Murillo 2001

Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapter 1: Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism
• Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina labor-based parties all moved away from labor (2)
• but despite similarities in national level characteristics...
• there were differences in union-government interactions across countries...
• and within countries
• and labor's ability to get concessions varied as well
• Labor based parties had comparative advantage in implementing neoliberal reform because they could blame external circumstances and still maintain their constituents' allegiance (3)
• but they often made their policy changes drastic to prove to business and IFIs that they meant business (4)
• even went after traditional union strongholds
• author suggests that pattern of concessions can't explain labor restraint, nor do partisan links, nor macroeconomic variables (6-8)
• MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY IS VARIATION IN UNION REACTIONS EVEN WHEN THESE THINGS ARE STABLE ACROSS UNIONS
• ARGUMENT:
• The incentives created by partisan loyalties, leadership competition (in unions), and union competition (for members) explains the interactions between unions and government (9)
• Chapter 2: Theory
• Interaction between unions and government has two settings, militant or restraint
•  Partisan loyalty (14)
• reduced union leaders fear of replacement (in the past)
• often resulted in union restraint in return for government concessions
• Leadership competition
• Partisan competition in unions, however, implies that loyal union leaders can be replaced (15)
• Thus leaders may have to act more militant in order to keep their positions, regardless of partisan links (16)
• Union competition
• more unions, more competition over members, more difficult to present a united front (16-17)
• Market Reforms
• opened up political space on the Left for populist or new left movements
• this means labor leaders have more possible party allies, but are more likely to experience leadership competition
• Thus militancy is generally expected in this case
• See chart on page 19 for matrix of union/leadership/partisan competition
• Chapter 3: The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies
• short story of transition
• CGT cooperated but was able to squeeze concessions out of Menem (28)
• CTM was acquiescent but received no compensation (28)
• CTV opposed market reforms, got concessions to cooperate, eventually reform was dropped (28-29)
• All Three countries:
• included labor Unions in party structures, while establishing legal codes that subsidized unions, and engaging in pro-worker economic policies (30)
• labor codes also limited union competition (31)
• these resulted in making labor the core constituents of PJ, PRI, and AD (32)
• labor codes made up for labor weakness in the face of employers
• but also made unions reliant on party power
• histories in each country
• Venezuela: 33-39)
• Mexico: (39-45)
• Argentina: (45-50)
• Legacies of incorporation/the Alliance
• union competition was more prevalent in Mexico than in Venezuela or Argentina (though CGT splits increased this at times) (51)
• Leadership competition was easier in Venezuela (in the form of partisan competition) than in Argentina, and Mexico was harder than both
• Chapter 4: Venezuela
• Democratic stability had traditionally set Venezuela apart from Mexico and Argentina, as did strong dependence on oil exports (52)
• the CTV had been essentially a transmission belt for the Accion Democratica, leading to many CTV strikes during COPEI administrations while labor peace under AD administrations (53-54)
• COPEI union leaders did poorly in CTV elections, so they generally weren't able to pose an important threat within the CTV (55)
• Pérez Administration (1989-1993): The Great Turnaround
• bait-and switch from poulism to neoliberalism, pragmatic decision (56)
• urban riots in '89 after gas prices shot up, riots were violently repressed (57)
• two coup attempts in 1992 against Pérez
• CTV militancy PEAKED during this administration!  breaking traditional alliance! (58)
• Market Reforms
• Pérez could not get CTV on board for his monetary stabilization, in great part because the measures would allow real wages to go down, CTV wanted concessions (59-60)
• no one opposed the trade liberalization, despite known dangers (60-61)
• CTV accepted privatization of non-strategic sectors in exchange for continued CB rights and employee ownership plans (62)
• CTV rejected reform of severance payment system, despite concession given to them
• CTV "not enthusiastic" about pension reform, delayed this reform until coups attempts, when it became politically unfeasible (64)
• Labor Flexibility:
• though the government tried to flexibilize labor regulations and hiring, actual reform went the other way, and made the labor more protective (64-65)
• CTV pressured AD legislators, who broke ranks with President to back this labor-friendly law, Pérez signed it because his veto would have been overridden (65)
• Leadership competition in the CTV
• most leadership competition was along partisan lines, so this competition increased AD leaders' need/desire to be militant, even against an AD president (66-67)
• the riots played an important part in signaling wider unhappiness with Pérez, and AD union leaders were up for election the next year, so fear of replacement was high (68-69)
• replacement threat dipped after AD won decisively in CTV elections in 1990, but then threat rebounded when AD union leaders suffered many defeats in 1991 local union elections (70)
• meanwhile Pérez lost control of the AD himself (71)
• Increasing partisan competition in the CTV made AD leaders more militant, while lack of other strong national labor confederations made AD able to extract concessions (72)
• Sector analysis
• oil: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• early on absence of union competition meant that union leaders cooperated with business owners in restructuring plans (75)
• but rising power of opposition led union to become more militant in 1993, and company to offer concessions so that it could continue to work with AD union leaders, as opposed to more radical leaders
• automobiles: cooperation
• in the face of restructuring union collaborated with management (76)
• the practice of hiring fro union lists meant there was no insurgent militancy (77)
• TV: cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• traditionally one union, no partisan competition
• in privatization AD controlled members and got some good concessions (78), CB rights, etc
• but Causa R started growing more popular as privatization continued (80)
• new, younger AD leaders upped militancy to keep control
• electricity:  cooperation --> opposition (effective)
• centralized national union had no partisan competition, so began as effective cooperation (because they got big wage increases for going with decentralization) (81)
• decentralization, however, allowed Causa R to make some inroads (82)
• AD upped militancy to face down partisan threat
• education: opposition (ineffective resistance)
• teachers militant against education reforms (83)
• but teachers broken up into 11 different federations, strikes and negotiations failed (83-84)
• Summary:
• the success of union cooperation often sowed the seeds for greater militancy later due to replacement threat (85)
• Conclusion and Epilogue
• CTV faced hard choice of going with AD but facing possible replacement threat, eventually decided to be militant against Pérez (87)
• CTV militancy effectively gained concessions in many cases, but resulted in firms not able to withstand foreign competition (89-90)
• CTV relied a great deal on political resources, but these resources became obsolete as the party system began eroding after 1992 (90)
• Chapter 5: Mexico
• until 1985 de la Madrid tried to recover business confidence by using fiscal and monetary cuts and holding wages down, afterward he turned to trade liberalization (93)
• in 19813 CTM called a general strike and allowed non-PRI independent unions to join in May Day ceremonies (94)
• government repressed teh most important independent strikes, thus curtailing partisan competition within the unions
• dlM did not target eh CTMs legislative positions
• dlM tried to hold the PRI together
• Salinas!
• took the neoliberal reforms much farther (97)
• improvements in economic conditions + Salinas's political skills allowed PRI to make some comebacks in 1991 elections
• he was able to control labor and even gain their support for some reform measures (98)
• only a minority of unions resisted
• Market Reforms
• stabilization
• CTM signed wage pacts, which improved inflation but also held down wages, but did so under (unsuccessful) protest  (99)
• CROC, CROM, FTSTE did not qualify their support, and even boycotted CTM demands (100)
• trade liberalization
• all in favor, despite the fact that many unions' constituents were hurt by this
• privatization
• most confederations accepted privatization without concessions
• FESEBES was more successful in gaining concessions (102)
• pension reform
• official unions were divided, CTM opposed, but CTM legislators voted for reform in order to hold the line with the PRI (103)
• housing (INFONAVIT)
• CTM rejected this reform vigorously
• all other unions was OK with it, so government ignored CTM (104)
• though eventually the CTM got some of this power back (Burgess 1996)
• Labor flexibility
• CTM protests, everyone else sides with government (105)
• Labor organization regulations
• all PRI-unions rejected this to save their power, reform too business friendly (106)
• Union competition and PRI monopoly
• PRI-unions competed for favor with government
• 1988 PRI-unions closed ranks with PRI, fearing non-PRI president would be bad for them (107)
• Salinas used repression to curtail partisan competition in some important unions (see oil workers) (108)
• the CTM was a bit more militant, but other unions more docile to PRI, PRI was able to play unions off one another
• this went so far as to encourage unions to disaffiliate with CTM and affiliate with CROC, CROM
• meanwhile FESEBES became face of "new unionism", but these leaders gained from having close personal relationship with Salinas (108-109)
