Notes!: August 2013

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Bogliaccini 2013

Bogliaccini, Juan Ariel. 2013. "Trade Liberalization, Deindustrialization, and Inequality: Evidence from Middle-Income Latin American Countries". Latin American Research Review. 48 (2): 79-105.

Introduction

article shows that trade liberalization reform played an important role in the destruction of formal employment in industry... (79)
...and a concomitant deindustrialization that increased inequality

literature review:

two competing arguments to increase in inequality: opening to international trade, and technological improvement (82)
this article argues that trade destroyed most job opportunities for lower social groups (83)
in every case there was reviewed there was some development of industrial production, usually created through ISI spending
with traded openings, these businesses could not compete and shut down
this brings into question the theoretical claims behind the liberal model, that new export possibilities would trigger greater industrialization (85)

Data and model

author expects the destruction of employment to have a negative effect on inequality, and for the effect to increase as liberalization increases (88)
author expects inequality to increase less in countries with stronger democratic institutions (89)

Results

two broad conclusions (90)

trade liberalization produced significant destruction of employment in industry
the destruction of this employment increased inequality

as trade liberalization advanced, formal employment in industry shrank
membership in Mercosur rsulted in loss of employment (95)
membership in NAFTA resulted in RISE in employment
in this model GDP per capita has a NEGATIVE relationship to employment in industry
decrease in informal employment increases inequality in the long run, and these variables are not independent of one another over time (96)
increase in informal sector is related to increase in inequality (97)
increases in GDP per capita are related to increases in inequality my take: financialization?
increase in length of time under democracy decreases inequality (98)

Conclusions

trade reform had a clear and detrimental effects on equality through its fostering of deindustrialization
in particular, the Latin American version of liberalization failed to include and alternative welfare structure for coping with the deindustrialization and informalization of their economies

Bellinger and Arce 2011

Bellinger,, Paul T., and Moisés Arce. 2011. "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era". Political Research Quarterly. 64 (3): 688-704.

Introduction

LA has seen a generalized rise in protests (688)
collective actors in LA are highly responsive to changes in economic policy, and democracy ahs given them room to move
central question: do economic reofrms in teh context of democracy demobilize political actors, or RE-mobilize them?
literature notes discord between neoliberlal society and democratic protest
paper is to test and see which effect is greater, demobilization associated with neoliberalism or re-mobilization associated with democracy (689)

Literature review

demobilization literature

increase in poverty, decrease in equality, higher levels of unemployment, and lower standards of living all create "anomie" (Zermeño 1990)
but this literature has trouble explaining the revival of protests in Latin America
in this literature, market policies erode democracy (690)
and state diminishes, leaving it an unhelpful target of economic grievances

Repoliticization literature (690-691)

traditional class-based actors are protesting (labor)
NEW actors are protesting (unemployed, indigenous, regional groups)
elaborating the repoliticization argument (691)

neoliberal turn:

heightened economic insecurities
offered a master frame for protest

democracy enhanced opportunity for collective activity

authors believe regime type is a core component of the political opportunity for collective mobilization

Data and Method

data from 1970-2003 (692)
dependent variable: collective protest
independent variables: economic liberalization, democracy, semi-democracy, autocracy, and interactions between these two categories
Controls include the level of regional protest to account for cyclical, demonstration effect (693)

Results

economic liberalization x democracy and economic liberalization x semi-democracy interaction terms are positive, support repoliticization argument (695)
econ lib x autocracy supports demobilization argument IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS
also protest is shown to be regionally cyclical (697)
index of civil liberties shows that the political opportunities provided by democracy, outside of simple elections, are actually driving remobilization

Conclusion

authors cast doubt on demobilization perspective (699)
Latin American citizens do not seem to be passive, atomized

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

"Demanding Accountable Government: Citizens, Politicians, and the Perils of Representative Democracy in Argentina" Enrique Peruzzotti, p.229-249

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Introduction

in the past 20 years a more sophisticated and demanding citizenry has emerged, demanding representation and accountability from Argentine politicians (229-230)
and important actor was the rise of the human rights movement in response to the dictatorship (230)
Menem's disregard of demands for greater accountability also spured the citizenry

Redefinition of Representation

Argentine citizenry switched from "authorization" view of representation, which is connected to populism, to demanding accountability of representatives as in liberal democracy (Pitkin 1972) (231)

populist leaders were given authorization to act in the interests of the people
now citizens demand politicians be directly accountable
this pivoted thanks in part to the emergence of the human rights movement in the 1980s and their demands against the military (231-232)

there is no longer a direct relationship between constituents and representatives...this relationship is mediated by institutions (233)

this is a change driven by leveling off of high expectations for politicians and a new trust in institutions

The partial dissolution of captive electorates has led to more fluid and unpredictable electoral behavior (235)

footnote: the PJ has been able to keep hold of its lower class constituents through clientelism

The Politics of Social Accountability

three main actors

NGOs and advocacy organizations (236-237)
Social movements (237)
watchdog journalism (237-238)

threefold contribution

signalling to population, "what's happening, why its bad" (238-239)
social initiatives can activate a network of horizontal agencies of accountability, gets a movement going (239-240)
establishment of permanent watchdog groups/agencies (240)

2001 buildup and Accountability politics

Alianza promised to renew ties, not be corrupt (241)
then the Senate scandal (241-242)

the scandal cast doubts n the electoral arena as a place where accountability could be found (243)
the bribes went to the very heart of the state's electoral institutions
Alianza was slow to respond, and had a tepid response

this led to electoral protest/null ballots in 2001 (244-245)...
...and mobilizations against leaders, que se vayan todos, (245-246)

and local, representative, unofficial neighborhood "governments" called asambleas sprung up (246-248)
these eventually ran out of steam in 2002 and most were gone by 2003 (248)

Conclusion

shared concern of the quality of democratic institutions connects the politics of social accountability, the cacerolazos (pot banging protests), and the asambleas (249)
importantly, though, these mobilizations were triggered by the spread of frustration that the government wasn't listening/wasn't accountable

Levitsky 2005

"Crisis and Renovation: Institutional Weakness and the Transformation of Argentine Peronism, 1983-2003" Levitsky, p181-206

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Introduction

although the PJ is well-organized it's internal structures are weakly institutionalized, its lacks stable internal rules and bureaucracy (181)
the PJs weakly institutionalized party-union linkages allowed reformers to dismantle traditional mechanism of labor participation (182)
this enabled the party to

attract the middle class
create a clientelistic relationship with the urban poor

The fluidity of the PJ sent it into crisis in 2000-2001 along with the rest of the country, but this fluidity also allowed it to adapt and survive the crisis

Institutionalization and Party Adaptation

institutionalization creates stable expectations, rules of the game (O'Donnell 1994) (182)
but institutionalization also inhibits organizational change (Zucker 1977) (183)

they are sticky

The PJ as a Weakly Institutionalized Party

PJ is well-organized with deep roots in working- and lower-class society (184)

but it lacks even a minimal bureaucratic structure
in the years following Perón's death, no faction was able to impose an organizational structure or binding rules (185)
The Renovators in the 1980s tried to create more rules, but essentially failed

"We use the party statutes when they are useful. When they are not useful, we don't use them."

