Murillo and Ronconi 2004

Murillo, Maria Victoria, and Lucas Ronconi. 2004. "Teachers' Strikes in Argentina: Partisan Alignments and Public-sector Labor Relations". Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID). 39 (1): 77-98.

• Intro
• Teachers have been the most militant sector since 1989 (77)
• increase in militancy is related to, but can't be fully explained by (78)
• worsening of conditions
• challenges to income security (through decentralization)
• "Patterns of teachers' militancy are better explained by political alignments between public employees' and teachers' unions than by labor institutions (78)
• How does/would this explanation change in the context of no viable parties outside the PJ?
• then partisan alignments are less salient, but alignments with factions of the one party may be important
• at some point this may become clientelism, depending on your definition of clientelism, as unions may ally themselves with personalties or groups within the PJ (as they have in the past)
• Teachers' strikes reflect a larger but uneven trend of provincialization of protests, which happened no doubt because of the decentralization of the education system
• Explaining Public Teachers' Strikes
• economic conditions don't quite play in here, since these are public sector workers (79)
• labor strength can var across provinces, so it could bean important variable
• but political alignments will likely be very salient, given that governors have a high degree of discretion in implementing labor laws (80)
• Argentine Public Education and the Provincial Analysis
•  by 1993 primary and secondary public education administered at the provincial level (81)
• provincial governors now have the power to decide legality of strikes, etc, but also have a lot of discretionon how they use labor laws
• provincial governors also control education expenditures
• CTERA has traditionally been the national union (82)
• teachers caught between government and parents at times 
• A Cross-Provincial Test on Teachers' Militancy
• dependent variable: strike days lost
• independent measures: (82-83)
• political affiliation of union leaders compared to governor, percentage of legislators of governor's party, change in teachers' real earnings, unemployment, attendance bonus, unionization, union fragmentation
• downside: data are for a short period of time, so some independent variables don't really change much (85)
• Political alignment (of union leaders/governors) has the strongest effect, though other variables have an effect as well (86)
• if job stable and unemployment high (ie low exit alternatives), union members will protest for better things
• authors suspect that executive discretion diminishes the effect of institutional and organizational variables, which is why they weren't necessarily strong effects here (88)
• Conclusion
• politicization of labor relations thanks to provincialization of education AND executive discretion re: labor laws
•  suggestion: labor laws should be strengthened to decrease executive discretion, which should in turn decrease strike days (89)

Roberts 2002

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. "Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era". Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID). 36 (4): 3-33.

• Introduction
• Social inequality along class "fault lines" is unusually pronounced and appears to be growing (3)
• despite inequality growth and economic insecurity, parties are not cleaving the political arena along class lines, but are building cross-class platforms (4)
• this is especially true in Latin America, which is contiuning historical subordination of the popular classes
• though in the past class cleavages were important, after neoliberal turn party systems now are more elite dominated than before, and the elites dominate the popular classes through diffuse, multi-class forms of representation (5)
• Distinction between "segmented" and "stratified" cleavages
• segmented cleavages are constructed across class lines (ELITE parties)
• stratified cleavages are grounded in class consituencies or organizations (LABOR MOBILIZING parties)
• neoliberal critical juncture was hard on stratified parties, made them seek/create more segmented party structures (5-6)
• Argumetn is that neoliberal juncture realigned party systems across Latin America toward segmented structures (6)
• Economic Crisis, Strucutral Adjustment, and Deepening Social Inequalities
• Given teh growth of inequliaty, one could expect rejuvenation of class-based politics (7)
• but it's not happening
• early protests against neoliberalism were not sustaine
• the economic transition drove new wedges between different sectors of the lower classes, diffusing class cleavages
• Party Systems and Cleavage Structures in Latin America: Historical Patterns
• uses term from European scholars, class cleavages, where a cleavage must: differentiate a group, organize them for political representation, and generate a sense of collective identity (8) (citing Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and Bartolini and Mair 1990)
• this rarely happens so neatly in Latin America
• most economic identities are rather shallow
• labor-backed parties have always had to attract other support as well
• better definiton of segmented versus stratified cleavages (9)
• segmented cleavages may be grounded in social/cultural distinction, or the may be entirely political
• at 1900 modernization began creating a more diversified social structure (10)
• the mobilization of workers created intense class conflict
• nevertheless, class cleavages were never quite as durable in Latin America as the were in Europe
• nor, indeed, were parties organized only within one class...most were at least partially multi-class
• this meant that labor either supported historical parties, or became a major supporter of populist/cross-class parties (11)
• though populism did not generate strict class cleavages, it did create stratified fault lines that differentiated elite adn mass parties (12)
• but the impportance of labor unions as backers for populist and left parties at least meant that some stratficiation occurred in class cleavages for left and labor mobilizing parties
• for elite/traditional parties, the relationship with labor was usually patronage-based, and did not encapsulate voters within a party, could be more personalistic (113)
• labor movemetns were, thus, weaker in elite-party systems
• Countries with l abor-mobilizing parties tended to adopt more and deeper ISI measures, thus the neoliberal turn buffeted both socioeconomic and political connections between parties and popular sectors (14)
• Party Systems in the Transition from ISI to Neoliberalism
• Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico were regional leaders in ISI, joined by Bolivia, Peru, Venzuela
• in all these coutnries, the state became the focal point of social deamnds (15)
• thus the fundamental change in development model (from ISI to neoliberalism), and its commensurate withdrawing of the state from development, posed the greater political and economic shock to parties with labor mobilizing party systems (16)
• (up to that point) the most stable electoral party systems are those that have eschewed the organization of class cleavages and are grounded in intra-elite schisms (Roberts pulls this back and makes a different claim in a 2012 article!) (18)
• Market reforms pose a threat to the resources available for clientelism, but they pose little threat to the segmented organizational logic (19)
• in contrast, beoliberalism produced sharp discontinuities in labor-mobilizing systems with stratified organizations
• the stratified logic have been undermined by the more individualistic nature of neoliberalism
• The Erosion of Class Cleavages in the Neoliberal Era
• Argentina, Chile, and Peru demonstrated (in the past) that all three dimensions of class cleavage can develop in Latin America (20-21)
• But the new economic model has thrown much of that into doubt (21-26)
• the new economic model creates dispersion and segmentation among workers, with only a few having stable jobs, which fragments the labor movement (22)
• unionization has also dropped, meaning unions have a smaller political voice
• many labor-based parties have relaxed their ties to labor (Levitsky 1998, 2001, 2003, Murillo 1997, 2001)(23-24)
• class has also been less important in determining voting patterns (24-25)
• The Transformation of Political Representation in Comparative Perspective
• Brazil seems the last labor-mobilizing party left, but class still hasn't been important recently as it has in the past for voting (26)
• there has been an erosion of stratified axes of electoral competition, and a reinforcement of segmented patterns
• labor unions remain political actors, but their ties to parties and state institutions have loosened, their access to policy-making has narrowed, and their voice has diminished (26-27)
• suggests their is a "re-oligarchization" of politics

Roberts 2007

"The Crisis of Labor Politics in Latin America: Parties and Labor Movements during the Transition to Neoliberalism". 2007. International Labor and Working-Class History. 72 (1): 116-133.