• Salinas also curtailed political resources of CTM
• CTM had no exit option, because it had alienated other parties (110)
• THOUGH ALL UNIONS ABLE TO COME TOGETHER TO STOP LABOR REFORM
• sectors:
• oil: subordination
• union passively accepted worse CB agreements under Salinas (1989, 1991, 1993) (112)
• union should have been able to use effective restraint, given its power (113)
• but La Quina support Cárdenas, so he was repressed, union forced to have new, CTM friendly head
• automobile: subordination
• local unions were democratically elected, became militant in the face of restructuring (115-116)
• CTM repressed local unions when they did this, forcing subordination
• this in most part due to undemocratic national government/union
• telecommunications
• STRM recognized need to restructuring, and supported it in exchange for concessions (118)
• this was aided by strong, monopolistic control of union by Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who was an ally and asset of Salinas (head of FESEBES, face of new unionism!) (119)
• electricity
• LFC+ SME vs CFE+SUTERM (120)
• SME leadership had real elections, meant they had to listen to constituents
• plan would have combined everyone into one company, one union (SUTERM)
• SME strike repressed in 1987, moderate leaders won later in 1987 (Jorge Sánchez), they negotiated with Salinas who promised to allow SME/LFC to continue to exist (121)
• Sánchez became political asset for Salinas 
• but then in 1993 Sánchez lost election, SME became more militant
• education: opposition (effective militancy)
• union rejected decentralization (122)
• CNTE toppled Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in 1989, Salinas put in Elba Esther Gordillo (123)
• allowed some competition so CNTE could win some things
• government granted concessions to improve EEG's standing and reduce teacher militancy (124)
• Conclusion
• PRI curtailed partisan competition, but union competition allowed PRI to manipulate unions, get what they wanted (125-126)
• for the most part, unions were subordinate to Salinas (126)
• but unions still feared replacement via rebellion as happened in the SNTE
• and important explanatory factor here is undemocratic state (127)
• but the addition of union competition adds an important key to understanding differences below the national level (129)
• Chapter 6: Argentina
• When the Radicals surprisingly won the 1983 elections, Peronist unions unified in their militancy against Alfonsín (132-133)
• then Menem was elected, and bait and switch occurred (134)
• but the high costs of hyperinflation meant many people supported Menem's reforms, in great part because these reforms were successful (135)
• Menem created a coalition of most of the labor unions, provincial governnors, and voters from teh lower strata (136)
• but the CGT was a bit divided, the CTA split off and the MTA remained a populist faction within the CGT (137)
• Reforms
• measures cut inflation, but caused job losses (137-138)
• Stabilization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, by 1992 unified CGT accept the measures (139)
• trade liberalization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, despite the fact that both had tradeable and nontradeable sectors in their ranks (141)
• CTA, despite not having tradeable sectors, rejected this
• privatization
• pro-reform CGT San Martin supported, populist CGT Azopado rejected, unified CGT accept the measures with concessions (142)
• pension reform
• reunified CGT rejected in 1992 (143)
• government granted concession, CGT supported in 1993
• CTA remained against it (144)
• social security
• CGT specifically reunified to oppose this reform (145)
• implementation was put off, and CGT obtained a bunch of concessions and allowances for what was put in place
• labor flexibility
•  reform CGT negotiated some key provisions, but hte law still never became a reality
• CTA rejected all changes, the government ignored them
• the CGT, government, and employers did negotiate some deals on flexibility, but none were laws specifically 91467-147), more like pacts/deals/promises
• labor organization regulation
• government attempted to get rid of monopoly representation (148)
• CTA and employers liked it
• CGT rejected it, government didn't pass it
• Despite impact of Menem's reforms, partisan identity explains why unions were not nearly as militant was they could have been...many peronist unions limited militancy (149)
• split over Menemism in the CGt allowed Menem to reward loyal CGT branch, manipulate competition between the two (150)
• CGT reunified when government attempted to deregulate union funds
• reunification allowed CGT unions to go from subordination to cooperation (effective restraint) (151)
• but there were some unions, the CTA, CTERA (teachers) and ATE (state employees) who had more partisan competition, which forced peronists to up their militancy, which meant they received limited concession (152)
• sector analysis
• oil: cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened the existence of the YPF union (there was already a  private oilworkers union (153)
• union leaders had no partisan or union competition  (154)
• union was able to get concessions from the government, allowed privatization
• automobiles: opposition --> cooperation
• initially militant, then moves to more-expected cooperation
• author suggests militancy was because some people were hoping to save old ISI coalition, though they failed to do so (157)
• telecommunications: opposition (effective militancy) --> cooperation (effective restraint)
• privatization threatened downsizing
• FOETRA union was peronist, had little high-up competition, but was decentralized so faced the possbility of leadership competition, so there were militant (but only really had job demands, not political ones ) (158-9)
• government granted concessions in order to maintain their friends in power and the top of FOETRA (159)
• leadership competition dropped thanks to concessions, and union moved from opposition (effective militancy) to cooperation (effective restraint)
• electricity: opposition --> cooperation
• union was peronist, initially limited militancy and accepted privatization (161)
• but then faced some leadership competition in 1991, increased militancy
• government granted concessions to keep loyal union leaders at top of union (162)
• concession calmed everyone down, union expelled dissidents, moved to cooperation
• education
• CTERA was very pluralistic, but teachers in general had many unions, were decentralized (164-5)
• partisan competition made the union militant, but division between unions weakened everyone (165)
• "the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition increased the militancy of teachers and reduced their capacity to actually make any gains" (166)
• Conclusion
• peronist unions did restrain their militancy, but usually (167-169)
• peronist restraint led to dissension, which increased militancy
• government would pay off militant CGT unions
• concessions would clam down militancy, allow CGT to move back to cooperation
• CTA rejected all of this, worked against Menem (170)
• CGT did not suffer union competition, and the little partisan competition that existed was able to be quelled with concessions, keeping peronist CGT leaders in charge
• Chapter7: Multilevel comparison
• cross-national comparison of what we saw in first chapters
• authors suggets this is a most common comparison, that governments in each of these three countries converged on neoliberalism, through this common context we can understand how union-government interactions became important to the reforms and transitions (174-175)
• At a national level (176)
• CTV in Venezuela was effective militancy (opposition)
• CTM in Mexico was ineffective restraint (subordination)
• CGT in Argentina shifted from ineffective restraint (subordination) to effective restraint (cooperation)
• the story is not just inducements and constraints anymore
• if inducements made labor stronger in Mexico and Venezuela, they wouldn't have had to protest/hit the streets to oppose the reforms (as in Venezuela) or the lack of concessions in Mexico or in Argentina (179)
• market reforms make leadership competition more likely by providing rival union leaders with a populist cause (181)
• and then union competition, in turn, can explain why militancy is or isn't effective 
• CTV: urban riots increased fear of leadership competition, which increase militancy, and single big confederation meant no union competition, which increase militancy effectiveness, effective opposition (181-182)
• CGT: Peronist faced no leadership competition, but union competition allowed Menem to manipulate among the three factions within the CGT, only once uCGT reunified did it gain cooperation (effective restraint) (182)
• CTM: no leadership competition, but lots of union competition allowed Salinas to play unions off one another, subordination (ineffective restraint) (183)
• sector comparisons: 183-192
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
• Labor party Alliances Beyond Market Reforms
• the uncertainty of economic interests during the time of reform reinforced the effect of partisan loyalties, leadership competition, and union competition on union-government interactions (201)
• labor-based parties needed to retain loyalty of labor allies to implement neoliberal reforms quickly
• labor-based parties refrained from altering labor codes to:
• limit the rise of non-loyal rival unions
• signal to labor allies that they shift was pragmatic, not ideological
• for labor unions, the value of political resources was doomed to decline in more open economies with less state intervention (202)
• growth of the informal sector limited reach of labor codes and decreased electoral power of unions
• In Argentina the large unions emphasized their role as a service organization rather than their industrial or political power
• in Mexico non-CTM large unions increased social provisions as well, and adopted new forms of management cooperation
• in all three countries some part of the labor movement engaged in building opposition political parties (202-203)
• unrest in Venezuela derailed reforms, while labor peace allowed reforms in Mexico and Argentina to go through (203