Three areas of institutional weakness

Weak leadership bodies (186)

the party's national leaders are routinely ignored by lower-level branches and officeholders
the government runs the party, especially when their is a seated executive

Fluid Party Hierarchy

politicians and those with power have often parachuted into top leadership/electoral positions (187)
in many provinces internal elections are negotiated or imposed by party bosses

Loosely Structured party-union linkage

62 organizations and the tercio (188)

The effects of weak institutionalization

the PJ suffers from low levels of trust in the organization (188-189)
the PJ is highly malleable, and may be changed quickly to line up with short-term goals of dominant actors (189)
Pj experiences bandwagoning effect (190)
PJ officeholders have substantial autonomy from the party

Peronism's dual transformation int eh 1980s and 1990s

Crisis:

working class had eroded (191)
debt crisis and exhaustion of ISI left the PJ without the ability to continue a statist program

to adapt the PJ dismantle union-party inks and replaced them with clientelistic links

labor participation had been based entirely on need of party leaders for the resources unions had (192)

62 orgs and tercio were often imposed by union leaders

as PJ won office, politicians were able to use state resources instead of union resources

Erosion of union influence enhanced the PJ's autonomy, allowing it to attract the middle class... (195)
...meanwhile it created clientelistic networks to maintain ties to urban poor in era of de-industrialization, and shrinking working class

but clientelism generated political costs, as the Pj became the part of corruption (196)

though most of the Party didn't agree with Menem and neoliberal turn, bandwagon was created since he had control over appointments to office/government (197-198)
The Crisis

The PJ's fluid structure meant the party had no unified response to the 2000 crisis, sending Pj into its own internal conflict/crisis (200)

no one had enough power to find a unified program or to discipline party members (201)

Menem and Duhalde were bitter enemies and fought over control of the party (202)

this rivalry meant there was no agreement on primaries, candidates
in 2003 PJ supported no presidential candidate, allowed all three to run outside the party (202-203)

Kirchner's victory pushed the party to the center-left (204)

even though the PJ had undertaken the neoliberal reforms themselves, the internal fluidity allowed this leftist, dark horse candidate (Kirchner) to rise and have a chance in the election
Kirchner realigned the PJ with leftist politicians, progressive intellectuals, and humans rights groups (205)

Conclusion

Peronisms current coalition change seem to be more permanent (ie away from labor unions) (206)
PJ remains the party of the poor, but will likely never again be a labor backed party

Etchemendy 2005

"Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001" Sabastián Etchemendy, p. 62-87

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Introduction

rather than being unambiguous losers in the neoliberal reforms, some key industrial and labor actors within the old ISI coalition can and do preserve their existing market power in the new "liberal" order (62-63)
argument: dominant unions and certain established industrial players were actually part of the reform coalition (63)
two goals of chapter

explain why Menem chose to rewared some industries and unions
assess the consequences of this pattern of transformation of the populist/industrial coalition

ISI past generated very strong industries that were also potential losers in turn to neoliberalism (64)
unions had a very clear goal of preserving the corporatist institutions -- ((induced them to be willing to trade liberalization for maintaining this bastion of power))
Results of Menem's bargains (65)

Business

compensations eventually led to a high exchange, which undermined business's ability to compete
no strategy in the face of global competition was developed...once the side payments were gone, business still couldn't compete on open market

labor

benefits funneled only to formal sector
bureaucratization of unions allowed room for the creation of large, autonomous, powerful groups of unemployed and other actors

Industry: Political Winners

the government compensated firms from four tradeable sectors: oil extraction, petrochemicals, autos, and steel (66)

privatization usually meant directly rewarding state assets to these businesses
and the pace of deregulation was consistently slowed
why firms in these sectors?

mixed sectors, meaning these firms had a higher lobbying capacity because they were partially public (69)
these firms were the largest and most powerful in economic terms
these firms were also relatively more concentrated (fewer firms and more economic value per firm) (70-71)
all of these firms had monopolistic industry associations through which they could bargain (72)

Working Class: Compensating Leaders and Insiders in the Formal Sector

the politics of compensation focused on teh leaders (74)

unemployed and laid off were left to their fate

there were four payoffs:

maintenance of corporatist union structure

while government did get some flexibilization of contracts (75)...
unions maintained their monopoly of representation in privatized firms

preserving labor's administration of healthcare

deregulation only went so far as to promote competition within the union-run system

granting unions privileged position in private pension market (76)

unions were allowed to create/control their own pension funds to compete on the market
but unions abandoned most of these by 2000 (no explanation given by author)

granting unions share of privatization

employee stock ownership programs (76)
these rpograms were only offered to formal employees (77)
and the stocks were monaaged by hte unions

and the stock value totally soared

generally all four of these payoffs converged on maintaining union leaders' control of unions and increasing the amount of money they controlled (79)

they faced little danger of being uprooted by competing organizations or their own rank and file

The Consequences

the compenstations porlonged the fixed exchange rate (80-81)
disregarded any strategy for actual export competition (82)

compensation was based on teh control of domestic markets (82)
this ended up being a short term strategy, and no one sought a longer term one
when the compenstations, which were based on the strong exchange rate, were consumed by the end of the decade, firms still could compete on the global market! (83)

offered nothing to the unemployed (83)

there was no antional policy to attenuate hardships of neolibreal transformation, specifically focused on working class/poor who lost jobs and purchasing power (84)
government chose to support unions over the unemployed
and the unions chose to take their compensations and similarly ignored the poor, which just paved the way for the piquteros and other groups (85)

Conclusions

the configuration of labor and industrial interests befor ethe reform determined the pattersn fo compensations during and after the reform (86) ... my take: the rich get richer, sort of
the compensatory policies were a double edged sword (86-87)

on the one hand, they made the reform politically viable (87)
on the other hand, these compensations sowed the seeds of future economic and political instability, which erupted in 2001

Levitsky and Murillo 2005b

"Building Castles in the Sand? The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Argentina" Levitsky and Murillo, 21-44

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Central argument OF THE BOOK: the major cause of Argentina's under-performance was persistent and widespread institutional instability (21)
The Origins of Institutional Instability

between 1955 and 1972 Argentina politics were deadlocked (24)
one the one hand, allowing Peronist party to compete in elections woul certainly result in Personit victory, which was unacceptable to many elites
yet, on the other hand, keeping the Peronists out of elections was a major destabilizing influence
eventually military leadership had to allow Peron back into power (25), then another military regime
The brutality and dramatic failure of the military regime discredited the military in the eyes of the public (26)

gave rise to broad public support for liberal democracy (Catterberg 1990
and gave rise to a powerful human rights movement

change in office between Alfonsín and Menem was first time democratic change of hands, but even then Alfonsín resigned early because of economic crisis, and there was a lot of institutional fluidity

Argentina under Menem

Menem abandoned traditional Peronism, set off on neoliberalism (27)

among the fully democratic countries, Argentina carried out the most rapid and far-reaching reforms
among the countries with the deepest crisis and radical reform, Argentina was the most democratic
BUT many of the policy arrangements made by Menem proved to be economically unsustainable
AND Menem did little to strengthen political institutions, and in same cases he weakened them

The Politics of Radical Economic Reform: Why Menem was successful

Menem's ability to end hyperinflation increased public support for him/his policies (28)
The strength of the PJ helped Menem keep a solid electoral base

the PJ's hegemony in the popular sectors limited possibility of anti-reofrm appeals (29)
PJ's close ties to organized labor gave union leaders a stake in limiting opposition from working class

Menem gave side payments and policy concessions to losers (30)

unions protected pro-labor law
industrialists were giving help in competing for privatization contracts
governors wooed by putting off provincial budgetary adjustments

Encroachment on legistlative and judicial perogatives

lots of executive decrees
court-packing and impeachments

PROBLEMATIC LEGACIES (31)

convertability left governmetn without tools to rspond to economic shocks or erosion of competitiveness
public debt grew a lot
reforms generated large-scale social exclusion (and middle class shrunk