•  Introduction
• the neoliberal turn dislocated the mode of political representation of the popular (working) class(es), as this incorporation was rooted in the state-led development model (116)
•  domestic consumption was previoulsy the driver of the economy
• this meant that wages generally rose over time, and unions flourished (117)
• "An elective affinity existed, then, between strong developmentalist states, mass party organizations, and dense trade-union movements"
• the neoliberal disruption undercut organized labor both in the political realm and in teh workplace
• Party System Differentiation Under ISI: Elitist and Labor-Mobilizing Patterns
• elitist
• 19th century oligarchic parties (or new, elite-driven parties) (Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay)
• attracted support from the popular classes but did not drive union creation/membership (118)
• Labor-mobilizing
• new parties (usually)
• party could be populist (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela) of leftist (Chile, Nicaragua after 1979)
• in these countries, level of trade union membership and degree of organizational concentration were much higher, which usually is read as meaning unions were much stronger in these places
• labor-mobilizing countires tended to have a deeper commitment to ISI (119), elitist countries didn't stray nearly as far from liberal economic development (120)
• the depth of ISI system also helps predict which countries made neoliberal turn last
• stabilization was frequently delayed until a deep crisis
• needed austerity measures were usually worse, "shock treatment"
• contractions, crises, and disequilibria were not as strong in elite countries(121)
• paradoxically, the places with teh strongest labor movements endured the deepest and most painful wage cuts, adjustment (122)
• But what were the political consequences?!
• Economic Crisis, Market Reform, and the Transformation of Political Representation
• after neoliberal adjustment, there was an erosion of the social alignments and organizational forms that distinguished elite and labor-mobilizing party systems (123)
• the groups (unions) that used to supply grassroots activists, identities, and loyal voters are now much weakers
• at the same time, mass media has become more prevalent
• NEW parties: top-down, largely detached from an increasingly individualized, independent, and more volatile electorate
• with the dominance of neoliberal thinking, party programs have converged a great deal (124)
• bait-and-switch occurrences by many left and populist parties in 1980s and 1990s meant:
• they were saddled with the political costs of the transition, and
• the transition weakened their traditional supporters (125)
• this has forced many of these parties to seek new connections with the electorate, and they tend to do so using patron-clientelism, leadership appeal, or political marketing (instead of offering to change the economic system)
• The Puzzle of Electoral Volatility in Latin America
• lots of intraregional differences in electoral volatility (126)
• volatility increased in the context of growing economic stability and democratic consolidation in the 1990s
• thus volatility is not explained by "tough economic times"
• party systems anchored in mass parties saw lots of dislocation in the 1980s and 1990s during transition, whereas elite party systems were relatively stable (127)
• BUT recent divisions in elite party states f Uruguay and Colombia suggest the elite/mass differentiation isn't perfect either
• Overall, it seems that voters just don't identify with any party nearly as strongly as they used to (128)
• this volatility is especially striking given that many of these parties had all the institutionalization that should have made them very stable (129)
• strong grassroots organizations
• linkages to social blocs
• as labor unions grew weaker and more detached from political parties, electoral competition became less polarize but also less programmatic, less grounded in popular interests, and more fluid and personalistic
• Conclusion
• "Latin America's widely noted 'crisis of representation' is, at least in part, a crisis of a particular type of socialpolitical representation" (130)
• the Left might be able to fix this, but it's a long way away from being able to do that/actually doing that (130-131)

12/30/13

Questions:
Why don't poor people and workers team up?

Why would they?
The urban poor and workers are both in tenuous positions.  In many cases the urban poor were workers, and have lost their jobs or otherwise slipped into poverty.  Under a Marxian analysis they share similar interests and similar oppressors.

Why don't they?
This is an important question.

• There is a collective action problem, and neoliberal society might be more atomized (Kurtz 2004).
• Labor unions have gotten weaker (cite everyone), and have lost their political partners in many instances (Levitsky 2003, Murillo 2004, Burgess 2004).
• Roberts (1999?) has an analysis of class-cleavages without class, where class identities aren't prevalent but class issues still are.
• They have differing demands on the government
• unions want jobs
• unions want higher wages, for which informality may be a subsidy
• poor want social spending, which could come at the expense of higher wages for unions
• poor want jobs
• unions want leverage over employers
• poor don't necessarily care about this, as they would prefer first to have an employer, no?
• poor have to spend a lot of time waiting on the government (Auyero 2012)
• incorporation for the poor is waiting in waiting rooms, being subjugated
• incorporation for the workers is improved wages but smaller unions, more precarious work

Auyero 2012

Auyero, Javier. 2012. Patients of the state: the politics of waiting in Argentina. Durham: Duke University Press.\

• Introduction and Chapter 1
• waiting for government aid as "temporal processes in and through which political subordination is reproduced" (2)
• people are "kicked around", given the reunaround, forced to wait by local officials/bureaucrats (4)
• BOOK focuses on "the workings of political domination" among the urban poor, specifically through waiting (5)
•   state practices provide the poor with an education/crash course on the workings of state power
• they also shape clients perception of the state and their own status
• and clients learn the rules of the game
• making the dispossessed wait is negative, akin to repression, but has "positive" effects of creating citizens who are patient, subordinate, dominated; waiting creates this and recreates this (8-9)
• SEEMS LIKE CLIENTELISM ON A GRAND SCALE, NO?
• if the state really wanted active, full-fledged citizens, it wouldn't make them wait so much, waste their time, take time away from productive actions and/or political activity...so what this state actually wants is subordinates (22)
• the processes of waiting are part of the recreation of subordination, which looks like an exercise of power/agency but is actually subjugation through constraining use of time for the poor, demanding they not be contentious, and thereby preventing conflict from arising (34-35)

• Chapter 2: Urban Relegation
• since the neoliberal turn, (80s, but more in 1990s), shantytowns have been growing a great deal (36-38), inequality has been gorwing, and along with that spatial segregation of rich (behind gates) and poor has been on the rise (38-39)
• class mobility is decreasing, as is the belief that moving up is possible (39)
• Poor are dominated by: (41)
• "fists and kicks", state repression (which can be overt and covert), administered by government and army/police
• "tentacles", non-violent subjugation to "waiting", administered by local officials
• State repression
• overt: (48-56)
• protest and repression (decreasing repression after 2003)
• police violence still prevlaent
• incarceration increasing
• National Guard has occupied entire neighborhoods to "keep the peace"
• evictions of homeless/squatters from public spaces
• covert 56-58
• evictions by those contracted to do it by the state, usually fairly violent
• "tentacles"
• Kafkaesque play where government creaqtes threat/issue, then offers the solution for this isssue
• usually issue demands waiting, time spent in offices, paperwork
• there is no monoloithic state, but rather a large number of agents and agencies through which the poor have to maneuver, spending time (60-62)
• This domination, subjugation doesn't end all protests...protests will increase as social insecurities increase, both due to economics and interactions with the state (63)
• Chapter 3:
• local leaders tell the poor when and where to register, even when the state opens offices in their neighborhoods..."local leaders attempt to control the timing of the state's precarious and always limited welfare programs" (67)
• chapter argument: everything in their waiting teaches them a lesson: keep waiting, there's nothing you can do about the endless lines (73)
• three processes: veiling, confusing, rushing/delaying (73-74)
• all serve to snare poor people into uncertain and arbitrary waiting time
• there is a total absence of routine outside a RENAPER office (where one gets an ID card) (80)
• Chapter 4: The Welfare office
• everyone comes with someone (family usually)
• disorgainzed chaso in teh waiting room, lines are created and dissolved, people are given appointments on days when the office is closed (on accident)
• elections can speed up the cprocess, but afterward there is more "kicking the ball" down the street when it comes to actual payments (105-106)
• much of the fault of issues is placed on the computer..."i don't know why, but the computer says that", "it needs to be reprogrammed, so it will come later", the computers says this and that is the way it is....Auyero brings it to Marx's idea of the machine reprogramming the worker (115-118), but couldn't it also just as much be that there is little real reason for any of these things happening, and the computer can be a black, uncontrollable bo
• people come multiple times throughout the year for their benefits, as there seem to be many problem (118-123)
• but few complain once there, because "patients" understand that they are expected to wait, contestation may just bring about further delay, other "repressions" of sorts
• welfare benefits are gendered female:  women wait, get some random benefits 124-126)
• government pushes men toward employment opportunities (126)
• relying on welfare benefits leaves you on teh street, so in a way the state reinforces patriarchy by ensuring that stability can only be found if a women is with a man with a job (126-127)
• Chapter 5:  Chapter on environment
• for those waiting for a dangerous plant ot be moved, or for themselves to be moved away from the plant (by the government), politics is a profoundly dis-empowering experience, and everything takes a long time to work (if it does at all ) (143)
• court ruled in great favor of the residents, but the state has yet to comply in any way (148-152)
• Conclusion
• the state (of waiting and being dominated through waiting) is not a cultural phenomenon, but a political construct, somethign created by the state tiself (154-155)
• unpredictability and waiting have the effect of binding the poor to the state, reducing the poor's agency and disempowering them (156-7)

12/3/2013

There needs to be some connection between the big issues of the day and the individual worker/citizen.

Workers are squeezed between the demands of the international market (competitive wages, etc) and their own demands of subsistence.

The union leader is in some ways a nexus between the individual worker and the government or national confederation.  Yet the union leader who cannot involve his/her members in the movement

How to get workers to

Taco stands.  How do workers at the ground level, the self-employed, the independent contractors, what is there work?  how do they view themselves?  What's the point of that work (ie survival versus career)?  They are the bottom of the system, not even fully integrated into the capitalistic market, in the shadow economy (more or less). 

12/2/2013

Political incorporation is the connection of the people in a country to their political institutions.  Much has been written on  the importance of political institutions on the functioning of a democracy (Roberts DATE, Flores-Macias 2012).  One of the important pieces of democratic viability is the legitimacy of these institutions.  That legitimacy comes from whether people see there needs expressed and/or assuaged through the political system, OR, importantly, at least see the future possibility of have these needs assuaged (Przeworski).  But how long will people wait for their need to be met?  At what point does democratic procedure become subsumed by demanded outcomes?

This problem is especially puzzling for those squeezed by the global economy.  The working class, especially those who struggle on the edge of subsistence despite having some sort of job, face a future that involves either upskilling, finding some way into the more-skilled economy or, more likely, being caught in a cycle of near poverty (Standing, probably).