Big Idea #1, Round 2

Of the many parts of one's life that define a person, the world of work and of politics are two of the most important fields of the human experience.  Most humans spend the greater part of their day working; moreover, local, state, and national politics shape and create the environment and rules that form the basis of everyday life.  Though neither political actions nor work are exhaustive of the experiences and identities of many people, many still come to define themselves in great part through their politics and job.  In doing so, however, people also tend to demand a voice in both of these spheres.  Few choose to be under the sway of a tyrant, be it an authoritarian president or an authoritarian manager.

But outside of such generalizations, it is often difficult to trace the more specific connections between the world of work and of politics.  At a macro level, the labor laws set by governments serve to define and structure the the workplace, both in its general functioning (through laws about working conditions) and in the seemingly inherent conflict between workers and management (Cook 2007, OTHERS?).  But those labor laws tend to be mediated through local- and state-level institutions, by the amount of funding and enforcement available, and many other factors that can shift the actual effects these macro-dynamics have at the local level.  Similarly, one finds a great many macro-level research projects that relate the political leanings of the popular classes (a term I use to denote those who, in more classical definitions, might be considered peasants or workers, but don't quite fit these concepts given the current development and economic context), but similarly micro-level experiences are important in shaping the specific political opinions and activism of the popular classes (Auyero______).  WHY STUDY WORK AND POLITICS?

In order to understand the complex relationship between political action and the workplace, it will be helpful to employ a theory of fields.  Fligstein and McAdam (2012) use the concept of interconnected, embedded fields to describe the environments through which individuals interact with and are influenced by the world around them.  Using this complex concept it is possible to conceive how workplace experiences can have an effect of political experiences, and vice versa, without oversimplifying this connection into a one-way interaction, wherein one set of experiences produces the other.  (But is this what I am arguing, that these two experiences can cause each other?)


