Notes!

Thursday, August 15, 2013

Szwarcberg 2013

Mariela Szwarcberg. "The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine Case." Latin American Research Review 48.2 (2013): 32-54.

Introduction

while clientelism is often taken as a given, party operatives in Argentina and elsewhere can prefer not to distribute goods in exchange of electoral support (33)
argument: a party operative's capacity to turn to clientelistic strategies of mobilization is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the use of clientelism...party operatives have to prefer to build clientelistic linkages with voters
study of municipal candidates in Argentina

Mobilizing Voters: Lit review

while the poor are targets of clientelistic strategies, scholars have convincingly shown that the poor are strategic and sophisticated in making political decisions
to explain candidates' strategic choices to turn out voters, I distinguish between a candidates CAPACITY and PREFERENCE to use clientelism (34)
political parties contribute to shaping politicians' strategies by providing (or not providing) incentives to use clientelism to turn out voters (35)

Choosing Strategies of Political Mobilization

Assumption: candidates interested in a political career have to demonstrate their ability to get votes for the party
Table 1: (36)

Candidate has Capacity to use Clientelism	Candidate Prefers to use Clientelism
Candidate has Capacity to use Clientelism	Yes	No
Yes	Pragmatist	Idealist
No	Resentful	Utopist

Without observing explicit choice, can't tell the difference between resentful and utopist

Data

ballot positions reflect the value of each candidate to the party (39)
data suggests the longer a candidate uses clientelism to build a constituency the more likely they will have a higher ballot position

Candidates Capacity

Incumbent candidates are more likely to have access to material goods (39)
access to resources is also conditioned by level of government

candidate who has party members in national and/or regional office has more resources than one who is just a local incumbent (40)

also, to effectively use clientelism a candidate need to have access to resources AND a network of party activists to spread resources around

in Argentina this means only the PJ and Radical party (my take: though maybe not the Radicals anymore?) (41)
given the data, cast majority of the sample is PJ activists
Some new parties do have minimal clientelist networks if candidates brought activists and networks with them from a previous party (PJ or UCR) (42)

Candidate's Preferences

Candidates that engage in "solving voter problems" will obtain electoral support and will also monitor political participation (43)

usually by taking attendance at political rallies
this works because voting is mandatory, but finding who voted what is still impossible
for this paper, a candidate who takes attendance is clientelistic

Explaining variation in candidate preferences

interesting thing is that idealists are almost equal in number to the pragmatists (44)
now focus on PJ, since they are the ones with the most resources
in José C Paz neighborhood, unemployment rate is 80%ish (45)

easy to mobilize voters by distributing goods

intraparty competition induces candidates to use clientelism (46)

if one doesn't do it, another will
if candidate doesn't go clientelistic, sends signal to party that he's not willing to do "whatever it takes" to win

idealist candidates essentially know they are committing political suicide (47)
candidates realize that the best way to mobilize voters is to help and then coerce them

but if this doesn't happen, party "doesn't forgive you" (48)
its bad, but "these are the rules of the game"

in Río Cuarto, another municipality, two Radical candidates faced off

one wanted to create electoral alliance with another party
the other wanted to keep "purity" of Radical ideology
electoral coalition won because able to attract more voters!

Resentful candidates blame their electoral failure entirely on their incapacity to provide benefits (49)
strong correlation between pragmatist candidates and PJ (49), fewer pragmatists in UCR (50)

Conclusion

THE PARTIES CREATE THE INCENTIVES THAT CAUSE MOST CANDIDATES TO TURN TO CLIENTELISM (51)
But not all candidates prefer to use clientelism...parties could create ways to get these "cleaner" politicians to rise through the ranks

Martin and Brady 2007

Martin, Nathan D., and David Brady. 2007. "Workers of the Less Developed World Unite? A Multilevel Analysis of Unionization in Less Developed Countries". American Sociological Review. 72 (4): 562-584

Introduction

Study seeks to understand why unionization varies across LDCs and across different types of workers (563)
argument: variation in union membership is a function of more than the worker's individual characteristics, but is also constrained by country-level institutions, industrialization, and globalization

Expectations

Individual characteristics that will increase unionization probability

middle-age (not young) (564)
male
lower class...though there are more white collar unions in LA

Country-level characteristics

ex-communist regime (565)

result in high unionization AND distinctive relations between unions and nascent democratic institutions

democracy

higher unionization rate

size of state

more government = more unions

influence of IMF

will result in smaller government

influence of ILO

Industrialization should increase unionization (566)

this assumes LDCs industrialize int eh same way that First World industrialized (567)...too simple!