Democratic Institutions under Menem

Menem frequently circumvented legistlaive process using decrees (32-33)
M allowed little judicial independence (33)
executive accountability decreased, allowing corruption to increase
widespread perception of corruption and abuse eroded the credibility of Argentina's representative institutions (35)

Party system and Political representation in the 1990s

Alianza able to win on anti-corruption ticket (37)
mostly because middle and upper-middle classed had little faith in credibility of government

The Post-Menem Era

Alianza failed to clean up politics (37)

actually got caught up in its own curruption scandal, which it didn't handle very well (37-38)

Alianza did poorly in economic arena

inherited a recession *38)
convertibility left them without policy tools, and convertibility was too popular to be touched

in 1999 legislative vote 22% cast spoiled/blank votes
three Presidents in 2 weeks

third was Duhalde, who ended convertibility (39)
economic plunged into chaos
poliitcal system and parties pushed into crisis as well

FREPASO and UCR disintegrated (40)

2003 elections:

military made no move to intervene
despite anger, no anti-establishment outsider received more than 2% of the vote (41)
PJ finished 1-2-3 in presidential vote, all other partis wiped out

PJ proved remarkably resilient

Kirchner 1

concentrated power in the executive (43)
but his initiatives were more transparent and oriented toward institutional integrity
rst of the story yet to be seen (chapter form 2005)....

Levitsky and Murillo 2005a

"Introduction" Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, p. 1-17

in Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2005. Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Federalism and the Link between Subnational and National Politics

subnational politics are crucial to understanding national-level politics and policymaking in Argentina (9)
provincial governors have been able to gather enormous power under democratic rule

The Transformation of State-Society Relations in the Postcorporatist era

labor protest has been increasingly confined to provincial public sector employees (Farinetti 2002) (12)
blockade as a new form of protest
the participants in provincial riots and urban looting are frequently embedded in (and mobilized by) the very clientelistic networks that they are said to replace (13)

much of the urban poor was incorporated into clientelistic networks during the 1990s

postcorporatist scenario reveals a trend away from national-level collective bargaining organizations and national definied class identities

localized, territorial identities are becoming more salient
most new social actors are resisting close ties to the state
authors mention the middle class, CTA, and piqueteros....but some of the piqueteros have drawn closer to the state in recent years

Monday, August 19, 2013

Wibbels and Roberts 2010

Wibbels, Erik, and Kenneth Roberts. 2010. "The Politics of Economic Crisis in Latin America". Studies in Comparative International Development. 45 (4): 383-409.

Introduction

Most quantitative models show that strong unions and powerful left parties are associated with severe economic crises (383)
BUT some evidence that the combination of left parties and strong unions can actually alleviate inflationary crises
crisis differ in depth, duration, and frequency (384)
but crises also need to be analytically separated from neoliberal economic reforms (previous scholarship tends to conflate these things)
authors examine three types of crises (385)

inflationary
growth
fiscal

Political conditions tested:

are new democracies more vulnerable to crises?
what effects do sub-regime variables have, including executive powers, party systems, and electoral competition?
how organized/powerful is labor and the left?

Early reporting of results:

different types of crises are independent and have distinct political correlates
neither powerful executives nor high levels of democracy are correlated with crisis events or duration
strength of electoral left and labor are correlated to more frequent crises...
BUT left in power + strong unions can facilitate early exits from crises

Methodological considerations

drawbacks to current literature

economic crises are often conflated with economic performance (386)
crises differ in depth and duration

any attempt to relate crises to political factors needs to include factors that explain variation in severity and duration

Crises vary in type

are some type of governments more prone to certain types of crises?

finally, really need to disentangle crises from neoliberal turn (387)

explanation of their variables (387-388)

The Political Determinants of Economic Crisis

most of these hypotheses built off existing literature
regime level of analysis:

literature supports two hypotheses regard new democracies, combined to form this one hypothesis: (388-389)
H1: Economic crises will be more severe and prolonged in new democracies (389)

sub-regime level

party system fragmentation is an impediment to economic efficiency (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999) -- mans executive can easily get legislative majority and push reforms/policies
BUT also: fragmented party systems could make it less likely the executive will have legislative majority, and just add more veto players (Tsebelis 1995) -- meaning parties will have short-time horizons and not want to enact unfavorable policies

but more veot players may result in gridlock, a sort of backdoor to stability, which will improve investors' outlook
H2: the severity and duration of crises will have a U-shaped relationship with the number of effective political parties (390)

close electoral compeititon could result in both parties uniting behind reforms, realizing that their future ability to govern may be constrained iuf current crisis isn't dealt with

H3: economic crises will be more severe and prolonged in less competitive electoral environments

presidents with a ton of power can push reforms

H3: economic crises will be longer and more severe when the chief executive is weaker (391)

Labor and the Left (392)

H5a: economic crises will be longer and more severe when labor mobilizing or populist parties are strong
H5b: economic crises will be longer and more severe when organized labor movements are strong
H5c: economic crises will be longer and more severe when combined strength of left and labor is high

Finally, politics should have the greatest impact on financial crises, less impact on inflationary crises, and the least impact on growth crises (393)

Research Design

crises are measured as deviations from the regional mean performance for the entire period under study (394)

13% of country-years experienced GDP crises
11% of country-years experienced inflationary crises
11% of country-years experienced fiscal crises
the correlations between these crises are quite low

countries predisposed to one type of crisis are not necessarily predisposed to another (395)

on average, GDP crises (1.5 years) are shorter than fiscal crises (3.4 year) which are shorter than inflationary crises (5 years)
also, depth and duration are distinct

Results and Discussion

"politics play a much stronger role in producing crises than they do in year-to-year performance" (397)

more significant effect on the probability of inflationary and fiscal crises than growth crises

Strongest indicators: labor and the Left

strong left significantly increases probability of inflationary crises (397)
strong unions significantly increases probability of inflationary crises , even more than left parties(398)

BUT!!!! electoral strength of the left increases probability of inflationary crises ONLY WHEN UNIONS ARE WEAK (398-399)

strong left and labor unions allows governments to negotiate pacts between labor and capital on wages, investment, and employments that can temper redistributive demands (399)

Other important indicators

new regimes are more likely to have inflationary and/or fiscal crises (400)
political competition was not significant
increasing the power to the chief executive increases the probability of a fiscal crisis (emphasis in original)

party system fragmentation is weird...has an inverted u-shaped relationship with inflationary and fiscal crises (401)

could be that fragemented party systems block adjustment, but do block risky policies that could result in crisis
My take: that sounds unlikely...fitting the theory to the data, not finding an explanation

global economic conditions are not associated with inflation or fiscal crises
Outside of the variables on the left and labor unions, no other variable is consistent across all the models (401)

Duration of crisis

political variables provide less insight into this (402)
left will increase inflationary crisis length when labor is weak (402-403)
left + labor = shorter inflationary crises (by about 3 months) (403)
crises are shorter as party system fractionalization increases (404) -- ?????

Conclusions

the most important factor seems to be the nature of party-society linkages (405)
countries with conservative parties and weak labor unions were less susceptible to crises in general

Ellner 2004

Ellner, Steve. 2004. "Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin America". Science &Amp; Society. 68 (1): 10-32.