<<<The puzzle is:  why wasn't Mexico able to join the Left turn?  Why don't union leaders jump to left parties when they don't get any resources from their traditional parties?>>>


The general fields of politics and the workplace are, independently, two of the most important places that people interact with each other, larger society, and create their own identity.  Politics and work are important to people because they shape everything from a person's individual day to the society around them.  Though they are not exhaustive of the experiences of many people, still many come to define themselves through their political acts and their work.  In doing so, however, people also tend to demand a voice in both of these spheres.  Few choose to be under the sway of a tyrant, be it an authoritarian president or an authoritarian manager.

Using the theory of interconnected fields, however, we can begin to explore the relationship between ones work experience and political action.  Rather than viewing the individual as a blue- or white-collar worker, and then additively combining that identity with their political leanings, I propose exploring the ways contention both in the workplace and in the political sphere can interact with one and inform one another. 

Latin America is an especially key place to study this interaction due to its long history of alliances between the state, parties, and labor unions.  Starting at the turn of the century and extending well through the middle of the twentieth century, many Latin American countries undertook efforts to incorporate the growing urban working class into the national political system.  Landed elites, the general narrative goes, initially dealt with grassroots level labor discontent using overt repression.  As the oligarchic elites began to be displaced by the rising middle class, the new middle-class elites began to incorporate movements into the political system in order to gain the support of the working class in elections nd governance (Collier and Collier,1991: Chapter1).  In many places this labor-state (or labor-party) alliance resulted in a national system through which the state supported organization of the working class into workplace-level unions, and those unions subsequently supported the party/state in elections(for the case of Mexico see, Middlebrook 1995, ______).  In this way, unions acted a nexus both of political incorporation and what one might call "workplace incorporation;"  that is to say, through unions workers had a voice both in politics and in their workplace. (Admittedly this is oversimplified:  unions were often undemocratic, mitigating the actual voice workers had.  Nevertheless, these channels existed and at times worked in favor of workers.)

Much of this political bargain was based on a certain set of developmental policies which called for interventionist, state-led development; namely, import substitution industrialization.  Beginning in the 1980s, however, this model of development contributed to economic crises in a number of states, starting first in Mexico.  These crises combined with international pressures caused many countries to shift development policies.  State-led ISI development gave way to neoliberal policies.  By shifting to neoliberalism countries essentially broke with the union as a mechanism of political incorporation.  Starting in the 1980s and lasting through the 1990s, presidents enacted structural changes to the state and economy that served to divorce unions from their previous political allies (Murillo 2001, Burgess 2004).  (This would be expanded to include the more specific histories of the countries I would include in the study.)  As unions and workers lost their privileged channels to the government, they also lost some of their most important organizational, political, and economic resources.  In addition to this general weakening, many states began actively promoting business interests to the detriment of workers and unions.  Whereas before the state had been an lly to unions during labor conflicts, now the state increasingly sided with business against workers (Bensusán).  In this way workers lost much of their voice in the workplace as well.

In the current era the neoliberal project is in many ways complete; though certainly no economic development policy is ever truly "finished" in its work, neoliberalism has become a stable and institutionalized state policy. (That is not to say it is hegemonic, nor irreversibly institutionalized, as some countries with recently-elected governments from the Left and Center-left are proving.  Nevertheless, in most countries neoliberal policies are the dominant, status quo economic policy.)  The end of the reform-era of neoliberalism has still left important questions about the voice of the popular classes in their workplaces and political society. For much of the past century there was an important link between the project of political incorporation and workers' voice in the workplace; since the drastic losses to unions during the neoliberal turn, however, these two forms of incorporation have become decoupled.  In a broad sense citizenship used to include a voice in politics and in the workplace.  In the current era, however, citizenship/political incorporation guarantee only a voice in political elections, not a voice at work.  And though there have been some moves in the opposite direction, even the rise of the Left has not brought with it a strong renewal in union power at the workplace.

I propose to study the connection (or lack thereof) between voice in teh workplace and voice in the political process.  Are these two forms of voice interchangeable? That is to say, can the feeling of political voice and/or power replace the desire voice at the workplace, and vice versa?  Will workers accept authoritarian regimes in the workplace if they feel that they have a voice on the national stage, or an ally in the government (on second thought, this is likely better done on the local to state-level)).  Similarly, are workers more likely to demand enhanced voice workplace if they feel the state government does not represent them?  Finally, pushing this analysis further, when are political voice and workplace voice not enough?  At what point will people seek extra-institutional measures to make their demands (be they political or work-related)


Important context to keep in mind for work and politics:
The world of work has changed a great deal.  With the collapse of ISI and dawn of neoliberalism workers did not just face restructuring in public state-owned enterprises.  Rather neoliberalism often resulted in more flexible work arrangements for workers in almost all sectors.  Firms began locating and relocating production to greenfield sites, far away from the urban strongholds of unions.  Countries also began creating export processing zones, places where both unions were not historically strong, and where the reach of labor law itself at times came into question.  Whereas the government had attempted to homogenize much of the working class in the working class, at least politically, now workers were hired and labored in increasingly decentralized, contingent, and irregular ways.  Women and youth have entered the workforce to much a greater extent, creating new divisions and heterogeneity in the workforce. Perhaps most importantly, in the current era these new work arrangements have brought into question the use of class, and specifically the working class, as a concept that has any roots in actual society.  Though one can find class cleavages in a broad sense, mainly in the form of inequality, it has become harder to find a coherent working class identity group (Roberts 1999, Kurtz 2004?).  Thus finding a "workplace voice" isn't so easy as merely forming a union.  Nevertheless, I would argue workplaces that are difficult to organize, and thus less likely to ever allow a worker any sort of voice in the workplace, should still be considered in this inquiry.  Work is still one of the most important facets of human life, and is not less important to individual lives even in its more decentralized form.
The world of politics has also changed a great deal since the initial incorporation period.  During the initial period of working class incorporation into the state and politics, creating alliances with unions gave political parties important access to workers in a number of senses.  Perhaps the most important form of access was the preferential channel of communication political parties gained by allying with (and/or coopting) union leaders.  Before the era of mass communication these union-party connections allowed parties to effectively communicate with, educate, and mobilize workers across the country, and without having to recruit these members through more arduous means (setting up party offices, building local machines, etc.).   The alliance allowed the party to collaborate with, and often coopt, the almost ready-made political chapters that were unions at the time.  Now, however, party systems have changed to the point where well-institutionalized parties do not have as large a competitive advantage in nationwide elections.  In many specific cased economic or political crises have weakened institutionalized parties, or worse delegitimized them (is this helpful?).  But across Latin America the consistent expansion of mass media has also allowed political candidates to reach those in areas where they (or their party) have little or no on-the-ground presence.  In that sense, unions are no longer necessarily an important ally to political parties.  Indeed in some countries the weakening (or historical weakness) of the labor movement has allowed for other social movements to become important interlocutors with parties and the government.  The indigenous movement in Ecuador (under the leadership of CONAIE), for example, became a strong political force starting in the 1990s; the cocaleros and other movements filled the vacuum left by the weakened COB in Bolivia; and the unemployed movements are increasingly replacing labor unions important constituents of the Peronist party in Argentina (though the PJ is relying more heavily on clientelist relations in general than alliances with social movements [Levitsky 2003?]).