Globalization

arguments go both ways...can create transnational linkages in labor movements, but also give capital greater leverage
measured as amount of trade

Data and Methods

regional pattern is discernible: greater unionization in Eastern Europe (post-communist) than any other region (569)
construct a class schema using earnings level, occupational category, and educational attainment when appropriate (570)
uses GDP per capita to measure industrialization (572): WOULDN'T THIS BE INFLATED BY FINANCIALIZATION, IF PRESENT?

but also include % of labor force in industry versus agriculture

decompose the analysis into post-communist and not, since post-communist has such a strong effect

Results

workers in ex-communist countries 2.75 times more likely to be unionized (574)
democracy is not significant
government expenditure as % of GDP not significant
ILO not significant
IMF is significant in expected way (a person is 50-60% less likely to be unionized)
most globalization variables not significant (575)

WHICH MEANS THAT inflation and institutional variation are more important predictors of unionization across LDCs

in ex-communist countries the unskilled proletariat is WAY more likely to be unionized (578)

Discussion

industrialization isn't creating new union members! weird!/DUH! (580)
but also globalization had no effect...is that a problem with data?

Wednesday, August 14, 2013

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89.

Introduction

argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):

pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments

other explanations are incomplete

authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
corporatism is too party/politics focused

the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions

labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law

Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics

Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)

that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups

pluralist system allows autonomy
corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)

A Note on Case Selection

Uruguay (64)

pluralist labor relations system
class-based unionism
strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention

this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.

Chile

historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)

decentralizing influence of labor law
state has a lot of power over unions
parties have control of unions
THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship

Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion

Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)

meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)

Uruguay

unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
gave them and independent streak
they also formed a number of labor-based parties
before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)

this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created

Meant that:

in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties

Authoritarian Labor Regimes

Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)

Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations

Transitional Context

Chilean transition was controlled (72)

left parties and unions still outlawed
in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)

decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)

In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)

initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)

Return of Elected Rule

Chile

"concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
there was a resurgence of union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so

Uruguay

reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
return to 1968 labor relations system
there was a resurgence of union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)

manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)

with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)

Conclusion

one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)

BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)

strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
"institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
testable hypothesis: regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched

my take: makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle

under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Grayson, George W. “Mexico's Semicorporatist Regime,” in Wiarda, Howard J. 2004. Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America--revisited. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Overview:

Salinas’s neoliberal reforms
- Ruptured the ruling party (246)
- Diminished rewards to the faithful (due to lower government revenues through tariffs, quotas, etc.)
- Diminished central control
- Caused businesses to start competing on labor costs, which is bad for system/unions
Wiarda also Suggests these reforms led to calls for greater democracy, and gave rise to opposition party successes (especially at the state and local level)
Population growth and social diversification also meant there were more groups outside the corporatist political framework (247)
As corporatist institutions had been slightly undermined, Fox did not have great control over corrupt labor leaders (248)
Talks a lot about Fox’s political styling
- disdain for politicians
- attempt to use media instead of government organizations
- included PRI in some things, didn’t hammer away at them, not many panistas in his cabinet
- allowed Sup Marcos and EZLN to address nation
PRI maintains traditional sectors, though does some changes (BUT, of course, primaries for elections undermine any delegate/candidate concessions)
AMLO taking some corporatist reins, very humanistic but also relatively authoritarian (read: populist)
Lots of foreign NGOs hanging out, too…massive increase over the 2000s, maybe they’ll be important in the future?
No new rules of the game exist for governing (255)
- No new organizations have replaced traditional corporatist structures
- Corp. structures remain, although in much weaker form.

Quotes:
“No new rules of the game exist for governing.” (255)

Greer, Stevens, and Stephens 2007

Greer, Stevens, Stephens 2007

GREER, CHARLES R., CHARLES D. STEVENS, and GREGORY K. STEPHENS. 2007. "The State of the Unions in Mexico". Journal of Labor Research. 28 (1): 69-92.
Overview:

Mostly relies on other literature, not much new analysis
Covers declining union density, composition of employment in Mexico (70-74
Description of power union lost as PRI marginalized labor, and CTM leaders still held on to PRI (75-76)
Uses Bensusán’s typology to show how state-corp unions losing power means the whole movement is losing power (80-83)
Relative Deprivation theory suggests workers should be more active (86)
Transnational alliances (87-88)