Introduction

neoliberalism in 1990s led to economic stagnation and increase in executive power, not growth and democracy (10-11)
compares three views of the Left (11)

Center-left proposed by Jorge Castaneda
Left that just focuses on anti-neoliberal strategy (Maria Harnecker)
Left that is anti-neoliberal AS WELL AS anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, James Petras

Underlying debate stems from the fact that the anti-neoliberal strategy hasn't been well-articulated

Center-Left strategy

achieve social justice and nationalistic goals (12)
but avoid far reaching reforms
GOAL: Left will woo centrist voters away from the right
a sort of neo-Asian tiger model (13)
regimes that tried this (15)

Concertación in Chile
Caldera, Venezuela, 1993
de la Rua, Argentina, 1999
Fox, Mexico, 2000

Results:

Fox offered PRD a few cabinet positions, which they refused to take

a bit of a caricature of this idea (16)

Argentina and Chile won election, but did not push anti-neoliberal strategy, which made Left parties in these alliances lose legitimacy/credibility (16-18)
left ends up taking a back seat to the center in essentially all of these cases (18)
these alliances help solidify democratic transitions (19)

but they also spurred voter apathy

to really work, anti-neoliberalism needs to be a harder line for Left parties (21)

Anti-neoliberalism and anti-imperialism

Harnecker proposes adopting neoliberal bylines such as efficiency in government, but gaining this by retraining workers (22)

also, Left can seek alliances with non-left

Petras: Left should join radical social movements (22)

thinks there is continued relevance to anti-imperialism argument, doesn't see mutual benefit in globalization (23)

According to Petras, Lula's alliances with national bourgeoisie is an abandonment of his progressive goals (25)

Harnecker thinks Lula has made some of the most important anti-neoliberal moves

neither author is sure of what Chávez is doing/wants to do (26)

but Petras is willing ot look past his populism to highlight his anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist ideas (27)

Conclusion

Castaneda's ideas focus on globalization, moderation based on inescapable fact of globalization (28)
Harnecker sees left on defensive since their is not international socialist bloc anymore

her idea: left can gain power, then slowly make changes on international scale
focus just on anti-neoliberalism for the time being

Petras wants it all, ideological purity of sorts, if you are going to be Left, be LEFT! (29)
events have shown center-left hasn't been an effective strategy so far

but Petra's approach seems a bit too radical, as seen because both Lula and Chavez had some alliances with middle class, at least to get to power (30)

Muirillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2010

Murillo, Maria Victoria, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. 2010. "Electoral Revolution or Democratic Alternation?" Latin American Research Review. 45 (3): 87-114.

Introduction

Argument: Left wave is actually just the normalization of democratic politics (87)
electoral accountability is still the primary mechanism of controlling the executive in the region's democracies (88)

democratic elections have allowed voters to punish bad performers
thus the rise of the Left is a result of retrospective voting

they use Levitsky and Roberts' definition of the left, which is based on overarching redistributive goals irrespective of the strategies pursued to achieve those goals (89)
Arnold and Samuels (2011...in Levitsky and Roberts) note that the Left turn has not been accompanied by citizens' self-placement on ideological scales (though some authors disagree...)

other surveys agree, as does authors data, which shows leftward shift in votes, but not a giant shift (89-90)

thus the authors test to see if voting is related to right-leaning candidates poor performance in the economic arena during the 1990s (90)

Explaining the rise of the Left

their take is that the sudden "backlash" and rise of the Left is actually due to the institutionalization of democracy and electoral accountability, not a radical swing to the Left (93)

My take: so it's not a Marxist revolution, but why does that mean it's not a backlash? or even a radical backlash?!

Democracy

Hypothesis 1: failure of prior economic policies and poor economic growth will increase the share of Left voting ONLY WHEN there is a right wing candidate to blame (94)

dependent on the extent of democratic experience in each country (95)

Socioeconomic factors

Inequality hypotheses (2 and 3)

greater inequality = more left votes (95), OR
U shaped curve (Debs and Helmke 2008): same as above, but at some high point of inequality rich people start bribing poor to maintain current inequality (95-96)

Left as a refuge from the economic insecurity of being in the global market, hypothesis 4 (96)

Crisis of Political representation

left-wing outsiders will benefit when crisis of representation comes under right wing leader (97)

Empirical Model (97-100)
Results

high inflation under right-wing leader greatly increases likelihood of left-win (100)

but reaction AGAINST left-wing governments in same situation is slightly stronger (101)

but right wing governments are not necessarily rewarded for achieving growth (100-101)
no support for income inequality arguments (101)
no support for left-votes because of representation crisis under right government (103)
weak/inconsistent support for globalization argument

Conclusion

inflation may be more visible than growth to everyday people, meaning voters may decide their vote on the former but not on the latter (106)
strong effect of inflation and non-result by other hypotheses shows electoral accountability on economic issues is mostly at work in rise of Left

Friday, August 16, 2013

Hilgers 2008

Hilgers, Tina. 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (4): 123-153.

Introduction

PRD has been dhandicapped by factionalism, personalism, and clientelism (123)
PRD has lost many supporters because they have become disillusioned with PRD
Why have PRD politicians come to use clientelism?

External Factors

poverty
long history of clientelism in Mexican politics
PRI's use of clientelism
PRD founders proficiency at using clientielism

Internal Factors

party's strategy during democratic transition
predominance of Cuauthémoc Cardenas and primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic factions and centralized power (124)

the PRD focused on elections
did NOT focus on creating an institutionalized party
thus leadership and alliances were personalized

Comparison case: PT in Brazil

shared similar external factors, but this party decided to create internal institutions

Use of clientelism also ambiguous

PRD client experiences range from exploitation to participatory community building (125)

Defining Clientelism

People of differing social status exchange goods and services for mutual benefit

the durability of the relationship depends on its benefits outweighing its costs
Gouldner (1977), clientelism not necessarily bad, "principle of reciprocity" (126)
Flynn (1975) clentelism = elite control of masses
Fox (1994)

authoritarian clientelism = relationship of asymmetrical power
semi-clientlelism = elites have no capacity to ensure compliance

heart of clientelism = tension between positive and negative processes (127)

but just describing it as "exchange of goods" does not distinguish clientelism from patronage, vote-buying, or pork-barreling

The Initial Causes of Perredista Clientelism

PRI used camarillas extensively, networks through which (128)

groups endorsed successful figures
and actors moved up in the ranks of government as their mentors did

though much of the lower classes likely voted for Cárdenas in 1988, they couldn't afford to continue to support him post-election because this would threaten their relationship with PRI government
Given this environment, Cárdenas and his supporters decided to consooidate the amalgam of the FDN into a party (129)

immediate problems: this party was ridiculously divided ideologically
only thing everyone agreed on: they wanted to beat the PRI

Generally three big currents (FAR fro internally homogeneous)

institutional, independent left -- all the previous left parties, ended up being sort of center-left
social left/civil society organizations -- left, but did not fit in with institutional groups...mobilizers, student movements, etc
ex-priistas -- no unity, just wanted to beat PRI

Cárdenas believed best strategy was electoral, just try and get PRI unelected at every level

democratic transition immediately, radical change could come later
primacy of his vision legitimated Cárdenas even though he ran for Presidency of PRD unopposed (130)
((some FDN groups didn't join PRD, either wanting to maintain independence or not anger PRI))

PRD never formally detailed procedures for structuring the currents and ensuring internal democracy in PRD (131)

no horizontal links in the party...all info flowed through Cárdenas!
the currents began to seem like the PRI's camarillas

BUT the PRD didn't have as much access to resources, so internal competition over resource was worse
each current was organized around one "strong man"
everything became a negotiation, internal elections became undeniably fraudulent/negotiated

The rise of AMLO split the party between Cárdenas and AMLO (152)

AMLO made alliances with external groups, which strengthened his position but weakened party unity

At times the PRD's desire to win elections has overshadowed its principles

some candidates are courted purely because of their clientelist networks

In 2004 Congress the pRD noted the issues of clientelism and corruption in the party, tried to ameliorate them, but of course these changes totally failed to win overall support (133)