Big Idea #1, 1/13/14

Fligstein and McAdam (2012) use the concept of interconnected, embedded fields to describe the environments through which individuals interact with and are influenced by the world around them.  Though overzealous definition of  these meso-level fields can create a multitude of divisions among people in the world, the interconnectedness of many of these fields can helpfully describe how one person's experience in their own workplace can be translated and understood by others in different workplaces.

The general fields of politics and the workplace are two of the most important places that people personally interact with each other and connect to and interact with their larger society.  The state can connect people with different identities,  through a unifying mode of citizenship.  who have little in common besides begin from one large geographic area; similarly the world of work can connect people across the world through similar experiences and identities.

Politics and work are important to people because they shape everything from a person's individual day to the society around them.  Though they are not exhaustive of the experiences of many people, still many come to define themselves through their political acts and their work.  In doing so, however, people also tend to demand a voice in both of these spheres.  Few choose to be under the sway of a tyrant, be it an authoritarian president or an authoritarian manager.

Starting at the turn of the century and extending well through the middle of the twentieth century, many Latin American countries undertook efforts to incorporate the growing urban working class into the national political system.  Elites, the general narrative goes, dealt with possible groundswell threats to their leadership by first repressing, then attempting to coopt the working class.  In many places this resulted in a national system through which the working class was organized into workplace-level unions, and those unions were subsequently incorporated into the political sphere.  In this way, unions gave workers a voice both in their workplace and a voice in civil society. (Admittedly this is oversimplified:  unions were often undemocratic, mitigating the actual voice workers had.  Nevertheless, these channels existed and at times worked in favor of workers.)

The shift in development policies in the 1980s, from ISI to economic liberalism, essentially broke the mechanism of the union as the organization of political incorporation.  Starting in the 1980s and lasting through the 1990s, presidents enacted structural changes to the state and economy that served to divorce unions from their previous political allies.  (This would be expanded to include the more specific histories of the countries I would include in the study.)  As unions and workers lost their privileged channels to the government, they also lost the political and economic resources that allowed them to maintain their voice in the operation of the workplace as well.  In this way workers also lost much of their voice in the workplace.

In the current era the neoliberal project is in many ways complete; though certainly no economic development policy is ever truly "finished" in its work, neoliberalism has become a stable and institutionalized state policy. (That is not to say it is hegemonic, nor irreversibly institutionalized, as some countries with recently-elected governments from the Left and Center-left are proving.  Nevertheless, neoliberalism is for most countries the dominant, status quo economic policy.)  The end of the reform-era of neoliberalism has still left important questions for voice of the popular classes in their work and their society.

Important context for work and politics:
The world of work has changed a great deal.  With the collapse of ISI and dawn of neoliberalism workers did not jut face restructuring in public state-owned enterprises.  Rather neoliberalism often resulted in more flexible work arrangements for workers in almost all sectors.  Firms began locating and relocating production to greenfield sites, far away from the urban strongholds of unions.  Countries also began creating export processing zones, places where labor law and blah blah blah...Whereas the government had attempted to homogenize much of the working class in the working class, at least politically, now workers were hired and labored in increasingly remote locations, with irregular yada yada yada...the workforce is divided, heterogeneous.  In the current era these new work arrangements have brought into question the use of class, and specifically the working class, as a concept that has any roots in actual society.  Though one can find class cleavages in a broad sense, mainly in the form of inequality, it has become harder to find a coherent working class identity group (Roberts 1999, Kurtz 2004?).
The world of politics has also changed a great deal since the initial incorporation period.  During the initial period of working class incorporation into the state and politics, creating alliances with unions gave political parties important access to workers in a number of senses.  Perhaps the most important form of access was the preferential channel of communication political parties gained by allying with (and/or coopting) union leaders.  Before the era of mass communication these union-party connections allowed parties to effectively communicate with, educate, and mobilize workers across the country, and without having to recruit these members through more arduous means (setting up party offices, building local machines, etc.).   The alliance allowed the party to collaborate with, and often coopt, the almost ready-made political chapters that were unions at the time.  Now, however, party systems have changed to the point where well-institutionalized parties do not have as large a competitive advantage in nationwide elections.  In many specific cased economic or political crises have weakened institutionalized parties, or worse delegitimized them (is this helpful?).  But across Latin America the consistent expansion of mass media has also allowed political candidates to reach those in areas where they (or their party) have little or no on-the-ground presence.  ... Hmm, where am I going with this.
Overall, then, political incorporation and voice in the workplace were coupled during much of the 20th century, but since the neoliberal turn these two forms of incorporation have become decoupled.  In a very broad sense citizenship used to include a voice in politics and in the workplace.  In the current era, however, citizenship/political incorporation guarantee only a voice in political elections, not a voice at work.  And though there have been some moves in the opposite direction, even the rise of the left has not brought with it a strong renewal in union power at the workplace.
Can political voice and/or power replace voice at the workplace, and vice versa?  [[When/where/why do political outcomes matter more than process?]]  That is to say, will workers accept authoritarian regimes in the workplace if they feel that they have a voice on the national stage, or an ally in the government (this should probably be state, not national).  Similarly, are workers more likely to demand workplace voice if they feel the state government does not represent them?