Quotes:
“The once powerful alliance of government, unions, and business is becoming more tilted against union and workers’ rights and is losing power in the global marketplace.” (82)
“Thus, with the emergence of broad economic and political change, labor unions and the workers they are supposed to represent are at a decided disadvantage and are struggling to find ways to promote the kind of change in labor institutions and support of workers’ rights that is necessary to ensure adequate wages, safety, and other workplace conditions (Gillespie and Tergen 1995).” (84)
‘Relative deprivation theory may partially explain the actions of individuals and workers’ rights organizations oriented toward labor unrest and disputes (Greer and Stephens 1996). More specifically, relative deprivation may lead to increasing collective action, such as growing membership in and support for independent unions. However, obstacles are in the way of such action, such as the traditional ineffectiveness of union intervention, unfriendly legislation, government interpretation of existing laws in favor of company positions, and the prevalence of protectionist company unions…Spontaneous, unofficial, and even violent worker responses to some employer actions should not be entirely unexpected” (86)
“Despite the rhetoric for cross0border solidarity such alliances have not had much success in the past. Reasons for their failures include divergent interests of workers, at least as perceived in the short-run; absence of international expertise or program infrastructure in most unions…; reactive efforts as opposed to strategic initiatives…There are fewer reasons to expect successful alliances between the United States and Mexico given the differential wages and the past hostility of the Mexican government…” (88-89)

“We predict that more independent unions will grow stronger because they meet worker instrumentality needs and because of perceptions of relative deprivation. A country can pursue an economic development strategy based on low wages for only so long. Workers will replace the state-corporatist unions…with independent unions (Bensusán’s terms…) that better represent their interests” (89)

Middlebrook 1995

Middlebrook (1995)