The PRD in Government

even in elected local government there are disputes between members of different currents
In the Federal District (134)

the PRD promised to regulate taxis drivers (piratas who rob people), vendors and squatters
but instead allied with them to increase PRD voter strength
groups/citizens that are unable/unwilling to make such alliances are immediately and a disadvantage
THERE HAVE BEEN SOME GOOD DEVELOPMENTS IN DF (135)

but these tend to be undermined by the methods through which they were achieved
AMLO portected the poor through unorthodox and extra-constitutional means
in the end, this is probably bad for democracy

PRD administrator in Nezhualcóyotl, Estado Mexico, made government way more tasnparent

BUT this meant he/his faction was less able to negotiate party positions and policy

in Chiapas clients who leave the PRD are repressed (136)
My Take: OVERALL: Good governing undermines ability for people to move up in PRD
Now people just expect the PRD to be clientelistic, nationwide (137)

Comparison to PT in Brazil

PT faced authoritarian beginnings, lots of clientelism in country, and success hinged on Lula's personalistic leadership (138-139)
PT still does patronage and targeted social programs, but this isn't like the PRD's clientelism (139)

patronage does note = clientelism (140)
Blosa Familia is universal, so while its good for PT votes, it doesn't exactly have the same connotation as focused clientelistic distribution of benefits

My Take: Splitting hairs a bit, but there is something less bad about PT's clentelism than the PRD's
While PRD though winning electiosn was key, the PT did not think this was enough (141)

PT's early focus was on building organization, seeking POLICY change first!
PT adopted democratic procedures early on and the rules are enforced, as is party unity
PT's connection with voters/its base have kept it from becoming a catch-all party

The Clients' Perspective

in some instances clientelism is the best method for keeping politicians accountable, and could build community (142)
FPFV, squatters group, allied with PRD in DF

demonstrating and rallying with PRD became mandatory to get apartment/material benefits (143)
if you left group, they didn't return your deposit assuming you wouldn't have the legal means/stamina to get it back
clearly it is tough being in this alliance, but members have few resources and few alternatives (144)...some think it's a fine bargain, others don't

some in DF sought clientelistic linkages to provide for themselves, but found they built community and political power as well (145)

Conclusion

Those wo stick with PRD after engaging in clientelism are not the poorest of the poor, nor are they in highly exploitative relationships with their patron (147)

Thursday, August 15, 2013

Cató and Ventrici 2011

Cató, Juan, and Patricia Ventrici. 2011. "Labor Union Renewal in Argentina: Democratic Revitalization from the Base". Latin American Perspectives. 38 (6): 38-51.

Introduction

2001 crisis involved the collapse of the development formula based on financial accumulation, exhaustion of social model based on exclusion and regressive distribution of income, and delegitimization of political authority (38)
the persecution of labor leaders during the dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the cooptation of union leaders in the 1990s, significantly weakened labor as a social actor (38-39)
BUT the new landscape created by Néstor Kirchner provided a favorable climate for labor union revitalization through union democracy (39)
look at subway workers to see how rank and file changed their internal procedures, became more democratic, and how the union fared after making these changes

The Union legacy of the 1990s and the New Situation

the (neoliberal) changes to the labor market and the deterioration of the norms of protection delegitimized many unions in the 1990s (Marshall and Perelman 2002) (40)
many unions privileged organizational survival over rank and file interests

Union Democracy

paper looks at the ways labor unions as a social actor deal with workers' needs (41)
the major unions, since 2003, have continued the old model of deeply rooted bureaucracy and top-down control (42)

the struggle by many leaders to preserve their power closes off the possibility of revitalization

but the weakening of corporatism also brought the old model of unionism into crisis (citing de la Garza 2008)
in Argentina unionism is on the defensive, and any attempt and innovation is perceived as a threat to leaders...questioning leaders is seen as a declaration of rivalry (43)

Resistance to Union Bureaucratization: The Subway Assembly Delegates

the new, post-2001 era made possible the emergence and/or consolidation of union renewal from the base
the Subway union went against the grain of history, as it was

challenged entrenched union bureaucracy (44)
was innovative and employed a lot of direct action
was particularly success in achieving its demands

Boundary-violating actions by the base revealed the limits of the established rules, and allowed rank and file to supersede them
1994: subway privatized

the union outwardly complained, but internally decided to moderate demands, work with management, limit workers in transition
unhappy workers started meeting and complaining clandestinely

in 1997 a worker was unfairly fired and other workers left on an unauthorized strike (45), though most delegates and leadership did not aid them

after this these militant workers attempted to gain elected positions in the union Assembly as delegates
in 2000 the militant delegates won 17 of 21 seats

then, in 2001, after an unpopular management decision supported by the union leadership, and demanded to negotiate this decision

management found that the Assembly, not the leadership, was the real power, and bypassed negotiating with the leadership in this case (45-46)

the main challenge for the Assembly was to keep workers invovled and reelecting them (46)

soon the Assembly had taken over long- and medium-term strategy for the union, and became the main interlocutor with management

both management (using cooptation) and the official union leadership (using non-recognition) tried to break up the Assembly
Assembly's main demands were not on wages, but on improving conditions, lowering hours, including more non-organized workers in contracts, and reducing arbitrary management decisions (47)

my take: sounds a lot like job control unionism!

the Assembly consolidated itself both practically and symbolically, and continued to make gains (47-48)

Conclusion

In this case, union democracy was not an obstacle but a prerequisite for increased union power (48)
the Assembly engaged members in active participation and direct action, which showed them that the traditional institutional limits could be overcome and innovation could occur (49)

Szwarcberg 2013

Mariela Szwarcberg. "The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine Case." Latin American Research Review 48.2 (2013): 32-54.

Introduction

while clientelism is often taken as a given, party operatives in Argentina and elsewhere can prefer not to distribute goods in exchange of electoral support (33)
argument: a party operative's capacity to turn to clientelistic strategies of mobilization is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the use of clientelism...party operatives have to prefer to build clientelistic linkages with voters
study of municipal candidates in Argentina

Mobilizing Voters: Lit review

while the poor are targets of clientelistic strategies, scholars have convincingly shown that the poor are strategic and sophisticated in making political decisions
to explain candidates' strategic choices to turn out voters, I distinguish between a candidates CAPACITY and PREFERENCE to use clientelism (34)
political parties contribute to shaping politicians' strategies by providing (or not providing) incentives to use clientelism to turn out voters (35)

Choosing Strategies of Political Mobilization

Assumption: candidates interested in a political career have to demonstrate their ability to get votes for the party
Table 1: (36)

Candidate has Capacity to use Clientelism	Candidate Prefers to use Clientelism
Candidate has Capacity to use Clientelism	Yes	No
Yes	Pragmatist	Idealist
No	Resentful	Utopist

Without observing explicit choice, can't tell the difference between resentful and utopist

Data

ballot positions reflect the value of each candidate to the party (39)
data suggests the longer a candidate uses clientelism to build a constituency the more likely they will have a higher ballot position

Candidates Capacity

Incumbent candidates are more likely to have access to material goods (39)
access to resources is also conditioned by level of government

candidate who has party members in national and/or regional office has more resources than one who is just a local incumbent (40)

also, to effectively use clientelism a candidate need to have access to resources AND a network of party activists to spread resources around

in Argentina this means only the PJ and Radical party (my take: though maybe not the Radicals anymore?) (41)
given the data, cast majority of the sample is PJ activists
Some new parties do have minimal clientelist networks if candidates brought activists and networks with them from a previous party (PJ or UCR) (42)

Candidate's Preferences

Candidates that engage in "solving voter problems" will obtain electoral support and will also monitor political participation (43)

usually by taking attendance at political rallies
this works because voting is mandatory, but finding who voted what is still impossible
for this paper, a candidate who takes attendance is clientelistic

Explaining variation in candidate preferences

interesting thing is that idealists are almost equal in number to the pragmatists (44)
now focus on PJ, since they are the ones with the most resources
in José C Paz neighborhood, unemployment rate is 80%ish (45)

easy to mobilize voters by distributing goods

intraparty competition induces candidates to use clientelism (46)

if one doesn't do it, another will
if candidate doesn't go clientelistic, sends signal to party that he's not willing to do "whatever it takes" to win

idealist candidates essentially know they are committing political suicide (47)
candidates realize that the best way to mobilize voters is to help and then coerce them

but if this doesn't happen, party "doesn't forgive you" (48)
its bad, but "these are the rules of the game"

in Río Cuarto, another municipality, two Radical candidates faced off

one wanted to create electoral alliance with another party
the other wanted to keep "purity" of Radical ideology
electoral coalition won because able to attract more voters!