Cochabamba 2004

Olivera, Oscar, and Tom Lewis. 2004. Cochabamba!: water war in Bolivia. Cambridge, Mass: South End Press.


Oscar Oliveira  "Privatization" 7-24

• (11-12) "we were--and still are--tremendously worried by the fact that the Bolivian government evidently prefers to follow the dictates of the World Bank instead of taking into account what the population views as in its best interests"
• disconnenct between government and people, either in reality or in perception..."why don't they (the government" listen to us, help us??
• (14) describes selling mineral rights as "stripped of our material inheritance"
• (15) external debt was contacted "undemocratically--in our name, but without our consent"...and now Bolivia is hostage to its external debt, resulting in terrible conditions for the people
• (16) external debt is "a complete loss of sovereignty

Oscar Oliveira "Organizing" 24-32

• (27 28) offered office of the union for the Coordinaria en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida
•  a group formed by the union and a previous civil society org. interested in water issues (27)
• the Coordinaria spoke in the name of the people who felt ignored (28)
• hoped that the water issue would unite disparate factions, urban and country, etc etc, and it worked (30)
• in one protest Oliveira and Morales snared traffic, busted windows, were repressed by police when government promised (and failed to show up to) negotiations (31)

Raul Gutiérrez-Aguilar 2004 "The Coordinaria: One Year after the Water War" (53-64)

• the coordinaria movement differed from trade-union movements in the past in that it focused on basic, universal needs, not just individual proposals (55)
• the coordinaria used assembly-style poolitics, not internal institutions (56)
•  the coordinaria assembly became a place for other civil groups to discuss with each other more specfici problems, neighborhood to neighborhood, as well as a mass-mobilizing movement
• the coordinaria has had toruble in times of calm due to "the atomized society" and stretching of the social farbic by neoliberalism (58) -- people are lazy
• coordinaria hopes to poltiicize the people, and the working class, who have been under-political since the demise of the trade unions (64)

 
Álvaro García Linera 2004 "The 'Multitude'" 65-86

• 
  
• idea that unoins are being replaced by political parties as the means of negotiation between the state and society...is this surprising? (69)
•  this has looked more like clientelism, in this authors view
• "union" form of collective organizing is being replaced (in Bolivia) with the "Multitude" form (70-71)
• since the unified workplace has been diffused (often ino the niehgborhoods and homes), geographic groups and collective action organizations are more important now (71-73)
• Coordinaria members are uniting under an identity created through the struggle, but it is vauge, something like "ordinary working people" (78)  <<The breadth of this identity is an important weakness of it>>
• 
  
•  

Kingstone, Young, Aubrey 2013

Kingstone, Peter, Joseph K. Young, and Rebecca Aubrey. 2013. "Resistance to Privatization: Why Protest Movements Succeed and Fail in Latin America". Latin American Politics and Society. 55 (3): 93-116

• Introduction
• Broad Defense in Peru, coalition of many civil society organizations, was able to block privatization in 2002 (93-94)
• Article focuses on privatization because it fidrectly affest jobs and consumers, and national industries can be symbolic (94)
• Argument: protest tend to succeed under two conditions
• when protesters engage in "brokerage" across multiple sectors of society (94-95)
• (95) protests are most successful when civil rights are protected but political representation is weak
• this model accounts well for failure, but not so well for success...will discuss example of Bolivia and Uruguay to play this out
• Privatization in Latin America
• Privatization can have diffuse and uneven effects, improving the experience of some while decreasing jobs and increasing prices as well (96)
• the perception of corruption can increase hostility to privatization
• this is likely due to or increased by lack of transparency and public scrutiny in these privatizations (97)
• authors identify 104 protest cases in 18 countries between 1990 and 2000
• 25 successfully reversed the sale
• protests were frequent in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, though few succeeded in any of these places, and were less frequent but more successful in Costa Rica and Uruguay
• Successful Resistance
• political opportunity
• hypothesis 1: and open civil rights climate is associated with greater likelihood of success for protest (99)
• hypothesis 2: the level of political rights is negatively associated with success of protest movements
• assume that high political representation will result in grievances going through "proper channels"
• brokerage
• occurs when previously unconnected groups cooperate in seeking a common goal
• hypothesis 3: brokerage increases probability of protest success (100)
• alternative explanations
• protest became more frequent and successful later in period as neoliberal project lost steam
• no trend in this direction in data
• certain sectors are more likely to generate protest
• protest were more successful and had more linkages if a public utlity
• but suggest that overall success is high enough that this doesn't really pan out in data either.
• could make argument they're making a molehill out of a mountain here!
• Research Design:  uses a bunch of third party measures (101-103). tests political, economic, and brokerage variables
•  Results
• all hypotheses proven (103), economic variables hard to gauge, and their seem to be some country effects as well (104) (through discussion on 106)
• Democracy, Neoliberalism, and Protest
• the modal case of a successful protest is one where civil rights are protected but political representation is weak enough to demand groups use outside channels (106)
• Bolivian Water War
• 107-109
• privatization of water company done without consultation of the polity (108)
• Earlier protests against privatization had failed, in Cochabamba there was brokerage
• protesters barricaded, took over parts of city when government failed to negotiate
• police leveraged this situation for a pay raise...is this significant to success?
• importantly, the political exclusion of indigenous people led to this successful mobilization (109)
• Protecting ANTEL in Uruguay
• ultimately the protest was channeled through a national plebiscite (109)
• generally the country is seen as politically open, but Elite parties were losing groudn to Frente Amplio at this point
• notes brokerage between PIT-CNT union confedration and the Frente Amplio's civil society org (110)
• does this really count as two civil society orgs?!
• protesters took advantage of national plebiscite rule in Constitution (110-111)
• Conclusions
• privatization, especailly when its done undemocratically, may tap into deeper, already held feelings of political exclusion (111)
• this political exclusion may predate privatization effort, and even neoliberalism for that matter (though likely not the latter)
• high success in Costa Rica and Uruguay occured because of brokerage between CSOs, unions, and political parties (111-112)...protests are eventually channeled into political institutions
• these stand in contrast to Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico where protest has taken place almost entirely outside of formal political institutions  (112)

1/8/14

Why compare Mexico and Argentina?