The government exists to ensure the health and wellbeing of its people, but how far the idea of "health and wellbeing" extends is under debate.  Moreover, the extent to which the people of a given country, especially those without material wealth, are represented by a government is an important part of a government's legitimacy.  

So when do we talk to the people?

How do labor unions fit in?

Why is political incorporation important?  Or rather, why does it matter to the worker?
- politics is the arena where workers have (or at least rhetorically have) as much legitimacy as business. 

Stronk 2013

Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

"Neoliberal Class Formation(s): The Informal Porletariat and "new" Workers' Organizations in Latin America" Susan Spronk 75-94

• Applies EP Thomspons "class struggle without class" ideas
• notes other authors (murillo 2001) saying that unions just tried to surivive, not fight enoliberalism
• But during the neoliberal period the locus of class struggle has moved out of the factory and into the streets/communities (82)
  partially because many people are employed informally/self-employed
• the focus of class strgugle has shifted from demands over wages to demands for basic subsistence
• piqueteros born of those who weren't represented by traditional unions
• at first hey were very radical, non-hierarchical, etc. etc.
• but then they were coopted by employment plans from Kirchner (except for more radical splinter) (83-84)
• Oscar Olivera and gas war people: start with everyday struggle, get imporved conditions, and then work towards socialism (85)
• but actual gains in both cases have been minimal
• CRITIQUE OF BOTH these organizations arises from an argument about "treating the symptoms versus treating the cause"
• (86-88) plant takeovers in Argentina and Venezuela face issues with government and with (previous) business owners
• but even outside of these issues, cooperativism doesn't undo the bad social relations, it just makes the workers their own bosses
• 
  

Webber and Carr 2013

Webber, Jeffery R., and Barry Carr, eds. 2013. The new Latin American left: cracks in the empire.

Introduction: the Latin American Left in Theory and Practice, Jeffrey R. Webber and Barry Carr 1-30

• Social contradictions of the neoliberal model generated a series of crises in the closing years of the 1990s and the opening moments of the current decade (3)
• Authors situate contemporary Latin American Left on continuum of "radical Left" to "izquierda permitida" (5)
• izquierda permitida signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to US impoerial strategies.  In its regime form, it seeks to divide and coopt radical left social movements and parties"
• the radical left sees liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life" (6)
• admittedly draws on Castaneda for this idea, but repurposes "bad" left as "really really awesomely radical" Left (my words)
• neostructuralism idea:  that commodities aren't what will compete on teh world market, but whole social systems (7)
• rejects market as god of all
• but admits an international market, suggests that the national institutions can be shaped (by heavy hand of government, if so desired) to make the nation as a whole produce things competitively
• somewhere between pure world market and pure national protection
• this is the izquierda permitida
• focus on redistributing wealth, not on undoing the market which causes inequality in the first place (8)

Hochstetler, Smith, Silva 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"The Road Traveled" Kathryn Hochstetler, William C. Smith, and Eduardo Silva (Conclusion to edited volume)

Concluding remarks for the book, most of which connect different chapters

• ALternations to political opportunity structure ideas (Sikkink)
• must also include "levels of threat" as a factor
• when/if a threat disappears, a transnational network can fold (see FTAA fight for examples)
• also, even when both domestic and international arenas seem "closed", activists can/will still attempt to change things (not be discouraged, as Sikkink suggests)
• also whether "opportunities" can even bee objectively defined in the moment is challenged, undermining Sikkink's framework as a way to do anything but analyze post facto
• questions also about the ability to clearly distinguish between international and national levels...fights can be simultaneously about both
• Also, activists themselves can be brokers between national/international level, which can be problematic...if the activist/broker leaves the fight, the network may crumble
• Effects of the Left Turn
• easy to assume left would be good, but not always the case
• The impact of shifts in domestic opportunity structures hinge on the interaction of three factors (191):
• evolution of specific threats and international opportunities
• the perceptions of movement leaders
• and the relationship of activists to institutionalized politics
• if the Left helps us nationally, will activists abandon transnational moves?
• 
  

Rossi 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed.. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

"Juggling Multiple Agendas:The Struggle of Trade Unions against National, Continental, and International Neoliberalism in Argentina" Frederico M. Rossi

• Focused on resistance to FTAA in Argentina
• focusing on main coalition against this, whose central actor was the CTA (141)
• BUT the CTA's participation in block the FTAA and other intternational efforts was conditioned by their nationally focused agenda (142)
• "The CTA is a paradigmatic case of a national actor involved in transnational activism against neoliberalism operating with an exclusively domestic logic."
• the CTA saw the FTAA as an act of American imprialism that would undermine Argentina as a nation (144)
• so the frame was both international and national
• in Argentina the major coalition opposed to the FTAA was the Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA (FTAA in esp.), No a la Deuda, No a la Militarización y No a la Pobreza (144-145) formed in 2002
• linked regional groups, Catholic grops, unions, political parties (small ones) na dother social movement organizations (see, e.g 146 table)
• 2005 big summit held in Argentina against the FTAA (Hugo Chávez and Kirchner had already come out against the agreement (148)
• CTa in this instance joined a transnational/international movement, but nevertheless did not shift its national focus (150)
• FTAA essentially dead by 2006
• ORIt dissolved by 2008, in favor of new regional union, the CSA, so CTA OK with joiningit because it doesn't ahve Cold War history.  At the same time, CTA bows out of Autoconvocatoria (which had been renamed) because the grop couldn't figure out a positive plan (only a negative one: boo to neoliberalism) (153)
• yet CSA hasn't made a big splash yet, are still trying to get their feet under them
• since 2009 CTA has done a lot more south-south coordination, though not much has really happened so far
• CTAs interaction with Kirchner led to a general shift toward focus on domestic policies to the detriment of international actions (154)
• YET THROUGHOUT AL OF THIS CTA REMAINED INVOLVED IN MERCOSUR, implementing social accords, etc. etc. (154)
• CTA has simultaneous and PARALLEL agendas (155)
• some domestic focus, some international focus, some regional focus, but the three rarely ever connect
• made some gains on domestic front with Kirchner
• gains on international front mostly due to gains with domestic front
• so why still with Mercosur? (156)
• gets CTA working with Arg. foreign policy
• is some recognition that CTA could play into better domestic recognition
• and Mercosur seems like a vaiable alternative to FTAA, allows CTA some power whereas FTAA probably wouldn't
• 
  

Nolan Garcia 2013

Silva, Eduardo. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia,  Network Dynmaics and Local Labor Rights Movements in Puebla, Mexico 106-140

• suggests that most labor movements tried to get protective legislation in the face of neoliberalism, and still do (106)
• whole story is about alliances...when transnational movement returned to wield power at the local level, positive/negative unionization outcomes were decided (mainly) by who was allowed to stay in the alliance...when some members were excluded, unions lost important resources which in turn led to defeat (107)
• looking at maquilas, especially Kukdong
• transnational network built over Kukdong fight, then after that was done network leadership was transferred to Mexicans in Matamoros (where they lost)...in two other places, Johnson Contorls and Vaqueros Navarra, national alliances supplied resources that were once supplied by internaional allies, leading to success (107-8)
• (109) local groups seek international allies in hopes of garnering some resources (put broadly) that would allow them to overcome domestic obstacles
• an important key to positive outcomes is what happens when transnational movements "come home"
• starting on 112, account of Kukdong issue, official union is the CROC
• workers at Kukdong became center of a convergence of other groups who became a transnational movement, including USAS, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Maquila Solidarity Network, a local (new) workers center (CAT) and many others (114)
• Kukdong eventually liquidated itself to create a new identity, thus nulling contract with the CROC and allowing independent union to be formed (117)
• though transnational allies wanted to leverage this win into new organizing, members of the new union just wanted to keep their jobs, and withdrew from organizing efforts once they had a contract.  eventually the union lost its own control of the factory to another PRI organization
• CAT then took the lead as this network (minus USAS and a couple others) took on a plant in Matamoros...the network specifically had CAT take the lead so it would be a Mexican-led charge ...goal was to form an independent union (118)
• CAT decided to go after PUMA (because they made clothes at Matamoros Garment) and sought German allies (119)
• but then Matamoros Garment just closed their plant, ending the struggle (120)
• then CAT moved on to Tarrant Ajalpan (TA)
• again goal was to get independent union
• CAT took the lead, but informed the transnational network (121)
• MY IDEAS: "informed"?  is this really transnational cooperation anymore
• took the route of trying to enforce codes on conduct, not mexican law
• early brand targets don't really pan out (122)
• CAT never really got any traction, meanwhile the owners began taking orders to other shops, TA was heading for closure (123)
• everyone gets impatient, workers get tired of waiting for CAT, everyone bickers, and TA closes (123-124)
• CAT COMES OFF WIN AT KUDONG JUST TO LOSE TWICE
• CAT failed after Kukdong because they weren't able to leverage brands the same way that transnational network idd at Kukdong (125)
• brand focus provided all the economic leverage, which is utterly necessary
• at Johnson Controls and Vaqueros Navarra, workers decided to register with Mineros and FAT (resp.), meaning they got to skip first step of union registration process nad could go straight to the election process! (126)  in this case the weaker local groups were able to get help from stronger, though national, groups, and work around local hurdles (127)
• SO WHY DOESN'T EVERYONE DO THIS? why doesn't everyone just affiliate with a national union?!
• Conclusion:  IN THE END, ALL THESE FACTORIES WERE CLOSED, or the unions were busted (128)
• 
  

Silva 2013

Silva, Eduardo, ed. 2013. Transnational activism and national movements in Latin America: bridging the divide.