Chapter 1: Mass Politics and Regime formation
1. On the concept of Post-revolutionary Authoritarian rule
  1. Features:
    1. Prominence of mas actors
      1. May be mobilized less and less over time
      2. Still important base of control for government
    2. Political ideals from revolutionary era
      1. Something referencing social change
      2. Rule is legitimated by invoking these symbols/ideologies
      3. Cannot be empty promises, must deliver the goods as well
    3. Dual importance of state and hegemonic party
      1. Party mobilizes social base
      2. Party can serve to cement social alliances
      3. Party can serve as method through which social allies can gain access to state apparatus
2. Framework for studying mass politics in authoritarian regimes
  1. Limitations on mass mobilization
    1. Can happen through public apathy, legal restrictions, channeling mobilization through the party.
  2. Limits on sociopolitical pluralism
  3. Limits on Demand articulation
    1. Restrictions creates situation in which groups must negotiate, compromise, or modify their goals
3. (28) “ The party [PRI (and its predecessors)] has been the principal channel through which leaders of lower class organizations achieve upward political mobility”
  1. BUT: the party never developed autonomous means of limiting its constituents’ political actions, it relied on state power for those controls.
  2. THUS: organized labor enjoyed relative autonomy in the party framework (though certainly not in the state regime)
4. Central Argument: to understand the bases of elite control over and general character of mass politics, must understand both state and societal controls over the labor movement
  1. State = labor law, etc.
  2. Societal = labor unions’ reliance on state subsidies
    1. Economic structure that influenced patterns of unionization and CB power
    2. Organizational form of the labor movement
    3. Political ideas that influence policy preferences and political response strategies
Chapter 2: State Structures and political Control
1. (42) “On the one hand, expanded state administrative capacity gradually increased governing elites’ ability to control developments in the labor sector. On the other hand, legal recognition of basic labor rights and inclusion of worker representatives in come administrative structures strengthened organized labor by providing important symbolic and material benefits to both unions and individual workers.”
2. (51-2) 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo institutionalized activist role of government in protection f workers at a time when the unions weren’t strong enough to protect themselves (the CROM had fallen out of power soon before 1930)
  1. Leads to creation of Secretary of Labor (STPS, Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social), as well as the CTM
3. JCA’s preserves the distinction between federal and local jurisdictions (60)
4. Labor seat on JCA’s help unions expand their organizations (61-62)
5. Reconocimiento, official recognition/registration of unions, improves power of unions compared to employers, but also gives state power over unions (65)
6. State has some ability to meddle in union internal affairs (elections, etc.) but not much. Also, requirements do not safeguard union democracy.
7. Strikes must be registered, only occur after arbitration proceedings have concluded (69)
Chapter 3 – The challenge of mass participation and the origins of Mexico’s state subsidized labor movement
1. Before the revolution, labor movements were dispersed, and in small enterprises, who had little bargaining power
2. Morones, while founding the CROM
  1. marginalized the anarchosyndicalists, and
  2. decided they need to ally with the government to have any power
3. CROM never made inroads in industries with strong unions, like railroad workers and electrical workers
4. Relations between the CROM and Obregon quickly soured, were eventually charged with assassination of Obregon!
5. CTM founded by CROM dissidents and under Cardenas’ hope to unite labor movement to support him, CROM remains relatively pro-Calles
6. Even while he supported the CTM, Cardenas worked against the CTM
  1. He helped found the FSTSE to keep government workers out of the hands of the CTM
  2. He kept peasants out of the CTM
7. Cardenas’s PRM first to officially tie labor to an official political party (1938), SECTORS
8. SME leaves CTM in 1939 after CTM supports presidential candidate Camacho
9. Subsidies to labor movement
  1. Legal
    1. Exclusion clauses
    2. Separation clauses
  2. Financial
    1. CTM had trouble collecting dues, but stayed solvent
    2. Middlebrook hints at direct monetary subsidies
  3. Political
    1. Preferential access to electoral lists of PRM/PRI and administrative positions
      1. Leverage for union
      2. Personal benefit
    2. No reelection meant constant demand for new and loyal candidates
    3. CTM dominated these positions
    4. Chair in the Chamber of Deputies was most available, some Senate seats, practically no governorships (too important to PRI power structure to give away as spoils)
10. (106) “The consolidation of the post-revolutionary social pact occurred, then, not with CTM membership in the governing party but with the political triumph of progovernment labor leaders in the aftermath of a major labor crisis in the late 1940s” (emphasis added by me!)
Chapter 4: Turning Point the 1947-51 Labor Crisis
1. Case study on railroad workers
2. RR, like other protected sectors, autonomous, strong, politically minded
3. During labor crisis (post-WWII) government supports more pragmatic leadership, alternative/radical paths slowly squelched
4. Once these unions are turned toward pragmatic (non-radical) ends
  1. CTM dominant, BUT:
  2. Begins period of truly institutionalized social pact
    1. Previously pact had rested on shoulders of President and specific union confederations
5. Labor movement united under CT in 1966, but only a façade under which fragmentation persists
6. Social pact:
  1. Unions (leaders) can’t survive without political support
  2. Unions become effective tools of worker control for political leaders
7. Also, CROC formed in 1952 by Aleman government, “to unite disparate labor groups in an organization that was simultaneously…
Chapter 5: State Structures, Political Control, and Labor Participation: an Assessment
1. STRIKES: “…postrevolutionary governments generally maintained strong control over stieks in federal-jurisdiction economic activities, regardless of changes in the political character of different presidential administrations.” (171)
2. LABOR UNION REGISTRATION: Political influence/action can influence rates of labor union registration, but generally no variables explained differences in time to register, meaning there was NO effect due to
  1. presidential administration
  2. difference in confederation
3. WORKER DEMAND RESOLUTION:
  1. Includes an in-depth case of RR workers union
  2. Some presidential effect, but also surprising anti-worker effect for Cardenas
Chapter 6: Labor Politics and ISI
1. ISI good and bad
  1. Development, work, but
  2. Balance of payment problems
  3. Inflation problems
  4. Result: people have jobs, but their wages are falling!
2. CTM often spoke radically, acted pragmatically when ISI stumbled and inflation rose
3. Section on democracy in Mexican automobile sector
  1. Neither presidential policy nor strength of state labor federations adequately explains democratization (229)
  2. Car mfg. undergoing changes, less paternal relations, just-in-time0ish style prxn, and modern assembly line
  3. Workers viewed democratization seen as a way to gain better bargaining power, as their leaders were initially unable to cope with their new demands
  4. Workplace differences (especially with delegado system) important to explaining variation across auto plants (236)
  5. Democratic unions generally better at gaining control of production, bad at increasing wages, struck more often
Chapter 7: Labor Politics under Economic Stress in the 1980s
1. Failure of ISI
  1. Economic difficulties, interest rates, defaults
  2. Less government spending
  3. Inflation!!!
2. Organized Labor’s Response
  1. Unions never thought they were adequately compensated for sacrifices during 1976-7 crisis
  2. De la Madrid agrees to price controls in 1983, then immediately breaks his deal
  3. NO strike petitions approved
  4. CROC and CROM used to harass CTM
  5. 1984 CTM threatens general strike, but steps back and agrees to negotiate on de la Madrid’s terms, CT makes demands but never gains anything real
  6. WORKERS LOSE
  7. “The CTM’s historical reluctance to pursue more aggressive collective action in support of workers’ interests is one of the most noteworthy aspects of state-labor relations in Mexico.” (265)
3. What explains unions’ actions?
  1. Usual suspects
    1. Crisis weakened bargaining power
      1. CTM had heterogeneous members
      2. None/few in strategic industries
    2. Government control over strikes and union recognition
    3. CTM had more deputies in Congress, maybe thought they’d recoup losses later?
  2. New ideas
    1. Internal weakness of CTM, others
    2. Leaders’ (Velazquez’s) political beleifs
      1. (Weakish)
      2. Leaders’ fear that a true mobilization would be a breeding ground for union democracy, undermine their old control over unions
4. Industrial restructuring in automobile industry
  1. Automakers open new plants, get CTM unions, undermine democratic unions
  2. CTM unions give management much more leeway on production methods, democratic unions able to fight back a bit
  3. Volkswagen at Puebla
    1. Leaders capitulate a bit in secret agreement
    2. Midlevel and rank and file revolt
    3. Union turmoil allows VW (thanks to JFCA decision) to fire everyone, rehire who they want, keep pliable union
  4. Flexible contracts more important than low wages to managers! (286)
5. Privatization of state-owned firms crushed official unions ability to use political influence to win economic demands
6. State-subsidized labor organizations lost their ability to win concessions, but maintained their significance as instruments of political control of workers.
CONCLUSION
1. Union/party alliance
  1. Benefitted labor because resulted in subsidies
  2. Benefitted party because party had no other means of controlling mass base
2. CTM resisted democratic opening: why?! Central question of the chapter
3. Over time unions had experienced a cumulative weakening after presidents defined and redefined the alliance
4. Unions weakest point ever in 1980s/90s, and business gains better foothold with government
5. BUT labor still important for getting out the vote
  1. This control, however, became less reliable (see 1988 prez election)
6. “Because post-revoutionary authoritarian regimes generally develop distinctive ideologies that give workers a special place in postrevolutionary society…labor has a stronger interest in preserving elements of the status quo…” (317)
  1. Long-term democratization may be a good thing, BUT
  2. Short term democratization may pose significant costs to labor unions
7. As jobs move north in Mexico, they further weaken unions by
  1. Dispersing labor
  2. Gets far away from political center of country
  3. Move closer to anti-union areas of the country.
8. Labor leaders also suck at times, protection contracts
9. Political parties are an important place where labor can get power, but
  1. Have the taint of old style PRI relationships
  2. PRD, rest of left have focused on electoral competitions, not alliances with unions (325-6)
10. Finally, labor law needs to change, bad!

