were actually part of the reform coalition (63)
two goals of chapter

explain why Menem chose to rewared some industries and unions
assess the consequences of this pattern of transformation of the populist/industrial coalition

ISI past generated very strong industries that were also potential losers in turn to neoliberalism (64)
unions had a very clear goal of preserving the corporatist institutions -- ((induced them to be willing to trade liberalization for maintaining this bastion of power))
Results of Menem's bargains (65)

Business

compensations eventually led to a high exchange, which undermined business's ability to compete
no strategy in the face of global competition was developed...once the side payments were gone, business still couldn't compete on open market

labor

benefits funneled only to formal sector
bureaucratization of unions allowed room for the creation of large, autonomous, powerful groups of unemployed and other actors

Industry: Political Winners

the government compensated firms from four tradeable sectors: oil extraction, petrochemicals, autos, and steel (66)

privatization usually meant directly rewarding state assets to these businesses
and the pace of deregulation was consistently slowed
why firms in these sectors?

mixed sectors, meaning these firms had a higher lobbying capacity because they were partially public (69)
these firms were the largest and most powerful in economic terms
these firms were also relatively more concentrated (fewer firms and more economic value per firm) (70-71)
all of these firms had monopolistic industry associations through which they could bargain (72)

Working Class: Compensating Leaders and Insiders in the Formal Sector

the politics of compensation focused on teh leaders (74)

unemployed and laid off were left to their fate

there were four payoffs:

maintenance of corporatist union structure

while government did get some flexibilization of contracts (75)...
unions maintained their monopoly of representation in privatized firms

preserving labor's administration of healthcare

deregulation only went so far as to promote competition within the union-run system

granting unions privileged position in private pension market (76)

unions were allowed to create/control their own pension funds to compete on the market
but unions abandoned most of these by 2000 (no explanation given by author)

granting unions share of privatization

employee stock ownership programs (76)
these rpograms were only offered to formal employees (77)
and the stocks were monaaged by hte unions

and the stock value totally soared

generally all four of these payoffs converged on maintaining union leaders' control of unions and increasing the amount of money they controlled (79)

they faced little danger of being uprooted by competing organizations or their own rank and file

The Consequences

the compenstations porlonged the fixed exchange rate (80-81)
disregarded any strategy for actual export competition (82)

compensation was based on teh control of domestic markets (82)
this ended up being a short term strategy, and no one sought a longer term one
when the compenstations, which were based on the strong exchange rate, were consumed by the end of the decade, firms still could compete on the global market! (83)

offered nothing to the unemployed (83)

there was no antional policy to attenuate hardships of neolibreal transformation, specifically focused on working class/poor who lost jobs and purchasing power (84)
government chose to support unions over the unemployed
and the unions chose to take their compensations and similarly ignored the poor, which just paved the way for the piquteros and other groups (85)

Conclusions

the configuration of labor and industrial interests befor ethe reform determined the pattersn fo compensations during and after the reform (86) ... my take: the rich get richer, sort of
the compensatory policies were a double edged sword (86-87)

on the one hand, they made the reform politically viable (87)
on the other hand, these compensations sowed the seeds of future economic and political instability, which erupted in 2001

Levitsky and Murillo 2005b

"Building Castles in the Sand? The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Argentina" Levitsky and Murillo, 21-44

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Central argument OF THE BOOK: the major cause of Argentina's under-performance was persistent and widespread institutional instability (21)
The Origins of Institutional Instability

between 1955 and 1972 Argentina politics were deadlocked (24)
one the one hand, allowing Peronist party to compete in elections woul certainly result in Personit victory, which was unacceptable to many elites
yet, on the other hand, keeping the Peronists out of elections was a major destabilizing influence
eventually military leadership had to allow Peron back into power (25), then another military regime
The brutality and dramatic failure of the military regime discredited the military in the eyes of the public (26)

gave rise to broad public support for liberal democracy (Catterberg 1990
and gave rise to a powerful human rights movement

change in office between Alfonsín and Menem was first time democratic change of hands, but even then Alfonsín resigned early because of economic crisis, and there was a lot of institutional fluidity

Argentina under Menem

Menem abandoned traditional Peronism, set off on neoliberalism (27)

among the fully democratic countries, Argentina carried out the most rapid and far-reaching reforms
among the countries with the deepest crisis and radical reform, Argentina was the most democratic
BUT many of the policy arrangements made by Menem proved to be economically unsustainable
AND Menem did little to strengthen political institutions, and in same cases he weakened them

The Politics of Radical Economic Reform: Why Menem was successful

Menem's ability to end hyperinflation increased public support for him/his policies (28)
The strength of the PJ helped Menem keep a solid electoral base

the PJ's hegemony in the popular sectors limited possibility of anti-reofrm appeals (29)
PJ's close ties to organized labor gave union leaders a stake in limiting opposition from working class

Menem gave side payments and policy concessions to losers (30)

unions protected pro-labor law
industrialists were giving help in competing for privatization contracts
governors wooed by putting off provincial budgetary adjustments

Encroachment on legistlative and judicial perogatives

lots of executive decrees
court-packing and impeachments

PROBLEMATIC LEGACIES (31)

convertability left governmetn without tools to rspond to economic shocks or erosion of competitiveness
public debt grew a lot
reforms generated large-scale social exclusion (and middle class shrunk

Democratic Institutions under Menem

Menem frequently circumvented legistlaive process using decrees (32-33)
M allowed little judicial independence (33)
executive accountability decreased, allowing corruption to increase
widespread perception of corruption and abuse eroded the credibility of Argentina's representative institutions (35)

Party system and Political representation in the 1990s

Alianza able to win on anti-corruption ticket (37)
mostly because middle and upper-middle classed had little faith in credibility of government

The Post-Menem Era

Alianza failed to clean up politics (37)

actually got caught up in its own curruption scandal, which it didn't handle very well (37-38)

Alianza did poorly in economic arena

inherited a recession *38)
convertibility left them without policy tools, and convertibility was too popular to be touched

in 1999 legislative vote 22% cast spoiled/blank votes
three Presidents in 2 weeks

third was Duhalde, who ended convertibility (39)
economic plunged into chaos
poliitcal system and parties pushed into crisis as well

FREPASO and UCR disintegrated (40)

2003 elections:

military made no move to intervene
despite anger, no anti-establishment outsider received more than 2% of the vote (41)
PJ finished 1-2-3 in presidential vote, all other partis wiped out

PJ proved remarkably resilient

Kirchner 1

concentrated power in the executive (43)
but his initiatives were more transparent and oriented toward institutional integrity
rst of the story yet to be seen (chapter form 2005)....