Introduction, Eduardo Silva

• Transnationalism has multilevel charactersitics....national level shapes internal level, adn vice versa (2)
• see lots of deeply rooted local activities and activists that get involved (at times rather hevily) in transtional politics, but the focus is almost always on the national level (target is national government) (9)
• Sikkink (2005) (11) set ups 4 types of transnational interaction, based on oppenness of political targets
• international closed + national closed = activism discouraged
• international open + national closed = boomerang transnationalism
• international closed + national open ="democratic deficit", where int'l institutions (IMF, e.g.) not open to democracy), activists look to state for protection from int'l
• international open + national open = insider/outsider cooperation, transnationalism is often a secondary tactic
• 
  

10/8/13

Why do I study work, labor, unions, workers?

My father's manufacturing plant was closed because of a union drive.  Though the union drive failed miserably, the plant was closed and production was moved to another place (Mexico, I believe) for the simple fact that a union had been there at all.  I took this to mean that management was interested in cooperation with workers, but only to a point.  Once a union threat was seen, workers were immediately either disposable or possible enemies of "the business."

Workers are people, people trying to make a living.  Businesses do not employ people, they employ "employees."

I believe people should be represented by within their political system (government).

People have a right to be treated as human beings at work, meaning their interests shoul dbe considered alongside business interests.

Current business logic (neoliberal market logic) does not allow workers to have any influence at work, nor does it take workers interests to heart.  Everything in neoliberal logic demands a sacrifice of a section of the people.  Neoliberalism is tyranny of the market.

Politics can be used to fight back against tyranny, even in the workplace.

I want to study workers, see how they advance their workplace interests in the political sphere.  Workers/people use the political sphere to advance workers' rights because business can be coerced by national institutions.  But what happens when business are multinational? 

9/24/13

During the first round of political incorporation, unions and the working class accepted political incorporation in major part because they did not have the autonomous power to defeat capital.  That is to say, despite the growth of their organizations they still fought an uphill battle against managers and employers at the workplace.  Political incorporation offered workers the chance to gain political power to supplement their organizational power.  (In many cases political power was or became the vast majority of unions' power, either replacing their preexisting economic power or making up for the fact that they never had any in the first place!)

Now, workers again find themselves weakened in the face of capital,their previous political connections having abandoned them to market-oriented economic policies.  Meanwhile capital has heightened its power.  Even as labor movements have spread nationally, capital has gained the ability to divide workers internationally.  Moreover, the heightened ability for capital flight has left governments also at a disadvantage in teh face of capital.  As workers once faced before, now governments face the authoritarian hand of managers picking up shop in the face of unfavorable rules.

And yet national institutions still matter, and capital is not utterly free to jump from place to place.  Not all industries are hypermobile.

Workers again need to advance their movement politically, access the power of the state to make up for their weakness in bargaining.  (How does national political incorporation work in an international world?)  That is to say, an important well for union power still remains with the state.  In this new incorporation moment, however, unions find themselves weak,  somewhat unattractive allies.

There has to be some connection between international solidarity, national political power, and local bargaining power.  Anner (2010) effectively shows that transnational movements are not effectively institutionalized without local organizing. 

9/23/2013

After the advent of neoliberalism in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (and in Chile in 1973), scholars generally accept that the function, or at least the goal of the state changed fundamentally and radically.  Before neoliberalism political incorporation of the popular classes (i.e. peasants and workers, broadly stated) was done through protective-yet-constraining connections between a party or government and popular organizations.  The most often used example of this type of incorporation was labor unions and governments, where union leaders earned the privilege of joining the government in exchange for votes for a party and moderating the demands of workers.  But the advent of the neoliberal model changed this relationship between the masses and the state.  Now the state took a hands-off approach to political incorporation; electoral contests replaced organizations as the connection between parties and the masses.  A possible driver of this change was the idea that politicians could connect directly to the masses (both literally, thanks to mass media, but also figuratively, in the sense that politicians felt they had shed the image of themselves as the "elite ruling class", and that having set aside such pretenses they could now connect directly to their constituents without the aid of a interpreter/wrangler, in the form of a union leader or some other such individual).  But the result was a shift in the state's goal of incorporation.  Previously political incorporation seemed to be defined outcomes; that is to say, the government proved that it has incorporated the masses by wanting/seeking/achieving improvements in the lives of workers, peasants, and generally anyone not considered elite.  In this model, the political process is not entirely fair, and the government attempts to achieve more equal (though hardly totally equal) economic outcomes.  Now political incorporation was a matter of process (Roberts, I think?), where holding representative and clean(ish) elections was the entire purpose, and the economic health of ones constituents is left to the market.

We are now in a new era of political incorporation, as the 1990s and 2000s exposed the issues with relying solely on voting as political incorporation.  Democratization has been uneven, and even where it seems to be complete economic troubles have tainted the progress of electoral opening.  Some party systems have collapsed, while others have come to rely (again) and clientelistic methods of incorporation.  Democracy has not adequately softened economic struggles, nor has it created societies in which the poor and rich have equal access to the state or rights under the law.

So what now? The idea of a new incorporation moment (which we are currently, in, or perhaps at the tail end of, in some cases) suggests that the political parties and leaders are seeking ways to connect or reconnect to the popular classes.  (aha!) In many ways the PRI has already done this, as it won an election after being totally crushed for two elections in a row.  In this new incorporation moment, how are people reconnecting with politicians, and vice versa?  Where do civil society organizations fit into this?  Unions are still around, but are they big enough, important enough to warrant a role in political reincorporation?  Unemployed groups in Argentina have become important partners with the government, or at least were under Néstor Kirchner.  They haven't replaced unions, but they have come from almost nowhere to become as important, if not more important that unions in the constellation of civil society organizations that supported Kirchner.  What, then, occurred in Mexico?  Some unions supported Pena Nieto, but they do not have organizations large enough to drive the whoel electoral process (except maybe for the SNTE, which is an important part of Pena Nieto's election story).  How did Pena Nieto attract voters?  Did he incorporate them, or simply market to them?

Bogliaccini 2013

Bogliaccini, Juan Ariel. 2013. "Trade Liberalization, Deindustrialization, and Inequality: Evidence from Middle-Income Latin American Countries". Latin American Research Review. 48 (2): 79-105.

• Introduction
• article shows that trade liberalization reform played an important role in the destruction of formal employment in industry... (79)
• ...and a concomitant deindustrialization that increased inequality
• literature review:
• two competing arguments to increase in inequality: opening to international trade, and technological improvement (82)
• this article argues that trade destroyed most job opportunities for lower social groups (83)
• in every case there was reviewed there was some development of industrial production, usually created through ISI spending
• with traded openings, these businesses could not compete and shut down
• this brings into question the theoretical claims behind the liberal model, that new export possibilities would trigger greater industrialization (85)
• Data and model
• author expects the destruction of employment to have a negative effect on inequality, and for the effect to increase as liberalization increases (88)
• author expects inequality to increase less in countries with stronger democratic institutions (89)
• Results
• two broad conclusions (90)
• trade liberalization produced significant destruction of employment in industry
• the destruction of this employment increased inequality
• as trade liberalization advanced, formal employment in industry shrank
• membership in Mercosur rsulted in loss of employment (95)
• membership in NAFTA resulted in RISE in employment
• in this model GDP per capita has a NEGATIVE relationship to employment in industry
• decrease in informal employment increases inequality in the long run, and these variables are not independent of one another over time (96)
• increase in informal sector is related to increase in inequality (97)
• increases in GDP per capita are related to increases in inequality my take: financialization?
• increase in length of time under democracy decreases inequality (98)
• Conclusions
• trade reform had a clear and detrimental effects on equality through its fostering of deindustrialization
• in particular, the Latin American version of liberalization failed to include and alternative welfare structure for coping with the deindustrialization and informalization of their economies

Bellinger and Arce 2011

Bellinger,, Paul T., and Moisés Arce. 2011. "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era". Political Research Quarterly. 64 (3): 688-704.