• The PJ and the PRI were both countries of parties that relied on mass-mobilization of labor
• Both the PJ and the PRI initiated  neoliberal reforms, in a sort of bait-and-switch maneuver
• Both are back in power, the PJ on a leftist bent and the PRI not so much
• Both Mexico and Argentina face an issue of inequality, and groups in both places have initiated resistance against neoliberalism specifically.
• Mexico in some sense has an outlet for unemployed workers, in that the US can be an option (or is at least understood as an option) for employment for Mexicans. Argentina does not quite have such an outlet...one might count Chile, but certainly the Chilean economy does not compare to the US economy in its ability to absorb workers.
• Labor unions in both places have been disarticulated from the labor-based party
• Mexico has competitive elections, while Argentina doesn't really, at this point
• where do the conservatives go? for whom do they vote?

1/6/13

Silva (2012): the old fomr of incorporation is gone, and movements/the popular sector are clamoring for greater incorporation, or reincorporation.

What does incorporation look like?  in Colliers (1991) it tends to start from elites, can be done either through party membership or electoral mobilization.  However, with the Colliers incorporation was due to the decline of the oligarchy.  One could suggest that the neoliberal turn is a similar decline in an oligarchy, but that oligarchy would include organized labor.  But even then, it's less that labor was part of the oligarchy and more than the elites could no longer use the old methods of incorporating labor, and by extension the popular classes.

Is there a need to incorporate the popular classes anymore?  Or does the state simply become something more like a whack-a-mole game.  Always shifting, not programmatic, but also not overwhelming?

What does incororation look like to people on the ground?
Do people feel "politically incorporated" in their everyday lives? What would this even mean?

Popular sectors face the demands of the everyday, and sometimes those demands are great enough that they cannot make do on their own.  The literature has a lot of reasons why a group would create a movement (relative deprivation, grievances, etc etc).  But ostensibly they interact with the government in hopes of improving their outcomes in society.  How do we understand the crusaders versus the coopted?

To what extent is a labor union or popular movement the result of leadership cultivation, and to what extent is it groundswell support?  Organic versus created?

Silva 2012

Silva, Eduardo. 2012. "Exchange Rising? Karl Polanyi and Contentious Politics in Contemporary Latin America". Latin American Politics and Society. 54 (3): 1-32.

• Introduction
• organized workers and their capacity for mobilization were a key nonparty political societal source of advocacy and defense of protections [from capitalism in the 20th century]" (1)
• But deindustrialization, privatizaion, deregulation, and business-friendly labor codes debilitated the workplace as the locus from which to organize effective societal countermovement [against neoliberalism]"
• so what now? who will stand up against capitalism?
• Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador suggest that Polanyi's theory may still be useful (2)
• that is, that the circuits of exchange in capitalism, the commodification of labor, land, and money, can be sources of mobilization and resistance
• this article seeks to anchor Polanyi in real events
• thsi article also needs an explanation for how social movements reocgnized the common threat of recommodification and then formed horizontal linkages to fight it (3)
• goes for contentious politics literature, using threat, framing, and brokerage
• this article combines this idea with Poanyi's circuits of exchaage
• NOTE: defnesive reactiosn to recommodification were also mized with identity, organization, and disruptive action, NOR DID LABOR DISAPPEAR FROM THE SCENE
• labor was important before neoliberalism, and likely led the charge against reforms initially, but in many places there is a new "head" organization in current contentious politics, and it tends to not be labor (4)
• Two Sources of Societal Countermovement to Free-Market Captialism: Production and Exchange
• Marx focused on point of production (4-5)
• concentration of workers created shared identities (5)
• large-scale industrial owrkplace provided place for uniosn to organize
• power depended on ability of unions to disrupt production
• Polanyi had a different persepective
• what's important are the attempts to subordinate market economics to SOCIAL RELATIONS
• people demadn some stability and reciprocity, but te market is to volatile to give it to them (6)
• ressistance to free-market (in Polanyi's view) can come from more places than just the industrial proleriat
• Polanyi predicts blacklash against the free-market, McAdam explains the nuts and bolts of how the movements are created (7)
• Market Reforms, National Populism, and Organized Labor
• "National populism was Latin America's version of the social democratic compromise that evolved in Europe during the long 20th century (8)
• a coalition of urban labor, middle classes, and domestic market oriented bourgeoisie, mediated by the state, supported ISI
• labor in Latin America was not as powerful as labor in Europe, which is why they had to rely on a coalition with the middle class and labor-friendly parties (9)
• labor led the popular sectors, most of the others got a decent deal, but not as good as labor (8-9)
• first and second stage structural (neoliberal) reforms intensified the commodification of labor , land, and money
• first stage was liberalizing the economy, shrinking the economic reach of hte state (10)
• second stage extended market logic to education, healthcare, other government services
• labor protested, but was too weakened by reforms to stop them
• Exchange, threat, and Contentious Politics
• new social movements arose from territories, social categories, identity politics because the point of production was no longer a relevant reference (11)
• but they operated alongside class-based groups, ie unions
• Many of the grievances sought by these groups were based around the commodificiation of land, labor, or money (12)
• peasants wanted land reforms, issues that were often intertwined with indigenous identity movements
• downside is that these movements tended to be a bit more heterogeneous that old union movements, since new movements were mobilized around multiple issues, not just at the point of production (like labor of old)
• but the weakness of labor also meant these movemetns had a chance to be of more central importance to the resistance against capitalism
• Argentina
• Unemployed movements showed up first in small towns in the interior (13)
• because they were unemployed, locus of fight was communities, not the workplace
• successful unemployed and underemployed movements in the WOrkers' Party in the late1990s (14)
• piqueteros, asembleas populares also happening
• these community-based movements linked up with the CTA
• the main CGT never hooked up with these movements, was mainly fighting rear-guard actions to control its own downsizing (15)
• Bolivia
• COB national union was powerful in Bolivia, but was massively weakened by privatization of tin mines and radical downsizing of the satate (16)
• coca federations, other peasant groups rose up in their place
• coca sindicatos were targeted for eradication by the US and Bolivian authorities in counternarcotics raids
• the CSUTCB union joined up with the cocaleros, framed the movement as anti-imperialism, neogtiated coca laws with the federal government (17)
• intertwining of material and indigenous culture strengthened the movement
• when the government took on indigenous rights and customs, the movement further consolidated itself and fought off this challenge
• also, water wars (18) and gas wars, demanding water access and use of money from gas mining to benefit the nation
• Ecuador
• urban labor movements mobilized against the reforms, but were weak and easily coopted (19)
• organized indigenous peoples became the main opposition to neoliberalism
• CONAIE, combined movement of highland and lowland indigenous movements, blocked land liberalization
• Exchange and the Repertoire of Contention
• direct action in the form of roadblocks, takeovers, and other disruptions to daily business overtook strikes on production as the most important form of direct action (19-21)
• Exchange and Framing
• exchange-based framing allowed individuals to unite despite the fact that they were in different locations in the structure of production (22)
• neoliberalism became an important frame
• it came to stand for loss of sovereignty to foreign governments, international institutions, and transnational capital
• corruption by government officials and helping foreign creditors and/or foreign banks was framed as theft
• moral indignation rallied people (22-23)
• life became an encompassing frame as well
• neoliberalism became an assault on life
• such big terms, frames allowed groups to make many horizontal linkages, more than just class-based ideas (23)
• (23-24) in Argentina many people experienced unemployment, precarity, or new forms of employment which they attributed to neoliberalism
• many differently situated people recognized themselves as part of the world of work, and saw neoliberal reforms as a worsening of their work lives (24)
• some dissident unions began proclaiming "the neighborhood is the new factory"
• this shifted the center of resistance away fro teh factory and into popular sector neighborhoods
• the demand for state intervention brought in other groups as well, environmentalists, gender, human rights, as they saw the state as the only actor who could protect them from the market
• Conclusions
• in practical matters, this means that movements need to be more broadly cooperative and coordinate with each other (26)
• but it also brings a challenge to the left in Latin America, who will be expected to agglomerate and channel these movements into real political power