Resentful candidates blame their electoral failure entirely on their incapacity to provide benefits (49)
strong correlation between pragmatist candidates and PJ (49), fewer pragmatists in UCR (50)

Conclusion

THE PARTIES CREATE THE INCENTIVES THAT CAUSE MOST CANDIDATES TO TURN TO CLIENTELISM (51)
But not all candidates prefer to use clientelism...parties could create ways to get these "cleaner" politicians to rise through the ranks

Martin and Brady 2007

Martin, Nathan D., and David Brady. 2007. "Workers of the Less Developed World Unite? A Multilevel Analysis of Unionization in Less Developed Countries". American Sociological Review. 72 (4): 562-584

Introduction

Study seeks to understand why unionization varies across LDCs and across different types of workers (563)
argument: variation in union membership is a function of more than the worker's individual characteristics, but is also constrained by country-level institutions, industrialization, and globalization

Expectations

Individual characteristics that will increase unionization probability

middle-age (not young) (564)
male
lower class...though there are more white collar unions in LA

Country-level characteristics

ex-communist regime (565)

result in high unionization AND distinctive relations between unions and nascent democratic institutions

democracy

higher unionization rate

size of state

more government = more unions

influence of IMF

will result in smaller government

influence of ILO

Industrialization should increase unionization (566)

this assumes LDCs industrialize int eh same way that First World industrialized (567)...too simple!

Globalization

arguments go both ways...can create transnational linkages in labor movements, but also give capital greater leverage
measured as amount of trade

Data and Methods

regional pattern is discernible: greater unionization in Eastern Europe (post-communist) than any other region (569)
construct a class schema using earnings level, occupational category, and educational attainment when appropriate (570)
uses GDP per capita to measure industrialization (572): WOULDN'T THIS BE INFLATED BY FINANCIALIZATION, IF PRESENT?

but also include % of labor force in industry versus agriculture

decompose the analysis into post-communist and not, since post-communist has such a strong effect

Results

workers in ex-communist countries 2.75 times more likely to be unionized (574)
democracy is not significant
government expenditure as % of GDP not significant
ILO not significant
IMF is significant in expected way (a person is 50-60% less likely to be unionized)
most globalization variables not significant (575)

WHICH MEANS THAT inflation and institutional variation are more important predictors of unionization across LDCs

in ex-communist countries the unskilled proletariat is WAY more likely to be unionized (578)

Discussion

industrialization isn't creating new union members! weird!/DUH! (580)
but also globalization had no effect...is that a problem with data?

Wednesday, August 14, 2013

Buchanan 2008

Buchanan, Paul G. 2008. "Preauthoritarian Institutions and Postauthoritarian Outcomes: Labor Politics in Chile and Uruguay". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 59-89.

Introduction

argument (59): In Chile and Uruguay (countries with long democratic histories interrupted by authoritarian regimes):

pre-authoritarian labor market institutions had a significant impact on post-authoritarian union fortunes
this is true regardless of any authoritarian reforms and the ideological inclinations of post-authoritarian governments

other explanations are incomplete

authoritarian legacies, historical strength of unions, and post-authoritarian labor-party linkages are important
corporatism is too party/politics focused

the idea doesn't recognize the deep patterns of state control built into labor codes (61)
moreover, it doesn't recognize the significance of the state in daily, humdrum operations of unions

labor movement strength is directly shaped by the labor code and the day-to-day workings of unions, which in turn are shaped by deeper patterns in labor law

Institutional History and the Course of Labor Politics

Whatever institutions existed before authoritarianism played a role once the dictators left (61)
the core of the interest intermediation regime in a state is interest group administration (i.e. labor ministry) (62)

that state is the overarching regulatory apparatus that frames interaction between interest groups

pluralist system allows autonomy
corporatist system goes for efficiency over freedom of association
state-corporatism more specifically gives the state control legal over which interest groups have bargaining status (63)

A Note on Case Selection

Uruguay (64)

pluralist labor relations system
class-based unionism
strong party ties that dominate the labor movement, with union leaders having a lot of control in the party ()
Uruguayan unions have historically had more independence from party hierarchies, as well as minimal state intervention

this made it more difficult to dictator to dismantle the labor movement BECAUSE HE HAD NO LEGAL /INSTITUTIONAL BASIS to do so.

Chile

historically strong union-party ties, but workers organized into parties first, unions second
argument: Chile is an anomalous case of state-corporatist labor administration existing under democratic rule (65)

decentralizing influence of labor law
state has a lot of power over unions
parties have control of unions
THEREFORE the pre-authoritarian structuring of union interests in Chile facilitated rather than impeded the dismantling of the union movement by the dictatorship

Pre-authoriarian Political Insertion

Chilean unions were subordinated on the shopfloor by communist and socialist parties (66)

meant that unions got political power, but also were totally reliant on parties
Left in Chile consolidated its hold over labor in the 1940s and 1950s (67)

Uruguay

unions were initially incorporated as an autonomous interests group
gave them and independent streak
they also formed a number of labor-based parties
before the FA, unions would vote Marxist union leaders on shopfloor, but for mainstream parties in elections (68)

this meant that he parties competed over labor votes, which meant that an extensive welfare state and state employment was created

Meant that:

in Chile, working-class representation was channelled mostly through political parties then down to unions (69)
while in Uruguay it was mostly through unions and up to parties

Authoritarian Labor Regimes

Pinochet was able to use the 1931 Labor Code to outlaw the biggest labor confederation and all Left parties (70)
Uruguayan dictator instituted new law in 1981 that outlawed strikes and shop-level unions (71)

Uruguayan workers simply ignored the law, informally forced managment to accede to their demands
military junta could never get enough traction or legitimacy in labor realm to control labor relations

Transitional Context

Chilean transition was controlled (72)

left parties and unions still outlawed
in 1985 Chilean political parties displaced unionists in the No campaign (73)
the Chilean opposition movement highlighted political opposition (74)

decided not to change economic model because they wanted to woo businessmen (74)

In Uruguay the transition was rapid, and was mostly hammered out between political elites (73)

initially labor and the Left were not allowed into negotiations, but then when formal negotiations started in 1984 they were invited to join (74)
contrary to Chilean case, business could not win any demands in teh negotiation, and the old labor code was put back in place...preauthoritarian labor politics was essentially reinstated intact for the foundational election (74-75)

Return of Elected Rule

Chile

"concertación" of business and labor interests was the banner of the opposition (75)
there was a resurgence of union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
in practice, despite "labor law reform" there was no change in business-labor relations (75-76)
inability to influence Concertación governments eventually led to split in labor (76)
state maintained large, expansive powers over registration, strike regulation, and financial review of unions (77)
union membership has dropped, as has collective bargaining coverage and the real wage (from 1980s levels to late 1990s levels) (78)
business is allowed to coordinate nationally, but unions are increasingly unable to do so