• Introduction
• LA has seen a generalized rise in protests (688)
• collective actors in LA are highly responsive to changes in economic policy, and democracy ahs given them room to move
• central question:  do economic reofrms in teh context of democracy demobilize political actors, or RE-mobilize them?
• literature notes discord between neoliberlal society and democratic protest
• paper is to test and see which effect is greater, demobilization associated with neoliberalism or re-mobilization associated with democracy (689)
• Literature review
• demobilization literature
• increase in poverty, decrease in equality, higher levels of unemployment, and lower standards of living all create "anomie" (Zermeño 1990)
• but this literature has trouble explaining the revival of protests in Latin America
• in this literature, market policies erode democracy (690)
• and state diminishes, leaving it an unhelpful target of economic grievances
• Repoliticization literature (690-691)
•  traditional class-based actors are protesting (labor)
• NEW actors are protesting (unemployed, indigenous, regional groups)
• elaborating the repoliticization argument (691)
• neoliberal turn:
• heightened economic insecurities
• offered a master frame for protest
• democracy enhanced opportunity for collective activity
• authors believe regime type is a core component of the political opportunity for collective mobilization
• Data and Method
• data from 1970-2003 (692)
• dependent variable: collective protest
• independent variables: economic liberalization, democracy, semi-democracy, autocracy, and interactions between these two categories
• Controls include the level of regional protest to account for cyclical, demonstration effect (693)
• Results
• economic liberalization x democracy and economic liberalization x semi-democracy interaction terms are positive, support repoliticization argument (695)
• econ lib x autocracy supports demobilization argument IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS
• also protest is shown to be regionally cyclical (697)
• index of civil liberties shows that the political opportunities provided by democracy, outside of simple elections, are actually driving remobilization
• Conclusion
• authors cast doubt on demobilization perspective (699)
• Latin American citizens do not seem to be passive, atomized

Peruzzotti 2005

"Demanding Accountable Government: Citizens, Politicians, and the Perils of Representative Democracy in Argentina" Enrique Peruzzotti, p.229-249

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• in the past 20 years a more sophisticated and demanding citizenry has emerged, demanding representation and accountability from Argentine politicians (229-230)
• and important actor was the rise of the human rights movement in response to the dictatorship (230)
• Menem's disregard of demands for greater accountability also spured the citizenry
• Redefinition of Representation
• Argentine citizenry switched from  "authorization" view of representation, which is connected to populism, to demanding accountability of representatives as in liberal democracy (Pitkin 1972) (231)
• populist leaders were given authorization to act in the interests of the people
• now citizens demand politicians be directly accountable
• this pivoted thanks in part to the emergence of the human rights movement in the 1980s and their demands against the military (231-232)
• there is no longer a direct relationship between constituents and representatives...this relationship is mediated by institutions (233)
• this is a change driven by leveling off of high expectations for politicians and a new trust in institutions
• The partial dissolution of captive electorates has led to more fluid and unpredictable electoral behavior (235)
• footnote: the PJ has been able to keep hold of its lower class constituents through clientelism
• The Politics of Social Accountability
• three main actors
• NGOs and advocacy organizations (236-237)
• Social movements (237)
• watchdog journalism (237-238)
• threefold contribution
• signalling to population, "what's happening, why its bad" (238-239)
• social initiatives can activate a network of horizontal agencies of accountability, gets a movement going (239-240)
• establishment of permanent watchdog groups/agencies (240)
• 2001 buildup and Accountability politics
• Alianza promised to renew ties, not be corrupt (241)
• then the Senate scandal (241-242)
•  the scandal cast doubts n the electoral arena as a place where accountability could be found (243)
• the bribes went to the very heart of the state's electoral institutions
• Alianza was slow to respond, and had a tepid response
• this led to electoral protest/null ballots in 2001 (244-245)...
• ...and mobilizations against leaders, que se vayan todos, (245-246)
• and local, representative, unofficial neighborhood "governments" called asambleas sprung up (246-248)
• these eventually ran out of steam in 2002 and most were gone by 2003 (248)
• Conclusion
• shared concern of the quality of democratic institutions connects the politics of social accountability, the cacerolazos (pot banging protests), and the asambleas (249)
• importantly, though, these mobilizations were triggered by the spread of frustration that the government wasn't listening/wasn't accountable

Levitsky 2005

"Crisis and Renovation: Institutional Weakness and the Transformation of Argentine Peronism, 1983-2003" Levitsky, p181-206

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• although the PJ is well-organized it's internal structures are weakly institutionalized, its lacks stable internal rules and bureaucracy (181)
• the PJs weakly institutionalized party-union linkages allowed reformers to dismantle traditional mechanism of labor participation (182)
• this enabled the party to 
• attract the middle class
• create a clientelistic relationship with the urban poor
• The fluidity of the PJ sent it into crisis in 2000-2001 along with the rest of the country, but this fluidity also allowed it to adapt and survive the crisis
• Institutionalization and Party Adaptation
• institutionalization creates stable expectations, rules of the game (O'Donnell 1994) (182)
• but institutionalization also inhibits organizational change (Zucker 1977) (183)
• they are sticky
• The PJ as a Weakly Institutionalized Party
• PJ is well-organized with deep roots in working- and lower-class society (184)
• but it lacks even a minimal bureaucratic structure
• in the years following Perón's death, no faction was able to impose an organizational structure or binding rules (185)
• The Renovators in the 1980s tried to create more rules, but essentially failed
• "We use the party statutes when they are useful. When they are not useful, we don't use them."
• Three areas of institutional weakness
• Weak leadership bodies (186)
• the party's national leaders are routinely ignored by lower-level branches and officeholders
• the government runs the party, especially when their is a seated executive
• Fluid Party Hierarchy
• politicians and those with power have often parachuted into top leadership/electoral positions  (187)
• in many provinces internal elections are negotiated or imposed by party bosses
• Loosely Structured party-union linkage
• 62 organizations and the tercio (188)
• The effects of weak institutionalization
• the PJ suffers from low levels of trust in the organization (188-189)
• the PJ is highly malleable, and may be changed quickly to line up with short-term goals of dominant actors (189)
• Pj experiences bandwagoning effect (190)
• PJ officeholders have substantial autonomy from the party
• Peronism's dual transformation int eh 1980s and 1990s
• Crisis:
• working class had eroded (191)
• debt crisis and exhaustion of ISI left the PJ without the ability to continue a statist program
• to adapt the PJ dismantle union-party inks and replaced them with clientelistic links
• labor participation had been based entirely on need of party leaders for the resources unions had (192)
• 62 orgs and tercio were often imposed by union leaders
• as PJ won office, politicians were able to use state resources instead of union resources
• Erosion of union influence enhanced the PJ's autonomy, allowing it to attract the middle class... (195)
• ...meanwhile it created clientelistic networks to maintain ties to urban poor in era of de-industrialization, and shrinking working class
• but clientelism generated political costs, as the Pj became the part of corruption (196)
• though most of the Party didn't agree with Menem and neoliberal turn, bandwagon was created since he had control over appointments to office/government (197-198)
• The Crisis
• The PJ's fluid structure meant the party had no unified response to the 2000 crisis, sending Pj into its own internal conflict/crisis (200)
• no one had enough power to find a unified program or to discipline party members (201)
• Menem and Duhalde were bitter enemies and fought over control of the party (202)
• this rivalry meant there was no agreement on primaries, candidates
• in 2003 PJ supported no presidential candidate, allowed all three to run outside the party (202-203)
• Kirchner's victory pushed the party to the center-left (204)
• even though the PJ had undertaken the neoliberal reforms themselves, the internal fluidity allowed this leftist, dark horse candidate (Kirchner) to rise and have a chance in the election
• Kirchner realigned the PJ with leftist politicians, progressive intellectuals, and humans rights groups (205)
• Conclusion
• Peronisms current coalition change seem to be more permanent (ie away from labor unions) (206)
• PJ remains the party of the poor, but will likely never again be a labor backed party

Etchemendy 2005

"Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001" Sabastián Etchemendy, p. 62-87