Elbert 2010

Elbert, Rodolfo. 2010. "How Do Unions Respond to Nonstandard Work Arrangements? Relations between Core and Non-Core Workers in a Food Processing Factory (Argentina, 2005-2008)". Journal of Workplace Rights. 15 (3): 387-398.

•  Introduction
• Though the working class is increasingly fragmented, in Argentina  workers in formal labor movements are being a bit more militant now (387-388)
• This paper is about a successful case of non-standard and standard workers cooperating to improve the lives of non-standard wokers
• there are grassroots strategies that non-core workers developed in order to obtain the support of core workers (388)
• Nonstandard work arrangements and Union Strategies in the Global South
• labor protests can include both core and non-core workers, and these protests need to be analyzed in light of this fact (389)
• Context of the Factory Case Study:
• K-Foods
• Production
• two main sections, manufacturing and packaging (390)
• some gender division in labor
• Labor relations = conflictual
• workers say management is too demanding
• management says workers are ideologically set against them (391)
• there is more or less explicit competition between teh company and the union for workers' loyalty
• nonstandard work
• most nonstandard workers are not represented by the union
• union politics
• three main groups (392)
• core workers, aligned with national leaders
• core workers who are more militant
• non-core workers seeking solidarity and core jobs
• Core and Non-core workers during two Labor Conflicts
• Campaign against Labor Outsourcing
• there was labor outsourcing at one of the plants, but the union did not fight it until 2005 (393)
• before this the national union did not intitiate a fight, despite favorable conditions
• in 2005 some grassroots organization began with outsourced workers and activists (394)
• core workers showed solidarity, and eventually (2006) these nonstandard workers were hired as core workers
• Temporary workers win permanent contracts
• temp contracts or those hired through agencies (395), NOT outsourced labor
• some of these workers also joined the grassroots group
• these workers eventually blockaded a highway to get their demands (to be core workers, among others) to be met
• when temp workers were sent home, allegedly because their was no work to be done, WHOLE PLANT went on strike (395-396)
• shop floor union and activist group came together, finally, most temp workers got core contracts (396)
• Union Strategies that Confront Nonstandard work Arrangments
• non-croes workers campagins were grassroots
• involved rank and file, despite teh fact that the union rarely did so
• ruthless in the pursuit of the creation of solidarty across core/non-core
• ALL OF THIS CREATED SOLIDARITY, which won the day
• these actiosn reveresed trend of labor fragmentation
• ME: Where's the government in all this?  They blockaded a highway and nothing bad happened?

1/2/14

Roberts (1999, 2003) describes class cleavages without class identities.

Is this related to inequality in the US as well?  Different social circumstances, for sure, but some of the main deep causes and some of the main answers.

Who do I want to study?  What sorts of people should I be paying attention to?

To recognize a change would demand not only that leaders notice the need for this new strategy, but that the base constituents also see the necessity of this mission, no?

What are the impediments to cooperation between these new social movements?

I can study the CTA in Argentina, who has had some contacts and cooperation with the piqueteros, but that cooperation eventually fell apart.  Why?  What sends a movement to go off on its own and not stay with another movement?

Currently many of the issues facing the poor and workers seem based in the ability of capital to travel very easily around the globe.  This creates a context in which capital can flee, and the relative ease of trade has forced local capital to compete with global capital.  Why don’t managers in local companies see their workers/employees as allies in the fight against global competitors?  Similarly, why don’t workers and the unemployed seem themselves as allies against employers, global capital?

One could describe workers and the unemployed as part of the same broad class.  Do workers and the unemployed see themselves as the same class?  Do they see each other as allies? Do union leaders and leaders of the poor see each other as allies or competitors? Why?

Money might be scarce, but are political resources as well?  Can unions actually gain from joining unemployed movements, as opposed to vice versa?  If labor-based parties are moving away from their labor allies, and ostensibly towards some other group (or perhaps just to the media?), should labor start to look towards other groups as allies as well?