Uruguay

reverted to 1967 Constitution (75)
return to 1968 labor relations system
there was a resurgence of union affiliation and mobilization in the months leading up to and following the elections
early governments tried to enact price ceilings, and then regulate strikes (79-80)...both of which were met with massive strikes that resulted in workers getting better welfare spending from government (79)
entry into Mercosur was devastating to manufacturing, unions (80)

manufacturers and unions banded together to try and stay afloat: wage restraint for job security
most of the cost of this adjustment was shifted toward the unorganized (80-81)

with the rise of the FA unions started looking toward changing national development strategies (81)

Conclusion

one important explanation: Pinochet repressed unions more forecefully (81)

BUT he was able to do so because of the powers granted him by the labor code (82)

strength of union movement was essentially also defined by historical, pre-authoritarian legal/political structures (82)
"institutional divergence in state approaches to post-authoritarian labor relations resulted from organizational dissimilarities inherited from the pre-authoritarian era" (83)
testable hypothesis: regardless of party in power or nature of union-party ties or the strength of unions, market oriented reform is more likely to succeed in countries where state corporatist labor administration is well entrenched

my take: makes sense in Mexico, half-works for Argentina, though it and Brazil are a puzzle

under conditions of state corporatism the tail (labor unions) can wag the dog (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, Chile)...BUT in Uruguay there is no dog to start wagging on his own! (85)

Grayson 2004

Grayson 2004

(in Wiarda 2004)

Grayson, George W. “Mexico's Semicorporatist Regime,” in Wiarda, Howard J. 2004. Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America--revisited. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Overview:

Salinas’s neoliberal reforms
- Ruptured the ruling party (246)
- Diminished rewards to the faithful (due to lower government revenues through tariffs, quotas, etc.)
- Diminished central control
- Caused businesses to start competing on labor costs, which is bad for system/unions
Wiarda also Suggests these reforms led to calls for greater democracy, and gave rise to opposition party successes (especially at the state and local level)
Population growth and social diversification also meant there were more groups outside the corporatist political framework (247)
As corporatist institutions had been slightly undermined, Fox did not have great control over corrupt labor leaders (248)
Talks a lot about Fox’s political styling
- disdain for politicians
- attempt to use media instead of government organizations
- included PRI in some things, didn’t hammer away at them, not many panistas in his cabinet
- allowed Sup Marcos and EZLN to address nation
PRI maintains traditional sectors, though does some changes (BUT, of course, primaries for elections undermine any delegate/candidate concessions)
AMLO taking some corporatist reins, very humanistic but also relatively authoritarian (read: populist)
Lots of foreign NGOs hanging out, too…massive increase over the 2000s, maybe they’ll be important in the future?
No new rules of the game exist for governing (255)
- No new organizations have replaced traditional corporatist structures
- Corp. structures remain, although in much weaker form.

Quotes:
“No new rules of the game exist for governing.” (255)

Greer, Stevens, and Stephens 2007

Greer, Stevens, Stephens 2007

GREER, CHARLES R., CHARLES D. STEVENS, and GREGORY K. STEPHENS. 2007. "The State of the Unions in Mexico". Journal of Labor Research. 28 (1): 69-92.
Overview:

Mostly relies on other literature, not much new analysis
Covers declining union density, composition of employment in Mexico (70-74
Description of power union lost as PRI marginalized labor, and CTM leaders still held on to PRI (75-76)
Uses Bensusán’s typology to show how state-corp unions losing power means the whole movement is losing power (80-83)
Relative Deprivation theory suggests workers should be more active (86)
Transnational alliances (87-88)

Quotes:
“The once powerful alliance of government, unions, and business is becoming more tilted against union and workers’ rights and is losing power in the global marketplace.” (82)
“Thus, with the emergence of broad economic and political change, labor unions and the workers they are supposed to represent are at a decided disadvantage and are struggling to find ways to promote the kind of change in labor institutions and support of workers’ rights that is necessary to ensure adequate wages, safety, and other workplace conditions (Gillespie and Tergen 1995).” (84)
‘Relative deprivation theory may partially explain the actions of individuals and workers’ rights organizations oriented toward labor unrest and disputes (Greer and Stephens 1996). More specifically, relative deprivation may lead to increasing collective action, such as growing membership in and support for independent unions. However, obstacles are in the way of such action, such as the traditional ineffectiveness of union intervention, unfriendly legislation, government interpretation of existing laws in favor of company positions, and the prevalence of protectionist company unions…Spontaneous, unofficial, and even violent worker responses to some employer actions should not be entirely unexpected” (86)
“Despite the rhetoric for cross0border solidarity such alliances have not had much success in the past. Reasons for their failures include divergent interests of workers, at least as perceived in the short-run; absence of international expertise or program infrastructure in most unions…; reactive efforts as opposed to strategic initiatives…There are fewer reasons to expect successful alliances between the United States and Mexico given the differential wages and the past hostility of the Mexican government…” (88-89)

“We predict that more independent unions will grow stronger because they meet worker instrumentality needs and because of perceptions of relative deprivation. A country can pursue an economic development strategy based on low wages for only so long. Workers will replace the state-corporatist unions…with independent unions (Bensusán’s terms…) that better represent their interests” (89)

Middlebrook 1995

Middlebrook (1995)