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Introduction
• rather than being unambiguous losers in the neoliberal reforms, some key industrial and labor actors within the old ISI coalition can and do preserve their existing market power in the new "liberal" order (62-63)
•  argument: dominant unions and certain established industrial players were actually part of the reform coalition (63)
• two goals of chapter
• explain why Menem chose to rewared some industries and unions
• assess the consequences of this pattern of transformation of the populist/industrial coalition
• ISI past generated very strong industries that were also potential losers in turn to neoliberalism (64)
• unions had a very clear goal of preserving the corporatist institutions -- ((induced them to be willing to trade liberalization for maintaining this bastion of power))
• Results of Menem's bargains (65)
• Business
• compensations eventually led to a high exchange, which undermined business's ability to compete
• no strategy in the face of global competition was developed...once the side payments were gone, business still couldn't compete on open market
• labor
• benefits funneled only to formal sector
• bureaucratization of unions allowed room for the creation of large, autonomous, powerful groups of unemployed and other actors
• Industry: Political Winners
• the government compensated firms from four tradeable sectors: oil extraction, petrochemicals, autos, and steel (66)
• privatization usually meant directly rewarding state assets to these businesses
• and the pace of deregulation was consistently slowed
• why firms in these sectors?
• mixed sectors, meaning these firms had a higher lobbying capacity because they were partially public (69)
• these firms were the largest and most powerful in economic terms
• these firms were also relatively more concentrated (fewer firms and more economic value per firm) (70-71)
• all of these firms had monopolistic industry associations through which they could bargain (72)
• Working Class: Compensating Leaders and Insiders in the Formal Sector
• the politics of compensation focused on teh leaders (74)
• unemployed and laid off were left to their fate
• there were four payoffs:
• maintenance of corporatist union structure
• while government did get some flexibilization of contracts (75)...
• unions maintained their monopoly of representation in privatized firms 
• preserving labor's administration of healthcare
• deregulation only went so far as to promote competition within the union-run system
• granting unions privileged position in private pension market (76)
• unions were allowed to create/control their own pension funds to compete on the market
• but unions abandoned most of these by 2000 (no explanation given by author)
• granting unions share of privatization
• employee stock ownership programs (76)
• these rpograms were only offered to formal employees (77)
• and the stocks were monaaged by hte unions
• and the stock value totally soared
• generally all four of these payoffs converged on maintaining union leaders' control of unions and increasing the amount of money they controlled (79)
• they faced little danger of being uprooted by competing organizations or their own rank and file
• The Consequences
• the compenstations porlonged the fixed exchange rate (80-81)
• disregarded any strategy for actual export competition (82)
• compensation was based on teh control of domestic markets (82)
• this ended up being a short term strategy, and no one sought a longer term one
• when the compenstations, which were based on the strong exchange rate, were consumed by the end of the decade, firms still could compete on the global market! (83)
• offered nothing to the unemployed (83)
• there was no antional policy to attenuate hardships of neolibreal transformation, specifically focused on working class/poor who lost jobs and purchasing power (84)
• government chose to support unions over the unemployed
• and the unions chose to take their compensations and similarly ignored the poor, which just paved the way for the piquteros and other groups (85)
• Conclusions
• the configuration of labor and industrial interests befor ethe reform determined the pattersn fo compensations during and after the reform (86) ... my take: the rich get richer, sort of
• the compensatory policies were a double edged sword (86-87)
• on the one hand, they made the reform politically viable (87)
• on the other hand, these compensations sowed the seeds of future economic and political instability, which erupted in 2001

Levitsky and Murillo 2005b

"Building Castles in the Sand? The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Argentina" Levitsky and Murillo, 21-44

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

•  Central argument OF THE BOOK: the major cause of Argentina's under-performance was persistent and widespread institutional instability (21)
• The Origins of Institutional Instability
• between 1955 and 1972 Argentina politics were deadlocked (24)
• one the one hand, allowing Peronist party to compete in elections woul certainly result in Personit victory, which was unacceptable to many elites
• yet, on the other hand, keeping the Peronists out of elections was a major destabilizing influence
• eventually military leadership had to allow Peron back into power (25), then another military regime
• The brutality and dramatic failure of the military regime discredited the military in the eyes of the public (26)
• gave rise to broad public support for liberal democracy (Catterberg 1990
• and gave rise to a powerful human rights movement
• change in office between Alfonsín and Menem was first time democratic change of hands, but even then Alfonsín resigned early because of economic crisis, and there was a lot of institutional fluidity
• Argentina under Menem
• Menem abandoned traditional Peronism, set off on neoliberalism (27)
• among the fully democratic countries, Argentina carried out the most rapid and far-reaching reforms
• among the countries with the deepest crisis and radical reform, Argentina was the most democratic
• BUT many of the policy arrangements made by Menem proved to be economically unsustainable
• AND Menem did little to strengthen political institutions, and in same cases he weakened them
• The Politics of Radical Economic Reform: Why Menem was successful
• Menem's ability to end hyperinflation increased public support for him/his policies (28)
• The strength of the PJ helped Menem keep a solid electoral base
• the PJ's hegemony in the popular sectors limited possibility of anti-reofrm appeals (29)
• PJ's close ties to organized labor gave union leaders a stake in limiting opposition from working class
• Menem gave side payments and policy concessions to losers (30)
• unions protected pro-labor law
• industrialists were giving help in competing for privatization contracts
• governors wooed by putting off provincial budgetary adjustments
• Encroachment on legistlative and judicial perogatives
• lots of executive decrees
• court-packing and impeachments
• PROBLEMATIC LEGACIES (31)
• convertability left governmetn without tools to rspond to economic shocks or erosion of competitiveness
• public debt grew a lot
• reforms generated large-scale social exclusion (and middle class shrunk
• Democratic Institutions under Menem
• Menem frequently circumvented legistlaive process using decrees (32-33)
• M allowed little judicial independence (33)
• executive accountability decreased, allowing corruption to increase
• widespread perception of corruption and abuse eroded the credibility of Argentina's representative institutions (35)
• Party system and Political representation in the 1990s
• Alianza able to win on anti-corruption ticket (37)
• mostly because middle and upper-middle classed had little faith in credibility of government
• The Post-Menem Era
• Alianza failed to clean up politics (37)
• actually got caught up in its own curruption scandal, which it didn't handle very well (37-38)
• Alianza did poorly in economic arena
• inherited a recession *38)
• convertibility left them without policy tools, and convertibility was too popular to be touched
• in 1999 legislative vote 22% cast spoiled/blank votes
• three Presidents in 2 weeks
• third was Duhalde, who ended convertibility (39)
• economic plunged into chaos
• poliitcal system and parties pushed into crisis as well
• FREPASO and UCR disintegrated (40)
• 2003 elections:
• military made no move to intervene
• despite anger, no anti-establishment outsider received more than 2% of the vote (41)
• PJ finished 1-2-3 in presidential vote, all other partis wiped out
• PJ proved remarkably resilient
• Kirchner 1
• concentrated power in the executive (43)
• but his initiatives were more transparent and oriented toward institutional integrity
• rst of the story yet to be seen (chapter form 2005)....

Levitsky and Murillo 2005a

"Introduction" Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, p. 1-17

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Federalism and the Link between Subnational and National Politics
• subnational politics are crucial to understanding national-level politics and policymaking in Argentina (9)
• provincial governors have been able to gather enormous power under democratic rule
• The Transformation of State-Society Relations in the Postcorporatist era
• labor protest has been increasingly confined to provincial public sector employees (Farinetti 2002) (12)
• blockade as a new form of protest
• the participants in provincial riots and urban looting are frequently embedded in (and mobilized by) the very clientelistic networks that they are said to replace (13)
• much of the urban poor was incorporated into clientelistic networks during the 1990s
• postcorporatist scenario reveals a trend away from national-level collective bargaining organizations and national definied class identities
• localized, territorial identities are becoming more salient
• most new social actors are resisting close ties to the state
• authors mention the middle class, CTA, and piqueteros....but some of the piqueteros have drawn closer to the state in recent years

Wibbels and Roberts 2010

Wibbels, Erik, and Kenneth Roberts. 2010. "The Politics of Economic Crisis in Latin America". Studies in Comparative International Development. 45 (4): 383-409.