Samstad 2002

Samstad 2002

Samstad, James G. 2002. "Corporatism and Democratic Transition: State and Labor during the Salinas and Zedillo Administrations". Latin American Politics and Society. 44 (4): 1-28.
Overview:

Corporatism involved three levels
- State/”Macro”-corporatism: national level, tripartite discussions of economic and political policy (3)
- Micro/Local or firm level corporatism: representatives on JCA’s
- Party corporatism
Shift to export-led growth created tensions in the coalition forged under ISI (5)
Procedural democracy poses a greater challenge to corporatism that ELG (6)
- Decline of strong president gives each level of corp. more autonomy
- Resistance to herding rank and file by authoritarian labor leaders
By end of Salinas, labor corp. still basically intact (11)
Creation of UNT in 1997, labor split challenged all three levels of corporatism
- who gets to peak bargain? (MACRO)
  - CTM tries ‘corporatism without government’
- UNT and some in CT call for more democratic PRI(PARTY)
  - ALSO: primaries for candidates decreases labor delegates
Few structural changes to corporatism, HOWEEVER, big changes in how corporatism works in practice

Quotes:
“The party (PRI) has formally incorporated labor as a ‘sector’ with nominal voting rights…Over the years, representatives of PRI-affiliated labor organizations consequently secured a non-insignificant share of nominations for elected posts…In return, those organizations were often expected to deliver the votes and organizational support of their rank and file…” (4)
“The shift to export-led growth created tensions in the coalition forged under ISI” (5)
“What change that has occurred has been in how corporatism functioned in practice, and this transformation has come primarily as a side-effect of a decline in centralized presidentialism and an increase in political pluralism during [Zedillo’s] sexennio.” (19)