Chapter 1: Mass Politics and Regime formation
1. On the concept of Post-revolutionary Authoritarian rule
  1. Features:
    1. Prominence of mas actors
      1. May be mobilized less and less over time
      2. Still important base of control for government
    2. Political ideals from revolutionary era
      1. Something referencing social change
      2. Rule is legitimated by invoking these symbols/ideologies
      3. Cannot be empty promises, must deliver the goods as well
    3. Dual importance of state and hegemonic party
      1. Party mobilizes social base
      2. Party can serve to cement social alliances
      3. Party can serve as method through which social allies can gain access to state apparatus
2. Framework for studying mass politics in authoritarian regimes
  1. Limitations on mass mobilization
    1. Can happen through public apathy, legal restrictions, channeling mobilization through the party.
  2. Limits on sociopolitical pluralism
  3. Limits on Demand articulation
    1. Restrictions creates situation in which groups must negotiate, compromise, or modify their goals
3. (28) “ The party [PRI (and its predecessors)] has been the principal channel through which leaders of lower class organizations achieve upward political mobility”
  1. BUT: the party never developed autonomous means of limiting its constituents’ political actions, it relied on state power for those controls.
  2. THUS: organized labor enjoyed relative autonomy in the party framework (though certainly not in the state regime)
4. Central Argument: to understand the bases of elite control over and general character of mass politics, must understand both state and societal controls over the labor movement
  1. State = labor law, etc.
  2. Societal = labor unions’ reliance on state subsidies
    1. Economic structure that influenced patterns of unionization and CB power
    2. Organizational form of the labor movement
    3. Political ideas that influence policy preferences and political response strategies
Chapter 2: State Structures and political Control
1. (42) “On the one hand, expanded state administrative capacity gradually increased governing elites’ ability to control developments in the labor sector. On the other hand, legal recognition of basic labor rights and inclusion of worker representatives in come administrative structures strengthened organized labor by providing important symbolic and material benefits to both unions and individual workers.”
2. (51-2) 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo institutionalized activist role of government in protection f workers at a time when the unions weren’t strong enough to protect themselves (the CROM had fallen out of power soon before 1930)
  1. Leads to creation of Secretary of Labor (STPS, Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social), as well as the CTM
3. JCA’s preserves the distinction between federal and local jurisdictions (60)
4. Labor seat on JCA’s help unions expand their organizations (61-62)
5. Reconocimiento, official recognition/registration of unions, improves power of unions compared to employers, but also gives state power over unions (65)
6. State has some ability to meddle in union internal affairs (elections, etc.) but not much. Also, requirements do not safeguard union democracy.
7. Strikes must be registered, only occur after arbitration proceedings have concluded (69)
Chapter 3 – The challenge of mass participation and the origins of Mexico’s state subsidized labor movement
1. Before the revolution, labor movements were dispersed, and in small enterprises, who had little bargaining power
2. Morones, while founding the CROM
  1. marginalized the anarchosyndicalists, and
  2. decided they need to ally with the government to have any power
3. CROM never made inroads in industries with strong unions, like railroad workers and electrical workers
4. Relations between the CROM and Obregon quickly soured, were eventually charged with assassination of Obregon!
5. CTM founded by CROM dissidents and under Cardenas’ hope to unite labor movement to support him, CROM remains relatively pro-Calles
6. Even while he supported the CTM, Cardenas worked against the CTM
  1. He helped found the FSTSE to keep government workers out of the hands of the CTM
  2. He kept peasants out of the CTM
7. Cardenas’s PRM first to officially tie labor to an official political party (1938), SECTORS
8. SME leaves CTM in 1939 after CTM supports presidential candidate Camacho
9. Subsidies to labor movement
  1. Legal
    1. Exclusion clauses
    2. Separation clauses
  2. Financial
    1. CTM had trouble collecting dues, but stayed solvent
    2. Middlebrook hints at direct monetary subsidies
  3. Political
    1. Preferential access to electoral lists of PRM/PRI and administrative positions
      1. Leverage for union
      2. Personal benefit
    2. No reelection meant constant demand for new and loyal candidates
    3. CTM dominated these positions
    4. Chair in the Chamber of Deputies was most available, some Senate seats, practically no governorships (too important to PRI power structure to give away as spoils)
10. (106) “The consolidation of the post-revolutionary social pact occurred, then, not with CTM membership in the governing party but with the political triumph of progovernment labor leaders in the aftermath of a major labor crisis in the late 1940s” (emphasis added by me!)
Chapter 4: Turning Point the 1947-51 Labor Crisis
1. Case study on railroad workers
2. RR, like other protected sectors, autonomous, strong, politically minded
3. During labor crisis (post-WWII) government supports more pragmatic leadership, alternative/radical paths slowly squelched
4. Once these unions are turned toward pragmatic (non-radical) ends
  1. CTM dominant, BUT:
  2. Begins period of truly institutionalized social pact
    1. Previously pact had rested on shoulders of President and specific union confederations
5. Labor movement united under CT in 1966, but only a façade under which fragmentation persists
6. Social pact:
  1. Unions (leaders) can’t survive without political support
  2. Unions become effective tools of worker control for political leaders
7. Also, CROC formed in 1952 by Aleman government, “to unite disparate labor groups in an organization that was simultaneously…
Chapter 5: State Structures, Political Control, and Labor Participation: an Assessment
1. STRIKES: “…postrevolutionary governments generally maintained strong control over stieks in federal-jurisdiction economic activities, regardless of changes in the political character of different presidential administrations.” (171)
2. LABOR UNION REGISTRATION: Political influence/action can influence rates of labor union registration, but generally no variables explained differences in time to register, meaning there was NO effect due to
  1. presidential administration
  2. difference in confederation
3. WORKER DEMAND RESOLUTION:
  1. Includes an in-depth case of RR workers union
  2. Some presidential effect, but also surprising anti-worker effect for Cardenas
Chapter 6: Labor Politics and ISI
1. ISI good and bad
  1. Development, work, but
  2. Balance of payment problems
  3. Inflation problems
  4. Result: people have jobs, but their wages are falling!
2. CTM often spoke radically, acted pragmatically when ISI stumbled and inflation rose
3. Section on democracy in Mexican automobile sector
  1. Neither presidential policy nor strength of state labor federations adequately explains democratization (229)
  2. Car mfg. undergoing changes, less paternal relations, just-in-time0ish style prxn, and modern assembly line
  3. Workers viewed democratization seen as a way to gain better bargaining power, as their leaders were initially unable to cope with their new demands
  4. Workplace differences (especially with delegado system) important to explaining variation across auto plants (236)
  5. Democratic unions generally better at gaining control of production, bad at increasing wages, struck more often
Chapter 7: Labor Politics under Economic Stress in the 1980s
1. Failure of ISI
  1. Economic difficulties, interest rates, defaults
  2. Less government spending
  3. Inflation!!!
2. Organized Labor’s Response
  1. Unions never thought they were adequately compensated for sacrifices during 1976-7 crisis
  2. De la Madrid agrees to price controls in 1983, then immediately breaks his deal
  3. NO strike petitions approved
  4. CROC and CROM used to harass CTM
  5. 1984 CTM threatens general strike, but steps back and agrees to negotiate on de la Madrid’s terms, CT makes demands but never gains anything real
  6. WORKERS LOSE
  7. “The CTM’s historical reluctance to pursue more aggressive collective action in support of workers’ interests is one of the most noteworthy aspects of state-labor relations in Mexico.” (265)
3. What explains unions’ actions?
  1. Usual suspects
    1. Crisis weakened bargaining power
      1. CTM had heterogeneous members
      2. None/few in strategic industries
    2. Government control over strikes and union recognition
    3. CTM had more deputies in Congress, maybe thought they’d recoup losses later?
  2. New ideas
    1. Internal weakness of CTM, others
    2. Leaders’ (Velazquez’s) political beleifs
      1. (Weakish)
      2. Leaders’ fear that a true mobilization would be a breeding ground for union democracy, undermine their old control over unions
4. Industrial restructuring in automobile industry
  1. Automakers open new plants, get CTM unions, undermine democratic unions
  2. CTM unions give management much more leeway on production methods, democratic unions able to fight back a bit
  3. Volkswagen at Puebla
    1. Leaders capitulate a bit in secret agreement
    2. Midlevel and rank and file revolt
    3. Union turmoil allows VW (thanks to JFCA decision) to fire everyone, rehire who they want, keep pliable union
  4. Flexible contracts more important than low wages to managers! (286)
5. Privatization of state-owned firms crushed official unions ability to use political influence to win economic demands
6. State-subsidized labor organizations lost their ability to win concessions, but maintained their significance as instruments of political control of workers.
CONCLUSION
1. Union/party alliance
  1. Benefitted labor because resulted in subsidies
  2. Benefitted party because party had no other means of controlling mass base
2. CTM resisted democratic opening: why?! Central question of the chapter
3. Over time unions had experienced a cumulative weakening after presidents defined and redefined the alliance
4. Unions weakest point ever in 1980s/90s, and business gains better foothold with government
5. BUT labor still important for getting out the vote
  1. This control, however, became less reliable (see 1988 prez election)
6. “Because post-revoutionary authoritarian regimes generally develop distinctive ideologies that give workers a special place in postrevolutionary society…labor has a stronger interest in preserving elements of the status quo…” (317)
  1. Long-term democratization may be a good thing, BUT
  2. Short term democratization may pose significant costs to labor unions
7. As jobs move north in Mexico, they further weaken unions by
  1. Dispersing labor
  2. Gets far away from political center of country
  3. Move closer to anti-union areas of the country.
8. Labor leaders also suck at times, protection contracts
9. Political parties are an important place where labor can get power, but
  1. Have the taint of old style PRI relationships
  2. PRD, rest of left have focused on electoral competitions, not alliances with unions (325-6)
10. Finally, labor law needs to change, bad!