• Introduction
• Most quantitative models show that strong unions and powerful left parties are associated with severe economic crises (383)
• BUT some evidence that the combination of left parties and strong unions can actually alleviate inflationary crises
• crisis differ in depth, duration, and frequency (384)
• but crises also need to be analytically separated from neoliberal economic reforms (previous scholarship tends to conflate these things)
• authors examine three types of crises (385)
• inflationary
• growth
• fiscal
• Political conditions tested:
• are new democracies more vulnerable to crises?
• what effects do sub-regime variables have, including executive powers, party systems, and electoral competition?
• how organized/powerful is labor and the left?
• Early reporting of results:
• different types of crises are independent and have distinct political correlates
• neither powerful executives nor high levels of democracy are correlated with crisis events or duration
• strength of electoral left and labor are correlated to more frequent crises...
• BUT left in power + strong unions can facilitate early exits from crises
• Methodological considerations
• drawbacks to current literature
• economic crises are often conflated with economic performance (386)
• crises differ in depth and duration
• any attempt to relate crises to political factors needs to include factors that explain variation in severity and duration
• Crises vary in type
• are some type of governments more prone to certain types of crises?
• finally, really need to disentangle crises from neoliberal turn (387)
• explanation of their variables (387-388)
• The Political Determinants of Economic Crisis
• most of these hypotheses built off existing literature
• regime level of analysis:
• literature supports two hypotheses regard new democracies, combined to form this one hypothesis: (388-389)
• H1: Economic crises will be more severe and prolonged in new democracies (389)
• sub-regime level
• party system fragmentation is an impediment to economic efficiency (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999) -- mans executive can easily get legislative majority and push reforms/policies
• BUT also: fragmented party systems could make it less likely the executive will have legislative majority, and just add more veto players (Tsebelis 1995) -- meaning parties will have short-time horizons and not want to enact unfavorable policies
• but more veot players may result in gridlock, a sort of backdoor to stability, which will improve investors' outlook
• H2: the severity and duration of crises will have a U-shaped relationship with the number of effective political parties (390)
• close electoral compeititon could result in both parties uniting behind reforms, realizing that their future ability to govern may be constrained iuf current crisis isn't dealt with
• H3: economic crises will be more severe and prolonged in less competitive electoral environments
• presidents with a ton of power can push reforms
• H3: economic crises will be longer and more severe when the chief executive is weaker (391)
• Labor and the Left (392)
• H5a: economic crises will be longer and more severe when labor mobilizing or populist parties are strong
• H5b: economic crises will be longer and more severe when organized labor movements are strong
• H5c: economic crises will be longer and more severe when combined strength of left and labor is high
• Finally, politics should have the greatest impact on financial crises, less impact on inflationary crises, and the least impact on growth crises (393)
• Research Design
• crises are measured as deviations from the regional mean performance for the entire period under study (394)
• 13% of country-years experienced GDP crises
• 11% of country-years experienced inflationary crises
• 11% of country-years experienced fiscal crises
• the correlations between these crises are quite low
• countries predisposed to one type of crisis are not necessarily predisposed to another (395)
• on average, GDP crises (1.5 years) are shorter than fiscal crises (3.4 year) which are shorter than inflationary crises (5 years)
• also, depth and duration are distinct
• Results and Discussion
• "politics play a much stronger role in producing crises than they do in year-to-year performance" (397)
• more significant effect on the probability of inflationary and fiscal crises than growth crises
• Strongest indicators: labor and the Left
• strong left significantly increases probability of inflationary crises (397)
• strong unions significantly increases probability of inflationary crises , even more than left parties(398)
• BUT!!!!  electoral strength of the left increases probability of inflationary crises ONLY WHEN UNIONS ARE WEAK (398-399)
• strong left and labor unions allows governments to negotiate pacts between labor and capital on wages, investment, and employments that can temper redistributive demands (399)
• Other important indicators
• new regimes are more likely to have inflationary and/or fiscal crises (400)
• political competition was not significant
• increasing the power to the chief executive increases the probability of a fiscal crisis (emphasis in original)
• party system fragmentation is weird...has an inverted u-shaped relationship with inflationary and fiscal crises (401)
• could be that fragemented party systems block adjustment, but do block risky policies that could result in crisis
• My take: that sounds unlikely...fitting the theory to the data, not finding an explanation
• global economic conditions are not associated with inflation or fiscal crises
• Outside of the variables on the left and labor unions, no other variable is consistent across all the models (401)
• Duration of crisis
• political variables provide less insight into this (402)
• left will increase inflationary crisis length when labor is weak (402-403)
• left + labor = shorter inflationary crises (by about 3 months) (403)
• crises are shorter as party system fractionalization increases (404) -- ?????
• Conclusions
• the most important factor seems to be the nature of party-society linkages (405)
• countries with conservative parties and weak labor unions were less susceptible to crises in general

Ellner 2004

Ellner, Steve. 2004. "Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin America". Science &Amp; Society. 68 (1): 10-32.

• Introduction
• neoliberalism in 1990s led to economic stagnation and increase in executive power, not growth and democracy (10-11)
• compares three views of the Left (11)
• Center-left proposed by Jorge Castaneda
• Left that just focuses on anti-neoliberal strategy (Maria Harnecker)
• Left that is anti-neoliberal AS WELL AS anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, James Petras
• Underlying debate stems from the fact that the anti-neoliberal strategy hasn't been well-articulated
• Center-Left strategy
• achieve social justice and nationalistic goals (12)
• but avoid far reaching reforms
• GOAL: Left will woo centrist voters away from the right
• a sort of neo-Asian tiger model (13)
• regimes that tried this (15)
• Concertación in Chile
• Caldera, Venezuela, 1993
• de la Rua, Argentina, 1999
• Fox, Mexico, 2000
• Results:
• Fox offered PRD a few cabinet positions, which they refused to take
• a bit of a caricature of this idea (16)
• Argentina and Chile won election, but did not push anti-neoliberal strategy, which made Left parties in these alliances lose legitimacy/credibility (16-18)
• left ends up taking a back seat to the center in essentially all of these cases (18)
•  these alliances help solidify democratic transitions (19)
• but they also spurred voter apathy
• to really work, anti-neoliberalism needs to be a harder line for Left parties (21)
• Anti-neoliberalism and anti-imperialism
• Harnecker proposes adopting neoliberal bylines such as efficiency in government, but gaining this by retraining workers (22)
• also, Left can seek alliances with non-left
• Petras: Left should join radical social movements (22)
• thinks there is continued relevance to anti-imperialism argument, doesn't see mutual benefit in globalization (23)
• According to Petras, Lula's alliances with national bourgeoisie is an abandonment of his progressive goals (25)
• Harnecker thinks Lula has made some of the most important anti-neoliberal moves
• neither author is sure of what Chávez is doing/wants to do (26)
• but Petras is willing ot look past his populism to highlight his anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist ideas (27)
• Conclusion
• Castaneda's ideas focus on globalization, moderation based on inescapable fact of globalization (28)
• Harnecker sees left on defensive since their is not international socialist bloc anymore
• her idea: left can gain power, then slowly make changes on international scale
• focus just on anti-neoliberalism for the time being
• Petras wants it all, ideological purity of sorts, if you are going to be Left, be LEFT! (29)
• events have shown center-left hasn't been an effective strategy so far
• but Petra's approach seems a bit too radical, as seen because both Lula and Chavez had some alliances with middle class, at least to get to power (30)

Muirillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2010

Murillo, Maria Victoria, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. 2010. "Electoral Revolution or Democratic Alternation?" Latin American Research Review. 45 (3): 87-114. 

• Introduction
• Argument: Left wave is actually just the normalization of democratic politics (87)
• electoral accountability is still the primary mechanism of controlling the executive in the region's democracies (88)
• democratic elections have allowed voters to punish bad performers
• thus the rise of the Left is a result of retrospective voting
• they use Levitsky and Roberts' definition of the left, which is based on overarching redistributive goals irrespective of the strategies pursued to achieve those goals (89)
• Arnold and Samuels (2011...in Levitsky and Roberts) note that the Left turn has not been accompanied by citizens' self-placement on ideological scales (though some authors disagree...)
• other surveys agree, as does authors data, which shows leftward shift in votes, but not a giant shift (89-90)
• thus the authors test to see if voting is related to right-leaning candidates poor performance in the economic arena during the 1990s (90)
• Explaining the rise of the Left
• their take is that the sudden "backlash" and rise of the Left is actually due to the institutionalization of democracy and electoral accountability, not a radical swing to the Left (93)
• My take: so it's not a Marxist revolution, but why does that mean it's not a backlash? or even a radical backlash?!
• Democracy
• Hypothesis 1: failure of prior economic policies and poor economic growth will increase the share of Left voting ONLY WHEN there is a right wing candidate to blame (94)
• dependent on the extent of democratic experience in each country (95)
• Socioeconomic factors
• Inequality hypotheses (2 and 3)
• greater inequality = more left votes (95), OR
• U shaped curve (Debs and Helmke 2008):  same as above, but at some high point of inequality rich people start bribing poor to maintain current inequality (95-96)
• Left as a refuge from the economic insecurity of being in the global market, hypothesis 4 (96)
• Crisis of Political representation
• left-wing outsiders will benefit when crisis of representation comes under right wing leader (97)
• Empirical Model (97-100) 
•  Results
• high inflation under right-wing leader greatly increases likelihood of left-win (100)
• but reaction AGAINST left-wing governments in same situation is slightly stronger (101)
• but right wing governments are not necessarily rewarded for achieving growth (100-101)
• no support for income inequality arguments (101)
• no support for left-votes because of representation crisis under right government (103)
• weak/inconsistent support for globalization argument
• Conclusion
• inflation may be more visible than growth to everyday people, meaning voters may decide their vote on the former but not on the latter (106)
• strong effect of inflation and non-result by other hypotheses shows electoral accountability on economic issues is mostly at work in rise of Left

Hilgers 2008

Hilgers, Tina. 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (4): 123-153. 

•  Introduction
• PRD has been dhandicapped by factionalism, personalism, and clientelism (123)
• PRD has lost many supporters because they have become disillusioned with PRD
• Why have PRD politicians come to use clientelism?
• External Factors
• poverty
• long history of clientelism in Mexican politics
• PRI's use of clientelism
• PRD founders proficiency at using clientielism
• Internal Factors
• party's strategy during democratic transition
• predominance of Cuauthémoc Cardenas and primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic factions and centralized power (124)
• the PRD focused on elections
• did NOT focus on creating an institutionalized party
• thus leadership and alliances were personalized
• Comparison case: PT in Brazil
• shared similar external factors, but this party decided to create internal institutions
• Use of clientelism also ambiguous
• PRD client experiences range from exploitation to participatory community building (125)
• Defining Clientelism
• People of differing social status exchange goods and services for mutual benefit
• the durability of the relationship depends on its benefits outweighing its costs
• Gouldner (1977), clientelism not necessarily bad, "principle of reciprocity" (126)
• Flynn (1975) clentelism = elite control of masses
• Fox (1994)
• authoritarian clientelism = relationship of asymmetrical power
• semi-clientlelism = elites have no capacity to ensure compliance
• heart of clientelism = tension between positive and negative processes (127)
• but just describing it as "exchange of goods" does not distinguish clientelism from patronage, vote-buying, or pork-barreling
• The Initial Causes of Perredista Clientelism
• PRI used camarillas extensively, networks through which (128)
• groups endorsed successful figures
• and actors moved up in the ranks of government as their mentors did
• though much of the lower classes likely voted for Cárdenas in 1988, they couldn't afford to continue to support him post-election because this would threaten their relationship with PRI government
• Given this environment, Cárdenas and his supporters decided to consooidate the amalgam of the FDN into a party (129)
• immediate problems:  this party was ridiculously divided ideologically
• only thing everyone agreed on: they wanted to beat the PRI
• Generally three big currents (FAR fro internally homogeneous)
• institutional, independent left -- all the previous left parties, ended up being sort of center-left
• social left/civil society organizations -- left, but did not fit in with institutional groups...mobilizers, student movements, etc
• ex-priistas -- no unity, just wanted to beat PRI
• Cárdenas believed best strategy was electoral, just try and get PRI unelected at every level
• democratic transition immediately, radical change could come later
• primacy of his vision legitimated  Cárdenas even though he ran for Presidency of PRD unopposed (130)
• ((some FDN groups didn't join PRD, either wanting to maintain independence or not anger PRI))
• PRD never formally detailed procedures for structuring the currents and ensuring internal democracy in PRD (131)
• no horizontal links in the party...all info flowed through Cárdenas!
• the currents began to seem like the PRI's camarillas
• BUT the PRD didn't have as much access to resources, so internal competition over resource was worse
• each current was organized around one "strong man"
• everything became a negotiation, internal elections became undeniably fraudulent/negotiated
• The rise of AMLO split the party between Cárdenas and AMLO (152)
• AMLO made alliances with external groups, which strengthened his position but weakened party unity
• At times the PRD's desire to win elections has overshadowed its principles
• some candidates are courted purely because of their clientelist networks
• In 2004 Congress the pRD noted the issues of clientelism and corruption in the party, tried to ameliorate them, but of course these changes totally failed to win overall support (133)
• The PRD in Government
• even in elected local government there are disputes between members of different currents
• In the Federal District (134)
• the PRD promised to regulate taxis drivers (piratas who rob people), vendors and squatters
• but instead allied with them to increase PRD voter strength
• groups/citizens that are unable/unwilling to make such alliances are immediately and a disadvantage
• THERE HAVE BEEN SOME GOOD DEVELOPMENTS IN DF (135)
• but these tend to be undermined by the methods through which they were achieved
• AMLO portected the poor through unorthodox and extra-constitutional means
• in the end, this is probably bad for democracy
• PRD administrator in Nezhualcóyotl, Estado Mexico, made government way more tasnparent
• BUT this meant he/his faction was less able to negotiate party positions and policy
• in Chiapas clients  who leave the PRD are repressed (136)
• My Take: OVERALL: Good governing undermines ability for people to move up in PRD
• Now people just expect the PRD to be clientelistic, nationwide (137)
• Comparison to PT in Brazil
• PT faced authoritarian beginnings, lots of clientelism in country, and success hinged on Lula's personalistic leadership (138-139)
• PT still does patronage and targeted social programs, but this isn't like the PRD's clientelism (139)
• patronage does note = clientelism (140)
• Blosa Familia is universal, so while its good for PT votes, it doesn't exactly have the same connotation as focused clientelistic distribution of benefits
• My Take: Splitting hairs a bit, but there is something less bad about PT's clentelism than the PRD's
• While PRD though winning electiosn was key, the PT did not think this was enough (141)
• PT's early focus was on building organization, seeking POLICY change first!
• PT adopted democratic procedures early on and the rules are enforced, as is party unity
• PT's connection with voters/its base have kept it from becoming a catch-all party
• The Clients' Perspective
• in some instances clientelism is the best method for keeping politicians accountable, and could build community (142)
• FPFV, squatters group, allied with PRD in DF
• demonstrating and rallying with PRD became mandatory to get apartment/material benefits (143)
• if you left group, they didn't return your deposit assuming you wouldn't have the legal means/stamina to get it back
• clearly it is tough being in this alliance, but members have few resources and few alternatives (144)...some think it's a fine bargain, others don't
• some in DF sought clientelistic linkages to provide for themselves, but found they built community and political power as well (145)
• Conclusion
• Those wo stick with PRD after engaging in clientelism are not the poorest of the poor, nor are they in highly exploitative relationships with their patron (147)
• 
  

Cató and Ventrici 2011

Cató, Juan, and Patricia Ventrici. 2011. "Labor Union Renewal in Argentina: Democratic Revitalization from the Base". Latin American Perspectives. 38 (6): 38-51. 

• Introduction
• 2001 crisis involved the collapse of the development formula based on financial accumulation, exhaustion of social model based on exclusion and regressive distribution of income, and delegitimization of political authority (38)
• the persecution of labor leaders during the dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the cooptation of union leaders in the 1990s, significantly weakened labor as a social actor (38-39) 
• BUT the new landscape created by Néstor Kirchner provided a favorable climate for labor union revitalization through union democracy (39)
• look at subway workers to see how rank and file changed their internal procedures, became more democratic, and how the union fared after making these changes
• The Union legacy of the 1990s and the New Situation
• the (neoliberal) changes to the labor market and the deterioration of the norms of protection delegitimized many unions in the 1990s (Marshall and Perelman 2002) (40)
• many unions privileged organizational survival over rank and file interests
• Union Democracy
• paper looks at the ways labor unions as a social actor deal with workers' needs (41)
• the major unions, since 2003, have continued the old model of deeply rooted bureaucracy and top-down control (42)
• the struggle by many leaders to preserve their power closes off the possibility of revitalization
• but the weakening of corporatism also brought the old model of unionism into crisis (citing de la Garza 2008)
• in Argentina unionism is on the defensive, and any attempt and innovation is perceived as a threat to leaders...questioning leaders is seen as a declaration of rivalry (43)
• Resistance to Union Bureaucratization:  The Subway Assembly Delegates
• the new, post-2001 era made possible the emergence and/or consolidation of union renewal from the base
• the Subway union went against the grain of history, as it was
• challenged entrenched union bureaucracy (44)
• was innovative and employed a lot of direct action
• was particularly success in achieving its demands
• Boundary-violating actions by the base revealed the limits of the established rules, and allowed rank and file to supersede them
• 1994: subway privatized
• the union outwardly complained, but internally decided to moderate demands, work with management, limit workers in transition
• unhappy workers started meeting and complaining clandestinely
• in 1997 a worker was unfairly fired and other workers left on an unauthorized strike (45), though most delegates and leadership did not aid them
• after this these militant workers attempted to gain elected positions in the union Assembly as delegates
• in 2000 the militant delegates won 17 of 21 seats
• then, in 2001, after an unpopular management decision supported by the union leadership, and demanded to negotiate this decision
• management found that the Assembly, not the leadership, was the real power, and bypassed negotiating with the leadership in this case (45-46)
• the main challenge for the Assembly was to keep workers invovled and reelecting them (46)
• soon the Assembly had taken over long- and medium-term strategy for the union, and became the main interlocutor with management
• both management (using cooptation) and the official union leadership (using non-recognition) tried to break up the Assembly
•  Assembly's main demands were not on wages, but on improving conditions, lowering hours, including more non-organized workers in contracts, and reducing arbitrary management decisions (47)
• my take:  sounds a lot like job control unionism!
• the Assembly consolidated itself both practically and symbolically, and continued to make gains (47-48)
• Conclusion
• In this case, union democracy was not an obstacle but a prerequisite for increased union power (48)
• the Assembly engaged members in active participation and direct action, which showed them that the traditional institutional limits could be overcome and innovation could occur (49)